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ABSTRACT OF THESIS. 
Despite the scarcity of source material and the difficulty of 
interpreting such evidence as exists, it is clear that the development 
of royal justice led to the emergence of a unified common law in 
medieval Scotland. This was achieved although no structure of 
central courts like that of England emerged until the fifteenth 
century. Instead royal justice was administered by courts based 
in the localities such as those of the sheriff and the burghs, or by 
courts such as those of the justiciar which went on circuit through 
the kingdom. Within this structure there operated from the thirteenth 
century a rule that actions conqerning the recovery of land from 
intruders had to be raised by pleadable brieves. There were various 
types of such writs; the relevant ones were the brieves of dissasine 
and mortancestor, pleadable in the justiciar's court, and the brieve 
of right, pleadable in the sheriff and burgh courts. It appears 
that round these brieves there developed a considerable body of 
law, and at least some of them remained in use until the sixteenth 
century. It is against this background that the exclusion of the 
developing 'central' courts of the fifteenth century from cases 
concerning fee and heritage, or landownership, must be considered. 
These courts developed as a method of handling the judicial functions 
of parliament and the king's council. To begin with these functions 
were confined to the supervision and correction of the ordinary courts 
of the common law, but by the mid-fifteenth century the jurisdiction 
of council in particular as an alternative forum was established in 
most areas other than that of fee and heritage. This limitation, 
it is argued, continued because the common.law still required that 
pleadable brieves (which were not addressed to either parliament or 
..... -----.......... __________________ _ 
council) be used to commence actions of that kind. Only when 
the pleadable brieves had £allen into desuetude in the first half 
of the sixteenth century did the council come to have jurisdiction 
in fee and heritage. 
(a) Scope of Thesis 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Law and its administration in medieval Scotland has on the 
whole been an under-researched subject. For at least a century 
and perhaps longer few Scottish lawyers have seen much need to press 
their researches any further back than the seventeenth century 
Institutions of Stair. When reference has been made to earlier 
sources, it has seldom been with a view to elucidating their historical 
significance in the development of the law. Medieval historians 
have been similarly reluctant. to come to grips with the topic. There 
are many reasons for this. Unlike the lawyers, the historians have 
well appreciated the real difficulties of the source material, which 
make it very hard to say what the lat·l t·las at almost any given point 
in the middle ages, and virtually im~~ssible to offer any narrative 
account of its substantive development throughout the period. 
Historians have also tended to shy away from the more abstruse 
technicalities of the law as lying beyond the scope of their training 
and competence. 
What the historians have succeeded in doing, however, has been 
to draw our attention to the development of the institutions which 
administered the law in me~ieval Scotland, the courts. Most notably 
Professor Dickinson in three volumes published by the Scottish History 
Society gave detailed attention to the sheriff, baron and burgh 
courts, building his discussion ~round some of their.earliest 
1 
surviving records. The court of the medieval regality has also 
been the subject of a work based on the record of one such court, 
2 by Messrs. Webster and Duncan. More recently the history of the 
justiciar's court has been the subject of two articles, one a short 
general sketch by Profess0r Dickinson, .the other a detailed study 
IO 
of the twelfth and thirteenth century material by Professor Barrow.3 
For the period after 1300, 4 the conclusions drawn about the 
administration of justice by these courts have not been enthusiastic 
ones. Lord Cooper wrote of 1 a rather chaotic welter of ill-defined 
and overlapping jurisdictions - the Justiciar, the Deputes for the 
Justiciar, Lords of Regality, the sheriffs and the barons ••• 
administering ~ules of la~ in the spirit to be expected in a land 
which was in a chronic state of disturbance, where life was cheap 
and relics of the blood feud still survived, and where everything 
within the Highland line was literally beyond the pale'. 5 He 
1. The Sheriff Court Book of Fife 1515 - 1522 (Scottish History 
Soc., 3rd series, vol. 12, 1928); The Court Book of the Barony 
of Carnwath 1523- 1542 (Scottish History Soc., 3rd series, 
vol. 29, 1937); Earl Records of Aberdeen 131 · 1398- 1407 
(Scottish History Soc., 3rd series, vol. 9, 1957 • 
2. The Regality of Dunfermline Court Book 1531 - 1538 (Dunfermline, 
1953). 
3· w.c. Dickinson, 'The High Court of Justiciary', in Introduction 
to Scottish Legal History ed. G.C.H. Paton (Stair Soc., vol. 20, 
1958) 4o8 - 412; G.w.s. Barrow, 'The Scottish justiciar in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries', JR 16 (1971) 97- 148, reprinted 
in a collection of the author's papers, The Kingdom of the Scots 
(London,l973) 83- 138. Henceforth the latter version will be 
cited, as 'Barrow, Kingdom'. 
4. Most writers agree that the system worked well i~ the twelfth 
and thirteenth centu~ies: see Barrow, Kingdom, 86 -· 9· 
5. T.M. Cooper, 'The dark age of Scottish legal history 1350 - 1650' 
(19th David Murray Lecture, Glasgow, 1952), reprinted in his 
Selected Papers 1922 - 1954 (Edinburgh, 1957) 219 - 236, at 234. 
uttered these remarks as part of a lecture entitled 'The Dark Age 
of Scottish Legal History ·1350- 1650', in which he also said: 6 
This was unquestionably the period when Scots Law, 
11 
viewed as a science and a philosophy from the comparative 
standpoint, reached its low-water mark; and it is not 
easy to see why it should have sunk so low unless the 
explanation is that the executive remained so impotent 
and the courts-so inferior in capacity and efficiency 
for so prolonged a period that they gradually dragged 
the substantive law down to their own level. 
These pessimistic comments were echoed by Professor Dickinson in his 
lecture delivered only a few months after that of Lord Cooper. 
Speaking of the period from the reign of Robert I (1306 - 1329) 
forward, he said: 7 
(N]ow franchisal privileges grew, flourished, and were 
assumed, unchecked. Now, too, the office of sheriff 
had become largely-heritable in the houses of the 
nobility; and the ayres of the justiciars (which in 
earlier times had checked and supervised the inferior 
courts) were often in abeyance, or held only here and 
there at wide intervals of time ••• Chroniclers and 
poets in the fifteenth century are at one that the 
laws are not put to execution and that justice is 
delayed and denied; the records abound in pious 
exhortations that justice must be done without fraud 
or favour to any man, clearly implying that that was 
not then the case. In effect the courts of the judges 
ordinary no longer gave justice to those who, under 
the feudal law and administration, were bound to look 
there for right and remedy. 
What may be termed the Cooper/Dickinson view of later medieval 
law and administration has been very-·largely accepted by historians 
and lawyers up to and including recent times and has been taken as 
part of the essential background to the emergence of a 'central' 
court from the judicial activities of the king's council in the 
6. Cooper, Selected Papers, 230~ 
7. W.C. Dickinson, 'The administration of justice in medieval 
Scotland', Aberdeen University Review ~4 (1951- 2) 338- 351 
at 345· 
/2 
fifteenth century. Unable to obtain justice in the inefficient 
courts of the sheriffs, barons and justiciars, people turned to the 
king and his council and the increasing quantity of business there 
compelled the establishment of a new institution to deal with it. 
The new institution became in the fulness of time the Court of 
Session and thus a new unity was brought to the administration and 
8 
ultimately also to the content of the law. 
There have however been some few voices dissenting from the 
thesis of a 'Dark Age' of Scots law in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. As early as 1956, Sheriff McKechnie commented that 
'while there are dark patches I think the description 'The Dark Age' 
is unfortunate 1 .9 More recently J.J. Robertson offered a reappraisal 
of the medieval period as a whole,arguing that it should be seen 
as one in which an 'archaic' legal structure, with 'an hierarchic 
system of courts, staffed by officials rather than professional 
lawyers', developed into a 'mature' one of which the 'main 
characteristic is professionalism'. In his view the later medieval 
period should be seen as one of progress to such a mature system, 
rather than one of retrogression and decline from the earlier 
structure. For Robertson the legal institutions established in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries - the courts of the justiciars, 
sheriffs and barons - exemplify the •archaic' character of Scottish 
government at that period. The evidence for the development of 
8. For recent examples of this view see R. Nicholson, Scotland: The 
Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1975) 311, 383 - 4, 426 - 31; N.A.T. 
Macdougall, James III : A Political Study (Edinburgh, 1982) 99, 
203 - 4; T.M. Chalmers, 'The king's council, patronage and the 
governance of Scotland 1460- 1513' (Aberdeen Ph.D., 1982) 297· 
So far. as the 'Cooper/Dickinson view' has been extended back to 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Barrow, Kingdom, 86 - 9. 
9. H. McKechnie, 'Judicial process upon brieves 1219 - 1532' (23rd 
David Murray Lecture, Glasgow, 1956) 19. 
'maturity' is the rise of a central court, efforts to improve the 
administration of justice, the legislative activity of parliament 
and the professional, lawyerly skills which lie behind each of these 
10 phenomena. 
But as Robertson hims~lf acknowledges 'archaic' elements were 
still to be found in fifteenth century Scots law. It is of course 
important to avoid the supposition that the terms 'archaic' and 
'mature' are intended to have much more than a descriptive function 
in Robertson's argument, but it is clear that he sees the developments 
thus defined as representing progress and improvement. It is part 
of the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate the continuing 
significance and importance of the so-called 'archaic' elements of 
medieval Scots law in the legal structure of the later medieval period, 
and to discuss the nature of their relationship with the development 
of one of the symptoms of 'maturity', the emerging conciliar court. 
In the process, it will be shown that the courts derided by Cooper, 
Dickinson and their followers and described as 'archaic' by Robertson 
were in fact capable of developing and administering a significant 
body of law and that the rise of a new judicial institution from the 
king's council must be seen against that background, rather than one 
of backwardness and legal primitivism. 
The subject is a very broad one and what follows does not 
attempt to cover all the relevant ground. Instead it is approached 
through consideration of t\-tO rules of jurisdiction, one of v1hich \•Tas 
laid down by statute in 1318 but had already been operative for many 
10. J.J. Robertson, 'The development of the law', in Scottish 
Society in the Fifteenth Century ed. J.M. Brown (London, 1977) 
136 - 152, esp. at 139 - 40. 
14 
years, and the other of which constituted an important restriction 
on the competence of the developing 'central' courts of the fifteenth 
century. Both concerned jurisdiction to try cases regarding title 
to land. The first of them can be summarised as laying down that 
no-one in possession of l~nds could be ejected therefrom except by 
court action commenced by a pleadable brieve. The second rule was 
that cases concerning 'fee and heritage' should be heard by the judge 
ordinary and not by the 'central' courts, the auditors of parliament 
and the lords of council. Anyone reading the printed records of 
these bodies will quickly become familiar with their practice of 
remitting matters of fee and heritage to the judge ordinary. This 
obviously constituted a fundamental jurisdictional limitation which 
was not superseded even after the emergence of the lords of council 
and session on a quasi-institutionalised basis in the 1490s. 
Historians studying the developing institution in the belief that it 
was conceived as some sort of supreme court to bring good order to 
the administration of justice have been puzzled by this restricted 
. . d. t• 11 Jur~s 1.c 1.on. Their general view is well summarised by Professor 
D. k. 12 ~c ~nson: 
The exclusion from the jurisdiction of the "Lords of 
Council and Session" of actions relating to 11 fee and 
heritage" was the only feudal victory; only the one 
basic feudal concept still survived - that a plea 
relating to the holding o~ land must be heard in the 
court of the lord of whom the land is held. 
No writer on the subject appears to have observed the significance in 
this matter of a document printed last century by the Historical 
11. See e.g. Acts of th·e Lords of Neilson 
and H.M. Paton Edinburgh, 191 x1v; Acta Dominorum Conci1ii 
1501 - 3 ed. J.A. Clyde (Stair Soc., vol. 8, 1943) xxxvii. 
12. Dic~inson, 'Administration of justice', 350. 
Manuscripts Commission in one of its Scottish reports. 
setting out in full: 13 
It is worth 
This is the answer that \'le, Hylzame the Grame, Richard 
the Grame and Henry the Grame, mru(is tyll our soverayne 
lorde the kyngis letter, the quhylke chargyt us to compeyr 
the xii day of July tyll answar apon the landis of Hutton 
and to bryng wy~h us charteris and documentis to schow. 
And in the fyrst, we clame the sayde landis wyth thair 
pertynence our fee and herytage, and haf beyne this 
hundreth yeris and more, and we in pesabyll possessioun 
this xx yeris, and we understande that he that is yer 
and day in peseabyll possessioun in any lande demande it 
of fee and herytage he aucht nocht toga <owte of his 
possessioun forowte the kyngis brefe pledabyll; and we 
understande that our soverayne lorde the kyngis counsale 
is na courte to plede for na herytage na lyfe na lym in: 
Quharfor we beseke our soverayne lorde the kyng for the 
lufe of Gode that of his mychty majeste that he walde 
kepe us as we that ar his pure legis unwrangyt (in1 
oure lyfis and in oure lande in ony other wayis bot as 
the course of commoune law wyll and at we may byde befor 
our jugegis ordynar ·as the ordur of law of Scotland wyll. 
This document formed part of the muniments of the family of 
Edmonstone of Duntreath, Stirlingshire. After being inventoried by 
the Historical Manuscripts Commission, the muniments were deposited 
15 
in the Scottish Record Office in Edinburgh, where they remained until 
1980. Then that part of the collection which included the above 
document was sold in 1980. Some documents relating to Temple lands 
were sold to the Order of the Knights of St. John; the rest, including 
our document, were sold to an unknown buyer. A microfilm was taken 
before the sale and has been retained in the Register House, but owing 
to export regulations this will not be made available to the public 
until 1988.14 It has thus·not been possible to examine the original 
document, which might prove helpful in determining its date. In the 
13. Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports on Various Collections 
V 77• 
14. The document formed part of SRO, GD 97/3; the microfilm is 
SRO·, RH 4/124/1. For the sale to the Knights see The Knights of 
St. John of Jerusalem in Scotland edd. I.B. Cowan, P.H.R. Mackay 
and A. Macquarrie (Scottish History Soc., 4th series, vol. 19, 
1983) lxxix. 
JG 
Commission report it was assigned to the fourteenth century, but no 
grounds for this were stated. It may be tentatively suggested that 
the date is too early, since it was only in the fifteenth century that 
it became common for documents relating to litigation to be in the 
vernacular rather than Latin. The parties and the lands in question 
remain unidentified. In 1510 the lands of Meikle Hutton in 
Dumfriesshire were said to have belonged to William Graham of 
Mackeswray before being apprised by the king and sold to John lord 
Maxwell.15 But this is the only evidence of Grahams of Hutton known 
to me and it is not clear why the petition of a small Dumfriesshire 
family should have found its way into the Duntreath muniments. 
Regrettably therefore it is not possible to say anything very specific 
about the date or provenance of the document. 
The importance of the document lies in its explicit connection of 
the two rules on pleadable brieves and fee and heritage, suggesting 
that the limitation of the jurisdiction of the central courts came 
about, not through the application of some 'feudal concept', but as 
a consequence of a rule of law going back to the thirteenth century 
and embodied in an act of 1318. 
It has long been recognised that land and its ownership was the 
most important kind of dispute in which medieval courts could be called 
upon to adjudicate. Consequently it would be strange to find that, 
if the development of a ce~tral court was intended to remedy the decline 
of a fragmented law and legal system, a rule of that discredited system 
was allowed to operate for many years to restrict the new court's 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if we posit a system of courts 
15. Registrum Magni Sigilii Regum Scottorum edd. J.M. Thomson 
and others (Edinburgh,lB82 - 1914) ii no. 3522 • 
...... ---.............. -------------------
that was well established and worked within a known framework of 
law and jurisdiction, then we must look at the central courts in a 
new way: not as a device to supersede the existing structure, but 
as something supplemental or additional to it. 
17 
What follows therefor-e is mainly a study of these two rules of 
jurisdiction and an attempt to show the connection between them, with 
a view to setting the rise of the central courts firmly in the context 
of later medieval law and its administration. The first chapter 
shows that in the later medieval period there were frequent references 
to a secular common law, the administration of which was the 
responsibility of the king and his officers. These officers, who 
included the justiciars, the sheriffs and the provosts and bailies 
of the burghs, held their courts in the name of the king. This is 
followed by a detailed discussion of the justiciary in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, arguing that it played a far more active 
and significant role in legal administration than has hitherto been 
allowed. This chapter thus enables us to take seriously the argument 
that within the older 'archaic' structure of courts it was possible 
for substantive law to be administered and indeed to develop. 
The next two chapters consist of detailed analysis of the rule 
regarding pleadable brieves, showing evidence for its continued force 
up to at least 1400 and moreover for the use of the relevant brieves, 
those of dissasine, mortancestor and right, into the sixteenth century. 
This is followed by a chapter discussing the nature of the jurisdiction 
of the 'central' courts - parliament, council general and council -
in which it is argued that it was.indeed supplemental to the ordinary 
processes of the common .law and that its most significant development 
in the fifteenth century was a shift of jurisdiction and business to 
lS 
the council so that it became an alternative to the ordinary 
courts in all but fee and.heritage cases. In the next chapter 
it is shown that there is no direct connection between the fee 
and heritage rule and the rule on pleadable brieves, but that 
there was a complex link.bound in with the development of conciliar 
jurisdiction described in the previous chapter. 
Lastly the various threads of argument are brought together 
in a ·chapter of conclusions. 
(b) Sources 
One of the principal difficulties inhibiting research on 
medieval· Scots law is the state of the sources. Many of the types 
of source which legal historians of other countries use for this 
kind of work are not available to, or are not readily usable by their 
Scottish colleagues. It thus behoves one essaying research in the 
field to state the materials he has used and his reasons for using 
them. They may be divided into four broad categories: (i) Court 
Records; (ii) Legislation; (iii) Legal Treatises and Formularies; 
(iv) Comparative Legal History. 
(i) Court Records 
In the period with which this thesis is primarily concerned -
c.1250 to c.1500 - it is only in the last hundred years or so that 
the records of any court begin to become available in any quantity. 
That such records once existed admits of little doubt and this is not 
the place to discuss the reasons for their non-surviva1.16 The earliest 
16. See B. Webster, Scotland from the Eleventh Century to 1603 
(Cambridge, 1975) 160 - 3 for valuable comments. 
surviving continuous records are those of the burgh courts. 17 Of 
sheriff court records, there is a tantalising fragment from Inverness 
of late 1456 and then nothing else until the beginning of the sixteenth 
18 
century. Similarly some parts of the justiciary records for the 
1490s survive, but only in the sixteenth century do they become 
. 19 contJ.nuous. For baronies and regalities we have nothing before 
1500. 20 It follows therefore that the compilation of a medieval 
Civil Judicial Statistics is an impossible task and that we must 
look to sources other than the archives of the courts themselves 
for most of our evidence about their activities in the medieval 
period. 
The places in which to look for such material have been well 
demonstrated by Lord Cooper, .Sheriff l-1cKechnie, Professor Duncan, 
Professor Willock and Professor Barrow. 21 We may preface our 
discussion by quoting McKechnie's remark that 'the Dark Age ••• is 
17. D. Robertson and M. v/ood, 'Burgh court records 1319 - 1834', 
in Sources and Literature of Scots Law ed. H. McKechnie (Stair 
Soc., vol. 1, 1936) (henceforth '~') 98- 110. 
18. C.A. Malcolm, 'Sheriff and other local court records 1385 -
1935', in SLSL, 111- 132. 
19. S.A. Gillon, 'Criminal law', in SLSL, 370- 378. 
20. Malcolm, 'Sheriff court records', cited above, n.l8. 
21. See the following works: T.M. Cooper, Select Scottish 
Cases of the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1944); 
McKechnie, 'Brieves 1 ; • A.A.J.-1. Duncan, 'The central courts 
before 1532~, in·Introduction to Scottish Legal History, 
321 - 340; -I.D. Willock, The Origin and Develo~ment of 
the Jury in Scotland (Stair Soc., vol. 23, 1966 ; Barrow, 
Kingdom, 83 - 138. All use 'charter' evidence to elucidate 
legal practice. 

21 
from other sources. Some of these records stretch back as far as 
the thirteenth century, but it is important to bear in mind that 
great part~ of them have not survived and that we know of other parts 
only by the good fortune that copies of now lost originals were made 
at some point by zealous antiquarians such as Lord Haddington. 23 
In this discussion of court records I have purposely left the 
records of the 'central' courts to the last. They survive from 
1466 to 1496 in the case of the parliamentary auditors, from 1478 on 
in the case of the king's council. The former really belong with 
the records of parliament, despite their treatment as something 
separate by Thomas Thomson when he published them as The Acts of 
the Lords Auditors of Causes ~d Complaints in 1839, and the remarks 
in the next section concerning parliamentary records before 1466 may 
be referred to. Council also kept records before 1478 but for our 
knowledge of cases before it in that period we are reliant once 
again upon the type of material already discussed above. But it 
should be noted that there also exist a number of documents which 
declare themselves to be extracts (or copies of the relevant entries) 
from the council records. From 1478 on we have the records themselves, 
printed in various forms under various editorial hands to 1503, and in 
. t . R • t H 24 manuscr1p 1n eg1s er ouse. Selections of the record after 1503 
23. See generally J.M. Thomson, The Public Records of Scotland 
(Glasgow, 1922) 14; Webster, Scotland, 132 - 151; G. Donaldson, 
The Sources of Scottish History (Edinburgh, 1978) 10 - 15. 
24. See Thomson, Public Records, 33 - 4; R.K. Hannay, 'Early records 
of council and session 1466 -.1659', in SLSL 16 --24; Donaldson, 
Sources, -16. ·The editions of the-council recorda are Acts.of the 
Lords of Counqil in.Civil Causes 1478- 1495 ed. T. Thomson 
(Edinburgh, 1B39); Acts of the Lords of Council in Civil Causes 
1496 - 1501 edd. Neilson and Paten (Edinburgh, 1918); Acta 
Dominorum Concilii 1501- 3 ed. Clyde (Stair Soc., vol.~l943) • 
...... ----.............. ------------------
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have been published by R.K. Hannay and by the Stair Society, 25 but 
otherwise the sheer quantity and bulk of the material, unindexed as 
it is, makes it all but impossible to use in a systematic way over a 
long period of time. Again the record is not complete, so that, 
despite its impressive bulk, statistics compiled from what survives 
may be misleading. In using the printed editions too one must be 
careful; it has been shown that Thomas Thomson misdated at least 
26 
one section of the record by five years. It also seems certain 
that when the record was restored and rebound in Register House in 
the nineteenth century, certain important data may have been lost. 27 
An eighteenth century· report on the 'state of the Records of Scotland' 
observed of the council records that 'from the year 1488 to 1495 there 
were two different registers of decreets kept, probably each of the 
28 two sessions by themselves•. That two such registers did exist 
seems confirmed by two inventories of 1676 and 1701. 29 They have now 
25. Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs 1501 - 1554 ed. 
R.K. Hannay.(Edinburgh, 1932); Acta Dominorum Concilii et 
Sessionis 1532- 1533 ed. I.H. Shearer (Stair Soc., vol. 14, 
1956). 
26. A.A.M. Duncan and M.P. McDiarmid, 'Some wrongly dated entries 
in the Acts of the Lords of Council', SHR 33 (1954) 86- 88. 
27. On the early nineteenth century restoration and rebinding of 
the council records under Thomas Thomson, see M.D. Young, 
'The age of the deputy clerk register 1806- 1928•, SHR 53 
(1974) 157 - 193 at 162 - 3· ---
28. Abstract of the state of the Records of Scotland reported 
b Thomas Ker on the 18 November 17 7 to a meetin of la ers 
and writers (NLS MS. no. 29 ) ff. 22 - 3· 
29. The 1676 inventory (SRO 1/4) describes volumes as follows: 
one from 20 July 1488 5 Harch 1491, one from 15 June 1491 
28 August 1495 (i te_ms 4 and 6); on·e from 23 February 1489 -
21 May 1491, one from 9 July 1491 - 15 May 1495 (items 3 and 5). 
These volumes are also described in th~ 1701 inventory (SRO 1/6) 
and by Ker • 
...... ----............ __________________ _ 
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more or less complete, down to 1707. For the earlier period, we 
have two rolls of the parliaments of John Balliol, three of David II 
and two of Robert II. However, although so little of the early 
original record remains, transcripts and printed editions of lost 
sections do survive, giving us further well authenticated information 
about the activities of parliament and the closely related council 
32 general between 1290 and the mid-fifteenth century. 
Going further back, into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
we enter much less certain terrain. Later medieval legal collections 
attributed legislation to Malcolm Mackenneth, David I, William I and 
Alexander II; but although we know that David and William did enact 
certain laws, it is far from clear that they or the other kings were 
responsible for the statutes subsequently assigned to their reigns. 33 
Before such attributions can be accepted they must be subjected to 
careful scrutiny. Even then the best conclusion may well be a 'not 
proven' verdict. 
The same collections also contain statutes of Alexander III, 
Robert I, David II, Robert II and Robert III. Again these statutes 
generally have no authentication beyond their self-attribution to a 
particular reign, and their reliability as evidence of a legislative 
act at a given point in time is minimal. The important exception 
32. Thomson, Public Records, 29 - 30; Webster, Scotland, 128 - 30. 
For recent additions to legislative material see W.C. Dickinson, 
'The acts of the parliament at Perth 6 Harch 1429/30', SHR 29 
(1950) 1- 12; A.A.H. Duncan, 'Councils general 1404 -J::1+23', 
SHR 35 (1956) 132 - 143 and I.E. O'Brien, 'The Scottish parliament 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 1: · (Glasgow Ph.D., 1980) 
eh. 1 and appendices. 
33. See T.M. Cooper, 'Early Scottish statutes revisited', JR 64 (1952) 
197 - 203, reprinted Selected Papers, 237 - 243; A.A.M. Duncan, 
'Regiam Majestatem: a reconsiderationi, JR 6 (1961) 199- 217 at 
206. - 10. For references to l.egislation of David I, Malcolm IV 
and William I see RRS i no. 233, RRS ii nos. 71, 124, 281, 406, 
442, 475; Arbroath:Liber i no. 229. 
to this general statement is a collection of acts said to have been 
laid down by a parliament of Robert I in 1318, authenticated by their 
transcription, presumably at the behest of Bernard de Linton, the 
king's chancellor as well as abbot of Arbroath, into the register 
of the abbey of Arbroath.34 
Most of the legislative material relevant to this thesis is 
gathered in the first two volumes of the Record edition of the Acts 
of the Parliaments of Scotland, and it is to this collection, rather 
than those such as Glendook's which lavzyers are accustomed to use, 
that reference is normally made for the texts and dates of statutes.35 
Only by taking material which is authenticated as historical evidence 
are we likely to achieve some understanding of the thinking and 
legislative purpose which lay behind the acts of parliament when they 
came into force. Even so, much of the material presented in the 
Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, particularly that in the first 
volume, must be treated with the greatest caution and subject to an 
awareness of the difficulties just outlined. 
(iii) Legal Treatises and Formularies 
In the previous section mention was made of the later medieval 
collections of legal material. These survive in some forty36 
manuscripts of different periods from the fourteenth to the end of 
the sixteenth centuries. In addition to legislation, they contain 
a number of treatises dealing with various branches of the law and 
34. Thomson, Public Records, 28. 
35. The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland edd. T. Thomson and 
C. Innes (12 vols.~ Edinburgh, 1Bl4- 1875). For 'lawyers' 
collections' of Scottish statutes see Lord Thankerton, 'The 
statutory law', in SLSL, 3 - 15. 
36. Th~ number given here is ex. inf. Mr. W.J. Windram. For 
descriptions of some of these MSS., see APS i 177- 210. 
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work Glanvill was a major source for the compiler of Regiam, the 
authenticity of the latter·as a representation of Scots law has 
sometimes been doubted; but it is clear that, whatever the original 
position, by the fifteenth century, Regiam was regarded as an 
authoritative statement of the law. It stretches credibility to 
suppose that the work could have achieved this status if, to begin 
with, it was not in some way an attempt at an account of the law of 
Scotland. 
This thesis has been composed in the belief that Regiam is a 
statement of the law which held authoritative status in Scotland in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and that this was also true of 
1 . 42 the slightly ater Quon~am. Accordingly both works may be referred 
to as evidence of the state of the law during that period. But while 
such an approach may be justified in general terms, it remains 
important to be aware of the considerable difficulties which then 
arise. There are no texts which can be marked off as constituting 
'official' or 'authorised' versions of either Regiam or Quoniam. 
The variety of versions of legal texts in circulation was already 
creating problems in the fifteenth century43 and continued to do so 
until Sir John Skene completed his edition of the 'auld lawes' in 1609. 
In modern times two versions of Regiam and Quoniam have been produced 
which perhaps give a misleading impression that there actually did exist 
42. From various points it seems that Quoniam represents Scots 
law at a later stage of development than does Regiam. For 
example, unlike Regiam, it deals with the brieve de proteccione 
regis infricta. 
43. In 1473 parliament laid down that 'thare be a buke maid contenand 
at the lawis of this realme ••• and nane other bukis be usit but 
the copy of it•. This was 'for the gret diversite now fundin 
in divers bukis put.in be divers personnis that ar callit men of law' 
(AP.S ii 105, c. 14). Was this the outcome of the 1469 proposal that 
'the kingis lawis, Regiam Maiestatem,actis, statutis and uther bukis. 
be put in a volum and •• be autorizit and the laif to be distroyit' 
{.;\PS ii 97, c. 19)? Nothinr; is kno,.,n to have come from either 
enactoent • 
...... ------............ ________________ __ 
a single text of each, somehow discoverable through the maze of 
variations found in the manu·script. The maze is part of the reality 
of medieval law; the modern scholarly text a device to enable the 
researcher to approach that reality. 
The variations of the.texts are usually emphasised to explain 
the difficulties of handling the evidence of Regiam and Quoniam. 
Nevertheless it is possible to see the main substance of both works 
if not necessarily their exact wording (if any), capitular order, 
or date of composition. It was on this basis that Skene compiled 
his editions of 1609.44 These have been much criticised but there 
has been only one serious attempt to do better, by Thomas Thomson and 
Cosmo Innes. Their editions form part of the first volume of the 
Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, but unfortunately lack a detailed 
. t. 45 apparatus cr1 1cus. Most recently Lord Cooper virtually reproduced 
Skene's texts for the Stair Society, his one concession to the 
criticisms of Skene being the interpolation of additional material 
from and cross-references to the work of Thomson and Innes. 46 From 
all this we may glean the substance of Regiam and Quoniam, while 
acknowledging that as yet we lack a truly critical knowledge of the 
works and their development. 
For the purposes of this thesis the Thomson/Innes editions of 
Regiam and Quoniam have been used in preference to those of Skene and 
44. On Skene's editions of 1609 see T.M. Cooper, 'Regiam Majestatem 
and the auld lawes', in SLSL, 70- 81. 
45. See APS i 597 - 659. The 'Table of Authorities' (APS i 211 - 273 
at 232 - 245) gives some idea of the material on.which the editors 
worked. 
46. 
Cooper, and references to either should be followed up in the first 
volume of the Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland. 47 There are two 
main reasons for this. First and foremost, the Thomson/In~es editions 
are the only ones worked out by recognised scholarly principles. 
Secondly it appears probab~e that the editors chose to base their 
texts on the earliest manuscripts: 48 that is, those produced in the 
period \dth which this thesis deals and when the status and use of both 
works was probably greatest. With Thomson and Innes we are surely 
nearer to the Regiam and Quoniam used in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. 
There are fewer problems with the collections of styles of brieves 
which may also be found in the manuscripts. There are three main 
collections (all now printed in more or less satisfactory form) 49 
apart from those which form what may be described as an 'appendix' 
to Quoniam in the Thomson/Innes edition.50 While there is no warrant 
for speaking of a 'Register of Brieves' comparable to the English 
Registrum Omnium Brevium, it does appear that the collections as we 
now have them were first put together in the reign of Robert I, 
perhaps on some official basis, and added to subsequently as necessary.5l 
47. References to the texts of either Skene or Cooper in this thesis 
are indicated by 'Skene, Regiam' or 'Cooper, Regiam' as 
appropriate. 
48. See J. Buchanan, 'The manuscripts of Regiam Hajestatem', JR 
49 (1937) 217 - 231 at 224 - 5· 
49. The Register of Brieves 1286- 1386 ed. T.M. Cooper (Stair Soc., 
vol. 10, 1946); Formular E : Scottish Letters and Brieves 1286 -
1424 ed. A.A.M. Duncan University of Glasgow, Scottish History 
Department Occasional Papers; 1976). 
50. For these, see Quon.iam Attachiamenta chs. 49 - 61. In the Skene 
and Cooper editions these styles are i~corporated in the text at 
appropriate points. 
51. Formulary E, 1 - 2. 
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Some limited use has been made in the thesis of other material 
contained in the legal manuscripts, either directly or from other 
printed collections based on the manuscripts. Prominent among these 
are Skene's collection of the 'auld lawes', which includes much more 
than the texts of Regiam and Quoniam, and Balfour's Practicks, which 
appears to represent an attempt of c. 1579 to digest the 'auld lawes' 
manuscripts alongside the decisions of the lords of council and session 
and the acts of parliament.52 These may be usefully compared with the 
'fragmenta collecta' which form the last section of the first volume 
of the Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland.53 The so-called 'fragmenta• 
are in fact extracts from various sources within the manuscripts. 
Only by checking with the table of authorities prefixed to the volume54 
and also with Balfour and Skene can it be discovered that in compiling 
the 'fragmenta• the editors broke up treatises contained within the 
manuscripts, or printed some parts of these works while omitting 
others altogether. This treatment has served only to deepen the 
difficulty of approaching the evidence contained in the manuscripts, 
but it is possible to make some sense of it by the process of checking 
and cross-referencing just mentioned. 
Finally, post-medieval works have been referred to in the research 
for this thesis. Skene's 'auld lawes' and Balfour's Practicks fall into 
this category, of course, but have been discussed above mainly because 
52. See H. McKechnie, 'Practicks 1469- 1700', in SLSL, 25- 41 
at 31 - 3 and the introduction to the Practicks-of Sir James 
Balfour of Pittendreich ed. P.G.B. McNeill (2 vols., Stair 
Soc., vols. 21 and 22, 1962, 1_963). 
53· APS i 719 - 754. 
54. See APS ·i 211- 273; see also the 'Notice of the Manuscripts', 
APS i 177 - 210. 
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they embody medieval source material. Nevertheless, as already 
mentioned, Balfour also digests a large number of the decisions of 
the lords of council and session, some from the fifteenth century, 
most from the sixteenth. Given the problems of research in the 
council and session records.referred to earlier, Balfour is a valuable 
guide to significant decisions of the court and thus amongst other 
things to the development of its jurisdiction.55 But it needs to 
be remembered that \·re do not know the reasons for the choice of 
authorities to be inserted in the Practicks; for example, whether 
it reflects any theory of precedent, such as the relative binding 
force of a single decision as contrasted with that of a chain of 
concurring decisions. Further the accuracy of Balfour's terse 
summaries of decisions must be tested against the original record.56 
Attention has recently been drawn to other practicks of the 
sixteenth century for the value of the guidance they give to the work 
of the court. By contrast with those of Balfour, these practicks 
record only decisions of the lords, and were kept by members of the 
bench, presumably to aid the court to achieve consistency in its 
cases. The earliest of these appear to be the practicks of John 
Sinclair, which cover the period 1540 to 1549.57 
Two further works require mention, both of a quite different 
nature from the practicks. In 1597 Sir John Skene published 
55. Donaldson, Sources, 17. 
56. McKechnie, 'Practicks', 33, 34. 
57. McKechnie, 1Practicks 1 , 29- 30; A.L. Murray, 'Sihclairts 
Practicks', -in La1r1 :Haking and Law Nakers in British History 
~d. A. Harding {Royal Historical Society, 1980) 90 - 104. 
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De Verborum Significatione, a by-product of his v1ork on the medieval 
legal manuscripts which took the form of a dictionary of the 1 difficill 
wordes and termes' to be found therein. It is therefore a very useful 
guide, not only to the language of medieval law, but also to the 
manuscripts themselves. Again however the work must be treated 
critically, against an independent examination of the source material. 
The Jus Feudale of Sir Thomas Craig of Riccarton was probably written 
at about the same time as the date of publication of De Verborum. 
Its value for our purposes lies in the fact that it is the first 
detailed treatment of a topic of substantive law which lies at the 
heart of this thesis,· namely, land law, and also in that· the subject 
was approached from an historical point of view. The accuracy of 
Craig's law and history has been questioned58 and undoubtedly his 
work must be examined with care; but frequently his is the earliest 
substantive discussion of particular legal subjects, so that he 
provides a good starting point for investigation of their earlier 
history. 
Later legal writers offer little of value to the student of 
medieval law. Stair, Mackenzie, Bankton, Erskine and Bell were 
chiefly concerned with providing accounts of contemporary law for 
practising lawyers. They constitute primary sources only for the 
law of their own time. By the eighteenth century the discipline of 
legal history had begun to emerge and the works of such as Kames on 
medieval law are its first fruits. 59 But these cannot be regarded 
58. McKechnie, 'Practicks', 33 -·4; A.C. Black, 'The institutional 
writers 1600- 1826•, in SLSL, 59- 69 at 61- 3; J.J. Robertson, 
'The illusory breve-testatum•, in The· Scottish Tradition 
Essays in Honour of Ronald Gordon Cant ed. G.w.s. Barrow 
(Edinburgh, 1974) 84 - 90. 
59. E.g. his Historical Law Tracts (Edinburgh, 1757). 
as evidence in the study of medieval law; they and all subsequent 
studies are secondary accotints based on assessments of the primary 
evidence. 
(iv) Comparative Legal History 
The foregoing accoun~ of the sources for the study of medieval 
Scots law has sought to show the fragmentary nature of the evidence 
and the problems in treating it. As a result writing an account of 
the law has something of the character of a children's puzzle: there 
are numerous dots which if joined correctly by lines will produce a 
recognisable picture. The primary evidence provides us with the 
dots and perhaps some· of the lines; from what source do we obtain 
the clue which will enable us to draw the remainder of the picture? 
The conclusion that the development of Scots law in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries was much influenced by the law of England 
has impressed itself upon all who have made a study of the subject. 
If F.W. Maitland went too far when he remarked that although English 
law 'had no power north of the Tweed ••• we may doubt whether he who 
crossed the river felt that he had passed from the land of one law 
60 to the land of another', it is clear that processes of legal 
transplantation did occur between the two kingdoms during the period. 
But the consensus of opinion has been that this came to an end with 
the outbreak of war between Scotland and England in the 1290s. 
This is stated in extreme form by Dr. J.H. Baker: 61 
The percolation into Scotland of Anglo-Norman feudalism 
and sheriffs, justiciars and the writ system raised the 
possibility that Scotland might have become the first 
60. F. Pollock and F. \'1 •· Mai tland, History of' English Law before 
the time of Edward I (2nd ed., reissued. Cambridge, 1968) i 222. 
61. J.H~ Baker, Introduction to English Legal History (2nd ed., 
London,l979) 31. 
common law countr,.Y. outside England. \1ar ended that 
possibility ••• ~)ntellectual contact with England 
was broken for centuries • • • [iJ he result v/as a fragmented 
confusion of custom and Canon la\'/· 
However difficulties in the way of such views are immediately 
apparent. If Regiam is a v1ork of the fourteenth century and an 
attempt at an account of contemporary Scots law, then it follows that 
in the compiler's mind the English work Glanvill continued to be of 
considerable relevance in that law. 62 In an important article 
published in 1966 Professor Harding has argued that the developments 
of English and Scots law are closely comparable throughout the 
medieval period; 63 he has subsequently suggested that the comparisons 
may also be made with developments in other European states.64 Most 
recently it has been pointed o.ut that those parts of the law which 
Stair in the seventeenth century described as 'ancient and immemorial 
custom' had been brought to Scotland in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries and were discussed in Regiam Majestatem. 65 
In this thesis much use will be made of comparative material 
from England and, to a much lesser extent, from elsewhere. This is 
not to suggest that Scottish courts and lawyers habitually referred to 
English materials in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. At 
least in relation to land law both systems were founded on Norman 
62. Duncan, 'Regiam Majestatem', 216- 7. 
63. A. Harding~'Medieval brieves of protection and the development 
of the common law', JR 11 (1966) 115 - 149. 
64. A. Harding, 'Plaints and bills in the history of English law', 
in Legal History Studies 1972 ed. D. Jenkins (Cardiff, 1975) 
65 - 6, especiall:y at 82 - 3·· 
65. W.D.H. Sellar, 'English law as a source [of Stair's Institutions]• 
in Stair Tercentenar~ Studies ed. D.M. Walker (Stair Soc., vol. 33, 
1981) 140 - 150 at 1 4 - 6. 
customs, which were first embodied in writing in Glanvill. It 
is clear that this work at 'least was of great importance in Scotland. 
The basic conceptual structures of what became Scots and English land 
law were thus virtually identical; as we shall see, the remedial 
structures were also clos~ly related. The copious English material 
however allows us to see the processes of legal reasoning at work 
within these structures, something almost invisible to the researcher 
in the Scottish evidence. Applying what is known of English law often 
helps to make sense of what 'tre can see in Scotland. 
The need to make comparisons with English law becomes all the 
more apparent l-rhen it· is recognised that the two jurisdictional rules 
at the centre of this thesis had their precise equivalents in England. 
The rule that no man needed to answer for his free holding except by 
the king's writ is one of the best known and most important parts of 
medieval English law. The rule that conciliar courts had no 
jurisdiction in cases concerning freehold particularly affected the 
later medieval courts of Chancery and Star Chamber. It has been 
little discussed by legal historians and has usually been ascribed 
66 to a sequence of fourteenth century statutes. However none of 
these really appear to be the origin of the rule; they are rather 
recognitions that such a rule existed •. The only legal historian to 
discuss a possible connection with the other rule was Professor T.F.T. 
Plucknett, the leading authority between the time of Maitland and 
the present generation on the development of English law in the later 
66. See J.F. Baldwin, The Kin~'s Council in England During the 
Middle Ages (Oxford, 1913 -279; Select Cases before the 
King's Council 1243- 1482 edd. I.S. Leadam and J.F. Baldwin 
(Selden Soc., vol. 35, 1918), xxvi; W_.s. Holdsworth, History 
of English Law (London, 1966 reprint) i 487 - 9. 
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middle ages. He had no doubt that the requirement of an oriBinal 
writ in cases of freehold operated to restrict the jurisdiction of 
the king's conciliar courts. 67 It seems clear from this that 
comparison of the English and Scottish rules will prove a fruitful 
exercise. 
There is less need to justify reference to the other major 
legal system of influence in medieval Scotland, the canon law. 
Quite apart from the canonical monopoly of matters pertaining to 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it has frequently been acknowledged 
how much Scottish court procedures owe to Romano-canonical ideas. 68 
This subject is further explored in the course of the thesis. One 
major point is that the language of procedure in the secular courts 
was clearly borrowed from canon law; the nature of the borrowing 
of the actual rules of procedure was however a more complex process 
than seems to have been realised hitherto. 
In brief the function of the comparative excursions in this 
thesis is to flesh out the bare bones of our surviving native sources. 
In a sense part of the argument is that such comparisons, especially 
those with English law, are justifiable and helpful in understanding 
the development of later medieval Scots law. But I have not sought 
to make comparisons with the native laws of medieval Ireland and 
The subject matter of this thesis is land law, which was 
67. T.F.T. Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed., 
London, 1956) 176 - 7. 
68. E.g. by Robertson, 'Development of the law', at 151 - 2, and his 
'Canon-law as a source (of stair's Institutions]'," in Stair 
Tercentenary Studies, 112 - 127 at 119 - 120; S.D. Ollivant, 
The Court of the Official in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Stair 
Soc., vol. 34, 1982) 130- 3. 
69. That. such comparisons may be fruitful in appropriate areas is 
suggested by e.g. W.D.H. Sellar, 'Marriage, divorce and concubinage 
in Gaelic Scotland', Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness 
51 (1981) 464 - 493· 
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a development of the feudal customs and tenures of Anglo-Norman 
rather than Celtic society~ No doubt Celtic social structures and 
customs lurk behind the feudal language and form of our documentary 
evidence on land-holding, probably at a much later date than is often 
realised; but the fact t~at such disguise was necessary shows how 
truly feudal was the common law relating to land. 
(c) References 
Abbreviations used in this thesis in referring to primary 
source material in general follow the styles suggested in the 
supplement to the October 1963 issue of the Scottish Historical 
Review. A full list will be found in the bibliography. References 
to Regiam Majestatem and Quoniam Attachiamenta are to the editions 
found in the first volume of the Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, 
unless otherwise indicated. In the case of Regiam references are 
by book and chapter, in Quoniam, by chapter. References to the 
English treatises known as Glanvill and Bracton are by those titles. 
I have used the modern editions of, respectively, G.D.G. Hall and 
S.E. Thorne. In Glanvill, references are by book and chapter, in 
Bracton, as is the usual convention, by the foliation of the first 
printed edition; but in the latter case, I have added in brackets 
references to the volume and page numbers of the Thorne edition. 
Abbreviated references to secondary sources are explained in the 
bibliography. Pa~e numbers are given without prefix; all such 
numbers may be taken as page references except in the case of 
periodical articles which are cited by journal name, volume number, 
year and pages. All other volume numbers are given in Roman numerals. 
Other numerical references are given an app~opriate prefix - 1 f 1 for 
' f o 1 i o 1 , • ' no • ' for 1 number ' • 
Chapter Two 
The Curia Regis, Royal Justice and the Common Law 
(a) Royal Justice and the Common Law 
In 1607.King James.the sixth of Scotland, the first of Great 
Britain, assured the House of Commons that the Scots had a very 
different concept of 'fundamental law' from that of the English. 
They used this phrase, he observed, •·not meaning as you do their 
Common Law for they have none but that which is called Jus Regis'. 1 
There was some unintended element of paradox in this distinction of 
the Common Law from the King's Law, since undoubtedly the former had 
its origins in the exercise of royal authority in the medieval 
period. James was of course speaking in the era of Coke when the 
Common Law was becoming a symbol of opposition to the tyranny of 
the prerogative power of monarchs, as the law of the land to which 
all must bow. But in the middle ages, when the state depended 
far more upon the figure of the king for its basic political unity, 
it was impossible to divorce the idea of the law of the land from the 
activity and authority of the king. Hence in the late twelfth 
century treatise ascribed to Ranulf de Glanvill, the writer identified 
'the laws and customs of the realm' or 'the laws of England' with the 
rules observed and enforced in the king's courts.2 It was only in 
the reign of Edward I (1272 - 1307) that it became usual to refer 
to the law of the realm, the law administered in the king's courts, 
as the common law; 3 but it followed from the fact that the king 
1. The Political Works of James I ed. C.H. Mcilwain (Cambridge, 1918) 
329. 
2. Gl'anvill, prologue. 
3. Pollock and Maitland, History of Enf,lish Law i 177. 
3i 
alone had authority over the whole of the kingdom that in secular 
af~airs only his courts could apply the law which was common to all 
the subjects within that kingdom. 
To begin with, it seems, the king's courts in England were 
used only in exceptional_or important cases, but their business 
expanded, notably from the reign of Henry II (1154 - 1189) onward, 
taking in an ever wider range of subject-matter as a matter of course. 
Thus gradually the king's courts became a forum for the ordinary 
administration of justice, and the rules they applied the general 
law of the land. Despite the comment of King James, a somewhat 
similar development ·may be traced in Scotland in the period 1100 -
1300, when there seems to have been steadily increasing royal activity 
in the administration of justice. Again the earliest evidence 
suggests that the king's intervention in legal disputes was the 
exception rather than the rule. So for example royal charters of 
the twelfth century granting franchisal jurisdiction refer to the 
availability of royal justice, but only if the beneficiary of the 
grant should fail to provide justice himself in his own court. 4 
This seems to suggest that the norm of the twelfth century was the 
non-royal court; but there were many factors making their first 
appearance in Scotland at this time which laid the base for change 
and development. 
The increasingly 'feudal' structure of government, for example, 
implied that the king, like any other lord, should hold a court of 
and for his tenants-in-chief. Such a court can be seen in action 
from the reign of David I (1124 - 1153) onward, although the 
4. Lawrie, Charters nos. 74, 179 and 209; RRS i nos. 222 and 262; 
RRS ii nos. 39 and 197. 
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description 'curia regis' does not appear in surviving evidence 
until the reign of William the Lion (1165 - 1214).5 But the work 
of his curia regis was not confined to the function of adjudication 
as we should recognise it; it was also a place where land might be 
formally granted by the king or where it might be resigned back into 
his hands. 6 Indeed, even in contentious matters, its function seems 
more often than not to have been to confirm quit-claims and compromises 
between the parties, rather than to determine their-respective rights.7 
It looks as though the imprimatur of confirmation by the king's court 
lent especial strength or binding force to such agreements, and 
parallels may be made with the institution of the 'feet of fines' 
in England. One might even ask whether the forms of adjudication 
in this period grew out of the forms of conveyancing rather than 
vice-versa, as is usually stated; certainly the surviving evidence 
gives the impression that William's curia was principally concerned 
with the formalities of transferring title to land. 
In all this the curia regis is recognisably the fore-runner of 
the thirteenth century colloquium, and thus also of the Scottish 
0 t 8 parl~amen • But as Professor A.A.M. Duncan has argued, there is 
no reason to suppose that the principal function of these institutions 
was a judicial one. Parliaments or colloquia were sessions of the 
king's council, doing the king's business, and while that business 
5· Lawrie, Charters nos. 130 and 182; 
and 7 below. See also RRS ii nos. 
6. RRS ii nos. 85 and 496. 
for 'curia regis', see nn. 6 
35 and 105. 
7. RRS ii nos. 236, 249, 364, 483, and 519~ For adjudications 
by the .'curia regis', sec RRS ii nos. 84, 353 and 440. 
8. For .the thirteenth century colloquia and parliaments as judicial bodie 
see H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, 'The Scottish parliaments 
of Edward I', SHR 25 (1928) 300- 319. 
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undoubtedly included judicial work, it probably always consisted 
mainly of 'political discussion and decision'.9 We may infer that 
this observation would be likely to hold true for the king's council 
in the twelfth century also from the emergence of the office of 
justice or jus~iciar (henceforth 'justiciar') in the reign of 
David I.10 It is apparent that it was introduced to do some of 
the king's judicial work, for both David and Malcolm IV (1153 -
1165) refer to hearings before the king or his justiciar as being 
alternatives of equivalent authority. 11 To underline this vice-
regal role of the justiciar there is a reference to a court held 
before Roland son of ·uchtred, justiciar perhaps of Galloway in the 
1190s, as 'curia domini regis•. 12 It may be that the institution 
was evolved to cope with the growing number of 'new men' in Scottish 
society at this period: that is, the Anglo-Norman knights, the 
burgesses and the religious men of the various monastic houses, 
most of whom owed their presence in Scotland to royal patronage and 
who would certainly have expected to receive the protection of royal 
justice. Perhaps it is significant that two royal charters giving 
the right to be sued only before the king or his justiciar were 
grants to a burgess and to an ecclesiastical foundation respectively. 
9. A.A.M. Duncan, 'The early parliaments of Scotland', SHR 45 
(1966) 36 - 58 at 57· 
10. See generally Barrow, Kingdom, eh. 3, esp. at 84. 
11. Lawrie, Charters no. 248; RRS i nos. 121 and 220. 
12. APS i 378. For Roland as j~sticiar of Galloway see RRS 
ii-45 and Barrow, Kingdom, 107 and 138. But cf. Duncan, 
Making of the Kingdom, 203 - 4. 
e( 
There are at least two thirteenth century references to the 
justiciar's court as curia domini regis, in 1221 and 1247 
respectively.13 Other courts were similarly described in this 
period; for example, one held before the chamberlain at Forfar in 
1228, while we. may also note what appears to be a description of 
Berwick burgh court as curia domini regis, probably in the thirteenth 
14 
century. A document from the reign of Alexander II, probably of 
date 1233 x 1235, refers to another case in the 'curia domini regis 
I 
apud Berwic in plfno comitatu'. The case was begun by royal brieve 
I 
addressed to the sheriff of Berwick and this, together with the 
reference to the 'full county', makes it certain that it is his 
court, rather than that of the burgh, which is being described as 
the king's court here.15 The sheriff and burgh courts had emerged 
in the reign of William I, if not before, and their development may 
~ 
again be attributed to the presence of the new men mentioned above 
d . . t h . f 1 . t' 16 an the~r cla~m o t e protect~on o roya JUS ~ce. But it is 
important to notice that in none of the examples above is there any 
suggestion of the king being present in the court and it seems that 
in Scotland as in England that is not necessarily implied by the use 
13. Fraser, Douglas iii no. 285; Raine, North Durham no. 126. 
14. Arbroath Liber i no. 229; Ke1so Liber i no. 34. 
15. Uurham Dean and Chapter Muniments, mise. eh., no. 1273 
(Appendix A). 
16. The earliest references to the sheriff court are c. 1200 
(Dryburgh Liber no. 223 and RRS ii 42); to the burgh court 
in 1212 (Melrose Liber i no •. 27 and Aberdeen Burgh·Recs., 
xxii and 1). See also Duncan, Making of the Kingdom, 
481 - 2 and G.W.S •. Barrow, Kingship and Unity (London, 1981) 
46 and 99. 
of the phrase 'curia regis'. The implication to be drawn is 
rather that the court was held in the king's name by a royal 
officer exercising royal jurisdiction.17 The growth in the 
number of such courts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries can 
surely be taken as a sign of a corresponding development in the 
regularity with which royal justice was used throughout the 
kingdom. 
Undoubtedly in the thirteenth century there was recognition 
of the existence of a body of law which could be described, for 
example, as 'the laws and customs of the realm' or as 1 the law 
and assize of the r~alm 1 or even as 'the laws of David', referring 
to the twelfth century king. 18 Moreover there are a number of 
interesting references to 'the common law' in contexts which suggest 
close parallels to the use of that phrase in England. But before 
going into the details of these references, it is worth pausing 
momentarily to consider the phrase itself and to remember that it 
was used first in the middle ages, not by lawyers in the English 
royal courts, but by the canonists who were seeking 'to distinguish 
the general and ordinary law of the universal church both from any 
rules peculiar to this or that provincial church, and from those 
papal privilegia which were always giving rise to ecclesiastical 
litigation•. 19 The jus commune was the law of all Christendom, 
17. Thus neither a baron nor a regality court would have been 
described as a curia regis and we may properly distinguish 
other courts such as those of the justiciar and the sheriff 
as •royal', albeit that 'all legitimate secular courts derived 
their authority from the-crown':· G.w.s. Barrow, 'Popular 
courts in early medieval Scotland: some suggested place-name 
evidence', Scottish Studies 25 (1981) 1- 24 at 2. 
18. See Barrow, Kingdom, 89, note 21. 
see Stones, Documents, 125. 
For 'the laws of David' 
19. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law i 176. 
the law of the Holy Roman Empire, as distinct from local specialties 
or the jus proprium. It was in other words the general law of 
Christendom as opposed to the varieties of laws applicable within 
different parts of Christendom. It was in this sense of the general 
as opposed to the particular that the English lawyers appropriated 
the term to describe the law of their royal courts, and to distinguish 
it from the several rules and customs which might be applied locally 
in various parts of the kingdom. 
The first reference to the 'common law' in Scotland is found 
as early as 1206 in a case where Melrose abbey sued the earl of 
Dunbar before papal judges delegate, seeking to recover rights of 
pasture. The earl argued that the ecclesiastical tribunal had no 
jurisdiction since he was a layman and the subject of the litigation 
was a lay holding. The appropriate forum for the determination of the 
dispute was that of common law (juris communis). Clearly here the 
earl was not referring to the common law of Christendom, and it is 
interesting to note that, although the judges delegate claimed 
jurisdiction thrqugh local custom, the dispute was finally resolved 
in the king's court. 20 The next reference is in 1264, in an 
administrative brieve of Alexander III which refers to 'the usage 
throughout our kingdom of Scotland according to ancient approved 
21 
custom and by the common law'. Here 'common law' is clearly 
equated with the custom of the realm, a rule applicable universally 
thr~ughout the kingdom. In 1290 the Guardians of the Scottish 
kingdom concluded the Treaty of Birgham with the king of England. 
20. Melrose Liber i 88. 
21. Melrose Liber i no. 309. 
;-~-·~ 
The treaty provided for a marriage between Queen Margaret of Scotland 
and the future Edward II and a form of union between the two kingdoms. 
The Guardians were however careful to preserve Scottish sovereignty 
and one of the conditions of the treaty was that 'no letter of common 
law or containing specia~ grace shall issue from the chancery unless 
22 according to the accustomed and due course of the chapel'. Here 
we see the common law linked with the brieves de cursu initiating 
litigations in the royal courts. 
The relationship between the concepts of the kingdom and of the 
common law as the law of the realm can be clearly seen in these 
pieces of evidence, and it is therefore not surprising that fairly 
frequent reference to the common law of Scotland and of England can 
be found in the records of the Great Cause of 1291 - 92. From 
these records we may again observe the concept of a common law of 
Scotland, and gain some idea of what the phrase meant in this secular 
context. Thus for instance the common la\v is described as the law 
used between subjects; 23 the common law of Scotland may be different 
from that of England; 24 and finally it is argued that, since the 
court is the court of the king of England, it is the English common 
law by which the result should be finally det.ermined. 25 The 
description of the common law as the law used between subjects is 
particularly interesting as a reminder of the concept of 'common 
pleas' in chapter 17 of the 1215 Magna Carta which gave rise in 
22. Stevenson, Documents i 168 - 9. 
23. Stones and Simpson, Edward I ii 167. 
24. Ibid., 198, 199, 212, 214 - 15. 
25. Ibid., 179, 198, 199· 
time to the court of that name and which meant those pleas in which 
there was no specific royal interest. 26 
The significance of royal jurisdiction and royal justice in 
Scotland as well as in England prior to 1300 is thus apparent. 
Royal justice was an aspect of kingship, part of the cement which 
bound the kingdom together. It seems that the provision of royal 
justice led to the emergence of a framework of national law, with 
its own courts and pr6cedure. The evidence suggests the increasing 
availability of these courts and procedures, so that their use became 
a matter of choice for litigants rather than a special favour from 
the king. No longer.was it the case that royal justice·was for 
use only if the king took an interest in the dispute; it was the 
law used between his subjects when they litigated in his courts. 
The creation of a-common law in Scotland appears therefore to 
have been achieved well before the end of the thirteenth century and 
to have its roots in the exercise of royal authority. It is of 
course striking that this development appears to have occurred without 
there being any noticeable evolution along English lines of the royal 
courts. There is no trace in Scotland during the thirteenth century 
of the emergence of courts comparable to those of Common Pleas and 
King's Bench which were developing at that time in England. Most 
commentators have seen this as a failure fatal to the developments 
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, since it led ultimately to 
a breakdown of that system in the period after 1350. But, as we have 
seen in examining the evidence for the period before 1300, it was 
26. Baker, Introduction, 35· For text of and comment on chapter 17, 
see J.C. Halt, Magna Carta (Cambridge,l965) 223- 4 and 322- 3. 
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royal activity in the administration of justice rather than a 
central court which was the key to the establishment of a national 
or common law. If we go on to consider the evidence from the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it is apparent that Scottish 
kings were still expected to give attention to the administration 
of justice. The most striking example of this is found in 1399 
when parliament held that 'the mysgovernance of the Realme and the 
default of the kepyng of the common law sulde be input to the kyng 
and his officeris'. 27 The personal nature of this burden is a 
recurrent theme of kingship in later medieval Scotland. In 1357 
upon his return from captivity in England, David II was enjoined to 
hold a justice ayre througho~t the kingdom in person 'on account of 
the full justice of the king's authority which makes and strikes 
f . d I 28 ear ~n wrong oers • Nearly thirty years later, 'because the 
lord king for certain reasons is unable to attend personally to 
the execution of justice and of the laws of his kingdom', it was 
decided that the heir to the throne, the earl of Carrick, was 'to 
execute the common law everywhere in the kingdom•. 29 Much later, 
when Carrick had succeeded to the throne as Robert III, his brother 
the duke of Albany was appointed king's lieutenant in similar fashion. 30 
Dr. N.A.T. Macdougall has pointed out that James III was the subject 
of repeated contemporary criticism 'because royal justice was not 
27- APS i 572-
28. APS i 491. 
29. APS i 551. 
30. See SHR 35 (1956) at 141 where Professor Duncan prints this 
first· statute of a council general of ·1404. 
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being vigorously administered by the king in person•. 31 One of 
the first commitments made by James IV on his accession to the throne 
in 1488 was to attend the justice ayres - a promise which, as we 
shall see, he seems to have kept.32 The general expectations of 
the king's subjects were c~early stated by parliament in 1473: he 
was to 'travel throw his Rea1me and put sic Justice and polycy in 
his owne realme that the brute and the fame of him mycht pas in 
utheris contreis 1 .33 
It seems therefore that there remained an association between 
' 
royal authority and the administration of the common law, and this 
borne out by the many other references to the common law in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth cent~ries. \Ye find mention made of the 
'kingis lawis' and the 'kingis lawis and statutis', 
34 which by act 
of parliament in 1426 were contrasted with and to prevail over 
is 
'particulare lawis ••• speciale privilegis ... lawis of uther cuntries 
and realmis 1 • 35 This is strongly reminiscent of the canonist idea 
of jus commune in a national context. The identity of the common 
law and the king's law is confirmed by a statute of 1504 ordaining 
that Scotland was to be 'reu1it be our soverane 1ordis ane 1awis and 
commone 1awis of the realme and be nain other 1awis•.
36 
31. Macdougal1, James Ill, 299· 
32. APS ii 208; for the justice ayres in the reign of James IV 
see Mackie, James IV, 50, and below, 83 - 7· 
33· APS ii 104. 
34. See for examp1~ ~ ii 9,c. 3; APS ii 49, c. 16, and APS ii 
222, c. 21. 
35. APS ii 9,c. 3· 
36. APS ii 252,c. 24. 
i 
In the fifteenth century then the term 'common law' retained 
the implication of generality distinct from the regional particularity 
of certain laws and customs within the kingdom. There is much evidence 
for the continuing existence of local laws and customs which owed 
little if anything to royal authority: 'Fleminglauch' in the Garioch 
for example, 37 or the laws of Gallo'tTay and 'surdi t de sergaunt 1 • 38 
In Fife there were the privileges of 'Kynmaccaroun' and the 'law of 
Clan Macduff', both of which appear to have conferred rights to 
repledge men to their own courts upon, respectively, Dunfermline 
abbey and the earl of Fife.39 Indeed it seems possible that the 
act of 1426 was directed in some way at the law of Clan Macduff. 
The earl of Fife, Murdoch St~wart, had been executed the previous 
37-
38. 
39· 
Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iv 156; RMS i app. 1 no. 128 and 
app. 2 no. 1297; Aberdeen- Banff Coll., 548. 
For the 'laws of Galloway', see APS i 403, 537 and RMS i app. 
2 no. 1012; for 'surdit de sergaunt', which appears~ have 
been the most important aspect of the Galloway laws, t-lelrose 
Liber i no. 316; Rot. Parl. i 472 (also Memoranda de Parliaments 
1305 ed. F.W. Naitland (Rolls Series, 1893) 171 - 2 and Bain, 
CDS ii no. 1874) and RMS i app. 1 nos. 20 and 59 (cf. RMS i 
no. 192 and app. 2 no:-1501, also Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iv 720 
and Fraser, Carlaverock ii no. 16). 'Surdit de sergaunt' is 
the subject of articles by G. Neilson, '"Surdit de sergaunt": 
an old Galloway law', 'The Scottish Antiquary 11 (1897) 155- 157, 
and w.c. Dickinson, 'Surdit de sergaunt', SHR 39 (1960) 170- 175· 
See also G.W.S. Barrow, 'The pattern of lordship and feudal 
settlement in Cumbria', Journal of Medieval History 1 (1975) 
117 - 138 at 129 - 30. 
For 'Kynmaccaroun', see Dunfermline Registrum no. 456; for the 
'law of Clan l-facduff', APS i 551; SRO, Abercairney Huniments, 
GD 24/5/17, a case of 1391 summarised HMC iii 417 along with 
another of 1421; Balfour, Practicks ii 511 - 12 recording a 
case of 1548; Skene, De Verborum Significatione, s.v. 'Clan-
Makduf'. See also J. Btuart, The Sculptured Stones of Scotland 
{2 vols, Spalding Club, 185h, 1867) ii, lxvi - lxxiii; W.F. 
Skene, Celtic Scotland (2nd ed., Edinburgh,l890) iii 303- 5; 
HMC viii 297 - 8;· Fife Court Bk., 345 n. 5; Dunfermline Court 
Bk., .11- 12; Duncan, Making of the Kingdom, 114- 5; Nicholson, 
Later Middle Ages, 190. Note also the reference to the 
'Grosmakduf' in James I's 1428 charter to Cupar: Cupar Chrs •. 
no. 3· 
~~~~~~~------~~--------~ 
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year; the meas~re may have been intended to prevent adherents still 
at large from pleading the law to escape royal justice. 40 If so, 
it marks a change in official policy. In 1384 it had· been permissible 
to reserve the privileges of the laws of Clan Macduff and of Galloway 
against an otherwise general enactment concerning the arrest of 
f . t• . . 41 ug~ ~ ve cr~m~nals. Now all ·the king' s subjects were to underlie 
the king's justice. Similarly in 1490 the custom of 'cawp taking' 
in Galloway and Carrick was abolished. 42 The statute of 1504 was 
passed by a parliament giving 'an un\·tOnted show of concern for the 
betterment of government in the Highlands and Isles' and seeking 
finally to subdue the stubborn independence of the Lordship of the 
Isles. It seems likely that, as with the statute of 1426, it 
represents, not vague and wistful aspirations, but the desire to 
suppress Celtic iaw and custom within the Lordship. 43 If this is 
accepted, then a more general pattern begins to emerge from the 
fifteenth century evidence: a tendency, not previously apparent, 
to establish the exclusive authority of the common law. 
40. This is the persuasive suggestion of A.A.M. Duncan, 'James I 
1424 - 1437' (University of Glasgow, Scottish History Department 
Occasional Papers 1976) 10. Both Balfour-Melville, James I, 
130 and Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 309 also link the act of 
1426 with the law of Clan Macduff, each for different reasons. 
But note the 1548 case in Balfour's Practicks, above, note 39. 
41. APS i 551; Nicholson, Later Middle Ages~190. 
42. See APS ii 214, c. 5, and APS ii 222, cc. 19 and 20. 'Cawps' 
were gifts to a chief made in return for his support and protection: 
Skene, DVS s.v. 'Cawpes•. It seems to be linked with 'Kenkynnol', 
for which see RMS i nos. 508 and 509 and app. 2 no. 942; Formulary E, 
no. 83; SRO,Ailsa Muniments, GD 25/1/29, 39, 40, 45, 52, 58, 60, 
63 and 66·;- RMS ii no. 414; Duncan, Making of the Kingdom, 108 - 9. 
43. Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 546. See also on the 1504 act G. 
Donaldson, 'Problems of sovereignty and law in Orkney and Shetland', 
Miscellany !I (Stair Soc., vol. 35, 1984) 13- 40 at 26, pointing. 
out that as originally drafted it was to apply to Orkney, Shetland 
and the Isles but was eventually confined to 'the !lis' -i.e. the 
Western Isles. There in an observation to sirnil~r effect in A.L. 
Kurray, 'Sinclair's Practicks', Lawmaking and Lawmakers in British 
Historl e~. A. Hardine (RoyRl Historical Society, 1930) 90 _ 104 at 
102 note 49. 
-
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There is also evidence showing the association of common law 
with good government, due process and general order. Defenders would 
give law-burrows to do nothing 'against the common law•. 44 In 1424 
parliament ordained that 1 ferme and sikkir pece be kepit and haldin 
throu all the Realme ••• ~nder all payne that may folowe be cours of 
common lawe•. 45 A similar statute the following year enacted that 
no-one was to assist 'opyn and manifest rebellouris agayne the kyngis 
maieste and the commoune law•. 46 In 1490 parliament found that a 
'process of forfaltour ••• was nocht lauchfully led nor deducit be 
just and gudely ordoure according to the Commoune Law and to the use 
and consuetude of utheris processes of forfaltour led of before•. 47 
Even the king had to bow to the common law. In 1391 Sir Thomas 
Erskine petitioned the king not to confirm any contract between Sir 
Malcolm Drummond and Sir John Swinton which might prejudice his wife's 
right to the earldom of Mar. To do otherwise, Erskine claimed, would 
be 'in hurtying of the commoune lauch of the kynryk'. The king 
replied 'that it suld nocht be his wil in that case no in nane othir 
oucht to do or to conferme that suld ryn ony man in preiudice of thair 
. 48 heritage attour the commoune lauch'. In 1493 James IV reached his 
majority and revoked a number of transactions carried out in his 
minority, explaining that the civil and the canon laws allowed those 
44. See e.g. Moray Registrum no. 353; ADA,l8, 19 etc., passim. 
45. APS ii 3, c. 2. 
46. APS ii 8, c. 15. 
47. ~s ii 218. 
48. APS i 578 - 9· 
.. 
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damaged by alienations of their heritage when under age to do this. 
Lastly he stated that he revoked all 'that the commoun law leiffs 
us to revoke and reduce'. 49 The common law thus appears as a check, 
at least in theory, upon arbitrary royal conduct, as well as a body 
of law distinct from the ·civilian and canonical codes. 
(b) The Royal Courts 
Against this b~ckground, some reassessment of the role of the 
sheriffs and justiciars in the administration of justice seems 
appropriate. It is perhaps worth stressing that their courts 
continued to be regarded as 'royal', in view of the tendency of 
some writers to confine royal justice to the workings of the king's 
council. Courts in the later middle ages continued to be made up 
of those who owed them suit. Thus the royal courts were made up 
of the king's tenants-in-chief and it is common to find references 
to suit of court in royal documents of our period, usually either 
demanding or waiving it. Thus the Regent Albany insisted in 1409 
that William Crawford should continue to pay suit at the sheriff 
courts of Stirling and at the justice court when it was held there,50 
while in 1346 David II exempted Newbattle Abbey from rendering suit 
at 'our justiciary court of Lothian'.5l Kings often spoke in such 
proprietary tones of these courts: numerous examples may be found in 
the first printed volume o~ the register of the great seal. Nor was 
it only the king who so regarded them: John Crab burgess of Aberdeen 
49. ~ ii 236, c. 22; 
50. Fraser, Elphinstone ii no. 11. 
51. RRS vi no. 101; Newbattle Registrum no. 272. 
.. 
53 
falsed the doom of a baron court 'in the sheriff court of our lord 
king' in 1382.52 This serves to underline the point already made 
concerning the early development of royal justice, that it was 
exercised through a number of courts and depended chiefly, not upon 
'central' courts following the king himself, but upon courts held in 
his name by his officers either based in or travelling through the 
various parts of the kingdom. By the end of the thirteenth century 
the administration of royal justice in this form had ceased to be 
remarkable, and the emphasis on the idea of the 'king's court' had 
lessened: nevertheless as late as 1428 there is a reference to the 
'curia regis vicecomitatus de Air?? while James II could speak of 
'curias nostras de camerarie et justiciarie' in 1445?4 The 
administration of the common law, the king's law, was not the king's 
sole responsibility before 1500. As parliament had indicated when 
censuring Robert III in 1399, any failings in this matter were due 
also to the defaults of the king's officers.55 
The importance and significance of the role of these officers 
is confirmed, I would suggest, by a number of enactments usually 
taken as indicative of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of their 
courts. Certainly, taken out of context, they convey an unhappy 
impression, but set against their general historical background they 
take on a different character, being contemporary with either a change 
52. Aberdeen Registrum i 145. 
53· RMS ii no. 108. 
54. Moray Registrum no. 191. 
55· APS i 5?2. 
.. 
in government or the conclusion of some major political crisis. 
So for example in 1357 David II was requested to hold an ayre to 
check particularly that royal officers had not conducted themselves 
fraudulently or unfaithfully. 56 This enactment was passed by a 
council within one month·of David's return from eleven years of 
captivity in England. 57 In 1404 Albany was appointed king's 
lieutenant to the enfeebled Robert III by a council-general, which 
also enacted that justiciars and sheriffs should be appointed and 
should not neglect to hold their courts at the due times. 58 Twenty 
years later, on the return of James I, again from captivity in 
England, parliament laid down 'that thar be maide officiaris and 
ministeris of lawe throu all the Realme that can and may halde the 
law to the kingis commonis 1 .59 In 1440, following what has been 
described as a complete collapse of law and order after the death 
of the lieutenant general in the previous year, a general council 
signalled the return of normality by ordering the holding of justice 
ayres. 60 When James II reached his.majority in 1450 and took up 
the responsibilities of government, parliament proclaimed general 
peace and asked the king to appoint officers capable of punishing 
those who infringed it. 'Juste men ••• that kennys the law' were 
to be appointed; negligent officers were to be punished; and 
56. APS i 492. 
57. Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 163 - 5· 
58. SHR 35 (1956) at 135, cc. 1 and 2 (translations at 136 - 7). 
59. APS ii 3, c. q. 
60. APS ii 32, c. 2; Dunlop, Bishop Kennedy, 318. 
• 
justice ayres were to be held. 61 Finally in 1488, following the 
dethronement and death of James III Qn the field of Stirling, it 
was ordained that all those who had held offices such as those of 
55 
justice and sheriff under him were to be replaced by the new king's 
. t 62 own appo1n ments. 
It is not unreasonable to see a pattern emerging when these 
statutes are considered together in this way. To some extent at 
least they appear to be proclamations of the intention of a new 
government to rule justly by the expectations of the time and place: 
that is, through the work of officers such as the justiciar and the 
sheriff. To say the.least it is striking how such proclamations 
coincide with changes at the top of the power structure. Perhaps 
therefore these enactments are part of contemporary political 
rhetoric, similar in this respect to the common statements that 
justice would be done to rich and poor alike and that holy mother 
church should be protected. At the same time, the passage of such 
statutes enabled the new government to appoint its own officers if 
necessary and thus consolidate its grip upon the kingdom. It may be 
in other words that, rather than using these statutes to deduce that 
sheriffs and justiciars did not ·hold their courts or that they were 
chronically fraudulent and inept, we should see them as indicators of 
the importance attached to these royal officers and their customary 
role in the later middle ages; an importance due, amongst other things, to 
the fact that they were judges of the common law of Scotland. 
61. APS ii 35, c. 2. -
62. APS ii 207, c. 6. 
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(c) The Justiciary 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with the justiciary 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, attempting to fill what 
remains something of a gap in its history. Thanks to the detailed 
studies of Professor Dickinson we have a relatively greater knowledge 
of the operation of the sheriff and the burgh courts. Hith both, 
there were three sittings per annum of the head courts (curiae capitales) 
at which all those who owed suit in the court would be present, as well 
as intermediate courts held at shorter intervals with a lesser 
attendance of suitors. Both sheriff and burgh courts had full 
complements of subordinate staff - mairs or sergeands to execute 
summonses a~d judgments, clerks to keep the written record, and 
dempsters to pronounce the dooms. 63 Unfortunately in his very 
brief article on the history of the High Court of Justiciary for 
the Stair Society's Introduction to Scottish Legal History Professor 
Dickinson had no space to discuss such matters as the organisation, 
structure and personnel of the medieval justiciary. For the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries the gap is now filled by the detailed study 
of Professor Barrow; the later medieval period remains little known, 
the fullest discussion still being that of Hume published in 1819. 64 
In seeking to repair this deficiency our starting point must be 
Professor Barrow's article, in which he concluded that the justiciary 
was 'a principal institutiqn within the framework of Scottish royal 
63. See the introductions to Fife Court Book esp. at xiv - xviii, 
liv- lxix, and Aberdeen Bu~gh Recs., esp. at cxvii - cxxv;_ 
also his '"County" days in Scotland', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical.Research 3 (1926) 161- 167. 
64. W.C. ~ickinson, 'The High Court of Justiciary', Introduction to 
Scottish Legal Histor~ ed. G.C.H. Paten (Stair Soc. vol. 20, 1958) 
4oS- 412 esp., at 4o - 9; D. Hume, Commentaries on the Law of 
Scotland respecting Crimes (2nd ed., 2 vols.,Edinburgh,1819) ii 
1 - 14. 
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government• 65 of that period, responsible inter alia for a wide 
range of judicial functions, both civil and criminal. For the 
purposes of the justiciarship the country was divided into regions 
bearing some relation to the older kingdoms which now made up the 
realm of Scotland. The basic division fell on the line of the river 
Forth, but another threefold partition was used, between the regions 
of Scotia, Lothian and Galloway. Probably twice in the year, in 
the spring and in the early autumn, the justiciars went on circuit, 
or on ayre, one to each region, and held courts at the caput of each 
of the sheriffdoms within his jurisdiction. They were not 
'professional' full-time judges comparable in any way with the 
English justices but were 1 \'li thout legal training, laymen rather 
than clergy, noblemen rather than of middle rank, and enjoying office 
by something akin to hereditary succession•. 66 
Professor Barrow is able to show: 67 
Nevertheless, as 
A study of the office as it was actually exercised in 
a period so formative for the historical Scottish 
kingdom ought at least to put us on our guard against 
hasty condemnations of the native secular legal 
machinery. It is not self-evident that the institutions 
at the disposal of the Scqttish state for administering 
justice during the period from David I to John Balliol 
were inadequate for the purposes for which they were 
designed. 
When we go on to examine the evidence for the justiciarship in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, continuity on at least three main 
points is apparent. First, the justiciarship continued to be divided 
regionally, around the line of the river Forth. Second, within each 
region, the justiciar continued to go on circuit or on ayre; and, in 
65. Barrow, Kingdom, 136. 
66. Barrow, Kingdom, 122. 
67. Barrow, Kingdom, 136. 
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theory at least, he went twice in the year. Third, the justiciars 
continued to be dra~m, on the whole, from the ranks of the magnates. 
Moreover, the holders of the office tended to be men of importance in 
other areas of royal government. Thus the justiciarship remained a 
significant office. Each of these points will now be examined in 
detail. 
(i) The regional division of the justiciary 
Professor Barrow's article brings the history of the justiciary 
down to 1306, the year of the coronation of Robert I. In the autumn 
of the previous year Edward I had introduced a new scheme for the 
justiciarship, with four rather than the traditional two or three 
zones. These were Lothian, G~lloway, the country between Forth and 
the Mounth, and the country north of the Mounth. 68 It seems that 
for a time Robert I adopted this scheme, at least in part, to judge 
from the appearance of a justiciar 'from the waters of the Forth to 
the mountains of Scotia' in 1310.69 By 1312 however we find a 
justiciar 'from Forth to Orkney• 70 - that is, subsuming the two 
northern regions of the 1305 Ordinance. References to a northern 
justiciar and to a justiciar of Lothian·are frequent thereafter, 
but no mention is ever made of a justiciar of Galloway. 71 It seems 
68. Stones, Documents no. 33 (also APS i 119 - 122; summarised 
Bain, CDS ii no. 1691). See Barro\'1, Bruce, 190. 
69. Abbotsford Mise. i 53 6; Lindores (Abbotsford) 11 - 13. 
70. H:HC V 626. 
71. See Barrow, Kingdom, 106 - 7 and note 107: the justiciarship 
of Galloway •• barely outlived the th~rteenth. century'. Note that 
_the designations of.Gilbert lord Kennedy as justiciar of Gallpway 
in 1459 (ER vi 574) and of Mark Ha1iburton as clerk of the 
justici"aryof Galloway in 1457 (ER vi 353) are not revivals of 
the thirteenth century justiciarY: but an aspect of the 
administration of cro\vn lands. The Douglas forfeiture in 1455 
had brought the lordship of Galloway into the crown patrimony 
(Nicholson, Later Middle Ages,378). 
therefore that under Robert I the justiciary returned to its 
simplest form of a twofold division between north and south. 72 
Only at the very end of the reign of David II did the 
terminology describing this division become settled as 'the 
justiciar ~ither] north (Pr] south of Forth'. Throughout the 
reign of Robert I and most of that of David II the southern 
justiciarship was said to be 'of Lothian•; 73 only in 1368 do we 
find the justiciar for that region being described as 'ex parte 
australi ague de Forth' (on the southern side of the water of 
74 Forth). Oddly this label may have been attached some years 
earlier to the clerk of the southern justiciary, in 1362. 75 From 
1368 the usage is substantially unvarying until the beginning of 
the sixteenth century. The description of the northern justiciar 
was much more changeable up to the 1360s and, indeed, to some extent 
beyond that time also. As early as 1282 there is a reference to 
the justiciar 'ex parte boreali ague de Forth' (on the northern 
side of the water of Forth), 76 but in the first half of the fourteenth 
century we also find the justiciar of Scotia, 77 the justiciar north 
72. Cf. Barrow, Bruce, 414. 
73· See the references to Robert Lauder the elder as justiciar 
of Lothian listed in Appendix B, below; also Melrose Liber ~~ 
no. 421; RRS vi nos. 101, 219 and 237. Raine, North Durham 
no. 326 gives the seal of the office of the justiciary of 
Lothian in 1366. 
74. RRS vi no. 503. 
75· RMS i no. 100 and note; cf. A.L. Murray, 'The lord clerk 
register', SHR 53 (1974) 124 .- 156 at 127. 
76. N.O. Anderson, Kings and Kingship in Early Scotland (Edinburgh, 
1973) xvii, note 3. 
77· Fraser, Menteith ii no. 29. 
of the Scottish sea, 78 and the justiciar of Scotia north of Forth. 79 
By and large from the 1360s the usage justiciar north of Forth was 
standard80 but there were occasional departures from this: Murdoch 
Stewart, for instance,is designated justiciar of Scotia north of 
81 Forth as late as 1398. . There are also references to Robert Lauder 
of the Bass and Edrington as justiciar of Scotia in 1425. 82 It is 
just possible that the description has a different meaning here 
however, as by the fifteenth century, the name 'Scotia' was commonly 
applied to the whole kingdom and not just the regions north of Forth. 83 
Since the usage north or south of Forth was otherwise the norm in the 
reign of James I, Lauder's title may suggest that he was justiciar 
for the whole kingdom. Not long after the accession of James !I James 
Douglas of Balvany earl of Avandale appears as 'justiciar of the whole 
realm of Scots generally constituted•, 84 showing that it was not 
78. Scone Liber no. 130; APS i 5ll;RRS vi nos. 3, 70 and 234; 
SHR 9 (1912) at 239; DUnfermline-Registrum no. 376; Aberdeen 
Registrum i 86; RMS i app. 1 no. 144. 
79. Aberdeen Registrum i 79 - 81; Fraser, Southesk ii no. 36. 
80. Early references to 'the justiciar north of Forth' include 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
Moray Registrum cartae originales no. 18; Dunfermline Registrum 
no. 376; Panmure Registrum 169; RMS i app. 1 no. 28; RMS i 
no. 161; RMS ii no. 3717; RRS vi nos. 33, 50, 230 and 462. 
In one northern document Alexander lord of the Isles is designed 
as justiciar 'this side (citra) Forth'~} (Aberdeen Registrum i 
241). 
RMSi no. 886. 
Lain~ Chrs. no. 81; RMS ii no. 29. 
Barrow, Kingdom, 364. 
Fraser, Douglas iii no. 301. 
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unthinkable for the offices to be combined in one man. Thus 1t1hen 
we see three men - Alexander Livingstone of Callendar, Gilbert lord 
Kennedy and David Guthrie of that ilk - each designated justiciar of 
Scotia later in the fifteenth century, 85 it may be that they were 
justiciars of the \·Jhole realm and that this explains the revival of 
the old-fashioned title. The hypothesis m~y gain support from the 
simple descriptions of Lauder, Kennedy and Guthrie at the relevant 
dates as 'the justiciar•.86 But if the offices north and south of 
Forth were united in this way in the fifteenth century clearly it was 
exceptional and only for the briefest of intervals on each occasion. 
For the most part there were two justiciars whose jurisdiction was 
determined by the course of the river Forth. 
Probably the importance to be given to these changes in the 
justiciars' titles is minimal. Doubtless Scotia was equivalent to 
the lands north of the Forth and similarly Lothian (and Galloway) to 
those in the south. It seems safe to conclude that these 'changes' 
do not signify any fundamental breach in the continuity of the 
justiciarship. It remained a task involving at least two people 
each having competence within a particular region. This was 
certainly regarded as the normal pattern throughout the fifteenth 
century. So in 1404 when a general council appointed the duke of 
Albany lieutenant in place of Robert III, the king ordained that there 
should be justiciars north and south of Forth. 87 Althou~h it is 
85. Foedera xi 238, summarised Bain, CDS iv no. 1216 (Livingstone 
of Callendar); RMS ii no. 81~ (Kennedy); SRO, Rollo of Duncub 
Muniments, GD 5b7li (Guthrie). · .. 
86. RMS ii, reign of James Itwitness nos. 27, 36 (Lauder); HMC 
iv 507 (Kennedy); TA i 66, 68 (Guthrie). 
87. SHR ·35 (1956) at 135 (c. 2). 
sometimes suggested that James I initiated the movement to 
establish a central court, he seems to have made no serious attempt 
to alter the structure of the justiciarship, and a statute of 1436 
refers to 'the kingis justices of baith the sydis of the watter of 
Forth•. 88 Four years later a general council ordained that 'the 
Justice on the south side of the scottis se and alsua on the north 
side of the scottis see [shal~ sett thare Justice airis' as part 
of an effort to restore order. 89 Even when reform was in the air, 
the arrangements of the justiciarship seem to have been virtually 
immune. Thus when in 1487, James III and his parliament commenced 
what looks like a 'law and order' drive, their basic tool for 
achieving this goal was the justiciarship, but the geographical 
division was simply assumed: the only change in this regard was to 
make it possible to have two 'justices-general' in each of the 
. 90 
reg1ons. This was made a little more specific early in 1488, 
when parliament listed four persons from whom the two 'gret Justicez ••• 
on the south side of Forthe' would be selected by the king, and named 
two others to act as justiciars in the north. 91 
The beginnings of change can be detected in the reign of James IV. 
From 1499 to 1501 George earl of Huntly and Andrew lord Gray were 
the justiciars, but from Huntly's death, Gray seems to have been the 
only holder of the office, and in 1503 he was described as 1 justiciar 
88. APS ii 24, c. 12. 
89. APS ii 32, c. 2. 
90. APS ii 176, c. 2. See also below, 114. 
91. APS ii 182, cc. 5 and 6. On the significance of this 'law and 
order' drive, contrast Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 523 - 4 
with Macdougall, James III, 236. 
general of the whole realm of Scotland'.92 In 1514 or 1515 Gray 
was succeeded by Colin earl of Argyll who was commissioned to act 
as justice-general both north and south of the Forth.93 This looks 
like the last word of the old system for by 1524 the Justice was to 
sit continually in Edinbu~gh for the hearing of criminal cases.94 
The central criminal court that had thus emerged was one with 
jurisdiction over the whole kingdom, and although there were attempts 
to revive the holding of ayres and justice courts in the localities 
throughout the sixteenth century, these do not appear to have been 
successful. 95 Thus it appears that not only is the reign of James IV 
significant for the beginning of the development of a central court in 
civil causes, but it is also the period in which a similar change in 
the administration of criminal justice was commenc~ng. 
(ii) The Justice Ayres 
This brings us on to the second point upon which continuity or 
conservatism may be observed in the development of the justiciarship 
between 1300 and 1500: that is, the system of justice ayres which 
according to a late thirteenth century manuscript, were to be held 
twice a year in the spring and in the autumn. 96 This remained the 
92. APS ii 273; and see below, 116 - 7. 
93· HMC iv 487. 
94. 
95· 
96. 
APS 11 286, c. 8. But note that at the end of the sixteenth 
century there was still a separate seal for the justiciary south 
of Forth: R.K. Hannay, 'The office of the justice clerk', JR 47 
(1935) 311 - 329 at 312. 
W.C. Dickinson, 'The High Co~rt of Justiciary', 410. 
SHS Mise. ii 36. 
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theoretical position throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, as a number of parliamentary and other enactments 
demonstrate. The justiciars were to 'pass throu the cuntre',97 
'twiss in the yere•, 98 'anys on the girss and anys on the Corne'99 
for this was a practice 'eftir the auld lawis', hallowed by 'auld 
lOO 
use and custom'. But historians have doubted whether practice 
did in fact follow ·theory in this regard. One has commented that 
' h d d t b f . f t' 101 h.l p f t e ayres ten e o e ew and ~n requen , w ~ e ro essor 
Dickinson noted that 'a system which works well has no need of 
frequent legislation, but at least seven acts enjoining the ayres 
to be held yearly, or generally, or diligently were passed between 
But as has been pointed out by Ranald Nicholson 
the frequency of legislation also suggests 'that against the general 
background of curial ineptitude the ayres stood out as being worthy 
of respect•. 103 
I have counted eleven enactments between 1404 and 1491 which 
refer to the holding of ayres. Some of these have already been 
referred to in the discussion of statutes which were in essence, it 
was submitted, propaganda statements of governments which were new 
or which wished to proclaim the return of normality after some crisis. 
97- ~s ii 35, c. 2. 
98. ~s ii 32, c. 2. 
99· ~s ii 170, c. 4; ~s ii 225, c. 10. 
100. ~s ii 32, c. 2; APS ii 35, c. 2. 
101. Dickinson/Duncan, Scotland, 98. 
102. Dickinson, 'The ffi~ Court of Justiciary', 4o8. 
103. Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 427 - 8. 
This would account for statutes enjoining the holding of justice 
ayres in 1404, 1440, 1450 and 1488. In this interpretation 
therefore, justice ayres would fall to be regarded as part of the 
ordinary routine of royal government, or as an aspect of normality, 
rather than occasional events. Careful scrutiny in context of two 
more of these statutes, passed respectively in March 1458 and in 
May 1491, also suggests that they cannot be explained as reactions 
to a failure to hold ayres. In the first of these, parliament 
enacted 'that justice ayris be haldin and continewyt yerly out throu 
104 the realme for gude of the commounys 1 • Nicholson states that 
'it was presumably because of lapses in the holding of justice 
ayres• 105 that this statute was passed; but if this is so it is 
strange that in the same parliament the king was congratulated on 
his success in the administration of justice which had driven 
d f h 1 d 106 M 'd f th h wrong oers rom t e an • oreover ev~ ence rom e exc equer 
rolls suggests that the ayres were held regularly throughout the 
4 d h k . h' lf t• t• . 107 1 50s, an that t e ~ng ~mse was an ac ~ve par ~c~pant. 
The statute cannot therefore be taken as meaning that ayres did 
not take place; it seems more likely to have been an endorsement 
of current successful practice. 
A similar comment may be applied to the act of 1491, which 
simply ordained that 'airis be set and haldin•. 108 It has been 
104. APS ii 49, c. 14. 
105. Nicholson, Later Middle A~es, 383. 
106. APS·ii 52. 
107. See below, 77 - B. 
108. APS ii 225,c. 10. 
remarked of James IV that he drove the ayres 'as they had never 
been driven before•. 109 While the implied comment on the period 
before James' accession may be questioned, it is true that in his 
reign we have for the first time clear evidence of ayres being held 
regularly. The evidence ·is found mainly in the accounts of the 
treasurer where they record the king's spending as he moved round 
the country with the ayres. Thus the king was with the justice 
ayre in the autumn of 1488, the spring of 1489 and also of 1490, 
and in July 1491.110 Others may well have been held in the period, 
but since the king did not participate there is no trace of them in 
the records of his finances. But enough has survived to indicate 
that, whatever may have lain behind the statute of 1491, it was 
not 'lapses in the holding of the ayres•. 
We come in consequence of this discussion to the remaining half-
dozen statutes with a rather more optimistic view of the regularity 
of justice ayres in the fifteenth century than has be·en taken 
previously. An immediately striking feature of this group is that 
they were all enacted in the period 1479 - 1488: that is, in the 
last years of the reign of James III. James was a troubled king 
throughout this period and to some extent these statutes reflect his 
particular problems. Thus for example the principal emphasis of the 
act of 1479 is not so much on failure to hold ayres, more the demand 
h , . ld . lf . . t 111 that t e K~ng shou h~mse part~c~pa e. As has already been 
109. Dickinson/Duncan, Scotland, 252. 
110. TA i 102 ~ 5, 130 - 1, 140, 150; ER x 243, 366. 
111. APS ii lll,c. 2. 
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noted, James was frequently criticised for his lack of involvement 
with the processes of justice; but this need not imply that 
consequently there was no justice to be had at all. In the 1480s 
James also came under heavy fire from parliament for his readiness 
to grant remissions and respites to convicted criminals, and it is 
in this context that the statutes anent justice ayres are to be found. 
A brief glimpse of the extent to which James did in fact grant 
remissions is provided by the treasurer's account for 1473.112 It 
is significant that these remissions or compositions were given 
following an ayre on the south-west circuit in the autumn of 1473· 
This suggests that ayres were a prerequisite of remissions, in the 
sense that generally a remissi~n would only be necessary upon 
conviction.113 Such a view would seem to be borne out by the 
parliamentary enactments under discussion: they seek the 'scharpe 
executioun of justice' upon criminals, that is, they prefer punishment 
114 to mercy. It can therefore be argued that the problem which 
these acts show is not the lack of justice ayres, but rather one 
concerned with the disposal of those convicted in the ayres. 
It is submitted therefore that too much has been inferred 
from the statutes of the fifteenth century regarding the frequency 
of justice ayres. Any conclusion upon· this question, be it positive 
112. TA i 6 - 10. 
113. C.H.W. Gane, 'The effect of a royal pardon in Scots law', 
JR 25 (1980) 18 - 46 at 21. 
114. APS ii 104, 118, 165, 170 and 176. See also APS ii 201 
and Macdougal1, James III, 99, 120 and 201 - 3-.---
or negative, based upon these statutes alone would be dangerous, 
as is clearly shown by the examples of 1458 and 1491. There is 
scope for differing interpretations as they stand; the validity 
of such interpretations must be tested against a deeper investigation 
of the sources than would appear to have been attempted hitherto. 
It is true of course that the material for such an investigation is 
not extensive, nor does it give us a direct or particularly satisfactory 
picture. What follows is largely based on an examination of the 
financial record contained in the exchequer rolls and on the 
completely haphazard references in charters, notarial instruments 
and the like, preserved in various sources. The limitations of 
such evidence for the purpose ~f determining the frequency of the 
justice ayres are obvious. The exchequer rolls refer to justice 
ayres when recorded in sheriffs' accounts; it is notorious that 
there are serious gaps in the sheriffs accounts.115 Equally a 
complete assessment of the 'charter' evidence would, in Professor 
Barrow's words, 'require the laborious and minute examination of 
scores and hundreds of private charters•.116 The present study 
has not aimed at that kind of completeness but rather at the 
assembly of sufficient material to support the conclusion that 
justice ayres were for the most part held on regular basis throughout 
the later medieval period. 
115. For the lack of sheriffs' accounts see Webster, Scotland, 
139. For the evidence found in the exchequer rolls see 
also ibid., 133- 141. For a helpful account of exchequer 
procedure see A.L. Hurray, 'The procedure of the Scottish 
exchequer in the early sixteenth century',. SHR 40 (1961) 
89 - 117, especially at 104 - 6 for the evidence of the 
sheriffs' accounts on justice ayres. 
116. Bar~ow, Kingdom, 119. 
Evidence for the holding of ayres in the reign of Robert I, 
as distinct from the appointment of justiciars, is not very 
extensive. As early as May 1306 the pleas of the justiciary of 
Fife were being held and included a perambulation.117 It is 
likely that this ayre was· held, not under the authority of Robert I, 
but under that of the English crown. 118 There is no doubt that at 
least one of the justiciars appointed by Edward I in the Ordinance 
of September 1305 did carry out justice ayres. He was Sir Adam 
Gordon, who in 1310 and 1311 had not received his fee for the 
second, third and fourth years in which he was justiciar of Lothian. 119 
He had been appointed to that office in the 1305 Ordinance and this 
evidence perhaps suggests th~t he held ayres in 1307, 1308 and 1309. 
It is also worth noting that the murder of John Comyn at Dumfries 
in February 1306 took place when 'King Edward's Justices were 
holding their session in the castle• 120 and that it is said by 
one chronicler of the period that the justices' use of the penalty 
of outlawry during that year drove many to side with the Bruce 
revolt.121 
117-
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
Dunfermline Registrum no. 590. 
The parties to the perambulation were the abbot and convent of 
Dunfermline and the earl of Fife, both in the English camp in 
1306. (Barrow, Bruc e, 179, 213). 
Bain, CDS iii nos. 181 and 211, and p. 403. For Gordon's 
position-as a 'leader and spokesman of the English party in 
Lothian' during these years, Barrow, Bruce, 270 - 1. 
Barrow, Bruce, 206. 
Chron. Guisborough, 37~ quoted Barrow; Bruce, 245. 
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In 1310 a dispute between the abbot and convent of Lindores 
and Newburgh was resolved before the northern justiciar, undoubtedly 
under Scottish authority, 122 while there is record of an assize 
before the justiciar north of Forth in 1320.123 Perhaps more 
settled conditions for the holding of ayres south of Forth are 
indicated by the demand made by the king in 1320 that the abbot 
and convent of Newbattle should give suit for their lands of 
Masterton, Mid-lothian, at the justiciary court of Edinburgh as 
often as it was held there. 124 Other signs that ayres were held 
include the king's grants to Robert Lauder the younger and Melrose 
abbey of pensions from the issues of the justiciary, respectively, 
north of Forth and at Roxburgh, 125 as well as his exemption in 1325 
of the tenants of Sir James Douglas from judgment at the hands of 
the king's justiciars except in cases of homicide and pleas of the 
126 
crown. It may safely be concluded that the justice ayres were 
not permanently dislocated by the turbulent political conditions 
of the early fourteenth century. 
The first mention of ayres after the death of Robert I is a 
reference in the exchequer rolls for 1331. to 'the last ayre at 
Stirling•, 127 which seems to imply that others had previously been 
122. Abbotsford Mise. i 53 - 6. 
123. Scone Liber no. 130.· 
124. RMS i no. 70; Newbattle Hegistrum no. 58. 
125. RMS i no. 163 (confirmation by David II of pension granted to 
Lauder by Robert I); RMS ~ app. 1 no. 12 (Melrose Liber ii no. 
361). 
126. RMS i app. 1 no •. 38; Fraser, Douglas iii no. 14. 
127. ER i 396. 
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held at that place. But this is the last reference that I have 
been able to trace to ayres south of Forth until 1346, when, perhaps 
significantly, David II exempted the abbot and convent of Newbattle 
from the obligation of suit at the justiciary court of Lothian, which 
was owed by reason of the grant to them by Robert I of Masterton 
t . d . th . h 128 men ~one ~n e prev~ous paragrap • Perhaps there is more to 
this than the accidents of survival of evidence, for the south-east 
of Scotland was subject either to English domination or to various 
acts of devastation or both from the mid-1330s until well into the 
1350s. Whether or not this actually prevented ayres being held 
south of Forth, it certainly had its effect on the circuit followed 
by the southern justiciars, a.s will be discussed later.129 
By contrast, in the same period there is a relative abundance 
of evidence for ayres north of Forth, an area which remained largely 
under the control of Scottish administration. An ayre was held 
at Elgin on 10 October 1337,130 while in late April 1342 a full 
justice court was held at Inverbervie,Kincardine, by the lieutenants 
of the northern justiciar.l3l The exchequer rolls for 1343 record 
the king's attendance at a justice ayre in Cupar, Fife. 132 
1347 the court of the justice ayre was held at Forfar.132a 
In July 
There 
is one valuable piece of evidence showing us the movements of a 
128. RRS vi no. 101; Newbattle Registrum no. 272; and see above , 70 
and note 124. 
129. See below, 88 - 9. 
130. ER i 444. 
131. BL, l-1S. Add. 33245, ff. 156 v. - 157 r. 
132. ER i 521. 
132a. A~broath Liber ii no. 22. 
northern ayre in February 1348; on the 8th the court was at Forfar 
and by the 22nd it had moved on to Dundee.133 In May the following 
year a court of justiciary was held 'at the standing stones of Rayne 
. G . h' 134 1n ar1oc • It is however apparent that there were also problems 
north of Forth in the 1350s and it has been said that after the 
departure of David II into English captivity in 1347 'judicial 
administration was in c~nfusion'.l35 But whether entries in the 
exchequer rolls such as 'the sheriff produced a letter of the earl 
of Ross, justiciar in his sheriffdom, that he should not intromit 
with the profits of the justiciary court' ,136 mean that ayres were 
not held must be a matter of doubt. 
Upon the king's return to Scotland in November 1357 he was 
requested by council general to hold a justice ayre throughout the 
realm to inquire into the wrongdoings of his officers amongst others. 
The ayre appears to have been carried out. 137 This seems to have 
established the pattern for the remainder of his reign for Wyntoun's 
comment that the king 'ilka yere a justry/ ••• gert ha1d rycht fellonely• 138 
seems to be borne out by surviving record. Indeed the very first piece 
of evidence for this period allows us to see justice ayres operating 
133· 
134. 
135· 
136. 
Fraser, Southesk ii no. 36. 
Aberdeen Registrum i 79 - 81. 
A.B. Webster, 'David Il and the government of fourteenth century 
Scotland', TRHS 5th series, 16 (1966) 115- 130 at 121. 
ER i 546. 
137. APS i 492; Webster, 'David II', 131 note 7 and 117 note 5· 
138. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing) ii 506 - 7, cited Webster, 'David II', 117. 
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twice in the year. Thus William Meldrum held an ayre at Cupar for 
eight days from 31 January in 1358 and subsequently received his 
expenses. 139 Later in the year there was an ayre in the north which 
began at Inverness on 1 October, had reached Inverbe~ by the 15th, 
140 
and on 5 November was at Cupar. It is possible that the ayre 
passed through Perth on this journey or on the one earlier in the 
year, for William Meldrum received his expenses as justiciar's 
lieutenant for 1358 in that burgh also.141 The ayre south of Forth 
before 1361.142 Th h d b . L also reappears ere a een ayres 1n anark and 
Forfar by the spring of 1359143 and in the same year there was another 
at Perth.144 Records show ayres at Stirling in the south and Forfar 
in the north in 1360.145 It seems therefore that if there had been 
inactivity in the king's absence his return certainly prompted a change 
in the picture. 
Such precision cannot be found in subsequent years within this 
period but year by year in the 1360s the exchequer rolls contain 
references to the issues of justice ayres, the expenses of the ayres, 
and the fees paid to the justiciar: for example, in 1361, 1362, 1364, 
Some of these issues could be and frequently 
were granted away as annual pensions to such men as John Gray, clerk 
139. ER i 561, 562. 
140. ER i 570, 586 - 7, 561. 
141. ER i 558 - 9. 
142. ER ii 82. 
143. ER i 590, 583. 
144. ER ii 82. 
145. Fraser, Menteith ii no. 29 (Stirling); RMS i app. 1 no. 145 
(Forfar). 
146. Issues: ER ii 171, 176, 306; Expenses: ER ii 82, 117; Fees: 
ER ii R?,~?h. 
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11 146a . of the ro s, and John Lyon, the king's secretary, wh1le in 
1365 the king commanded that the fee of the sergeant of the 
sheriffdom of Lanark should be paid inter alia from the issues of 
the justice ayres within the sheriffdom in accordance with old 
custom and the verdict of an assize before the sheriff of Lanark. 146b 
The implication is that the ayres were a continuing source of both 
income and expenditure in this period, and it would seem to follow 
that they were being held on at least an annual basis. Some of the 
gaps left by the financial records can be filled by other evidence. 
So in July 1366 a court of the justice ayre of Lothian was held at 
Melrose,147 while the dooms of justice courts at Forfar, Dundee, 
Peebles, Dumbarton, Edinburgh and Dumfries were falsed in Parliament 
In 1371 the earl of Ross complained to Robert 
II that David II had so acted as to prevent him paying suit at the 
court of the justiciar when it was held at Inverness.149 All this 
taken together suggests that justice ayres, north and south, were a 
regular feature of the latter part of David's reign. 
The first two Stewart kings, Robert II and Robert III, have not 
enjoyed a good reputation with historians, but despite the criticism 
of their failure to administer the law which can be found in the 
sources for the period there is also a good deal of evidence that 
146a. ID-1S i no. 161 (Gray);. RRS vi no. 431 (Lyon). 
146b. Rl1S i no. 199· 
147. Raine, North Durham no. 326. 
148 •. APS i 504, 535- 6. 
149. Familie of Innes," 70 - 72. 
justice ayres were held with regularity, particularly in the north. 
In the 1370s James and Alexander Lindsay regularly received fees 
for acting as justiciars north of Forthl50 while in the 1390s the 
same may be said of Murdoch Stewart.151 In 1406 the duke of Albany 
was allocated one hundred pounds for holdine five justice ayres north 
152 
of Forth. The exchequer rolls continue to speak of the issues 
and expenses of the ayres. 153 Grants from the issues south of Forth 
could be made to Alan Lauder the justice clerk in 1373 while in 1382 
Alexander Strachan of Carmyllie, a royal scutifer, was to be paid 
his fee for his office of coroner in Angus and the Mearns proportionately 
from the issues of the justiciary of the sheriffdoms of Forfar and 
Kincardine.154 In 1379 the right of the king's judex Andrew Dempster 
to an amercement from each justice ayre of Forfar was confirmed.l55 
In 1397 there is another reference to the profits of the Forfar 
justiciary.156 It seems therefore that the ayres remained an 
important source of royal income. A reference in the account of 
the sheriff of Lanark for 1388 mentions that two justice ayres were 
held within his bailiary in 1381,157 although it should be noted that 
in the former year the sheriff of Fife could not account for any 
issues from the justice court because none had been held. 158 The 
150. See ER ii 435, 437, 458, 620; ER iii 30, 652. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
154. 
155. 
156. 
157-
158. 
ER iii 316, 347, 376.· 
ER iii 644. 
ER ii 394, 430, 435, 437, 438, 457, 458, 462, 620; ER iii 
Ib4, 166, 167, 241, 265, 26~, 315, 643; ER iv 133, 212, 595, 634. 
RMS i nos. 456 (L~uder) and 735 (Strachan). 
RMS i no. 758. 
Eraser, Douglas iii nos. 45 and 48. 
ER iii 164. 
ER iii 166. 
financial evidence may be supplemented from the records of various 
cases before justiciars in the period~;· including ones of mortancestor, 
of slaughter and other crimes, and of falsing the doom of sheriff 
courts. 159 In short, there seems no doubt that justice ayres \olere 
a regular feature of life in the latter part of the fourteenth century. 
The Albany governorship leaves little trace in its records of 
the holding of justice ayres other than references to ayres south 
of Forth in 1410 and at Stirling in 1414.160 In 1409 Duke Robert 
stipulated for suit at the court of justiciary held in Stirling,161 
while in 1420 Duke Murdoch made an agreement with Alexander Stewart 
earl of Mar concerning the profits of the 'justry' of Aberdeen, Banff 
162 
and Inverness. This latter document suggests that it would be 
rash to draw too many conclusions from the lack of evidence for this 
period. If the ayres lapsed under the Albanies, then there was a 
revival after the return of James I in 1424. There are references 
to justice ayres north and south of Forth in 1425, 1433, 1434 and 
In 1431 the king commanded the justiciar south of Forth 
to pay second teinds of the issues of the justiciary to the abbot 
and convent of Scone, showing again the significance of the ayres as a 
source of profit.164 A glimpse of the preparations for the autumn 
ayre of 1435 is afforded by the letter sent by the justiciar north of 
159· 
160. 
161. 
162. 
164. 
E.g. Fraser, Menteith ii no. 43; HMC iii 417; Morton Registrum 
ii no. 130; Moray Registrum nos. 1~ 165 and 180; Spalding Mise. 
ii 319; Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iii 263. 
ER iv 133, 212. 
Fraser, Elphinstone ii no. 1~. 
Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iv 181. 
Laing Chrs. no. 81; Coupar Angus Chrs. ii no. 128; Laing Chrs. 
no. 113; Inchcolm Chrs. no. 50. Cf. ER iv 425, 595, 634. 
RHS ii no. 196. 
Forth to the sheriff of Kinross commanding him to summon suitors to 
th . t• t 165 e JUS ~ce cour • 
What happened in the period between the death of James I in 1437 
and the assumption of full power by his son in 1450 is extremely 
obscure. We know of an ayre at Jedburgh in 1437.165a The 
exchequer rolls at this time refer mainly to the holding of ayres 
within regalities which had fallen into crown hands such as Annandale 
and the earldoms of Strathearn and March. But in 1448 there was a 
dispute as to whether the bishop of Brechin owed suit of court when 
the justice ayre came to Inverbervie, caput of the sheriffdom of 
Kincardine. The case was determined by an assize in the sheriff 
court of Kincardine and it was held that the bishop had not been 
seen to give suit at the justice court, nor had he ever been amerced 
or punished for being absent. 166 This suggests that justice courts 
had been held with some regularity and, once again, that the argument 
from silence should not be pressed too hard. More concrete evidence 
for the holding of ayres on a regular basis can be found in the 1450s. 
Thus Goddo Dow and McKannane were hanged after conviction for their 
trespasses at the justice ayre of Stirling in the spring of 1453. 167 
Two ayres were held at Cupar in 1454, one in January, the other in 
168 June. In both the court heard cases of falsing the doom from 
165. Pitfirrane Writs no. 24. 
165a. Fraser, Dou5las iii no. 301. 
166. Brechin Registrum i no. 61. 
·167. ER vi 595· 
168. ER vi 78. 
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the sheriff court of Fife. Ayres seem also to have been held with 
a fair degree of regularity at centres such as Dumfries Kirkcudbr1·~ht 
' 0 ' 
Wigtown and Ayr in the south-west169 and were also recorded at 
Edinburgh, Peebles and Jedburgh. 17° In the rnid-1450s (we cannot be 
more precise as to date) James II attended an ayre in the north which 
progressed from Inverness through Elgin to Banff.l7l 
1457 there were ayres at Aberdeen. 172 
In 1455 and 
The 1450s seem then to have been a period in which justice ayres 
were held regularly. So also the 1460s, the period of the minority 
of James III. There are references to ayres being held before the 
queen mother, Mary of Gueldres, at Edinburgh, 173 and on her behalf by 
Andrew lord Avandale, the cha~cellor, at Dumfries, between 1460 and 
1464.174 Avandale held an ayre as justiciar south of Forth at Ayr 
in March 146o.175 Another ayre is recorded at Ayr in January 1466.176 
The 'justice ayris of Wigtoune', where three men were 'justifiit' and 
escheated, are referred to as recent events in October 1466. 177 
There was an ayre at Selkirk in 1466.178 In November 1469 the dooms 
of ayres held at Dumfries in July 1467 and October 1468 were fa1sed 
169. ER vi 168, 177, 195, 200, 206, 209, 351, 353, 450, 546, 570, 
b41, 557, 201, 550. 
170. ER vi 148, 97, 386, 174, 86, 143. 
171. ER vi 485 - 6. 
17 2. ER vi 15 8; ;;;.:.A;.::.b..:..e.::..r.::;.d.:;.e..::..:en~_B_a_n_;;f...;.f;__I_l_l • i v 205 - 213. 
173. ER vii 226. 
174. ER vii 281. 
175· 
176. 
Irvine Muniments 
177. 
178. 
Ibid.· i 
AD·A, 4. 
ER viii 
no. 13. 
4 
- 5· 
i no. 13. 
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in parliament.179 Thus it appears likely that there was still a 
fair degree of regularity in the holding of the ayres despite the 
various political crises of the period. 
James III assumed active authority in late 1469 and, as with his 
father, this event seems to lead to much more frequent reference to 
justice ayres in the financial records. There was an ayre at Selkirk 
180 
on 19 February 1470 and (assuming that the usual southern circuit 
181 
was being followed) it had reached Ayr by 23 March. Inferences 
about this southern circuit may be made from other references in the 
exchequer rolls to the holding of ayres in Edinburgh, 182 Lauderdale183 
184 
and the sheriffdom of Roxburgh before June 1470. It seems possible 
that this ayre was also at Stirling.185 It was probably followed by 
a northern ayre in the summer of 1470. We know that it was at Perth 
186 in June and at Cupar on the 18th of that month. Another ayre was 
held at Perth in November; 187 this is one of the rare instances where 
there is clear evidence of ayres being held in a region twice within 
one calendar year, in accordance with old use and custom. 
179· ~s ii 94. 
180. ER viii 4. 
181. ER viii 21. 
182. ER viii 27. 
183. ER viii 2, 3· 
184. ER viii 7-
185. ER viii 10. 
186. ER viii 
--
12, 33 - 4, 36. 
187. ER viii 36. 
There is less detail for subsequent years, but still plenty of 
material giving glimpses of regular ayres throughout the 1470s. In 
1471, for example, Robert lord Lyle, justiciar north of Forth, held 
an ayre at Cupar which gave a doom upon a brieve of mortancestor 
later falsed before the parliamentary auditors. The appeal related 
only to a preliminary point and the case was still continuing in 1478 
when another doom given upon it before John Haldane of Gleneagles as 
northern justiciar was also dealt with in parliament. 188 Another 
example of the doom of a justice ayre being falsed in parliament may 
be found in October 1476; the doom had been given 'in the justice 
ayre of Edinburgh the 12 day of Julii last bipast•.189 In November 
1472 Master David Guthrie, jus~iciar south of Forth, held an ayre at 
A 190 yr. The details of an ayre in the south-west in the late autumn 
of 1473 emerge clearly from the earliest surviving treasurer's accounts, 
in which there are listed the compositions given by those convicted at 
ayres in Dumfries, Kirkcudbright, \vigtown and Ayr. 191 Quite apart 
from anything else, this tantalising record shows how much it was in 
the interests of the royal finances to hold justice ayres. The same 
source records the payment of £100 to Guthrie as his fee in the office 
of 'jus try'. 192 A year later a sum of money was 'gevin to ane passand 
188. ADA,12, 66. 
189. APS ii 114; ADA,57· 
190. Irvine Muniments i no. 13. 
191. TA i 6 10. 
192. TA i 66, 68. 
to the lorde of Erskin for the continuacioune of the Justice Are of 
Striveline•.193 From a little later in the 1470s there are references 
to ayres at Haddington and Peebles and to 'my lord of Albanys justice 
aire•.194 The impression of the stability and routine nature of the 
system is confirmed by the confident statements made by the king's 
council at the end of the 1470s about the next justice ayres in 
Cupar, Perth and Jedburgh; 195 there were no doubts that these ayres 
would be held in the near future. 
The following decade is one in which parliament frequently called 
upon the king to hold his justice ayres, but, as already argued, it is 
in this period that the source from which we have derived most evidence 
for the holding of ayres, the exchequer rolls, suddenly ceases to 
assist. The ninth volume of the printed series covers the years 
1480 to 1487 and contains only two references to justice ayres. The 
first suggests that one needs to be held, to inquire into certain 
deforcements in Galloway; 196 the other is to the ayre which was in 
fact held subsequently, at Kirkcudbright in 1487. 197 Other sources 
are barely more helpful. An ayre was held in the town of Ayr in 
1487, perhaps following the one at Kirkcudbright; we learn of this 
from a chance reference in the Acta Dominorum Concilii for 1492. 198 
An entry in the same record a few years later tells of a justice ayre 
193. TA i 53· 
194. ER viii 396, 480, 585; ADC i 14. 
195- ~Ci 26, 55, 79-
196. ER ix 380. 
197· ER ix 460. 
198. ADC i 233· 
of Fife, also in 148?.199 However there may have been a breakdown 
of the system earlier in the decade, perhaps as a result of the major 
political crisis of 1482 - 83. In March 1482 the auditors of causes 
and complaints ordered that an inquest be held on certain matters 
at the next justice ayre of Peebles. The inquest was held, but 
2DC:> 
not until February 1485. This may mean that there had been no 
southern ayre in the intervening period or alternatively that the 
amount of business to be done in Peebles had not justified any ayre 
there until then. Certainly there was a justi~iar south of Forth 
during at least part of those three years, for Archibald earl of 
Angus had been forced to resign the office in March 1483. 201 This 
should not be taken as an indication of a failure by Angus to discharge 
his duties properly. He had been one of the leaders of the opposition 
party who precipitated the crisis with James III. at Lauder in July 1482 
and there is every reason to suppose that he acquired the office in 
consequence of this, as for a long time prior to the crisis he had 
been out of favour with the king. It is, indeed, possible that he 
went on ayre in the autumn of 1482 since, as many have noted with some 
puzzlement, his name is conspicuous by its absence from the witness 
1 . t f 1 h t durJ.·ng that tJ.·me. 202 J.s s o roya c ar ers The dismissal of Angus 
came when Jarnes regained full authority. Subsequently, as previously, 
it is the king's men who hold the justiciarship. 
This evidence shows that, whatever may or may not have been 
happening earlier in the decade, ayres were held in 148?. In January 
199· SRO, Acta Dominorum Concilii CS 5/16, f. ·6. 
200. ADA.,98; Peeb1es Burgh Recs. no. 16. 
201. APS xii 33· 
202. Nicholson, Later Middle Age~511; Macdougall, James III, 167. 
1488 ayres had been 'set' but were 'dissolvit and disertit' by 
order of parliament, with provision that new ones were to be 
'proclamyt and set of new to be haldin on the gerss' - that is, 
: h . 203 ~n t e spr~ng. There exists one reference to a justice ayre of 
Selkirk in 1488 in the time of James III. 204 Presumably this was 
the result of a proclamation following the January parliament, since 
the king \'/as overthro\'in and killed in early June. It is far from 
easy, therefore, to assess the scanty evidence for the 1480s; what 
can be said is that firm conclusions that the ayres were not held 
have no foundation beyond the fragmentary nature of the evidence 
showing that they were held at least occasionally. 
The reign of James IV brings about a transformation in the 
nature and amount of record information concerning the justice ayres 
which has led some commentators to infer a resurgence in the ayres 
themselves by comparison with what had gone before. Again caution 
ought to be observed before this conclusion is adopted wholesale. 
The record from which we can glean most information for the early 
years of this reign is the accounts of the treasurer which broadly 
are extant only from the beginning of the reign. Moreover the 
records of the southern justice courts themselves are in part available 
from 1493· Especially with regard to the former the accident of 
survival has surely little to do with any substantive change in the 
country's judicial arrangements. For example, the extent of 
references to justice ayres in the treasurer's accounts is entirely 
dependent on whether or not the king was in attendance. Nothing is 
203. APS ii 182, c. 7. ,· 
204. ADC (Stair) iii 138. 
84 
said in them of the ayres at Edinburgh in July 1491 and in January 
1493, of which we learn from the exchequer rolls. 205 The treasurer's 
accounts do tell us of a southern ayre held from February to April in 
149o206 but not of the northern ayre which was taking place at the 
t . 207 same 2me. The point is that silence should not be accorded any 
particular evidential value one way or another; this applies with 
ever greater force as, going back in time, the evidence becomes more 
and more scattered. 
The evidence for the reign up to 1500 is undeniably much more 
impressive than previously, with the ayres apparently at least annual 
208 
events. The new king \vas on ayre at Dundee in September 1488; 
in November he was south of Forth at Lauder. 209 This latter ayre 
210 
also appears to have taken in Lanark. From January to March 1489 
he was in ayre in the south, passing through Jedburgh, Selkirk, Peebles, 
D f . w· t and Ayr. 211 urn rles, lg own This ayre was also at Kirkcudbright 
212 
on 1 March. In the spring of the following year an ayre was at 
Jedburgh, Lanark and Edinburgh, 213 while in the north there was an 
214 
ayre at Cupar. In November 1490 Ormond, a messenger, was sent 
205. ER X 366, 396. 
206. TA i 130 - 1. 
207. ER X 243-
208. TA i 140 
209. TA i 89. 
210. TA i 93· 
211. TA i 102 5, 150. 
212. ADC i 165. Is this the ayre at Kirkcudbright held by John 
lord Drummond 8 May 1489 (Prot. Bk. Yaun~ no. 210)? 
213. TA· i 130. 
214. TA i 173-
north to 'proclaim the ayris•. 215 Sometime in that year there was 
f h . th h ld. . . t. t St · 1· 216 a case o s ow1ng e o 1ng 1n a JUS 1ce ayre a 1r 1ng. 
There was an ayre at Edinburgh in July 1491, 217 while in October 
218 
a messenger was sent to proclaim the ayre at Lanark. In January 
1492 another messenger was sent to Lanark to provide for a forthcoming 
ayre there; yet another was sent to the town of Ayr with a continuation 
of the ayre actually being held there. 219 In February John lord 
Drummond received his 'costis' in the ayres of Lanark, Selkirk, 
Edinburgh, Perth, Dundee, Bervieand Aberdeen, that is, both north 
220 
and south of Forth. In May, commissions and other letters for 
the next northern ayre were being sent out221 and in August a number 
of individuals were reimbursed for their costs in ayres at centres 
such as Lanark, Ayr, Stirling.and Perth. 222 In January 1493 a 
justice ayre was held at Edinburgh, 223 while at some uncertain date 
224 in that year there was also one at Aberdeen. It is in 1493 that 
fragmentary justiciary records become available, telling us of an ayre 
which was at Lauder from 7 to 14 and at Jedburgh from 16 to 21 November 
215. TA i 173-
216. ER X 668. 
217. ER X 366. 
218. TA i 182. 
219. TA i 184. 
220. TA i 185. 
221. TA i 200. 
222. TA i 201. 
223. ER X 396. 
224. ER xi 336*' 337 *· 
of that year. 225 In the summer of 1494 the king sent out letters 
to continue the ayres of the 'Northland 1 • 226 A royal justice court 
was held at Edinburgh before the depute of the justiciars south of 
Forth on 4 August 1494. 227 Another northern ayre was proclaimed 
228 
and commenced at Inverness on 6 October. It reached Elgin on 
30 October and, passing through Banff, was at Aberdeen on 10 
November. 229 From there a messenger was sent to the king carrying 
the 'extracts' of the ayre. 23° A southern ayre in spring 1495 can 
also be partially reconstructed from the treasurer's accounts and 
from those of its records which have survived. It started in 
Edinburgh on 2 February. It reached Jedburgh on 25 February and 
worked there until 3 March. ~n the following day the ayre was at 
Selkirk where it remained until 7 March. The next stop was Peebles 
on 9 March, then Lanark on the 16th, Dumfries on the 23rd and 
Kirkcudbright on 6 April. The circuit ended at Ayr. 231 Letters 
had to be sent for the continuation of this 'Southland' ayre. 232 
There was also a justice ayre at Ayr in July 1495, presumably the 
second.there that year. 233 Finally, we know that an ayre was in 
the north at Inverness in 1495. 234 
There are numerous references to these ayres in the records of 
the lords of council and of the parliamentary auditors of causes and 
1 . t 235 comp a~n s. But there appears to be no evidence for ayres in the 
years 1496 and 1497, nor is the evidence for the remaining years of 
the century quite so detailed and interesting as it is for the period 
1488 - 1495· However the records do allow us to see the complete 
northern circuit in an ayre held in January and February 1498. It 
through Elgin, Banff, Aberdeen, Bervie, began at Inverness and passed 
236 Dundee, Perth and Cupar. In the same year there was an ayre at 
at Jedburgh in October. 238 In November Edinburgh in June237 and 
this ayre was at Peebles for six working days. 239 There was an 
240 
ayre at Wigtown in February 1499 which by March had reached Ayr. 
Two southern ayres seem to have been held in 1500: certainly one 
was at Jedburgh in March and another at Lanark in October. 241 
This evidence from the late fifteenth century has been laid out 
in some detail not only to demonstrate the frequency of the ayres in 
234. 
235· 
236. 
237-
238. 
239· 
240. 
241. 
Family of Rose, 163. 
ADA 1 118, 130, 131, 149, 157, 174; ADC i 86, 92- 3,·111, 
125, 149, 155, 166, 202, 226, 228, 230, 233, 258, 296, 303, 
306 - 7, 309, 310, 315, 316, 337, 338, 351, 363, 366, 377, 
394, 410, 412. 
* . * TA i 318; ER xi 316 333 ; cf. ADC ii 93 - 211 esp. at 
210 - 11. 
TA i 318. 
ER xi 324• • 
SRO, JC 1/l, ff. 36 r. 
-
47 v. 
ER xi 340~' 349*o 
ER xi 324*' 353*. 
the period but also because it enables us to pull together the 
fragments which are all that we have to show the operation of the 
ayres for the rest of the later middle ages. Perhaps James IV did 
drive the ayres as they had never been driven before, but he certainly 
drove them along old-established tracks. In the 1260s the ayre of 
the justiciar of Scotia began at Inverness and passed through the 
sheriffdoms of Invernairn, Forres, Elgin, Banff and Aberdeen, before 
turning south to Kincardine, Forfar, Perth and Fife. 242 This is all 
but identical to the circuit of 1498 described in the previous 
paragraph. The only differences are the disappearance of Nairn and 
Forres, subsumed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries within 
the sheriffdoms of Inverness and Elgin respectively. 243 It should 
also be noted that within the sheriffdom of Forfar ayres were held 
both at Forfar and at Dundee; while in Fife we know of one ayre held 
244 
at Kinghorn in 1435, although Cupar seems to have been the usual 
location. 
South of Forth the pattern was less settled. The thirteenth 
century justiciarship of Galloway was absorbed into that of Lothian, 
to become together the justiciarship south of Forth. In the 1260s 
the ayre of the justiciar of Lothian included the sheriffdoms of 
245 Berwick and Roxburgh; the courts were no doubt held in the burghs 
of these names. Change was made necessary when in the fourteenth 
century both burghs passed into English hands. A document of 1372 
242. ER i 18. 
243. Fife Court Bk., 361. 
244. Inchcolm Chrs. no. 50. 
245. BR i 9 - 10, 27. 
under the name of William earl of Douglas, then justiciar south of 
Forth, explains that, although it had been the custom to hold a 
justice ayre at Berwick, that was not possible while the town remained 
subject to the English and so ayres had to be held at other places 
within the sheriffdom. It goes on to state that while it had been 
convenient to hold the ayre at Coldingham this was not to set a 
246 precedent for the future. Perhaps similar reasons lie behind 
the holding of an ayre at Melrose in Roxburghshire by the justiciar 
of Lothian in 1366: 247 it is worthy of note in this connection that 
in 1360 Melrose abbey carefully obtained a full statement of its 
regalian rights from the king, stating that justiciars and other 
royal officers were to be firm~y interdicted from any disturbance 
of those rights. 248 Did this represent a precaution made necessary 
by the establishment of Melrose as the ayre town of the sheriffdom 
of Roxburgh? In the long run Lauder and Jedburgh (itself recovered 
from English occupation only in 1409) became the ayre towns of Berwick 
and Roxburgh respectively. 
We must be careful here to distinguish the ayre towns from other 
places at which justice courts were held from time to time, as it 
were on an ad hoc basis: for example, on Largo La\•/ in Fife, and at 
Aberchirder, Banffshire, and North Berwick, East Lothian. 249 All these 
instances were cases of perambulations where the court met upon the 
246. Raine, North Durham no. 147. 
247. Raine, North Durham no. 326. 
248. RRS vi no. 237; Melrose Liber ii no. 437· 
249. Dunfermline Registrum no. 590; Hora~ Registrum no. 203; 
Laing Chrs. no. 113. 
marches in question. Other places off the usual circuits at which 
justice courts were held include Rayne in Aberdeenshire and Fowlis in 
Forfarshire. Each was a case of crime, perhaps to be explained by 
the principle that a criminal court should be held where the wrong 
was committed. 250 In general therefore departures from the circuit 
towns were exceptional and it seems clear that the principle stated 
at the end of the thirteenth century in the so-called 'Scottish King's 
Household', that the justiciar should hold his courts at the caput of 
each sheriffdom within his jurisdiction, 251 held good throughout the 
later middle ages. 
A typical southern ayre of this period would thus have commenced 
at Edinburgh before proceeding first to Lauder for the ayre of the 
sheriffdom of Berwick and then to Jedburgh for the ayre of Roxburgh. 
The journey ~ould be facilitated by the main road on the line of the 
R D St t h . h . . 1 t . th d. 1 . d 252 oman ere ree w ~c was a pr~nc~pa rou e ~n e me ~eva per~o • 
The ayre would then move over Teviotdale, perhaps back up Dere Street 
as far as Melrose, before going down the Ettrick water to Selkirk for 
its ayre. Yet another road, .possibly Roman in origin, led from 
Selkirk on to Peebles and probably from there to Lanark, the next two 
253 
stopping places of the ayre. From Lanark the ayre turned south 
to Dumfries, once more utilising a road originally constructed by 
250. Aberdeen Registrum i 79 - 81; HMC iii 417. The principle 
was embodied in statute in 1436:--APS ii 24,c. 12. 
251. SHS Mise. ii 37· 
252. For the road, see the artic~es by G.S. Maxwell and G.w.s. 
Barrow in Loads and ~oads in Scotland and Beyond edd. A. Fenton 
and G. Stell (Edinburgh, 1984) at 22 - 48 at 27 and 49 - 66 at 
52 respectively. 
253. Maxwell, in Loads and Roads, 27; Barrow, ibid., 53- 4. 
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the Romans, which crossed over the Lowther Hills from Clydesdale 
into Nithsdale by way of the Daer and Potrail waters. 254 Ayres would 
then be held at Kirkcudbright and Wigtown, before the final turn 
north for Ayr was made. Presumably from Ayr the next stop was 
Dumbarton and from there it would be a north-easterly journey to 
Stirling to conclude the ayre. 
The logic of this circuit can be plainly seen upon the map and 
is even more apparent in the north. The starting point was Inverness 
from where the ayre would proceed in an easterly direction to Elgin 
and then Banff before moving south east to Aberdeen. Here too a 
well-established royal road was being followed. 255 The route south 
from Aberdeen took the ayre along another familiar road, through 
Inverbervie, Forfar or Dundee, and on to Perth.256 From Perth the 
ayre would go south east into Fife and its final stopping place, 
Cupar. 
Study of the ayres on the map shows one other point. I~ is 
clear that an ayre of the later medieval period visited each of the 
main sheriffdoms as established by the end of the reign of Alexander 
II. There is no record of any ayres in the sheriffdoms of Kinross, 
Cromarty, Argyll, Tarbert or Renfrew, all of which first appear or 
were erected in the second half of the thirteenth,century. 257 A 
most striking feature of the northern ayre in particular is therefore 
its eastward orientation; the regions north and west of Inverness 
254. Maxwell, in Loads and Roads, 27 - 8. 
255. Barrow, in Loads and Roads; 51. 
256. Barrow, in Loads ·and Roads, 58. 
257. On the development of the medieval sheriffdoms, see Fife 
Court Bk., 347- 368. 
appear never to have been visited by royal justice ayres. But 
other arrangements frequently prevailed in these areas. There 
were special justiciars for those parts such as Cowal and Bute 
which were crown lands, while in 1430 James I granted to the keeper 
of Kintyre and Knapdale in Argyll 'full power of holding our courts 
of the sheriff and the justiciar, punishing and fining trespassers 
in the form of the common law of our realm•. 258 Nevertheless in 
1504 parliament remarked on the lack of justice ayres, justices and 
sheriffs in the north and west parts of the realm whereby 'the pepill 
ar almaist gane wild'. Justiciars and sheriffs were to be appointed 
in the northern and southern isles, sitting in the former case at 
Inverness or Dingwall, in the latter at Tarbert (Knapdale) or at 
Lochkilkerran (site of a new royal ~astle erected in 1498, now 
Campbeltown, Kintyre). Parliament went on to deal with other areas 
that had been 'out of use to cum to our justice airis' - the lands 
between Badenoch and Lorne called Dochart and Glendochart, the 
lordship of Lorne, Namore, Lochaber and Argyll.. Dochart and 
Glendochart and the lordship of Lorne should pertain to the ayre 
of Perth, as should Argyll.- 1 when it pleased the king'. However 
Namore and Lochaber should go to the ayre of Inverness. The justice 
of the lordship of Argyll should sit at Perth, while the ayres of the 
crown lands of Bute, Arran, Knapdale, Kintyre and Cumbrae should be 
held at Ayr or Rothesay. That part of Cowal not in the lordship of 
Argyll should belong to the ayre of Dumbarton. 259 
258. Fraser, Eglinton ii no. 35· 
259. APS ii 249,cc. 3- 5· See also APS ii 25l,c. 18. 
We need not accept the parliament's view that the lack of 
justice ayres in the areas mentioned had led to lawless anarchy in 
order to recognise that each of them was by virtue of its geographical 
position and internal topography likely to be difficult to administer 
effectively from such centres of government as Perth and Inverness. 
Clearly the acts of 1504 represent an attempt to exert a greater 
degree of central control of the administration of justice in these 
relatively remote areas where previously much had depended upon the 
men on the spot. 
The final observation to be made is that the lack of justiciary 
records and the statements about the holding of ayres in acts of 
parliament cannot be used to s~pport an argument that the ayres were 
in fact held irregularly or infrequently. An examination of all the 
surviving evidence suggests that in some years - for example, 1358, 
1381, 1454, 1470, 1492, 1493, 1495, 1498 and 1500 - two ayres were 
held in accordance with 'old use and custom', and that overall the 
justiciars. followed circuits north and south of Forth with considerable 
regularity throughout the later medieval period. 
( .. •) rnh . t' . 260 111 ~ e JUS 1c1ars 
The third point on which the continuity of the institution of the 
justiciarship before and after 1300 is apparent is that of personnel. 
The evidence shows that the justiciars of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries were, like their predecessors, drawn from the ranks of the 
magnates. Generally speaking they were also men prominent elsewhere 
in royal government. Thus they cannot be described as 'professional' 
260. For details of references to individuals as justiciars in this 
section, see Appendix B. Only additional material is cited 
in subsequent notes. 
judges in the sense that they spent their working lives acting solely 
in a judicial capacity. If they could be said to be of any profession 
it was that of 'civil servant'; moreover it is quite clear that, 
especially in the fifteenth century, many held office for short 
periods - say a year or perhaps only for one ayre - but more than 
once in their careers. Justiciarships appear therefore to have 
been delegated from time to time to members of the king's council. 
Although some of them held office for much longer periods, the 
justiciars were indeed a 'part-time, lay magistracy•. 261 But it 
need not follow from this that they merely masqueraded as judges. 
Some words of K.B. McFarlane are apposite: 'We are entitled to 
believe that those who appear~d to function did so until the contrary 
. d' 262 1s prove • Proof positive of legal knowledge amongst the 
Scottish justiciars is all but impossible and there are in general 
no external indicia such as, for example, university degrees in law 
or membership of professional groupings (for there were none) to 
help us. On the other hand, if we ask how these men came to be 
part of the king's government and why specifically they were appointed 
to carry out_ justice ayres, the answer must be that they were deemed 
fit for the task by the standards of the time - whatever those may 
have been and however different from our own or those of other 
countries then and now. 
A list of justiciars from c.1306 (the year in which Professor 
Barrow's study concludes) will be found in Appendix B, together with 
261. Cooper, Selected Papers, 227. 
262. K.B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England 
(Oxford, 1973) 229 - 30. 
the sources from which it is derived. It continues to the time 
when Colin Campbell third earl of Argyll was appointed justiciar 
general of the whole realm of Scotland north and south of Forth, 263 
thereby confirming what had in fact been the position since 1501, 
when the offices north and south of Forth were combined in the person 
of Andrew :~ord Gray. The present list is accordingly a bridge from 
the early medieval compilation of Professor Barrow to those found in 
standard works of reference which commence with Argyll's appointment 
and came down to whoever the current incumbent of the office of Lord 
Justice General may be. The bridge is a somewhat unsatisfactory 
construction, since there are many gaps and it is far from complete. 
A curious feature of the witness lists to later medieval royal 
charters is that they cease to designate the justiciars as such and 
we thus lack a source of information which is of great value for the 
period before 1306. Only in the reign of James IV does the designation 
'our justiciar' reappear regularly in the witness lists of royal 
charters. This may have occurred because in his reign certain men 
held the office continuously over a number of years whereas this ~as 
rather unusual earlier in the fifteenth century; but such an argument 
cannot explain the absence of the designation in the fourteenth 
century charters. Whatever the reason, the result is that references 
to individuals as justiciars tend to be patchy and difficult to 
connect so as to determine such matters as the length of time for which 
they held office, or the precise succession of office holders. Thus 
for example we can be certain that Alexander, lord of the Isles and earl 
of Ross, was justiciar north of Forth between 1439 and 1443, but we do 
263. HMC iv 487. 
not know when he first came or when he ceased to hold office. He 
died in May 1449, and the next reference to a justiciar north of 
Forth after 1443 is in September 1449. 264 It is quite likely that 
he held the office before 1439 but there is no evidence to prove 
this, nor to show that he kept it until his death. 
Nevertheless the list, incomplete and provisional though it is, 
does substantiate the conclusions stated at the beginning of this 
section. If it is examined by reign - that is by considering the 
justiciars under each king from Robert I to James IV - it becomes 
clear that the office was held by royal councillors, often even by 
those of royal blood. It was seldom i! ever held by persons out of 
favour with the king. In other words the justiciarships remained 
a very important. part of the structure of royal government. Of course 
this does not prove that those who held office were competent lawyers 
and judges; but as we have seen in the earlier discussion of the 
ayres, the justiciarship was no light task. It involved a period 
usually of months, rather than days or weeks, on circuit, a heavy 
diet of cases civil and criminal, and was of importance in giving 
at least the appearance of good government and justice as well as in 
bringing in much needed revenue to the royal coffers. Royal self-
interest, to put it no higher, dictated that the persons appointed 
should take their duties seriously and responsibly. 
In 1305 Edward I appointed four pairs of justiciars for Scotland, 
each pair consisting of a Scotsman and an Englishman. The Scots 
were Adam Gordon (Lothian), Roger Kirkpatrick (Galloway), Robert 
Keith (Forth to the Mounth) and R~ginald Cheyne (north of the Mounth). 265 
264. See below,ll~ and Appendix B. 
265. ~tones, Documents, no. 33; APS i 120. 
Gordon was certainly active in his office for some years while 
Cheyne remained a trusted agent of the English in the north. 266 
Just when Robert I began to appoint justiciars is unclear - there 
is a tantalising reference to David Muschet as justiciar of Fife 
in May 1306, as already noted267 - but there can be no doubt that 
Robert Keith's appearances in 1310 and 1312 as a justiciar north 
of Forth were under the authority of the Bruce since from Christmas 
1308 he had been 'one of the king's indispensable commanders and 
. . t t ' 268 adm1n1s ra ors • In November 1320 Thomas Randolph earl of Moray 
was the northern justiciar; he was perhaps the most important man 
in Scotland under the king until his death in 1332.269 Probably 
in the 1320s, when he appears to be a member of the king's council, 
William Muschet of Cargill was designed justiciar north of Forth. 270 
It is noticeable that the main territorial base of Keith, Randolph 
and Muschet was in the north; equally the landed interests of the 
southern justiciars lay south of Forth. There is a single reference 
to James Douglas as justiciar of Lothian before Robert Lauder the 
elder embarks on his long career in that office about 1319. Douglas 
stood alongside Randolph in the favour and esteem of king Robert271 
while Lauder was 'raised from obscurity' to a place of high importance 
266. 
267. 
268. 
269. 
270. 
See above, 69, for Gordon; for Cheyne, Barrow, Bruce, 
245 and 249. 
See above 69, notes 117 and 118. 
Barrow, Bruce, 399 - 400. 
Barrow, Bruce, 399 - 400 and 446. 
He was a signatory of the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) and 
present at the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh (1328): 
Barrow, Bruce, 366 and 427· 
271. Barrow, Bruce, 399· 
not only as justiciar but elsewhere in royal government.272 Muschet 
apart, all these individuals belonged to 'a small group of specially 
trusted, specially favoured men, who though not personally related to 
the king were obviously his intimate counsellors, prominent in every 
department of the royal service, military, diplomatic and judicial'. 273 
After king Robert's death in 1329 and the accession of the infant 
David II, we find Reginald Cheyne, son of the Edwardian justiciar, as 
'justiciario' at Elgin in 1330274 and a passage in Wyntoun describing 
'a justre •• held at Invernys' by the guardian Randolph in 1331. 
Wyntoun also refers to Randolph holding a 'justry' at Wigtown in 
Galloway that year. 275 Presumably however this was not as justiciar 
of Lothian, for Sir Robert Lauder continued to exercise this office 
until at least 1333· It is recorded that he was present at the 
battle of Halidon Hill in July of that year but that he was too old 
276 to take an active part. Nevertheless as one of the auditors of 
272. Barrow, Bruce, 400. 
273. Barrow, Bruce, 399· It should be noted here that the appearance 
of John son of Adam Bruning as a justiciar specially deputed 
ad hoc in 1320 (RHS i app. 1 no. 67) was not as a 'subordinate 
justiciar' (Barrow, Bruce, 441) but rather an early example of 
the special commission of justiciary, for which see Dickinson, 
'Administration of justice', 346. Another example in the 
reign of Robert I is RMS i app. 1 no. 74 (APS i 479). 
274. It is possible that Cheyne was acting here as justiciar, not of 
the king, but of the regality of Moray: A.Y. Cheyne, The Cheyne 
Family in Scotland (Eastbourne, 1931) 40. 
275. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), lines 3188 - 9, 3210. 
276. Notes on Historical References to the Scottish Family of 
Lauder compiled by J. Young_ under the direction of A. Lauder 
(2nd ed., Paisley, 1886) 34; C.A.B. Lawder, The Lawders of 
the Bass and their Descendents (Belfast, 1914) 15. 
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the exchequer in 1337 Lauder was designed justiciar of Lothian 
once again. But it is uncertain how meaningful the title was at 
that time. In 1334 the sheriffdoms of Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, 
Peebles, Edinburgh and Dumfries, the constabularies of Linlithgow 
and Haddington and the forests of Ettrick and Jedburgh - that is, 
most of the territory over which the justiciar of Lothian had 
jurisdiction - was ceded to the English crown and made subject to 
English administration. 277 This led to the appointment by Edward 
III of Sir Robert Lauder the younger, son of the already mentioned 
Sir Robert, as 'justitiarius regis Anglie in Laudonia 1 in June 1334. 278 
But 'if even a vestigial English administration ••• set to work in the 
ceded counties it was almost immediately displaced•. 279 A Scottish 
rising of gathering strength led to the renewal of hostilities, in 
Lothian and elsewhere, which lasted until 1338; 280 the evidence 
suggests that this was a period of considerable dislocation and 
281 difficulty in the government of Scotland. In 1338 there was 
still an English justiciar of Lothian, Richard Talbot the warden 
of Berwick; 282 it is his existence which casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of the elder Lauder's position as the Scottish justiciar 
277· Nicholson, Edward III, 160 - 4. 
278. Rot. Scot. i 271; Nicholson, Edward III, 162. 
279· Nicholson, Edward III; 167. 
280. Nicholson, Edward III, 164 ff.; Nicholson, Later Middle A~es, 
130 - 8. 
281. Nicholson, Edward III, 227 - 8; Nicholson, Later Middle Aeies, 
140. 
282. Bain, CDS iii no. 1288. 
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of Lothian during these years. 
The record of a dispute in the exchequer in the late 1330s 
shows the sheriff of Aberdeen, William Meldrum, as a justiciar, 
almost certainly north of Forth, in 1335, while Adam Buttergask 
was the current holder of the office. In the accounts of December 
1337 it was noted that Buttergask had held an ayre at Elgin. He 
appears to have been a significant figure at this period, holding 
offices such as clerk of the wardrobe and chamberlain depute. In 
origin a Perthshire man, his landholdings were all in the north, 
in particular Banffshire. 283 There also exist references to Robert 
Lauder the younger as justiciar of Scotia north of Forth in March 
1336 and February 1337. He had re-established himself on the 
Scottish side by 1335 when his tenements in the burgh of Berwick 
284 
were declared forfeit by Edward III. In the document of March 
1336 where he is styled justiciar of Scotia he is also designed 
lieutenant of the guardian of Scotland (almost certainly by then 
Andrew Murray), 285 while in the document of February 1337 he appears 
at Falkland alongside such other leaders of the Scottish party as 
the guardian Murray and William Douglas, who were then conducting 
a campaign in Fife. 286 Despite his obvious political stature at 
this time there is no sign that Lauder played any major role 
thereafter, judicial or otherwise, although he survived until the 
283. For Meldrum see ER i 542, 545; for Buttergask, ER i cl - cli. 
284. Bain, CDS iii nos. 1192, 1193· 
285. Arbroath Liber i no. 290;- Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 133. 
286. Spaldin~ Mis?. v 243 - 4 (sum~arised Fraser, Douglas iii 
no. 315 ; N1cholson, Later M1ddle Ages, 135. 
1360s. 287 In 1363 a pension of twenty pounds per annum granted 
to him by Robert I and to be uplifted from the profits of the 
justiciary north of Forth was confirmed by David II, 288 but this 
seems to be his only recorded link with the justiciary after 1337. 
Despite the re-establishment of 'normal' government we lack 
evidence for the justiciars of Lothian in the 1340s and, indeed, 
i 0 I 
for most of the 1350s. But for the king's exemption of Ne\·Jbattle 
abbey from suit at the court of the justiciary of Lothian in 1346289 
it would be tempting to suppose that the dislocation of the 1330s 
and the continuing incursions of the English into south-eastern 
290 Scotland had had long-term effects south of Forth. Ho\<~ever in 
the north the picture is different. The evidence for regular ayres 
there has already been discussed and this may be attributable to the 
hold upon the office north of Forth by one man throughout the period. 
By 1339 William fifth earl of Ross had acquired the northern 
justiciarship, which he held into the 1350s and perhaps as late as 
1358. This was despite a challenge in 1344 to his right to hold it, 
made by Sir John Randolph, nephew and heir of Thomas Randolph. 
John abandoned his claim in parliament when he confessed 'that he 
had no right to the office of justiciar north of the Scottish sea 
287. Scottish Family of Lauder, 38; Lawder, Lawders of the Bass, 19. 
288. RNS i no. 163; cf. RHS i app. 2 no. 1479· 
289. RRS vi no. 101; Nev1battle Hegistrum no. 272. 
290. On these incursions see Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 
147 - 50, 161 - 2; G.W.S. Barrow, 'The aftermath of 
vT~r - Scotland and England in the late th.irteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries•, TRHS 5th series, 28 (1978) 
103 - 125, esp. at 122 - 5. 
ro :z_ 
by way of heritage 1 • 291 Ross was a cousin of David II, his 
mother having been a sister of Robert I, and he was one of the 
greatest of northern landowners at this time. Hhenever David 
was in the north Ross was prominent among his counsellors. 292 
He may have been succeeded by the same William Meldrum who had been 
in office in 1335, as he is said in the exchequer rolls to have been 
justiciar at Cupar (north of Forth) on 25 January 1358. But in 
the same year Meldrum was also designated lieutenant to the (un-named 
h R ? ) • t. . 293 th t . t . t . 1 
- per aps oss. JUS ~c~ar, so a ~ ~s no qu~te c ear whether 
or not the other exchequer entry is reliable in giving him promotion 
to the higher position. 
On the return of David II from his English captivity in 1357 
the justiciarships again became the subject of royal patronage. 
Robert Erskine first appears as justiciar north of Forth in 1359 
and in 1360 he held the office jointly with Hugh Eglinton. Both 
these men seem likely to have risen to prominence through the 
entourage of the Steward, from whose territories they came. 294 
291. J.M. Thomson, 'A roll of the Scottish parliament 1344', 
SHR 9 (1912) 235 - 240 at 239· 
292. Webster, 'David II', 125; RRS vi 9· 
293· ER i 558 - 9; •see also §g i 546~ 
294. Erskine, Renfrewshire, is on the Clyde, by Paisley, and was 
held of the Stewarts from at latest the mid-thirteenth 
century: Barrow, Kingdom, 345. (see also RRS vi no. 119). 
Eglinton, north of Irvine, Ayrshire, was in Cunningham, 
granted to Robert Stewart by Robert I 1316 x 1320: RMS i 
no. 54. Hugh Eglinton married Robert Stewart's half-sister 
Egidia. A calendar of documents relating to Hugh Eglinton 
may be found in c;t. Neilson, ·'Sir Hew of Eglinton and Huchown 
of the Awle Ryale: a biographical calendar and literary 
estimate', Proceedings of the Royal Philosophical Society of 
Glasgow 32 (1900 - 1) 111 - 150, at 114 - 131. In many of 
these documents he is connected with Robert Stewart and his 
fa~ily and with Robert Erskine. 
/03 
Certainly Erskine had become chamberlain during the lieutenantcy 
of the Steward between 1347 and 1357. 295 But his career under 
David II was one of startling success and he could be described 
by the king as 'confederate nostro•. 296 He already held extensive 
th 1 d . 1357 297 h. . nor ern an s 1n , so 1s appo1ntment as justiciar north 
of Forth was consistent with the policy of linking the office with 
a local base. The doom of a justice court held by Erskine at 
Dundee, north of Forth, was falsed by parliament in June 1368, so 
it is possible that he retained the office from 1359 until this 
time. But by 1370, \villi am Dishington, another of the king's 
closest councillors and a Fife landowner, had succeeded him. 298 
In the south, \villiam Douglas held a justice ayre at Edinburgh 
in 1358 and was presumably justiciar of Lothian at that time. In 
the same year the king made him first earl of Douglas, but in 1363 
he was involved in a rebellion with the Steward and the earl of 
March. 299 This may have played some part in the transfer of the 
office to the faithful Erskine, who is found as justiciar of Lothian 
in 1366 and may therefore have been sole justiciar at this period. 
But when the Steward ascended the throne as Robert II in 1371, 
Douglas aeain became justiciar south of Forth. Royal favour and 
295-
296. 
Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 150. 
See RMS i no. 839; for his career, Webster, 'David II', 
127;Nicholson, Later Hiddle Ages, 169; RRS vi 9· 
297. See e.g. RRS vi no. 198 (the lordship of Garioch). 
298. See RRS vi 9· For his lands of Ardross and Kinbrackmont 
in Fife see ID-1S i nos. 293 and 327., RRS vi no. 361. 
299. Webs~er, 1David II', 127- 9; Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 
168 - 9· 
extensive southern landholdings were obviously important in this 
reappointment. Indeed it is just possible that the southern 
justiciarship remained in the Douglas family from that time until 
at least the early years of the fifteenth century. If so, this 
closely parallels the position north of Forth, the justiciarship 
of which was more or less a preserve of the Stewarts or their 
close relations until 1424. But the evidence for a Douglas hold 
on the southern justiciarship is very limited. Archibald Douglas 
('the Grim') who became the third earl in 1388, held an ayre at 
Dumfries in 1383, but the document recording this fact does not 
state whether or not·it was a justice ayre•300 Even before he 
achieved the earldom Archibald was a prominent figure in royal 
government, keeper of Edinburgh castle under David II and a regular 
name in witness lists to charters of David and the first two Stewart 
k . 301 ~ngs; exactly the type of man who might well have been appointed 
justiciar. In 1410 the fourth earl of Douglas, Archibald 'the 
Tyneman', held a justice ayre ·~parte australi ague de Forth'; 
this appointment at least must reflect the position of the Douglases 
as 'unquestionably the most powerful magnates south of Forth•. 302 
300. Melrose Liber ii no. 485; cf. Fraser, Douglas i 337· 
The ayre was not that of the chamberlain, for that office 
was held by Robert Stewart earl of Fif~ and Menteith from 
November 1382 until March 1407: British Chronology, 179. 
301. Fraser, Douglas i 321 - 352 narrates his career; see also 
Webster, 'David II', 127; Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 
169. 
302. Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 203. There is some evidence 
that the Douglases did no~ enjoy a complete monopoly of the 
. southern justiciarship in that David Stewart earl of Carrick 
and eldest son of Robert III apparently held a justice ayre 
at Lanark in 1392 (ER iii 311). But it seems unlikely that 
he was then a fully-fledged justiciar, since in 1392 he was 
only fourteen years of age: A. Grant, 'The higher nobility 
in Scotland and their estates c. 1371- 1424', (Oxford 
University D. Phil., 1975) 109 n. 1. 
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We know far more about the northern than the southern justiciars 
in the latter part of the fourteenth century. They seem by and large 
to have been close relations, either by blood or by marriage, of the 
new Stewart kings. Thus James Lindsay of Crawford, who held office 
in the early 1370s, was a nephew of Robert II, his mother having 
been the king's sister, ~gidia.303 He was succeeded by his uncle, 
Alexander Lindsay of Glenesk, whose second wife, Marjory Stewart, 
was a niece of Robert rr. 304 Alexander remained justiciar north 
of Forth until at least 1380; the next known holder of the office, 
Alexander Stewart earl of Buchan, was one of the king's younger sons 
and is first referred· to as justiciar in February 1387~ In December 
1388 Buchan was accused of negligence in the administration of his 
position before the king's council and was accordingly relieved of 
his duties. 305 He was replaced first by David Lindsay of Glenesk, 
son of the above mentioned Alexander Lindsay and a prominent courtier 
who was to become the first earl of Crawford in 1398. His vlife was 
a daughter of Robert II and accordingly the king would occasionally 
1 h . 'f"l" ' 306 sty e ~m as ~ ~us • His justiciarship was however short; in 
April 1389, perhaps after he had held the spring ayre, Murdoch 
Stewart, son and heir of the earl of Fife and a grand-nephew of Robert 
II, was appointed to hold office for one year. 307 
303. Scots Peerage iii 11 - 13. 
304. Scots Peerage iii 14. 
305. APS i 556 • 
. 306. Scots Peerage iii 13- 16 and see RMS i nos. 761- 4. 
Robert III styled him 'frater': RMS i nos. ·801, 811, 812. 
307. APS i 557. 
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These events of 1388 - 89 are of considerable interest in the 
light they throw on contemporary perceptions of the justiciarship 
and its political importance. The council general of December 1388 
which dismissed Buchan also stripped the king's eldest son, John earl 
of Carrick, of his guardianship of the realm and conferred it upon 
the earl Of F.;fe.3°8 u·th· f th F.f ~ w~ ~n a ew mon s ~ e ensured the passage 
of the office of justiciar north of Forth to his own heir. In 
December council had laid down that the new justiciar should be a 
person who was 'sufficiens'. This was expanded upon at the time 
of Murdoch Stewart's appointment, when it was agreed that ayres north 
of Forth could not easily (commode) be held at that time 'without 
sufficient power' (sine sufficienti potencia) and in consequence 
Murdoch's father was enjoined to support him with 'sufficient power 
and council•. 309 In other words, while 'regard for provincial 
differences and entrenched feudal power• 310 continued to be important 
in the appointment of justiciars, the political power and support 
of central government was deemed essential to their success. 
Murdoch Stewart appears to have held two ayres during his year 
of office, for he can be found acting as justiciar north of Forth 
in January and November 1390. In December 1391 however Walter 
Stewart lord of Brechin was the king's justiciar. He was a half-
brother of the new king Robert III and his guardian, Robert Stewart 
the earl of Fife, and played a prominent role in the royal council 
308. APS i 556; Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 199 - 201. 
309. APS i 556_- 7• 
310. Barrow, Kingdom, 136. 
throughout the 1390s.311 But from 1392 on, Murdoch appears to 
have had a firm grip on the northern justiciarship, as well as a 
high place in the king's councils, until captured by the English 
at the battle of Homildon Hill in 1402. He was to remain a 
prisoner south of the border until March 1416.312 It seems that 
his duties were taken over by his father, now the duke of Albany, 
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who in 1406 received one hundred pounds 'for the office of justiciar, 
having held five ayres by the time of the account north of the water 
of Forth'. If ayres were held on an annual basis, this entry in 
the exchequer rolls would fit quite neatly into the period from 
the capture of Hurdoch. 
Robert III died in April 1406. His heir, James I, was a 
captive in England and for almost the next twenty years supreme power 
in Scotland rested first in the hands of Albany and then from 1420 
in those of his son Murdoch.3l3 During this period of the Albany 
governorship, there is very little evidence about justiciars and 
justice ayres. The reference to the earl of Douglas as justiciar 
south of Forth in 1410 has already been mentioned, and there is also 
mention in the exchequer rolls of Albany holding an ayre at Stirling 
(south of Forth) in 1414. Matters became a little clearer with 
the return of James I to Scotland in 1424. Robert Lauder of the Bass 
and Edrington, direct descendant in the male line of the Robert 
311. Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 211, 216, 232; see also below, 109. 
312. Balfour-Melville, James I, 22, 25 - 6, 65. 
313. On the Albany governorship see Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 
229 - 60. 
Lauders who had been justiciars a century earlier,314 appears 
regularly in the witness lists of royal charters from 1425 to 
December 1426 as 'justiciar', and from then through 1427 as 
(03 
'justiciar south of Forth'. In the earlier period he can be found 
designed as the justiciar of Scotia; possibly an indication that 
he was then sole justiciar, as already discussed. In 1427 and 
1428 Patrick Ogilvy appears in the witness-lists with equal 
regularity as justiciar north of Forth. Both Lauder and Ogilvy 
were also sheriffs, respectively of Lothian and Angus. The former 
played a part in the negotiations for the release of the king from 
his English captivity, 315 while Ogilvy died in the royal service as 
an ambassador to France.316 ~s well as having appropriate local 
connections therefore, both men were active in general government 
work. This was probably also true of Thomas Somerville, the only 
other justiciar south of Forth of whom evidence has been discovered 
in the reign of James I.3l7 He \vas a considerable landowner whose 
son was to become a lord of parliament in the next reign and who 
himself was using a peerage style, the lord of Somerville, as early 
as 1430.318 He may have held his office from 1428 to 1436, in 
succession to Lauder. We know of two northern justiciars at the 
end of the reign of James I. Walter Stewart, the earl of Atholl, 
314. The most thorough accohnt of the Lauder descent is Lawder, 
Lawders of the Bass, 19 - 23. 
315. Balfour-Melville, James I, 93, 96. 
316. Balfour-Melville, James I, 162 - 3. 
317. For his career see .Scots Peerage.viii 7- 9. 
318. See A.· Grant, 'The development of the Scottish peerage', 
SHR 57 (1978) 1 - 27 at 12 - 17. 
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Strathearn and Caithness appears in the office in July 1433 and 
October 1435. An uncle of the king who was to play a leading part 
in his assassination in 1437, Walter's earldoms gave him much power 
and status in the north of Scotland and he had been active politically 
at the centre of government since the reign of his half-brother Robert 
III. This, it will be recalled, had included the office of justiciar 
as early as 1391 when his only title was lord of Brechin.3l9 Alexander 
Stewart earl of Mar held an ayre at Inverness as justiciar, presumably 
north of Forth, in 1435, as well as one at Aberdeen at some other 
unspecified date. The illegitimate son of the earl of Buchan who 
had been dismissed as justiciar in 1388, Alexander had acquired his 
title jure uxoris and, having led the successful army in the battle 
of Harlaw (1411) on behalf of the government, he became one of the 
most important men in the north of Scotland and an active supporter 
of the king. 320 
The death of James I led to the prolonged minority of James II. 
In November 1437 we find James Douglas of Balvany, earl of Avandale 
as 'justiciar of the whole realm of Scots generally constituted', 
but by 1441 when he had become the seventh earl of Douglas his 
office was confined to the regions south of Forth. He probably 
retained the office until his death in 1443. Douglas has perhaps 
been maligned too much at the hands of historians as a result of the 
319. See above, 106; Balfour-Melville, James I, 246 - 8; Nicholson, 
Later Middle Ages, 322 - 3. 
320. Balfour-Melville, Jarnes I, 21, 37, 46, 84, 195; Nicholson, 
Later Middle Ages, '19. 
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way in which he acquired his earldom through the 'Black Dinner' 
and the soubriquet, 'the Gross', attached to him by the sixteenth 
century chronicler, Pitscottie. The records suggest a long career 
in government: as early as 1405 he was warden of the march and 
later he was one of the ambassadors who treated for the release of 
J I h . E 1· h t· ·t 321 ames from ~s ng 1s cap 1v1 y. Thereafter he appears to 
have been a loyal servant of the king, if we may judge from his quite 
frequent position as a witness to the great seal charters.
322 Douglas 
was very prominent in the government of the early years of the royal 
minority apart from his work as justiciar; the same is true of his 
contemporary as justiciar north of Forth, Alexander lord of the Isles 
earl of Ross, and also of the man who apparently succeeded Douglas 
in the south, Alexander Livingstone of Callendar.323 Douglas died 
in 1443 and in 1444 we find Livingstone holding an ayre at Dumbarton. 
He also appears as justiciar of 'Scotia' in September 1449, a few 
months after the death.of the lord of the Isles; it is possible 
therefore that he had then become justiciar of the entire kingdom. 
By this time Livingstone had risen to a supreme position within the 
government, so his occupation of the office of justiciar demonstrates 
•t t• . l•t• 1 . t 324 1 s con ~nu~ng po 1 1ca 1mpor ance. 
321. Balfour-Melville, James I, 93, 95, 122, 130 and 192; Nicholson, 
Later Middle Ages, 225. 
322. RHS ii, reign of James I, \oJi tness nos. 6, 13 and 25. 
323. Dunlop, Bishop Kennedy, 29 - 46; Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 
327, 330 - 2, 355 - 6. For Alexander lord of the Isles as a 
justiciar see also J. Munro, 'The Lordship of the Isles', in 
The Middle A es in the Hi hlands ed~ L. Mac~ean of Dochgarroch 
Inverness Field Club, 19 1 23 - 37 at 28 - 9· 
324. Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 328, 349. 
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For the years between 1450 and 1460 it is difficult to find 
anything other than the briefest of references to individuals as 
justiciars, but those who are mentioned appear generally to have 
been men associated with the king's government. Sir George Crichton, 
justiciar at Ayr according to an entry in the exchequer rolls, was 
also admiral of Scotland.325 William Sinclair earl of Orkney and 
chancellor of Scotland from 1454 to 1456 is said in the Ordo 
Justiciarie to have been justiciar south of Forth and references 
in the exchequer rolls do suggest that he attended ayres in both 
north and south during his chancellorship. 326 William lord 
Somerville, a lord of parliament, is also mentioned in the same 
source as a justiciar in the early 1450s. Laurence lord Abernethy 
of Rothiemay, another lord of parliament, was justiciar south of 
Forth in March 1455· AndrevT Stewart lord Avandale, illegitimate 
son of the eldest son of Murdoch Stewart duke of Albany (a justiciar 
in the 1390s), held ayres at Kirkcudbright and Wigtown in either 
1457 or 1458. His career under James II has rightly been described 
as 'impressive' by Dr. Macdougall: having participated in the 
assassination of the earl of DouBlas in 1L~52, he rose through the 
household, receiving a knighthood, the barony of Avandale and a 
lordship of parliament before becoming warden of the west march in 
1459 and chancellor in 1460, just before the king's death. 327 
325· Dunlop, Bishop Kennedy, 57· 
326. For the Ordo see APS i 705 and below, 185 and note 33· 
327. Macdougall, James III, 22; · Chalmers, 'King's council', 
246 - 7• · For Avandale's descent see RMS ii no. 1425 and 
Highland Papers iv 203 - 6. ---
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Similarly John lord Lindsay of Byres, justiciar north of Forth in 
October and November 1457 although the lands from which he took his 
title \vere in East Lothian, \·Jas a lord of parliament by }1ay 1452-328 
Despite the death of James II, Avandale and Lindsay of Byres 
continued to hold office as justiciars during the minority of James 
III. The latter was justiciar north of Forth in June 1466 although 
Gilbert lord Kennedy's designation as 'justiciarius Scotie' which was 
discussed earlier, comes in 1464. Avandale, who was to remain 
chancellor until 1482, held an ayre at Dumfries between 1460 and 
1464 and at Ayr in 1460. However there were changes in practice 
south of Forth at this period, for quite frequently two justiciars 
were appointed to hold ayres there jointly.329 In February 1461 
Colin Campbell first earl of Argyll and Master of the Royal Household330 
and Robert lord Boyd, best known at that time as a lord of parliament 
331 
and long-standing servant of the crown, held court together as 
'justices' south of Forth. In January 1465, two lords of parliament, 
William lord Abernethy of Hothiemay and \rlilliam lord Borthwick, held 
an ayre together at Jedburgh as 'justices on southhalffe Forthe', 
while in October 1465, John lord Houston and Sir William Semple were 
the justiciars south of Forth at Dumbarton. In January 1466 \/illiam 
328. Grant, 'Scottish peerage', 13. Byres is now a farm in East 
Lothian-(OS, NT 495769)·- Lindsay was also a great nephew of 
Alexander Lindsay of Glenesk and a first cousin once removed of 
James Lindsay of Crawford and David Lindsay of Glenesk, all 
justiciars under Robert II: Scots Peerage v 391 - 3 and above, 105. 
329. There were precedents: e.g. the joint appointments of Robert 
Erskine and Hugh ~glinton as justiciars of Scotia in 1360 (Fraser, 
Menteith ii no. 29; RRS vi·no. 228). For examples before 1300 
see Barrow, Kingdom, 129. 
330. See Macdougall, James III, 66, 80; Chalmers, 'King's council', 
247 - 8. 
331. Macdougall, James III, 70. 
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Edmonstone of Duntreath and Gilbert Kennedy of Bargany, a cousin 
of Gilbert lord Kennedy, 332 held court together at Ayr as justiciars 
south of Forth 'generally constituted'. For a while such arrangements 
were then abandoned: in January 1467 Edmonstone of Duntreath was the 
solitary justiciar south of Forth and in October 1468 Robert first 
lord Lyle was the only justiciar in an ayre at Dumfries. But in 
March 1471 Edmonstone was acting jointly with David Guthrie of that 
ilk. Perhaps Guthrie was servine a form of apprenticeship, for 
by November 1472 he was the sole justiciar south of Forth generally 
constituted at Ayr, albeit with as powerful a figure as "the earl of 
Argyll as his depute. There is a possible reference to Thomas 
lord Erskine acting as justiciar south of Forth (at Stirling) in 1474333 
and mention has already been made of the termination of the appointment 
of Archibald earl of Angus in 1483. The next clear reference to 
justiciars acting south of Forth, in 1485, once again shows two men 
acting jointly, Andrew lord Avandale and Robert second lord Lyle. 333a 
North of Forth, by contrast, there is no evidence for the 
appointment of joint justiciars. Robert second lord Lyle held 
an ayre singly at Cupar in 1471 while David Guthrie was justiciar 
'of Scotia' in 1473· In 1478 John Haldane of Gleneagles held 
332. The Kennedies of Bargany descended from a younger brother of 
the father of Gilbert lord Kennedy: D. Cowan, Historical 
Account of the Noble"Family of Kennedy (Edinburgh, 1849) 
16 - 21. Note that Edmonstone and Kennedy were 'generally 
constituted': in April 1466 Houston and Semple were 'specially 
constituted' justiciars south of Forth to continue dealing 
with an action between Gilbert lord Kennedy and Robert lord 
Fleming begun the previous _year: SRO, Ailsa Muniments GD 
25/1/102. 
333. TA i 53· 
333a. The second Lord Lyle succeeded his father c. 1469: 
Scots Peera0e v 553. 
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another Cupar ayre. George earl of Huntly was appointed justiciar 
north of Forth in October 1479 and was apparently still in office in 
1482. The ayre of Fife in 1487 was however held by David earl of 
Crawford. It looks as though the rather wavering practice south of 
Forth did not affect the northern office. 
It is therefore in a new light that we may look at an act of 
parliament passed in October 1487 stating that one or two justice 
generals were to be made south and also north of Forth.33 4 It 
appears to place matters in the south on a statutory footing and to 
consider desirable the extension of practice there to the north. 
This was consolidated by further acts in January 1488 which effectively 
commanded that there be double· appointments on both circuits. 335 
David earl of Crawford and George earl of Huntly, both past holders 
of the office, were to be justiciars north of Forth. Two names 
were to be selected from a list of four for the southern offices. 
Only one of these, Hobert lord Lyle, had previously been a justiciar. 
But two of the others, John lord Glamis and John lord Drummond, were 
to have long careers as justiciars under James IV. The last of the 
four, John Ramsay lord Bothwell, was designed as a royal justiciar 
along with Robert lord Lyle immediately after the passage of the 1488 
act, but, having been a favourite of James III, did not obtain similar 
heights in the next reign.336 
334. APS ii 176, c. 2. 
335· APS ii 182, cc. 5 and 6. 
336. Macdougall, James III, 193; Chalmers, 'King's council', 293- 5~ 
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The justiciars of James III conform in general to the pattern 
of being government men, counsellors and supporters of the kings. 
This is clearly the case with people such as Avandale, Argyll, 
Crawford, Huntly, Lyle and Guthrie, and is probably also true of 
Edmonstone and Haldane. 337 Guthrie's is a particularly interesting 
case, for he had 'a long and successful administrative career', 
holding numerous important offices, including that of clerk register, 
between 1461 and 1474. It has been said that he was 'a rare creature 
for his age, a graduate laird, who had studied at Cologne and Paris'; 
he was probably the only layman to hold the office of clerk register 
before 1532. He appears to have been the first justiciar with a 
university degree, albeit that of M.A., and was an active court 
pleader. 338 
The same general conclusion can be drawn about the justiciars 
of the next reign. Moreover, because the men who held office were 
so often designated as justiciar in the witness lists of royal 
charters under the great seal, it is possible to state the periods 
of time for which they did so. In the period 1488 to 1495 this 
suggests that normally there were only two justiciars, but this may 
be misleading. There is also no indication of a geographical 
division of work. Throughout that period John lord Glamis acted 
as one of the justiciars. His first colleagues were Robert lord 
337-
338. 
See Nacdougall, James III, passim; also Chalmers, 'King's 
council', 172 (Lyle), 174- 5 (Crawford), 246- 7 (Avandale). 
Haldane attended parliaments (APS ii 116, 132, 169); 
Edmonstone was elected to the parliamentary committee ad causas 
in 1478 (APS ii 116). The·account of the latter's public 
career in~ Edmonstone, Genealo ical Account of the Famil of 
Edmonstone of Duntreath (Edinburgh, l 75 needs some correction. 
Hurray, 'The lord clerk register', 13~; Macdouga11, James III, 
100; for appearances as a p1eader in court see Appendices 
D and H. 
.... :. 
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Lyle and John lord Drummond but in early 1489 Lyle was involved in a 
rebellion339 and was dismissed. Drummond held office until 1491 
340 
when Lyle, restored to favour, was given back his former position, 
which he retained until 1495· The earliest surviving justiciary 
records however show Lyle holding court jointly with Laurence lord 
Oliphant as justiciars south of Forth at Lauder and Jedburgh in 
November 1493. 341 But in February and March 1495 these records 
describe Lyle and Glamis as justiciars south of Forth. This may 
have been the close of their careers in the offices. Their depute 
John lord Drummond seems to have been the man who actually held the 
342 
ayre. From 1494 Drummond was constantly designated justiciar 
in the great seal charters, so perhaps he acted then north of 
Forth. But he was the only person so designated from 1494 to 
1497; possibly for the latter part of that period he was sole 
justiciar. In 1498 he was described as justiciar both north and 
south of Forth generally constituted.343 By that time he was at 
the end of his career; he is not heard of as a justiciar again 
after that year. In 1497 Andrew lord Gray had become justiciar 
alongside Drummond; in 1499 he was joined by George earl of Huntly, 
now the chancellor. Huntly died in 1501 and Gray continued 
thereafter as the only justiciar. In 1503 he was described as 
'· t' 1 f th h 1 1 of Scots•.344 JUS 1ce genera o e w o e rea m He can be 
339· Mackie, James IV, 53· 
340. Mackie, James IV, 55- 6; Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 536 - 8. 
341. SRO, JCl/1 ff. 1 r., 7 r. 
342. SRO, JCl/1, ff. 18 r., 29 r. 
343. ER xi 316•. 
344. ~ ii 273· 
regarded as the first real justice general; the office was never 
again divided, either regionally or between individuals. 
Professor A.L. Brown has shown that Glamis, Lyle, Drummond 
and Gray were all key men in the administration of James IV. The 
same is also true of Oliphant and of Huntly, whose importance is 
sufficiently shown by his appointment to the chancellorship in 
1497- 345 The importance of Glamis in the council of James IV has 
346 
also been stressed by Dr. T.M. Chalmers. Glamis was the second 
graduate to be a justiciar. Apart from Huntly and, to a lesser 
extent, Lyle, all \'rere men who had been frustrated in career 
ambitions under James III and who had taken the side of James IV 
in the struggle leading to Sauchieburn in 1488. 347 It is also 
important to note that all held judicial positions apart from that 
of justiciar, not just under James IV, but also under James III. 
In particular Glamis, Oliphant, Drummond and Lyle acted as auditors 
of causes and complaints in the parliaments of James III, while 
Gray was sheriff of Forfar and, under James IV, a fairly regular 
t k . ' . 1 . . t . d . . 1 . 348 member of he ~ng s counc~ ~n ~ s JU ~c~a sess~ons. Thus 
it is quite apparent that these men were seen as having talents 
that fitted them for judicial work and it would be wrong to suppose 
that they lacked legal skills and knowledge or were unable to tackle 
the work which fell upon them. 
345. A.L. Brown, 'The Scottish 11 establishment" in the later 
fifteenth century', JR 23 (1978) 89- 105 at 99- 101. 
346. Chalmers, 'Kin~;'s council', .184- 5, 265 - 6. 
347. Bro\m, 'The Scottish "establishment"', 100; Macdougall, 
James III, 242 - 5. 
348. Brown, 'The Scottish "establishment"', lOO- 1; Chalmers, 
'King's council', 180 - 3, 459, 462. For Gray as sheriff 
• of Forfar see ffilS ii nos. 1806, 2257; ER xi 330 • 
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If this was true of the justiciars of James IV, was it also 
true of their predecessors? We only know about the former's 
judicial activities because the parliamentary and council records 
are nearly complete from 1488 onward. But it is possible to show 
that, quite apart from their general governmental work, some of the 
earlier justiciars performed judicial functions. Thus Robert 
Erskine, Archibald Douglas and William Dishington were appointed 
to the parliamentary committee to deal with matters touching common 
justice in 1370. 349 Alexander Stewart earl of Mar sat judicially 
in various cases before parliament (1430) council general (1422) 
and council (1424), and Robert Lauder of the Bass and Edrington and 
Thomas Somerville of Carnwath may be found with him in some of these 
cases.
350 John lord Lindsay of the Byres, William lord Somerville 
and Laurence lord Abernethy appear on conciliar and parliamentary 
sederunts dealing with legal actions in the late 1450s and 1460s.35l 
Those justiciars who were or became chancellor, such as William 
Sinclair earl of Orkney, Andrew lord Avandale and Colin earl of 
Argyll, would have been much involved in the judicial work of the 
king's council, as well as in the legal work of the king's chapel 
(or chancery). The rather fragmented records of council and 
parliament under James III show his justiciars as active in their 
349. APS i 508. 
350. 
351. 
See Paisley Registrum, 70; Fraser, Carlaverock ii no. 31; 
RMS ii no. 146 (APS ii 28 no. 6) for the relevant sederunts. 
Aberdeen - Banff I~ iv 205 ~ 13; Fraser, Chiefs of Grant 
iii 259·- 6o;- Fraser, Maxwells of Pollok i no. 35i 
Scone Liber no. 213 (APS xii 22 no. 4). Lindsay was 
appointed to be one or-the lords of session in 1458: 
APS ii 47. 
judicial work. Also of interest is the membership of a committee 
appointed by parliament in 1482 to examine the law of purpresture. 
It can be safely assumed that most of these were men of legal 
ability. Amongst them were Robert lord Lyle and John lord Drummond 
(as the lord of Stobhall) as well as Richard Lawson, soon to be if 
not already justice clerk, John Ross of Montgrennan, king's advocate 
and William lord Borthwick who was to be a justice-depute in 1485.352 
These last three names remind us that the justiciars did not 
act alone. There are numerous examples of deputes holding courts 
on their behalf, who appear usually to have been men less involved 
in the office of central government than their principals, but were 
also in general landowners of local prominence. 353 Justiciars 
north and south of Forth seem each to have had their clerk in the 
mid-fourteenth century. Thus Adam Forrester was appointed to 'the 
office of clerk of the rolls of the justiciary south of Forth' in 
1362354 and in 1366, as clerk of the rolls, he inserted a process 
in the justiciary rolls, having affixed the seal of the justiciary 
of Lothian to it. 355 He was therefore in attendance upon the court 
and kept its records and seal. In 1374 Alan Lauder, a descendant 
of the Robert Lauders who had been justiciars under Robert I and 
David II, received a pension of ten pounds for his labours 'in the 
352. APS ii 141. 
353· For references to 'lieutenants' of the justiciar early in 
the fourteenth century see BL, MS Add. 3321~5 ff. 156 v. -
157 r; Fraser, Southesk ii no. 36 and ER i 558 - 9. From 
c. 1360 references are to the justice-depute: ER ii 438; 
Pitfirrane writs nos. 16, 2~; Peebles Chrs. no-.-16; Moray 
Registrum no. 203; Prot. Bk. Young nos. 725, 962, 1211. 
354. RHS i .no. lOO and note; cf ID-1S i app. 2 no. 1461 and Nurray, 
'The lord clerk register', 127. 
355· Raine, North Durham no. 326. 
office of clerk of the rolls of the justiciary south of Forth'.356 
In 1369 William Chalmers was granted 'the office of clerk of the 
rolls of the justiciary north of Forth'.357 By 1380 Chalmers was 
designated simply as 'justice clerk of our lord king' 358 and in 
1398 he was still 'the justice clerk•, 359 without any particular 
geographical limitation to the office being apparent. However if 
Chalmers did become the sole justice clerk, this did not establish 
the office on those lines. By the middle of the fifteenth century 
/1..0 
there appear to have been 'justice clerkis' , 360 one perhaps being 
Robert Nairn, steward of the king and depute chamberlain, 361 while in 
1473 James III appointed his familiar 'armigerum' William Haket of 
Belses (Roxburghshire) clerk of justiciary south of Forth; perhaps 
this was a reappointment, for Haket had held the office in 1465.362 
Professor Hannay was probably correct to suggest that the final 
emergence of a single 'justice clerk general' came later in the reign 
and it seems likely that the first holder of the office was Richard 
Lawson, who is well known to historians as one of the most prominent 
lawyers of his time.363 It is by no means impossible that this was 
also true of his fourteenth century predecessors. 
356-
357· 
358. 
359· 
RMS i no. 456; HMC v 611. For his descent, see Lawder, 
LaWders of the Bas6, 19 - 23. 
RMS i no. 295. 
Moray Registrum no. 159· 
Moray Registrum P• 210. 
360. APS ii 3?, c. 15. 
361. ER vi 98. 
362. RMS ii no. 1119; SRO, ADl/60 (Append~x D). 
363. R •. K. Hannay, 'The office of the justice clerk', 312 - 13; 
Chalmers, 'King's council', 188 - 9, 245 - 6. 
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Finally the justiciars must also have received support on 
occasion, and perhaps often, from the king himself and his council. 
Mention has been made of how important the king's participation in 
the ayres seems to have been. It was commanded by statute in 
144o. 364 His attendance would have meant that of his council and 
therefore that of the men who acted as judges in the so-called 
central courts. Evidence of the kings' personal activities in 
this regard has already been discussed; from time to time there may 
be found references to the attendance of the council as well. In 
1348 a decision of the northern justiciary was reached 'de consilio 
jurisperito~um•, 365 while the following year several members of the 
king's council were with the justiciar of Scotia north of Forth when 
1 t h t d . R . h G . h 366 he held ful court a t e s an ~ng stones of ayne ~n t e ar~oc • 
In 1457 James II commanded the sheriff of Forfar to summon Thomas 
Cullace 'to compeir befoir us and our counsaile at Dunde the secunde 
day of the nixt justice aire of Anguss•.367 During the ayre of 
~lberdeen in November that year seven men were summoned to compear 
before the king and his council on a certain day of the ayre to 
answer for an alleged error made by them in the service of a brieve 
of inquest. 368 The apparent failure of James III and his council 
to attend the ayres may be reflected in the acts of 1488 appointing 
364. APS ii 32, c. 2. 
365. Fraser, Southesk ii no. 36. 
366. Aberdeen Registrum i 79 - 81. 
367. Brechin Registrum i no. 88. 
368. Aberdeen-Banff Dl. iv 205 - 13. 
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justiciars north and south of Forth, for they directed 'that our 
soverane lord send certane wise lordis and persouns of his consale 
••• to be assessouris and consalouris to thaim'.369 This probably 
reflects the traditional role of council on ayre. In the spring 
of 1498 there was an attempt to link council's judicial sessions 
with a justice· .ayre in the north, but this method of organising 
conciliar work was not repeated. 370 
It is therefore clear that, quite apart from the fact that in 
general the justiciars themselves were members of the king's 
government in othe~ capacities, they received support on their 
ayres from their fellow-councillors. There can be little doubt 
that legal skill was available to them in consequence and there is 
every reason to suppose that they themselves did not lack those 
skills. Indeed at least in some cases it may well have been those 
skills which ensured rises from relative obscurity to ereat prominence. 
Men like the first Robert Lauder, Robert Brskine, Andrew lord Avandale 
and John lord Drummond are good but surely not the only examples. 
It is tempting to make something of the general disappearance of 
men such as earls from the justiciarship, but it is too easy to 
suppose that this reflects a change in the nature of the office from 
a possession of the upper ranks of the nobility to one occupied by 
'professionals'. Those fourteenth and fifteenth century earls who 
were justiciars were, like their lesser colleagues, also generally 
active elsewhere in government service; they were 'political' earls. 
Equally the Drummonds, Lyles and Avandales of the fifteenth century 
369. APS ii 182. 
370. See above, 87, and note 236. 
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have their equivalents in earlier periods - Lauder, Erskine, 
Dishington, Somerville, Lindsay of the Byres. v/ha t did perhaps 
change was the extent to which a landed power base either north or 
south of Forth was of importance; from the 1450s it appears to 
have been of lessening sisnificance. It is true that Huntly and 
Crawford, who held office north of Forth at different times between 
1479 and 1500, were important landowners in the north, but otherviise 
the local power base seems not to matter at all. All justiciars, 
earls or not, were of course landowners; officers of law, in the 
\vords of a statute of 1424'. \vhich \vere to be echoed in 1487, needed 
to have 'sufficient of their own' in order to perform their function 
in accordance with the expectations of contemporary society.37l 
In conclusion this discussion of the justiciars reinforces 
the view that they and their ayres played a major role in the 
administration of the medieval common law. Moreover it is most 
unlikely that these king's men played a part antithetical to eood 
government, or were incapable of acting as judges or of comprehending 
the complexities of the law. 
(d) Conclusions 
It is thus apparent that scepticism about the administration, 
even the existence, of a common law in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries is misplaced as are doubts about the survival and vigour 
of the system which had evolved in the two preceding centuries. 
The loss of record makes it difficult to discover how the system 
worked, how effective it was and .what kind of law it produced and 
371. APS ii 3, c. 6; APS ii 176, c. 2; cp. APS i 556 - 7. 
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operated under; but if in our surviving sources we can perceive 
hints of system, legal thought and structure we ought to give them 
full value. In the next two chapters, we will examine one of the 
jurisdictional rules of the medieval common la\v in detail and it 
will be shown how the law could be sustained and developed in the 
decentralised court structure discussed in this chapter. It \vill 
then be apparent in what context the emergence of the conciliar court 
and the nature of its jurisdiction should be discussed. 
~ ,•' 
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Chapter Three 
Pleadable Brieves and Freehold 
(a) The rule and 'feudal theory' 
It is unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis to consider 
in detail the origins in Scotland of the rule that no man needed to 
answer for his freehold save by pleadable brieve. Professor Harding 
has argued persuasively that its roots lie in grants of the king's 
protection which included commands that the beneficiary should enjoy 
quiet possession of his lands and that he should not be impleaded 
except before the king or his justices.1 To this we must add the 
direct influence of English law, for the rule as such had first 
2 appeared in Glanvill towards the end of the twelfth century. Indeed 
at the end of the thirteenth century Alexander Macdonald of Islay 
spoke of the rule as common to the laws of both England and Scotland,3 
while the discussion of the subject in Regiam Majestatem is lifted 
straight from Glanvill. 4 The rule is also stated in the Leges 
Burgorum in a chapter found in all the early manuscripts and so 
attributable to the thirteenth century.5 
and applied in the Aberdeen burgh court. 6 
In 1317 the rule was cited 
1. Harding,, 'Medieval brieves of protection', 120 and 128- g. 
See in addition to the examples cited at 120 note 16, Lawrie, 
Charters no. 248. 
2. Glanvill XII, 2; XII, 25. 
3. Public Record Office, SC 1/18/147, printed by A.A.M. Duncan and 
J.G. Dunbar, 'Tarbert Castle', SHR 50 (1971) 1- 16 at 15- 16. 
See also ibid., 3- 5 and Barro~Bruce, 80 and note 3, 209. 
4. Regiam Majestatem III., 23, from Glanvill XII, 25. 
5. Ancient Burgh Laws, 21 (c. 43). 
6. Aberdeen Burgh Recs., 10- 14. 
12~ 
The establishment of the rule in Scotland was not therefore the 
result of a statute enacted in 1318 which stated that 'no one is to 
be ejected from his free holding [liberum tenementum suumJ of which 
he claims to be vest and saised as of fee without the king's pleadable 
brieve or some similar brieve nor without being first reasonably 
summoned to a certain day and place for his free holding•. 7 Why 
then was this statute necessary? Indeed it is surprising to find 
such a provision amongst the legislation of that 'feudally conservative' 
king Robert I, for the rule it embodied is usually seen by English 
legal historians as 'anti-feudal' in effect if not in intention, in 
that it seems to have destroyed the jurisdiction of seignorial courts 
in England over land disputes, which in 'feudal theory' was an 
1 . 8 exc usJ.Ve one. Robert I by contrast is usually seen as 'revitalising' 
the feudal institutions of the barony and the regality with their 
extensive franchisal powers. 9 What then lies behind the act of 
1318? 
One explanation may lie in the political background to the act. 
Following his victory at Bannockburn in 1314, Robert I had his 
_, 
parliament declare that all who would not corn~ into his peace would 
7. APS i 473, c. 25. 
B. See F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law edd. A.H. 
Chaytor and W.J. Whittaker (Cambridge, 1936, reprinted 1968); 
T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I (Oxford, 1949) 24 - 29; 
Brevia Placitata ed. G.J. Turner (Selden Soc., vol. 66) lxviii; 
D.M. Stenton, English Justice between the Norman Conguest and the 
Great Charter 10 6 - 1215 (London, 1965) 26 - 30; Royal Writs 
in En land from the Con uest to Glanvill ed. R.C. van Caenegem 
Selden Soc., vol. 77 213- 25 also his Birth of the English 
Common Law (Cambridge, 1973) 25 - 8); Milsom, Legal Framework, 
57 ~ 9; R.C. Palmer, The Count* Courts of Medieval England 
1150 - 1350 (Princeton, 1982) 1 2 - 7 (also his 'The feudal 
fram~work of English law•, Michigan Law Review 79 (1981) 1130-
1164). . 
g. See Barrow, Bruce, 410; Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 111. 
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be forfeited. 10 Thus those who held lands in both Scotland and 
England had to choose to which crown they w~uld in future give their 
allegiance; those who chose to be subject to the English king would 
lose their lands. This had happened to many even before 1314 and 
the lands had been granted out instead to supporters of king Robert. 
Coupled however with the return of former owners to Scottish allegiance 
after 1314, a complex situation arose. Professor Barrow's full review 
of the handling of this situation leads him to the conclusion that 
'king Robert held fast to the principle that there should be no 
disinheritance of men and women claiming property by hereditary 
right, provided that they were prepared to swear allegiance to him', 
and that 'the king's dealings with regard to property and the services 
rendered by its holders were informed by a spirit of conservatism and 
restoration•.11 Such a policy must however have led to clashes 
between those returning disinherited and those who had benefited from 
forfeiture of their lands. No doubt there were compromises. An 
instructive example is that involving the loyal Adam the marischal 
who was given the barony of Manor in Tweeddale on the forfeiture of 
its owner, Alexander Baddeby, in 1309. Baddeby re-entered Scottish 
allegiance after Bannockburn and Manor was divided between him and 
Adam, presumably by agreement. But in 1323 Baddeby unsuccessfully 
sought restoration of the whole from the king.12 It is surely 
against a background where the king's loyal adherents were uncertain 
10. APS i 464. 
11. Barrow, Bruce, 380 - 92. 
12. RMS i app. 1 no. 96; Barrow, Bruce, 392. 
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to what extent they would be able to retain their new lands against 
the returning disinherited that parliament enacted in 1318 that no man 
could be put out of his free holding without the king's pleadable 
brieve. There was nothing anti-feudal about this; it was a move 
in the interests of security of tenure and the status quo. Those 
in possession could only be put out through due process of law. 
This however is not to say that the rule had no effect on the 
feudal jurisdictions of the barons and other lords. Rather it 
seems certain that it did have an effect even before the passage of 
the 1318 act. Writers on Scottish franchise courts commonly - and 
correctly - emphasise the paucity of evidence upon which to base any 
conclusions regarding their ju~isdiction in medieval times. 
Generally it is assumed that the lord had jurisdiction to try the 
title disputes of his tenants,13 although I have not found any 
explicit statement in the sources to this effect, and certainly 
there are examples of land disputes being taken in franchise courts. 
To understand the effect of requiring a brieve in such cases, we must 
look at the rule in England, where, according to Glanvill, the effect 
of the rule requiring writs was that the demandant should have a writ 
of right directed to the lord of whom he claimed to hold, ordering 
him to do full right. The writ concluded by threatening transfer 
13. In his edition of the Court Book of the Barony of Carnwath, 
W.C. Dickinson cites in a footnote the statement of W.S. McKechnie 
in Magna Carta (2nd ed., 346), 'In pleas of disputed titles to 
land, feudal theory gave sole jurisdiction to the lord of the 
fief. No principle was more absolutely established than this', 
but makes no comment on its applicability in Scotland: Carnwath 
Court Bk., xi, note 2. In a subsequent article, he was less 
cautious: ·•Administration of justice', at 340 and 350. Similar 
views may be found in the introduction to Acta Dominorum Concilii 
1501 - 1503 J.A. Clyde at xxxvii - xxxviii, where there is heavy 
reliance on the much later authority of Craig's Jus Feudale. 
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of the case to the sheriff in the event of the lord's disobedience. 14 
Thus there was a writ by which cases relating to land would start in 
their 'natural' forum, the court of the lord of whom the land in 
question was held. In Scotland there was in the thirteenth century 
a brieve called 'de recto•,15 but when we are given a style for it 
in the Ayr manuscript, 16 we seem to be in the presence of something 
very different from the English writ. It runs as follows: 
The king to the sheriff. We command etc that you 
cause N. the bearer of the presents to have full 
right of four carrucates of your bailiary which 
he claims to hold of us heritably, rendering 
therefor to us twenty silver shillings annually 
and giving such forinsee service and aid as 
pertains to the service of half a knight; of 
which carrucates of land with the pertinents 
R de B unjustly deforced him, as he says, acting 
thereupon so that for no defect of right etc. 
There is another exactly similar style in the Ayr manuscript 
addressed to 'the provosts and bailies of the burgh of A.•, 17 
while both the Bute manuscript and Quoniam Attachiamenta contain 
styles, again exactly similar, addressed to the sheriff.18 The 
styles reflect early fourteenth century practice. By good fortune 
we have surviving the text of a brieve of right addressed to the 
burgh court of Aberdeen in 1317 and sewn to the roll of the court.19 
14. Glanvill XII, 2 and 13. 
15. See Stones and Simpson, Edward I ii 342 - 3 and Stevenson, 
Documents i 384 - 6 for references in the late thirteenth 
century. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Re g. Brieves, 
Re g. Brieves, 
Re g. Brie'ves, 
Aberdeen Burgh 
39 (no. 18). 
40 (no. 19). 
61 (no. 91); guoniam Attachiamenta c. 57· 
Recs., 7 
-
8. 
It may be translated thus: 
Robert by the grace of God king of Scots to 
his faithful officers and bailies of Aberdeen 
greetings: We command and ordain you that you 
cause John son of Laurence and Marjory daughter 
of the late Brice de Cragy, his wife, to have 
full right by reason of their said marriage of 
a perticate of land with the pertinents lying 
in the said burgh of Aberdeen on the eastern 
side of the street known as Gallowgate, between 
the lands which belonged to the late William 
Fiechet on the southern side at one end, and 
the lands on the northern side which belonged 
to the late Reginald de Grendoun at the other, 
which perticate of land with the pertinents 
he claims to hold of us heritably by reason 
of his said wife, rendering annually therefor 
to us and our heirs six silver pennies in this 
way, three pennies at the feast of Pentecost 
and three pennies at the feast of St. Martin, 
also rendering to the brothers of the order 
of the Trinity in Aberdeen six shillings and 
eight silver pennies half-yearly, in this way, 
at the above mentioned feast of Pentecost 
and the other half at the foresaid feast of 
St. Martin, of which perticate of land with 
the pertinents Emma, daughter of the foresaid 
late Brice de Cragy, has unjustly deforced 
them, so they say, acting thereupon so that 
we do not hear any just complaint for want of 
full right therein. 
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The Scottish brieve of right seems then to have been a form which 
commenced action directly in the royal courts. In this it is 
sharply distinct from the English writ of right. But the influence 
of the latter is discernible in the Scottish brieve in its formula 
of 'full right' and the accusation of 'deforcement' by a third 
party. It is important however to notice that in all the styles 
the bearer of the brieve is said to be one who claims to hold of 
the king: in other words, to be a tenant-in-chief. Feudal 
theory would suggest that it was perfectly proper for such a person 
to sue for his lands in the king's _court. We thus seem closer to· 
the thirteenth century English writpraecipe in capite which after 
i31 
Magna Carta was only available to tenants-in-chief, to enable them 
20 to recover their lands from another. It is worth setting out the 
form of this writ also: 21 
The king to the sheriff greeting. Command B. 
that justly and without delay he render to A. 
ten acres of land with appurtenances in such a 
vill which he claims to be his right and 
inheritance and to hold of us in chief and 
whereof he complains that the aforesaid B. 
deforces him; and if he does not do it and 
the said A. shall have given you security to 
prosecute his claim, then summon by good 
summoners the aforesaid B. that he be before 
our justices at Westminster to show why he has 
not done this, and have there the summoners 
and this writ. 
Again elements of the Scottish brieve can be seen to have derived 
from this writ: the statement that the demandant holds in chief 
of the king and that he claims by heritable right. But it is 
important to note that the ~cipe in capite was not a breve de 
recto and that for much of the thirteenth century the two were 
carefully distinguished by English lawyers. Maitland states 
that 'in course of time the term "Writ of Right" gains a somewhat 
extended sense and is used so as to include the~ecipe in capite• 22 
because by both writs the demandant recovered full proprietary 
right. He did not give chapter and verse for this statement and 
the point does not seem to have been dwelt upon by subsequent 
writers. Perhaps the beginnings of knowledge on this point may be 
20. Clause 34 of Magna Carta 1215 forbade the issue of:~ecipe 
writs so as to deprive lords of their jurisdiction. Accordingly 
only the king's tenants could use the.Praecipe, and the writ 
p~cipe in capite was introduced. Se~ below, 132. 
21. See Early Registers of Writs edd. E de Haas and G.D.G. Hall 
(Selden Soc., vol. 87), 18. 
22. Mai~land, Forms of Action, 19. 
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found in the Early Registers of Writs published by the Selden 
Society where may be found a writ in the p~cipe form being 
described as a 'breve de recto•. 23 It commands B. to render 
land to A. or else answer before the king's justices. There is 
no statement that the land is held of the king; instead it is 
stated that its lord has remitted his court. Such a clause, like 
the statement about the lands being held in chief, had been made 
necessary by clause 34 of Magna Carta which laid down that praecipe 
writs should not be issued if there was a lord with jurisdiction. 
Thus pra~ipe writs had always to show that this provision was met, 
and the pra~ipe quia dominus remisit curiam suam did so. 24 Its 
description by the 1260s as a 'breve de recto' is thus of some 
significance; it shows that by this time the development referred 
to by Maitland was under way. 
A further point of interest is to be found in the Statute of 
Wales of 1284, which gave a number of writs to be available 
henceforth to the English king's Welsh subjects. Although these 
included novel disseisin and mort d 1 ancestor, there is no sign of 
writs of right orpraecipe,at least under those names. Instead the 
Welsh were to have what the statute called the breve commune or 
general writ. 25 This took the form of thepraecipe quod reddat, 
the writ found in Glanvill and used in England prior to Magna Carta 
to enable any dispossessed land holder to recover his property before 
23. Early Registers of Writs, 36 (no. 8), 113 (no. 23). 
24. M.T. Clanchy, 'Magna Carta,·clause thirty four', 
English Historical Review 79 (1964) 542 - 547. 
25. Statutes. of the Realm i 60. 
p 
the king's justices, regardless of whether or not he held in 
h . f 26 c ~e • It was the use of this writ which clause 34 of Magna 
Carta sought to limit in 1215, but that did not of course apply 
to Wales. The point of interest for us has recently been 
demonstrated by L.B. Smith; the writ was referred to in the 
courts as the 'breve de recto' of the laws of Wales. 27 
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We can now return to the Scottish brieve of the Ayr manuscript 
and state some conclusions. The form as we have it is a combination 
of the English writ of right and writ praecipe. In many ways it 
is more like the latter, even to the extent that both were sent out 
of the king's writing-office 'close' where the writ of right went 
28 
'patent•. Nevertheless the Scottish brieve takes the title 'de 
recto•. Given the obvious influence of the English writs, and the 
discussion of the term 'breve de recto' above, it is hard to resist 
the inference that the Scottish brieve as it appears in the Ayr 
manuscript is a form of the latter part of the thirteenth century. 
And it gets its title because it is the way in which full 
proprietary right may be reclaimed. 
Discussing the rule requiring brieves to compel a man to 
answer for his lands, Lord Cooper commented that 'so far as has been 
noted there are no examples in the Scottish records of the period 
26. See Clanchy, 'Magna Carta, clause thirty four•, 543- 5· 
27. L.B. Smith, 'The Statute of Wales 1284•, Welsh History Review 10 
(1980 - 81) 127 - 154 at 141 - 4. 
28. See A.A.M. Duncan,. 'The acta of Robert I', SHR 32 (1953) 
1 - 39 at 8, commenting on the brieve of right sent to 
Aberdeen burgh court in 1317. 
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of a brieve of right addressed to a baron•. 29 This would hardly 
be surprising if the brieve of right was in fact confined to 
cases involving tenants-in-chief. However there are cases on 
record in which action was begun in a franchise court by a royal 
writ. In none of them are we told that the writ was a brieve 
of right or that it commanded the lord in question to do right, 
but in examining each of the cases it is worth bearing in mind 
the argument of Professor Harding, that the twelfth century royal 
protection might be enforced by orders 'facere rectum', and, in 
addition, a document of 1165 x 1166 in which it is stated that 
actions against the men of Holyrood abbey should be begun by a 
request to the abbot to do full right (plenum rectum); if he 
fails to do so, then the sheriff and the justice will do it 
. t d 30 J.ns ea • This sounds exactly like the English writ of right. 
And there should also be remembered another point, made by 
Professor Milsom, that there is no warrant for believing that the 
'full right' claimed was a complete proprietary right to land in 
the early period; it was merely a command to the addressee to 
31 put right some wrong which it was in his power to correct. 
All our Scottish cases come from the thirteenth century. 
The earliest of these is, to judge from the witness list to the 
document in which it is recorded, from the 1230s. The document 
29. Cooper, Re&iam, 213. 
30. Harding, 'Medieval brieves of protection', 119, 126; 
RRS ii no. 39· 
31. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 124 - 6. 
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notes a quit-claim of the monks of Durham serving God at 
Coldingham made by Matthew of Houberne for certain lands in 
Coldingham 'of which he had impleaded the prior and convent of 
Coldingham by brieve of the lord king in the court of the same 
prior of Coldingham'. The witness list is headed by the sheriff 
of Berwick, William de Lindsay; was he there to do right had the 
prior refused to do so?32 A second, less explicit, case may be 
the quit-claim of the prior and convent of Coldingham made by 
Michael of Auchencrow of half a carrucate in Old Cambus 'which he 
claimed by brieve of the lord king'.33 It is not stated in which 
court the claim was made, but the witnesses to the quit-claim are 
the suitors of the prior's co~rt in the 1240s. Yet another case 
from the prior's court is the one in which Bertram son of Henry 
of Ulvestoun impleaded his cousin Waldeve Kokes for two oxgangs 
of land in Nether Ayton 'by letters of the lord king'. Again 
we are not told to which court these letters were addressed, but 
the eventual settlement was reached 'in the full court of the lord 
prior of Coldingham at Ayton'. The name of the sheriff of Berwick 
is second in the list of witnesses to the compromise.34 
Moving from Berwickshire we must go to the Lennox for our 
final case, which was part of a cause c~lebre in thirteenth century 
Scottish legal history, the so-called Monachkenneran dispute. 
32. Raine, North Durham no. 296. 
33. Raine, North Durham no. 91. 
34. Fraser, Keir, 197 - 8. 
This arose in the 1230s out of the activities of one Dougal, a 
younger brother of the earl of Lennox and rector of the church 
at Kilpatrick on the north bank of the Clyde estuary. The church 
had been granted to Paisley abbey by the earl of Lennox but Dougal 
alienated the lands attached to it without the abbey's authority. 
The abbey recovered the lands in a series of actions before papal 
judges delegate, but allowed Dougal to retain his position as rector 
for life. He died in 1270, and in the following year his three 
grand-nieces were served as his co-heirs. Thereafter these ladies, 
together with the husbands, raised actions by royal letters in the 
earl's court against Paisley abbey, claiming rights in some of the 
lands attached to the church of Kilpatrick. The abbey bought off 
their claims for substantial sums. What was the nature of the claim 
against the abbey? As we have seen the lands were held of the earl 
of Lennox, so that a dispute about them naturally fell within the 
jurisdiction of his court. Grand-nieces at this time could not have 
used the brieve of mortancestor, since they were outwith the degrees 
of relationship for the form of action. It seems very possible 
that the 'royal letters' took the form of a brieve along the lines 
of the English writ of right. 35 
We may therefore tentatively suppose that in thirteenth century 
Scotland there was a brieve available to those who claimed to hold 
of a subject-superior rather than of the crown and which would have 
been addressed to the super1or's court. There is no warrant for 
calling this a brieve of right, nor really for suggesting that it 
35. For the three quit-claims, see Paisley Registrum 180, 192 and 198. 
For the earlier history of the Monachkenneran dispute, see ibid., 
157 - 70. Until 1318, a person c6uld only sue by brieve of 
mortancestor in virtue of a claim through parents, uncles, aunts 
and.siblings: see below, 202. 
i37 
commanded the addressee to do right or else the sheriff would. 
But it does appear that there were different remedies for the 
tenants-in-chief and for those on lower rungs of the feudal pyramid. 
Given what we know about the extent of English influence of the 
development of the Scottish formulary system, it seems likely that 
these brieves bore some resemblance at least to the English writs 
praecipe. in capite and de recto. 
But if this was so, it had ceased to be the case by the time of 
the Ayr formulary where, as Lord Cooper correctly points out, there 
are no styles addressed to the holder of a franchise court other than 
those connected with the giving of sasine. 36 However this does not 
mean that the man who held of a subject-superior had lost a remedy 
once available to him. Regiam gives the form for the statement of 
claim by the pursuer on the brieve of right, and by this he is made 
to say that he claims to hold the lands 'heritably of the lord king 
or of another lord•. 37 Thus it would seem that the brieve of right 
which pertained to the sheriff was available to enable the sub-tenant 
to recover his lands by the time this part of Regiam was written. 
It is worth noting that it appears in that opening section of Regiam 
which owes little to other works and which appears faithfully to 
reflect Scottish practice in the reign of Robert I. Perhaps then 
we can see a course of development here whereby the brieve which had 
been available only to tenants-in-chief became one for general use. 
If the normal procedure on a brieve addressed to a subject-superior's 
court was in any event for the case to be transferred to the sheriff, 
36. Reg. Brieves, 13, 17. 
37. Regiam Majestatem I, 9· 
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then this would have been a sensible rationalisation along lines 
similar to those already shown to be working in contemporary 
England and Wales. 
The disappearance of the brieve addressed to the holder of 
the franchise court may suggest a decline in the regularity with 
which proprietary disputes were tried in these courts in the later 
medieval period and that the jurisdiction which is implied by the 
existence of the brieve of the thirteenth century had ceased to 
have substantial meaning. This may be confirmed by a 1358 grant 
of David II to the warden of the mint of jurisdiction over all 
pleas concerning his men, excepting only those of the crown and of 
freeholding. 38 Although this is not expressly said the latter 
exception is presumably because such pleas had to be begun by 
brieve in the royal courts. Thus here a franchise was limited 
through this common law rule. 
Against this it can be argued that from the reign of Robert I 
the concept of a franchise of regality 'where the king's writ did 
not run' became very clearly defined. 39 How could a man claim 
that he must be impleaded by brieve if his lands were in a 
jurisdiction where the king's brieves had no force? It seems clear 
however that the rule applied equally within regalities as without. 
Thus Robert I made two grants of land to Thomas Randolph in regality 
'with the four complaints belonging to our royal crown and with all 
38. RRS vi no. 170. This grant survives only in the form of a late 
translation of the original •. 
39. On regalities see Carnwath Court Bk., xxxix- xliv; . Dunfermline 
Court Bk., introduction, passim; Grant, 'Higher nobility in 
Scotland', 111- 114. 
pleas and complaints both in common indictments and in pleadable 
b . ' 40 r~eves • It seems highly probable that this meant that the 
lord of regality was empowered to issue pleadable brieves within 
his regality wherever the king would have done so elsewhere. We 
know that the regality chancery of the archbishop of St. Andrews 
had styles for brieves of right, mortancestor and others in the 
sixteenth century, running in the name of the archbishop but 
otherwise exactly similar to those issued by the king. 41 In 1433, 
a brieve of dissasine was presented to the justice-ayre of the 
regality of Atholl, but was finally dealt with in the king's justice-
42 
ayre at Perth. Similarly a brieve of distress was issued by the 
chancery of the regality of the Garioch in 1407.43 Brieves of 
lining were common in the court of the regality burgh of Dunfermline. 44 
In other words, the regality seems to have been a microcosm of the 
kingdom and the rule requiring brieves in cases of freehold could 
have been and almost certainly was operative there as well. 
Thus far we have been looking at the constricting effect upon 
non-royal jurisdictions which the rule under discussion may have 
had. We now turn to the limitations of the rule itself in relation 
to these courts; limitations that do not appear from the terms in 
which it was formulated (those are discussed in the next section). 
40. RMS i app. 1 nos. 31 ahd 34. 
41. St. Andrews Formulare i 251 - 4. 
42. Coupar Angus Chrs. ii no. 128. 
43. Aberdeen Registrum i 212. 
44. Dunfermline Burgh Recs., 43. 
8 - 10. 
See also Dunfermline Court Bk., 
They can however be drawn from Regiam Majestatem and Quoniam 
Attachiamenta when they discuss the causes for which a man may be 
dispossessed by his lord. Both treatises state the rule, 45 but 
also describe a number of situations in which the lord can take 
action against his tenant's lands and in some of these Regiam at 
least is explicit on the point that the lord can do this without 
brieve. If the tenant fails to perform his services46 or render 
·d 47 1 · 1 t h d the lord48 d h. t d. a~ s, ays v~o en an s on or oes anyt ~ng en ~ng 
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to the disinheritance of his lord, 49 then he is liable to lose his 
lands in the lord's court even though not impleaded by brieve. 
Quoniam also discusses the failure to perform services in some 
detail, explaining that the lord may summon the tenant to his 
court and ultimately recognosce his lands. It is not said here 
that the lord may act without brieve, but the whole tenor of the 
chapter suggests that the lord is acting throughout on his own 
authority.50 Elsewhere Quoniam also notes that lands may be escheat 
to their lords if the tenant commits murder, 51 which seems to be a 
45. Regiam Majestatem III, 20; Quoniam Attachiamenta eh. 18. 
46. Regiam Majestatem II, 58. 
4?. Regiam Majestatem II, 6?. 
48. Regiam Majestatem II, 58. 
49. Regiam Majestatem II, 58. 
50. Quoniam Attachiamenta eh. 30. 
51. ~uoniam Attachiamenta eh. 14. 
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specific instance of the principle stated in Regiam that the lands 
of the convicted felon or thief revert to his lord.52 It is also 
said twice in Regiam that the heiress in ward of her lord who is 
unchaste loses her inheritance,53 and that the man without a son who 
marries off his daughter-heiresses without his lord's consent forfeits 
his lands.54 Nothing is said about the lord needing brieves as a 
preliminary to taking action by virtue of these rules. 
The striking thing about the Regiam passages is that they are 
all borrowed from Glanvill and have recently been discussed in their 
English context and in relation to the requirement of writs in cases 
touching freehold by Professor Milsom.55 As he points out, the 
factor which connects these various causes of disinheritance or 
forfeiture is some breach by the tenant of the duties he owes to his 
lord for his lands. This is obvious in the cases of failure to perform 
services or render aids, but it is also true of the act of felony. 
The rules about heiresses also make sense in this context, since the 
lord's interest is to ensure that the heiress is marriageable and that 
when she marries it is to a person fit to perform the services due 
from the lands. Professor Milsom argues accordingly that there 
can be drawn from Glanvill a distinction between the 'disciplinary' 
and the 'proprietary' jurisdiction of a lord over his tenants and that 
52. Resiam Majestatem II, 48, 50. 
53· Regiam Majestatem II, 44, 48. 
54. Regiam lwlaj esta tern II, 43. 
55· Milsom, -Legal Framework, 25 7; the relevant references 
in Glanvi11 are ·gJ. ven at p. 26. 
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the rule requiring royal writs to initiate the action applied only 
to the latter. The essence of the disciplinary jurisdiction was 
the lord's power to eject his tenants for failure to perform their 
duties; but it was 'squeezed out• by the possibility that if the 
lord failed to follow due process in its exercise he made himself 
liable to an action of novel disseisin by his tenant and also 'by 
misunderstanding about the need for writs•. 56 
Assessing the significance of these passages in Regiam is 
complicated by the vexed question of its relation to Scottish 
practice. But, as has been pointed out in the first chapter, 
it was undoubtedly regarded as an authoritative text in the later 
medieval period57 and could accordingly have been used to justify 
action by a lord against his tenant's lands without brieve. We 
can see some of the Regiam rules reappearing in Quoniam, in particular 
the one concerning services; perhaps this was the most common cause 
of disciplinary action and here of course Regiam was quite clear that 
no brieve was needed. Thus when the baron of Dirleton in East 
Lothian turned his tenant William Fenton out of the lands of Fenton 
in the 1380s, apparently without brieve, it may be that he was 
purporting to exercise this disciplinary jurisdiction.58 
Another area in which the lord might take action against his 
56. Milsom, Legal FrameworK, 27. This concept of the lord's 
'disciplinary' as distinct from his 'proprietary' jurisdiction 
is accepted in E. Searle, 'Seigneurial control of women's 
marriage: the antecedents and function of merchet in England', 
Past and Present no. 82 (1979) 3 - 43 at 8 - 11. A valuable 
critique is P.A. Brand and P~R. Hyams, Past and Present no. 99 
(1983) 123 - 133 at 124 - 6. 
57. See above, 26 - 7. 
58. APS i 552 - 3. 
;'::;··. 
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tenant, apparently without brieve, is purpresture. Again the 
discussion of this topic in Regiam is lifted almost straight from 
Glanvill. 59 Purpresture is defined as encroachment by a tenant 
upon the demesne of his lord. The lord can summon the offending 
tenant to his court and conviction leads to forfeiture of the lands 
held of the lord by the tenant. In Glanvill however there is a 
form of writ by which such actions have to begin, to which there is 
no equivalent in Regiam. Professor Milsom sees the writ as 
something of an oddity requiring explanation in that purpresture 
was clearly part of the lord's disciplinary jurisdiction and therefore 
no writ ought to have been necessary. The writ emerged, he suggests, 
because the action challenged .the tenant's right, not to his own 
tenement (although the disciplinary jurisdiction would forfeit that), 
60 but to the land upon which he was alleged to have encroached. 
Confusion of thought therefore suggested that there should be a 
writ, in accordance with the general rule. Scottish lawyers seem 
to have avoided this confusion. In the later fifteenth century there 
h b d bt b t . . d' . . t 61 seem. to ave een some ou s a ou JUr1s 1ct1on 1n purpres ure, 
but it is apparent that the action remained competent in baron courts 
and does not appear ever to have required a brieve in Scotland. 
Feudal discipline seems also to link two other subject-matters 
in which the Scottish lord could take action in his court against 
the tenant and his lands, recognition for unlicensed alienation 
and showing the holding. Over twenty-five years ago R.M. Maxtone-
59. Regiam Majestatem II, 68; Glanvill IX, 11 - 13. 
60. Milsom, Legal Framework, 27. 
61. See APS ii 133, 141; ADA, 91; ADC i 45, 59, 74. 
Graham demonstrated that, no matter what Quoniam might suggest, 
no brieve was required to compel the tenant to show his holding 
in his lord's court and concluded that 'unless a very narrow 
construction be put on ~he rule] - that no one with an ex facie 
valid title can be evicted without royal brieve - it cannot be 
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said to express the law of Scotland'. Elsewhere he showed that 
the main purpose of the action was to enable lords to ascertain 
the terms on which tenants held their lands and to ensure the 
preservation of their written titles. This looks very much like 
an exercise of disciplinary powers over tenants, especially as the 
tenant who failed to produce his chart~s or who was shown to be 
holding in a way inconsistent with their terms lost his lands. 
Similarly, recognition for unlicensed alienation was a power 
with an obvious disciplinary nature. Here the tenant who sold his 
lands or part of them to the extent of more than one half to another 
62a 
without his lord's consent would lose his holding completely. 
Such a power reflects the personal element of the ideal feudal 
relationship, and had the practical effect in medieval Scottish 
conveyancing that transfer of land was normally by resignation to 
and regrant by the lord, or by confirmation. 63 A statute of 140164 
laid down rules on the procedure to be followed by the lord's court 
62. R.M. Maxtone-Graham, 'Showing the holding', JR 2 (1957) 
251 - 269, at 254 - 5· 
62a. See APS i 492. 
63. See Grant, 'Higher nobility ~n Scotland', 197- 211. 
64. APS i 575. 
in such cases, which .. probably amounted to no more than a re-statement 
of the existing law. No mention is made there of any need for a 
brieve, although the result of the procedure was to deprive the 
tenant of his lands. The lord's court seems to have retained this 
element of its disciplinary jurisdiction throughout the fifteenth 
century; in 1497, Sir Simon Preston of that ilk falsed the doom of 
the baron court of Coulter concerning his alienation of lands in the 
barony which he held of Robert Menzies of Enach. The baron court 
had decreed that for this the lands should be recognosced in the 
baron's hands. 65 
It seems therefore that the division of franchisal jurisdiction 
suggested by Professor Milsom holds good for medieval Scotland and 
also survives for a much longer period than in England. Thus the 
rule requiring writs or brieves to put a man out of his freehold 
did not apply to disciplinary disputes in Scotland and this seems 
to explain a good deal of admittedly extremely scattered evidence. 
The reason for the non-application of the rule to such cases is not 
clear, but it is tentatively suggested that it was because the issue 
in disciplinary cases was not the ownership of the tenant's land, 
but the commission of wrongs against the lord. The loss of the land 
if the wrong was established was the penalty and not the issue at the 
centre of the dispute. Accordingly it can be said that the 
conclusion of R.M. Maxtone-Graham on the relation of the rule to 
showing the holding was based on a failure fully to grasp the nature 
both of showing the holding and of the rule requiring brieves in 
cases of freehold. It is of some significance that the English 
65. Prot. Bk. Young nos. 875 and 896; see also, for another 
recognition for alienation in a baron court, no. 895. 
equivalents of showing the holding (an action of guo waranto in the 
lord's court) and of recognition for unlicensed alienation both 
disappeared in the course of the thirteenth century. Professor 
Milsom has shown that in the case of guo waranto this was due to 
66 the misunderstanding about the need for writs in Glanvill's scheme 
and has suggested that the lord lost his power to take back lands 
for alienation because the tenant's grantee might bring novel 
d . . . 67 l.SSel.Sl.n. The survival of both powers in Scotland shows that, 
while the rule about the need for brieves was part of the law, it 
was understood not to apply to inhibit a lord's disciplinary 
jurisdiction. 
(b) The scope of the rule from 1318 
Whatever its earlier origins, from 1318 the source of the rule 
that no man need answer for his lands without the king's brieve was 
taken to be the statute of Robert I. Thus in 1382 it was said to be 
'according to the statute of king Robert' that he who had held 'for 
years' ought not to be expelled from possession without a pleadable 
brieve. 68 Similarly in 1398 the bishop of Moray argued that 
'according to the statute of king Robert' his church of Moray 
could only be put out of its immunity from suit at the sheriff 
court of Inverness, a freedom held for years and more, by pleadable 
brieve. 69 Sometime in the reign of Robert II it was argued that 
66. Milsom, Legal Framework, 45 - 7. 
67. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 115, 143. 
68. Aberdeen Registrum·i 155. 
69. Moray Registrum, 209. 
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'according to the statute of the last king Robert no-one ought to 
be ejected from any land of which he claims himself to be vest and 
saised without a pleadable brieve'.70 It is therefore necessary 
to examine the formulation of the rule found in the statute as the 
first step towards the determination of its scope in the later 
medieval period. 
The 1318 statute states that no-one is to be ejected from his 
free holding [liberum tenementum suu~J without the king's pleadable 
brieve. Two points seem to require closer scrutiny here: first 
the nature of a liberum tenementum, second what a pleadable brieve 
was. 
(i) Free holding in Scots law 
This topic was discussed in some detail almost forty years ago 
by Lord Cooper and Professor Dickinson. The former addressed 
himself in a short note to the question, 'What was the freehold or 
liberum tenementum or franktenement, to which we find many references 
in our early legal records?•. 71 Bringing together extracts from 
Regiam Majestatem and other medieval sources, he concluded that by 
the reign of Robert I liberum tenementum was used in correlation 
with the term feodum, or fee, to describe an interest in land which 
would endure only for the holder's lifetime. Feodum or fee, by 
contrast, described heritable interests which would pass to the 
current holder's heirs on his death. In the vernacular liberum 
tenementum was rendered as 'franktenement' until its Romanisation 
70. Moray Registrum, 379. 
71. T.M. Cooper, 'Freehold in Scots law', JR 57 (1945) 1-5. 
in the early modern period as usufruct or liferent. Lord Cooper 
finished his article by asking whether this interpretation of 
liberum tenementum in the context of the private law of landownership 
applied also in public law: specifically, to the right of freeholders, 
or libere tenens, to attend Parliament. 
Professor Dickinson sought to answer. 72 
It was this question which 
He pointed out that initial~y 
the prime distinction between the freeholder and other occupiers of 
land was that his holding was free, with an obligation of suit at his 
lord's court, that is, parliament in the case of the king's tenants-
in-chief. In the fourteenth century some of the king's freeholders 
became barons, so giving rise to a distinction between them and 
other freeholders; but the la~ter were those who held in chief of 
the king in fee and heritage alone, without the jurisdictional 
privileges conferred by a grant in liberam baroniam. But the 
phrase liberum tenementum was not used to describe the holding of 
such a libere tenens. Liberum tenementum was used to describe the 
holding of a person where the feodum or fee was held by another. 
This could best be illustrated by a practice that developed in the 
second half of the fourteenth century and subsequently became 
customary amongst landowners, whereby the holder of a fee resigned 
his lands to his superior in favour of another, typically a son. 
The superior would then grant the fee to the son subject to the 
reservation of a liberum tenementum in favour of the father. Thus 
the fiar of the lands became 'not the person who holds a fief, but 
the person who has a reversionary right to a fief which is subject 
72. W.C. Dickinson, 'Freehold in Scots law', JR 57 (1945) 135 - 151. 
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to a liferent•. 73 This conclusion is reinforced by the apparent 
fact that the holder of the liberum tenementum continued to act as 
owner of the land by, for example, paying suit at the superior's 
court. In this way the holder of a liberum tenementum could appear 
to be a libere tenens, causing conceptual confusion even in the 
writings of such distinguished jurists as John Skene and Thomas 
Craig. 
Professor Dickinson's article suggests that much of their 
confusion arose from the equation of liberum tenementum with the 
Roman institution of usufruct and a difficulty in consequence in 
seeing that the nature of the holding, while not amounting to 
outright ownership, was certainly not limited to a jus utendi or 
jus fruendi. Professor Dickinson remarked that perhaps Skene 
and Craig in describing the holding of the libere tenens as a liberum 
tenementum were groping after the pure doctrine of earlier Scots law 
and that the definition of liberum tenementum which held sway in the 
later middle ages was an ~nglish corruption; with respect it seems 
more likely that here as elsewhere the jurists were guilty of pressing 
feudal wine into Roman bottles, albeit with limited success. 
Another Regiam passage discussed by Lord Cooper shows how the 
74 
compiler saw the freehold as part of the fee. The man who had 
freehold might also have the fee; the man who had the fee might give 
the freehold away and, as Professor Dickinsori showed, retain what 
amounted to a reversionary interest only but which was still the fee. 
73· Dickinson, 'Freehold', 146. 
74. Regiam Majestatem IV, 40; Cooper, 'Freehold', 2- 3. 
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Regiam sug~ests that the nature of the remedy against dispossession 
might vary according to the nature of the right claimed. This 
aspect of the passage will be given detailed consideration in the 
next chapter. The crucial point for present purposes is that when 
the act of 1318 said that no-one was to be put out of his freeholding 
without the king's brieve, it was not intended to confer rights only 
upon him who had a mere freehold and nothing else; a fiar in 
possession had a free holding and he could not be ejected therefrom 
except by court action begun by the king's brieve. 
This conclusion is also borne out by a passage found in some 
of the 'auld lawes' manuscripts which proclaims itself to be a 
statute of Robert r. 75 Lord Cooper described it as a 'mature 
formulation of theory•. 76 It states that there may be three 
interests in land: possession, as when one holds land in security, 
liberum tenementum, when one has lands for the term of one's life, 
and fee, when a man may not have recourse or entry to his land until 
after the death of him who has the freehold. The passage concludes 
that all three interests may be claimed by one person and gives as 
an example of someone who ought to have possession, freehold and 
fee the person ejected unjustly from his heritable lands. 
When we turn to the cases in which the statute or rule was 
pleaded or referred to after 1318, it can be found in use to defend 
those claiming to hold by a heritable title. Thus William, Richard 
and Henry Graham of Hutton stated that they understood the law to be 
that anyone 'in peseabyll possessioun in any lande clamande it of 
75. APS i 722. 
76. Cooper, 'Freehold', 3. 
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fee and herytage ••• aucht nocht to ga owte of his possessioun 
forowte the kyngis brefe pledabyll'.77 The rule was referred to 
in the interesting legal battle which developed over the succession 
to the Douglas lands after the death without male heirs of the second 
earl, James, in the battle of Otterburn in 1388. His sister Isabella 
was his heir at law and her husband Sir Halcolm Drummond seems to 
have obtained sasine of the lands on her behalf. But in terms of 
a tailzie of 1342 the earl's illegitimate cousin, Archibald Douglas, 
was the heir entitled to take the lands and the earldom. Arc hi bald 
showed the tailzie and established his rights in parliament in 1389 
when it was also declared that those wishing to pursue alternative 
claims to the lands should proceed by pleadable brieves. 78 Here 
again the rule was being invoked in favour of one who alleged a 
heritable title, albeit the order of inheritance was subject to the 
limitation of a charter of tailzie. 
All the other references to the rule were made by ecclesiastical 
foundations where church lands or rights were under discussion. In 
such situations it was wholly inappropriate to talk either of 
inheritance or of holding for a lifetime, yet the 1318 statute 
clearly applied. There are two very similar statements of the 
law in the registers of the cathedrals of Aberdeen and Moray, both 
invoking the statute of king Robert where heirs of those to whom 
church lands had been alienated sought service to those lands by the 
king's brieve of inquest. Each text states that the bishop should 
77. HMC Various Collections v 77.· 
78. APS i 557 - B. For the background see Nicholson, 
Later Middle Ages, 201 - 2. 
have the brieve indorsed thus:79 
Sasine is not given because the said bishop 
claims himself vest and saised of the said 
lands as of ecclesiastical endowment (ut de 
dote ecclesie) and in pure alms, and according 
to the statute of king Robert one ought not 
to be expelled from possession who holds for 
years without pleadable brieve. 
(52 
With regard to the meaning of freehold, perhaps the most interesting 
of the cases concerning the church are found in 1369 and 1398. In 
the second of these, as has already been mentioned, the bishop of 
Moray claimed that under the 1318 statute no-one could deprive the 
church of its immunity from paying suit at the sheriff court of 
Inverness without the king's pleadable brieve.
80 Presumably 
therefore it was at least arguable that this immunity was a freehold 
within the meaning of the act. The 1369 case was about a claim to 
multures of the prior and monks of Pluscarden. They alleged that 
they had had peaceful possession for forty days and more and that, 
accordingly, it was 'against the customs of the realm' for them to 
be put out 'without a pleadable brieve•. 81 It is not known whether 
these were more than broadly accurate statements of the law of the 
fourteenth century, but they do seem to show the extended meaning 
which some at least tried to give to the 1318 statute in that 
period. 
79. Aberdeen Registrum i 155; Moray Registrum, 379· The register 
entries may be connected. Professor Stein has argued that the 
author of the passage in the Aberdeen register was William de 
Spynie. In 1397 William became bishop of Moray and he 
supervised the compilation of the Moray register: 'Roman law 
in Scotland', Ius Romanum.Medii Aevi, pars V, 13b (Milan, 
1968) 37 - 9-
80. Moray Registrum no. 179· 
81. Moray Registrum no. 153· 
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(ii) Pleadable brieves 
Modern legal historians82 have not dealt in any detail with the 
meaning of the phrase 'pleadable brieve' which appears as a technical 
term in Scottish legal sources from the end of the thirteenth until 
the beginning of the sixteenth century. Sheriff McKechnie spoke 
only of the 'so-called pleadable brieves•; 83 Professor Harding has 
observed that they were the equivalent of the 'original writs' in 
84 England. Professor Willock, following the institutional writers 
Stair and Erskine, distinguishes two categories of brieves: those 
which were 'retourable' and those which were 'non-retourable' and 
. 85 cont~nues: 
These classes of brieve are also distinguished 
as non-pleadable and pleadable respectively, 
the exception being that in the normal case the 
verdict to be retoured would simply establish a 
question of fact which would not be contested 
and so would not require to be pleaded before a 
judge, whereas the pleadable brieve was in its 
nature contentious, ar~s~ng as it did from a 
dispute between two parties. 
This equation of pleadable and non-retourable brieves first occurs 
in Stair's Institutions. 86 By the time of Stair, the non-retourable 
82. The topic was briefly discussed by M. Napier, "The Lanox of Auld 11 : 
An istolar Review of "The Lennox" b William Fraser (Edinburgh, 
1 0) 2 • His account seems to be derived from the misleading 
ones of Skene, Stair and Erskine. 
83. McKechnie, 'Brieves', 6. 
84. Harding, 'Medieval brieves of protection', 126. 
85. Willock, Jury in Scotland, 106. 
86. Stair, Institutions IV, iii, .10 and 17; cf. Erskine, 
Institute IV, i, 3. 
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brieves were four in number. They were the brieves of perambulation, 
lining, terce and division, although Stair notes that the brieves of 
right and 'disseasing' had also been pleadable before they fell into 
desuetude. Stair also states two distinctions between pleadable 
and retourable brieves. First, with the former there was no retour 
to the chancery of the result of the judicial process which it had 
commanded and ordained. Second, while with the retourable brieves 
there was only a general summons proclaimed at the market cross, 
calling any person wishing to state an interest in the case, in the 
pleadable brieves a particular person was named and called upon to 
defend the action. Something of this latter point may underlie the 
definition of pleadable brieves offered by Skene: 87 
Breves pleadable, breve placitable, are all sik 
brieves quhilks are persewed and defended be ane 
ordinar form of proces before ane competent judge 
at the instance of ane persewar against ane 
defender. 
Nevertheless we cannot follow Stair's account of pleadable brieves 
unquestioningly into the centuries before 1500, for when his list 
of such brieves is compared with those from the earlier period, it 
will be seen that there is no overlap. In Regiam Majestatem there 
is a chapter 'De his quae placitantur per brevia', which lists the 
brieves of right, de nativis, mortancestor, novel dissasine and 
distress. 88 Since there is no equivalent passage in Glanvill, 
this may well reflect Scottish practice at the time the passage 
was written, probably early in the fourteenth century. In Quoniam 
Attachiamenta there is another, slightly longer, list of brieves 
87. Skene, De Verborum Significatione, s.v. 'Breves pleadable'. 
88. Regiam Majestatem I, 4. 
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'communiter currentibus gue sunt placitabilia'. This includes 
all those mentioned in Regiam while adding the brieves of convention, 
de liberando hominem de plegiagio, de proteccione regis infricta and 
warrandice. 89 Given the prominence of Regiam and Quoniam, it is 
impossible to avoid reading some significance into the fact that 
neither includes Stair's pleadable brieves - perambulation, lining, 
terce and division - in its list. 
Examination of other medieval references to pleadable brieves 
reveals further points mentioned by neither Stair nor Skene. The 
first of these is in the short treatise known as 'The Scottish 
King's Household' which was probably written in the 1290s. It 
states that 'no writ [is to) ~e issued out of the chancery except 
the writs of course and pleadable, without the special command of 
the king's privy seal'.90 Brieves were issued under the great 
seal, which was usually brought into operation by letters of 
instruction from the king under his privy seal. This particular 
passage seems to have been accepted as authentic evidence of the 
practice of the late-thirteenth century practice of the capella regis: 
it seems therefore that the forms of some pleadable brieves were 
already settled so that it was possible to speak of them as de cursu. 
They were not issued of the king's grace as evidenced in his privy 
seal letters, but in the ordinary course of the chapel on payment 
of the appropriate fee.9l 
89. Quoniam Attachiamenta eh. 33· 
90. SHS Mise. ii 31 - 2. 
91. For the foregoing see Thomson, Public Records, 62 ~ 8; Duncan, 
'Acta of Robert I', 7; RRS vi 19, 25 and 28; Chalmers, 'King's 
council', 33· For the contrast between letters issued de gratia 
and de cursu see Stevenson, Documents i 169, Stones and Simpson, 
Edwa;d I ii 97 and RRS vi no. 306. 
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The pleadable brieve emerges as the first step in a contested 
court action in the statutory provision of 1318 being considered 
in this chapter. The defender is not to be ejected from his 
freehold without the king's pleadable brieve and he is to be given 
reasonable notice to answer for his tenement at a specific time and 
place.92 But three later statutory references, two in 1471 and one 
in 1504, are rather more illuminating. In May of the former year 
parliament passed an act 'for the eschewyn of maneswering of false 
inquestis and assisis •••• saffand and excepand the assises of breves 
pledabile quhilk this statute sal nocht extend apoun•. 93 The act 
was particularly aimed at juries serving upon retourable brieves of 
inquest.94 It seems therefore that there was some distinction 
drawn between retourable and pleadable brieves. At the next 
parliament, held in August, another act was passed, this time 
relating to the situation 'quhen any brefis pledable hapnis to be 
folowit before quhatsumever juge, and thir be excepciouns ane or ma 
proponit and thiruppoun borowis and recounters fundin and dome gevin 
and falsit and again said be outher of the partis and thirefter 
discussit in the parliament•. 95 In 1504 parliament again dealt 
with 'proces in all manner of dumys falsing', the mischief being 
the 'grete abusioune of justice and gret expense to the partis persewand 
thir land and heretage be the breve of rycht and other brevis pledabill 
92. APS i 4?3, c. 25. 
93. APS ii lOO, c. 9. 
94. Willock, Jury in _Scotland, 235· 
95· APS ii 101. 
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be proponing of exceptiouns frivole and borghis and recounteris 
and falsing of dumys thro presumyng of delais•. 96 Both these 
acts show clearly a link between pleadable brieves, the appeal 
procedure of 'falsing the doom' and the forms of pleading in 
court. 
To understand this last it is necessary briefly to examine 
two statutes of 1430 which refer to these forms in some detail. 
They show that a party making an 'exception' or 'weir of law' had 
to find a borgh or security to support his claim. The other 
litigant might 'recounter' or reply to the exception with reasons, 
having taken advice within or without the court before giving his 
answer. Upon this debate the court would then give a doom.97 
This clarifies the terminology used in the acts of 1471 and 1504 
somewhat. An action was raised by pleadable brieve; the defender 
proponed exceptions, one or more, and found security to back them 
up; the pursuer had to reply; the court then gave a doom on the 
debate; and the doom was subject to falsing. 
This process can be followed in the case which gave rise to the 
act of August 1471.98 At the previous parliament in May, Andrew 
Bisset sought to false a doom which had been given in the justice 
ayre of Cupar upon a 'brief of mortancestry'. The auditors of 
falsed dooms referred the question to the next parliament because 
they could 'nocht now be avisit be the lawys that thai find written 
96. APS ii 254, c. 41. 
97. APS ii 18, cc. 5 and 7• 
98. For what follows see ADA, 12; APS ii 101, 117; ADA, 66. 
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to declare quhat order and proces salbe had in the preceding of 
the said brief'. The act was the response of the August parliament, 
its order and form 'to be observit and kepit in al pointis in the 
pro ceding of the brief of mortancestrie purchest be Andro Bissate 
agane the lord of Ardros and now dependand in the justice are of 
Couper', as well as 'quhen any brefis pledable hapnis to be folowit 
before quhatsumever juge'. Where the judgment upon a defender's 
exception was finally falsed in the pursuer's favour, that was not 
to conclude the whole action in his favour; the parties should, 
rather, return to the justice-ayre and take it up once more. As 
the act put it, 'thai sal pas ordourly furthwart fra excepcioun to 
excepcioun how oft that ever ~he dome be falsit on to the time that 
the brief be brocht to the recognicioun of an assize'. It is not 
altogether clear what immediate effect this had upon Bisset's action 
but in June 1478 he again falsed 'the dome given in the justice are 
of Coupir' before parliament. The auditors decreed that the doom 
for the bourgh fundin be Alexander Spens 
advocate and forspekare for Johne Dishintoun 
of Ardross upoun thre breve of morthancestre 
purchest be Andreu Biset upoun the landis of 
Kinbrachmont and agane a recontre maide be 
Williame Richartsoun advocate and forspekare 
for the said Androu wes evil gevin and wele 
agane sayd. 
Here then is a perfect example of the model of pleading which was 
derived earlier from the various other fifteenth century statutes. 
Moreover the case proceeded.upon a brieve of mortancestor, one of 
those listed as pleadable by both Regiam and Quoniam. The 
defender excepts with a borgh, the pursuer recounters and the doom 
then given in the defender'~ favour is subsequently falsed. There 
is an interesting comparison with another case involving a brieve 
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of mortancestor in 1390. The document which records it explains 
that the brieve had been led before the justiciar twice previously 
and the dooms given then had both been falsed in parliament. On 
this occasion however, it is put to an assize of the best and 
worthiest of the country who return a verdict on the questions in 
the brieve, whether the pursuer's ancestor died vest and saised of 
certain lands, whether the pursuer is his nearest heir and whether 
the defender is now holding the lands.99 The best explanation of 
the procedural history of the case is surely that the two earlier 
dooms had been given on exceptions proposed by the defender, but 
that their falsing, by whichever party, had been in favour of the 
pursuer and that accordingly the question in the brieve could now be 
put to the assize. 
This brings us to the next point which is apparent from this 
evidence, namely, that the pleading of an exception prevented the 
brieve being put to the assize. The act of 1471 shows that bringing 
the brieve to the recognition of an assize was the conclusion of 
pleading, while in the 1390 case the action went to the assize only 
after the exceptions had been pleaded and the dooms thereon falsed. 
Another case, from 1368, brings out the point even more clearly. 
John son of Walter sued Thomas Scot, tenant of John Lindsay, by 
brieve de proteccione regis infricta in the justiciar's court at 
Lanark. The brieve was one of those listed as pleadable in Quoniam. 
The alleged infringement of the king's protection consisted in turning 
out cattle on the pursuer's pastures and deforcing his sergeant. 
Damages of forty pounds were sought. Scot began by denying breach 
99· Spalding Mise. ii 319. 
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of the king's protection and the amount of damages claimed, then 
sought advice outwith the court. Having re-entered the court, 
he repeated his denial. Then Lindsay, Scot's lord, acting as 
prelocutor for his tenant, claimed that the pasture pertained to 
him as his fee and heritage and that Scot ought not to answer 
concerning his lord's fee and heritage upon a brieve of protection. 
The court refused to put this exception to proof and decreed that 
Scot ought immediately to undergo an assize upon the principal action 
since he had denied the claim 'simpliciter et plane'. But this 
was overturned by parliament, which found that Scot's exception had 
been pleaded in time to prevent the claim being put to the assize. 100. 
Similarly in 1505, council reduced the doom given for the pursuer 
on a brieve of right (again, a pleadable brieve) because the sheriff-
depute had put it to the knowledge of an assize 'the borcht and 
recounter proponit of before [by the defende!j nocht discussit by 
101 
warde and dume' • Finally we may also note a case of 1465, in 
which the defender's warrantor failed to compear; the pursuer 
argued successfully that the defender 'had renuncit his rycht and 
put it til ane othir, and for that reson, sen ~arrandice) was the 
last excepcioune, thair acht na plede borowis na recountir to be 
herd, bot the justices suld ger the breffe procede to the 
. . f . ' 102 recogn~c1oune o ane ass1se • 
An exception is, then, a reason put forward by a defender for 
not giving judgment on the pursuer's claim. It is at this point 
lOO. APS i 505. 
101. SRO, Acta Dominorum Concilii, CS 5/16, ff. 144 v. - 145 r. 
(Appendix C). 
102. SRO, Lord Advocate's Department, AD 1/60 (Appendix D). 
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in the argument that attention must shift from Scottish to 
European legal development in the medieval period. It is clear 
that we are examining a form of pleading highly characteristic of 
developed medieval law throughout western Europe, which owed much 
to the 'rediscovery' of Roman law in the renaissance of the twelfth 
century and which represented a shift from the simple procedure 
whereby one party made a claim against another in set words, the 
defender uttered a formal denial, and the court then determined 
which of them should have the burden of proof and what form the 
proof should take: battle, compurgation or some kind of ordeal. 
The development of pleading was the result of the idea that the 
defender could add to his deni~l, introducing new matter to put 
the pursuer's claim in a different light. Its evolution was 
intimately connected with the study of rhetoric which in the twelfth 
century was 'characterised by sympathy for leeal problems'. The 
pursuit of probable truth, it was perceived, might be eased through 
the technique of disputation between parties. Until one party 
merely denied the truth of another's statement, there was no need 
for a judgment, at least so long as the statements made continued 
to be relevant to the case. 'A conflict of views represented an 
effective means of discovering the truth'. The procedure of the 
church courts was, as has been shown, based on these theories of 
contemporary logicians.103 To describe what the defender did in 
commencing the disputation, the word 'exception' was borrowed from 
Roman texts by the canonists and a great body of learning, to be 
103. A. Giuliani, 'The influence of rhetoric on the law of evidence 
and pl~ading', JR 7 (1962) 216- 251 (quotations at pp. 229, 
233). 
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found in works such as the Ordo of Tancred and the Speculum 
Judiciale of Durandus, came to be built upon it. For our purposes, 
it is important to note that the purpose of the pleading was to 
reach the true difference between the parties, the stage of 
litiscontestation at which the dispute was submitted for judgment. 
The canonists also distinguished broadly between three types of 
exception, the declinatory against the competence of the judge or 
the jurisdiction of the court, the dilatory against the formal 
competence of the way in which the action had been raised and, 
lastly, the peremptory which, if made out, would wholly defeat 
the pursuer's case. To such exceptions there might be replies or 
replications from the pursuer, which again could be of various 
types falling within the three basic categories. Thus it might 
be that the exception was in effect a new claim upon which the 
action would proceed thereafter. 104 
This learning made its impact upon the procedure of secular 
courts throughout ~urope, including England as is evident from the 
105 pages of Bracton. English legal historians have related the 
development to the emergence of the jury as a mode of proof 
supplanting the judicium Dei, battle, or oath, or ordeal. 
Fallible human beings could not always give the correct answer 
so long as the lawsuit consisted merely of a formal claim in set 
104. 
105-
For the foregoing see Ollivant, Court of the Official, 
108 - 113, and Select Cases from the Ecclesiastical Courts 
of the Province of Canterbur c. 1200 - 1 01 edd. N. Adams 
and C. Donahue Selden Soc~, vol. 95) introduction, 41- 3. 
Pollock· and Maitland, History of English Law ii 611 - 16; 
Bracton ff. 399 b. (iv 245) and 4oo - 4oo b (iv 247). 
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words met by a denial. Everything in the claim might be true and 
yet the defendant might still be in the right because not all the 
relevant facts had been brought out. Accordingly it was necessary 
to allow the defendant to introduce the additional material before 
the jury and not to confine him to his denia1. 106 From this 
process applied to the developing writ system a body of substantive 
107 law began to emerge: 
We begin to see that the assize-formulas contain 
words which are rapidly acquiring a technical 
import, such as 'disseised', 'free tenement', 
'as of fee' and so forth. A defendant may well 
fear that, with such phrases before them, the 
jurors, though they ought to answer the question 
in his favour, will give his adversary a verdict. 
The defendant, for example, has ejected a tenant 
in villeinage, who forthwith brings the Novel 
Disseisin against him. The jurors ought to say 
that the plaintiff has not been disseised from a 
'free tenement'. But will they do so, unless 
their attention is specially directed to the 
villein character of the tenure? So we allow 
the defendant to raise this point; we allow him 
to do so by way of an assertion that the assize 
should not proceed; this assertion we call an 
exceptio. 
Maitland goes on after this passage in the History of English 
Law to speak of 'the utmost laxity' in thirteenth century pleading, 
of 'the pleaders' many faults which would have shocked their 
successors'. 
108 Later, English pleading developed its own strict 
106. S.F.C. Milsom, 'Law and fact in legal development', 
University of TorontQ Law Journal 17 (1967) 1 - 19 at 
15 - 16; also his Historical Foundations, 42 - 4. 
107. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 
ii 613. 
108.. Pollock and Mai tland, History of English Law 
ii 614 - 5-
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rules and terminology, but as has often been recognised it did 
not lose its basic foundation in the principles of medieval logic. 109 
The purpose of pleading remained the finding of an issue between the 
parties - a proposition on the one side denied on the other - which 
could be put to a jury for answer. As Dr. Baker remarks, 'the logic 
• 1 . 1 I 110 was beaut~ful y s~mp e • The plaintiff made his claim, or count. 
The defendant might deny the whole, a general traverse, in which case 
there was a general issue for the jury. Alternatively he might deny 
one only of the plaintiff's facts, a special traverse producing only 
a special issue for the jury. Lastly the defendant might 'confess 
and avoid', that is, confess the truth of all that the plaintiff 
had said, but allege a new material fact which meant that no wrong had 
been committed. Here there was no issue, because an affirmative, 
the count, had not been met by a denial. Hence the plaintiff was 
required to reply and from his reply an issue might emerge. Only 
f . t b t . . d t . d 111 when an af ~rmative was me y a nega ~ve was JU gmen requ~re • 
Such pleadings were known in thirteenth-century England as 
peremptory exceptions, showing the extent of the influence of 
Romano-canonical procedure at this period.112 (Later, as English 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
Giuliani, 'Influence of rhetoric', 242- 8; Spelman's 
Reports ed. J.H. Baker (Selden Soc., vols. 93, 94) ii 
143 - 4. 
Baker, Introduction t"o English Legal History, 68. · 
Spelman's Reports ii 144 - 150. 
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law ii 614; 
Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 67. 
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procedure developed its own terminology, they became known as 
'special pleas in bar'.)113 Moreover there were also exceptions 
which Bracton described as dilatory, reasons for refusing to answer 
the plaintiff's claim at all. Bracton's account of these exceptions, 
and the order in which they must be propounded, was clearly drawn 
114 
straight from the procedure of the church courts, but as Maitland 
pointed out, in doing this Bracton was merely providing a 'new 
rubric' for old rules. 115 Such exceptions might be to the 
competence of the court or to the judge or to the form of the writ 
or of the plaintiff's counts, and they had to be proposed in an 
order which was identical to that laid down in the canon law. 
The subject of pleading in early Scots law has only been 
examined by one scholar, Sir Philip Hamilton-Grierson, in the 
introduction to his edition of Habakkuk Bisset's early seventeenth 
century Rolmentis of Court.116 The evidence examined by him 
suggested the model of a formal statement of claim followed by a 
denial, after which the court would adjudge the form of proof to 
be taken. But it was possible to plead exceptions such as in 
England. The matter is discussed in relation to brieves in both 
Regiam and Quoniam. There may be exceptions to the brieve itself, 
such as its lack of due form or its wrong description of the lands 
subject to dispute; there may be exceptions against the form of 
113. Pollock and :Haitland, Histor:t: of English Law ii 614. 
114. Bracton ff. 399 - 438 (iv 245 - 362). 
-115. Pollock and :Haitland, Histor:t: of English Law ii 614. 
116. (Scottish Text Society, 3 vols., 1920 - 26) iii 62 - 70. 
the pursuer's statement of claim. An exception, it appears from 
Quoniam, is some good reason why the matter should not be put before 
the assize. But in both texts the discussion appears to be confined 
to exceptions which, in the language of canonists and thirteenth 
century English law, would have been described as dilatory - that 
is, objections to the form in which the action was brought, rather 
th t •t b t 117 an o 1 s su s ance. 
It is also exceptions of this type with which chapters 14 to 
16 of the 1318 legislation deal, laying down the minimum content of 
a statement of claim (narracio) in cases relating to contracts, 
debts, caption of goods and 'all actions of wrong, great or small'. 
So long as the pursuer recites these minimum elements, his statement 
118 
cannot be challenged or quashed. Dilatory exceptions to brieves 
were dealt with again in 1430, when parliament ordained that, so 
long as the brieve was in 'the forme •••••• statute in the law of 
before' and 1 nocht rasit na blobit in suspect placis', exceptions 
against it were to be of no avail. The act lists the 'suspect 
placis' where erasures and blots could still give rise to exceptions 
- the names of the parties or the lands, the cause upon which the 
b · h d b h d ~ts date. 119 r1eve a een pure ase , or • It is one of a series 
of statutes designed, inter alia, 'til exclude frivolus and fraudful 
excepciounis•, 120 possibly enacted as a result of the deliberations 
117- See Regiam Majestatem I, 10 and 11; ~uoniam Attachiamenta 
eh. 35· 
118. APS i 470 - 1, cc. 14 - 16 •. 
11<). APS ii 17, c. 3· 
120. APS ii 17 - 18, cc. 1 - 7-
of a group which in 1426 had been appointed to 'mend the lawis 
that nedis mendment•.121 The statute by which they were appointed 
had also laid down that 'all lauchful excepciounis of law be 
admittit in jugement and all frivolus and fraudfull excepciounis 
be repellit and nocht admittit be the jugeis swa that the causis 
litigious and pleyis be nocht wrangwisly prolongyt' •. It must be 
doubted whether the act of 1430 would 'mend' this particular 
mischief, since it left considerable scope for the recalcitrant 
defender to attack the formal correctness of the brieve. 
In none of these sources is there any reference to the term 
'dilatory' as a description of a category of exceptions, nor is 
there any use of the other technical adjective 'peremptory'. 
However this classification of exceptions as either dilatory or 
peremptory was used in Scotland, as can be seen from the late 
fifteenth century records of the auditors of parliament and lords 
f "1 122 o councJ. • The contrast between the dilatory and the 
peremptory exception is also drawn in the first chapter of a short 
treatise, De Exceptionibus, which can be found in some of the 
legal manuscripts which circulated in Scotland before 1500. 
There a dilatory exception is described as something which delays 
the plea (placitum) while a peremptory exception is a statement 
against another in a legal process (in agendo) whereby he may be 
excluded from his action.123 
121. APS ii 10, c. 10. But cf. Duncan, 'James I', 4. 
122. See ADA, 198, and ADC (Stair) iii 32, 34, 9£ (also 
introduction, lvii). 
123. See Appendix E. 
If we turn to the case of John son of \/alter against Thomas 
Scot on a brieve de proteccione regis infricta which was discussed 
earlier, then we can find an example of a peremptory exception being 
pleaded which in the terminology of later English law would have been 
called a confession and avoidance. The defender admits the pursuer's 
facts, but seeks to add one of his own which casts a different light 
124 
on the matter. Similarly the procedure of pleading which can 
be derived from the statutes and cases of the fifteenth century 
examined above fits the model whereby the parties in debate define 
the issue which is to be put to the jury for verdict by a sequence 
of affirmations of fact until there is a denial. With each 
affirmation a borgh will be gi~en, for 'he who excepts must offer 
to prove his exception•~25 i.e. the fact upon which he relies. 
Finally, one of the parties enters a denial, pledges are given and 
the issue is put to a jury for proof. 
It may therefore be concluded that 'pleading' was a term with 
some substantive and specific content in medieval Scotland, a 
content of a nature very similar to that apparent in thirteenth-
century ~gland. The English model was of course heavily influenced 
by Romano-canonical procedure and no doubt this was also true of 
Scottish pleading; but given that in Scotland the issue was put to 
a jury rather than to a judge it seems likely that England provided 
the more direct influence in giving Scottish pleading its form. 
The connection with the pleadable brieves is apparent. If 
pleading was a debate between two parties about the facts of a 
124. APS i 505. 
125. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law ii 616. 
case in which they defined the dispute which the jury had to 
determine, then such a procedure could only take place upon a 
brieve if it set out in general terms some dispute between two 
parties and invited the court to decide it. The brieve of 
inquest was not such a brieve. It commanded the sheriff to 
carry out an inquisitorial function, to gather evidence on 
certain questions, draw conclusions with the assistance of a jury 
and report. The matter for decision on a brieve of inquest 
could not be narrowed down by oral pleading between parties: a 
retour which failed to answer all the points of the brieve would 
be invalid. The brieve determined what matters had to be proved. 
The same was true of the brieve of tutory, where the question to 
be answered was the identity of the nearest male relative over 
twenty-five years of age of a named individual and the brieve of 
idiotry, where various questions about a person's mental state and 
nearest male relatives had to be answered. No doubt there were 
disputes and debates over these matters before the court, but 
they did not affect the questions which were ultimately to be put 
to the jury: they were simply part of the material which would be 
considered in formulating answers for the retour. 126 
The question of the brieves Stair called pleadable is a little 
more difficult, yet it is apparent that, if our linking of the 
description 'pleadable' with the procedure of pleading is correct, 
Stair's discussion is mis-conceived. Perambulation, lining, 
division and kenning to terce were all essentially procedures for 
126. Willock, Jury in Scotland, 119 121. 
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declaring the boundaries of lands: in the first two instances, 
those between neighbouring proprietors, in the latter, between 
parties entitled to different parts of a greater whole. The 
declaration of the boundaries in each case involved physical acts 
of demarcation by the court, as has been explained by Professor 
Willock, and it was essentially this physical act which the brieves 
ordained should take place. 127 Thus in the brieves of perambulation 
and lining, the officer was to cause the boundaries to be walked out 
and marked by the court, while in the brieves of division and terce 
the officer was to split the property between the parties so that 
each received an equitable share of the sunny and shadowy portions 
of the land. The evidence gathered by Professor Willock shows 
that considerable labour might be called for from the members of 
the court involved in a case under one of these brieves. 128 But 
in none of these cases was the court called upon to give a doom. 
The act of demarcation and the giving of sasine, if required, was 
the end of procedure on the brieve, and could not be narrowed down 
bY pleading between the parties. True, there might be arguments 
and evidence led in court, but these do not appear to have been 
intended in any way to restrict the verdict of the court as 
expressed in the eventual demarcation by the good and faithful 
men of the country.129 
It is true that statutes of 1504 refer to 'the exceptioun oftymes 
proponit aganis wedowis persewand and followand thir brevis of 
127~ Willo~k, Jury in Scotland, 122 - 132.· 
128. Willock, Jury in Scotland, 127 8. 
129. Willock, Jury in Scotland, 126 7. 
·;...-
1 
terce' , 130 and to exceptions against the brieve of inquest,l3l 
language suggestive of pleading. But in the case of terce the 
'exception' in question was that the widow had not been married 
to the deceased man from whose lands terce was claimed, a question 
which the sheriff was in any case commanded to explore by the 
brieve. In much the same way, in the brieve of inquest he had 
to find out if its bearer was the nearest and lawful heir of the 
deceased, so that the exception of bastardy mentioned in the 1504 
statutes was in any event a question raised by the brieve. It 
was in other words a matter on which evidence would be heard, but 
not pleading. 
There are further indications that the brieve of terce was not 
pleadable in the several occasions upon which an assize which had 
served a brieve of terce was sued before the lords auditors or lords 
of council by summons of error, a procedure which by act of 
parliament was not to be used against assizes serving on pleadable 
b . 132 rJ.eves. Further the act of 1504 on falsing the doom implies 
that the only pleadable brieve addressed to the sheriff court in 
use at that time was the brieve of right. Both division and 
terce pertained to the sheriff and continued in frequent use for 
several centuries after 1504.133 
It may be concluded therefore that the brieves of perambulation, 
lining, terce and division were not pleadable in the sense in which 
130. APS ii 252, c. 22. 
131. APS ii 253, c. 40. 
132- E.g., ADA, 48 - 9, 54, 59, 124*; ADC i *97· 
133· APS ii 254, c. 41; Ba1four, Practicks ii 649 - 50. 
' ~' 
J 
that description was used up to the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, and are rightly excluded from the lists in Regiam and 
Quoniam. It has never been suggested that retourable brieves 
were pleadable, but it is interesting and revealing to consider 
yet another statute of 1504 in which it was narrated that 'thir 
has bene in tymez bigane gret abusioun in the proponing of 
exceptiouns frivole again the breif of inqueste and pervertit the 
ordour and natour of it as it war ane breve of pley'. The statute 
went on to allow certain dilatory exceptions against the summons, 
the judge and the inquest to be pleaded.134 Most of these can be 
seen as allowable before 1504, in cases of error or wrongful and 
partial proceedings against t~e inquest.l35 Although evidence is 
lacking, it is difficult to believe that dilatory pleas were not 
available against all brieves, retourable, non-retourable or 
pleadable. But it is most unlikely that mistakes in the drafting 
of the brieve or departures from due form would have been allowed 
to pass if challenged in court. What therefore would have been 
the distinctive features of the pleadable brieve would be the making 
of peremptory exceptions of fact, the creation thereby of an issue 
and the rendering by the court of a doom thereon. It followed, 
equally, that falsing the doom was the appropriate appeal procedure, 
and this explains why pleadable brieves were excluded from the act 
enabling actions of error ~gainst juries. 
134. APS ii 253, c. 40. 
135. See e.g. Fraser, Lennox ~~ no. 72 where in c. 1476 dilatory 
exceptions against the judge, court, brieve, day, place, 
petition and the points of the brieve were proposed against 
a brieve of inquest; also ADA, 14, 1·9, 44, 74; ADC i 10, 
2~2, 223, 243. 
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Three last points on procedure and pleading. The first is to 
note that the defender almost always had to begin his pleading with 
a general denial of the pursuer's claim. Regiam, apparently 
embodying the provisions of chapter 19 of the 1318 legislation, 
states that in the brieves of right, mortancestor and novel 
dissasine he must make a denial immediately but that he can then 
take advice (in the act, furth of court) before putting forward 
more specific defences. 136 There are similar statements about 
the need to start with a general denial in the brieves of right and 
dissasine and also in the brieve of distress, in Quoniam. 137 The 
case of John son of Walter aga~nst Thomas Scot shows the apparently 
general applicability of the rule. The defender started with a 
denial of the pursuer's claim under a brieve de proteccione regis 
infricta, then having taken advice outwith the court, sought to 
plead an exception. The court refused to allow him to plead, on 
the grounds presumably that he had taken up the general issue of 
the pursuer's claim, but parliament ruled that his exception should 
be heard. 138 The court's difficulty here illustrates the slowness 
of the process by which the ability to plead was grafted onto the 
older forms of lawsuit. As Maitland remarked in characteristic 
f~hion, 'a downright No has been in the past the one possible 
answer; it is still the indispensable preliminary to every possible 
answer•. 139 We can see a sort of mid-way stage being reached in 
trespass cases when we consider the provisions of chapter 17 
136. Regiam Najestatem I, 10; · APS i 471, c. 19. 
137. Quoniam Attachiamenta chs. 34, 36 and 40. 
138. APS i 505 • 
139. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law ii 609. 
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of the 1318 legislation. The act states that so long as the 
Q 
defender den~ 'torth et~ raysoun quod dicitur wrang et unlaw' 
and the amount of damages claimed by the pursuer, he is to be 
140 
regarded as having entered a defence. In other words, he does 
not have to state his entire defence immediately. Thus the law 
has moved beyond the point where the defender is only allowed to 
deny generally and is moving to the position where his general 
denial is only the formal opening of his pleading. Chapters 
18 and 19 show why these provisions were enacted: the former 
requires the pursuer to state his case fully before the defender 
need reply, the latter applies this principle to cases begun by 
b f . ht t t d 1 d. . 141 Th rieves o r1g , mor ances or an nove 1ssas1ne. e 
defender is not to be taken by surprise and forced immediately 
to an issue on a statement of claim whose form, apart from some 
minimum content, is ceasing to be predictable. 
The second and third of our final points may be briefly stated. 
First, pleading was not confined to actions begun by brieve. To 
speak of pleadable brieves distinguished them only from other brieves. 
Pleading was a method of restricting the role of proof in the new 
juridical world where judgment was given by men and not by God. 
Actions by pursuers against defenders were not all begun by brieve 
- as the rule insisting on brieves in cases of freehold itself 
makes plain. Wherever there was an action, pleading was a vital 
142 part of court procedure. 
140. APS i 471, c. 17. 
Lastly, it must be noted that there 
141. APS i 471, cc. 18· and 19. 
142. Apart from references already given see e.g. Fife Court Bk., 
315 - 316; APS i 504, ADA, index, 'Dilator defences or 
exceptions' and 'Exceptions', ADC i, index, 'Dilatory exceptions', 
ADC ii, index, 'Process', ADC TStair) iii, index, 'Exceptions 
dilatour'. 
-appears to be no Scottish ter~ equivalent to the English demurrer, 
whereby the defendant answered the pursuer by stating that his 
claim as it stood gave rise to no legal remedy and thereby posed a 
question of law which it was for the judge rather than the jury to 
143 
answer. The absence of evidence on the possibility or otherwise 
of such a plea is of course not conclusive against a background of 
almost total lack of material on the subject of pleading as a whole. 
The treatise De Exceptionibus speaks of exceptions de jure as reasons 
or arguments advanced in a dispute perceived to be sufficient, yet 
the proposer may resort to another answer. Perhaps this is a hint 
of the demurrer but it is not a very clear one. Exceptions de j.ure 
are also distinguished from exceptions of fact, by which both parties 
descend from the first proposition and after answering the proposer 
144 
may not resort to another answer. It may be noted that in 
England demurrers were often pleaded tentatively, to test the reaction 
of the court, but could be withdrawn. In pleading properly speaking 
however, once a party had advanced an exception the admissions it 
contained were conclusive and could not be 'tri thdrawn. This after 
all was the purpose of the procedure, to get at what the parties 
admitted to be true and narrow the scope of the proof. De Exceptionibus 
seems to be attempting to articulate the distinction between pleading 
a demurrer and pleading an exception of fact. In view of the 
uncertain status of the treatise as an account of Scots law, too 
much weight should not be given to the evidence it contains; but it 
would be altogether remarkable if pleas of the nature of demurrers 
143. Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 69 - 70. 
144. See Appendix E. 
__..._________ 
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were unknown in the Scottish secular courts of the period. 145 
An example of such a plea may in fact be found in a case of 1465 
where the defender's warrantor failed to turn up when called and 
the defender took a plea in law that since the warrantor was a 
· th ht t b · t d t"l he f 146 m~nor e case oug o e s~s e un ~ came o age. 
Our final question in this chapter must therefore be, to which 
of the pleadable brieves listed in Regiam and Quoniam would a 
pursuer seeking recovery of lands from another have been compelled 
by the act of 1318 to have recourse? Only three of those brieves 
appear to concern disputes over lands, namely, dissasine, 
mortancestor and right. All the rest are connected with the 
enforcement of personal ratheF than real rights.147 Accordingly 
in the next chapter the brieves of dissasine, mortancestor and 
right will be discussed in some detail. 
145. Ollivant, Court of the Official, 112 mentions that 
litiscontestation might take place in the official's 
court on pleas called 'jura' (i.e. of law?). 
146. SRO, Lord Advocate's·Department, AD 1/60 (Appendix D, 
where the legal issues are set out in full). 
147. For examples of the use of the brieves de compulsione see 
Morton Registrum ii no. 130, Kelso Liber ii no. 397; Aberdeen 
Burgh Recs., 133, 232, 237; Fraser, Wemyss ii no. 49; Fraser, 
Melville iii no. 41; RMS ii no. 375· They cease to appear 
after c. 1450. The last example of the brieve de nativis is 
Moray Registrum no. 143 (1364). The brieve de proteccione 
regis infricta was the only one of t~e personal brieves pleadable 
before the justiciar (Quoniam Attachiamenta eh. 37; APS i 505) 
and may have been made obsolete by statute in 1430: APS ii 22, 
c. 1 (see also w.c. Dickinson, 'The acts of the parliament at 
Perth 6 March 1429/30', SHR 29 (1950) 1 - 12 at 5 - 9 and Harding, 
'Medieval brievP.s of ~rotection', 13R). 
Chapter Four 
Dissasine, Mortancestor and Right 
(.a) Introduction 
There has been relatively little study of procedure by brieve 
in medieval Scottish courts by comparison with the wealth of literature 
on the equivalent English procedure by original writ. Forty years 
ago, Lord Cooper pointed out that a formulary system of procedure had 
come into operation in Scotland whereby court actions were begun by 
writs in the name of the king, commanding the judge to determine an 
issue set out in the document. Such documents were known in the 
vernacular as 1brieves', a word derived from their Latin name of 
'brevia'. It was Lord Cooper's belief that, after this sytem had 
'attained its culminating point in the early fourteenth century', 
it 'fell into decay' and had, with some exceptions, disappeared by 
1 the middle of the fifteenth century. The exceptions were, of 
course, the 'classical' brieves discussed in Stair's Institutions 
at the end of the seventeenth century - perambulation, succession, 
terce, division, lining in burghs, tutory and idiotry. 2 After the 
death of Lord Cooper, Sheriff McKechnie demonstrated that the theory 
of a declining system in the late medieval period was mistaken. 
In a careful study of a wide range of material, he sought the first 
appearance of each form of brieve and was able from this to show 
that the system was apparently still expanding in the fourteenth 
century and reached what he called its 'heyday' in the fifteenth. 
He also drew attention to the continuous history of the brieve of 
1. Reg. Brieves, 30. See also Cooper, Selected Papers, 228. 
2. Stair, Institutions, IV, iii, 4- 14. 
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right throughout this period. 3 Since McKechnie's paper was 
published, there have been further detailed studies of particular 
forms of brieve, notably Professor Harding's essay comparing the 
brieve de proteccione regis infricta with the English writs of 
4 trespass. Attention must also be paid to the illuminating work 
of Professor Barrow on twelfth century developments5 and to Professor 
Willock's careful researches on the 'classical seven' in the medieval 
. d 6 perJ.o • However, there remain many gaps in our knowledge, in 
particular in relation to the brieves of dissasine, mortancestor 
and right which, as the previous chapter has sought to show, were 
the ones to be used by litigants in cases touching freehold. 
As already mentioned, Sheriff McKechnie demonstrated the 
continuous existence and use of the brieve of right up to the 
beginning of the sixteenth century. But there would appear to have 
been no serious dissent from Lord Cooper's conclusions on the subject 
of the brieves of dissasine and mortancestor. He recognised their 
existence in the thirteenth century but, in line with his general 
thesis, seems to have thought that dissasine fell into desuetude 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Certainly he never 
carried its history beyond the legislation touching the matter in 
1318 in any of his published works. 7 Professor Walker has since 
3. See McKechnie, 'Brieves', passim. Cooper acknowledged 
}rlcKechnie' s correction .before its publication and his own death: 
Selected Papers, 222 n. 3. 
4. Harding, 'Medieval brieves of protection', passim. 
5· See RRS i 59 - 68 and RRS ii 69 - 75· 
6. Willock, Jury in Scotland, 105 - 139. 
7. See Reg. Brieves, 15 - 16; Selected Papers, 90 - 91; 'FreehoTd in 
Scots law', JR 57 (1945) 1- 5; and the editions of Regiam and 
Quoniam, 243 and 350, where he states that 'the latest reported 
case of Novel Dissasine which has been noted is Forman v. Ker (1469) 
1 Br. Supp. 112'. The case referred to is however plainly not one 
of dissasine, novel or otherwise. 
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noted a case of dissasine in 1368 and stated that 'it would appear 
accordingly that novel dissasine fell largely into desuetude round 
about 1400', 8 while Professor Willock states that this occurred 
'probably in the mid-fourteenth century•. 9 If Lord Cooper's view 
of dissasine is somewhat unclear, his thoughts on mortancestor are 
.1 h h •t 10 more eas1 y seen, w en e wr1 es: 
[T)he emphasis appears to have shifted from ejecting the 
intruder to declaring the title of the heir to succeed. 
Indeed the term "mortancestor", which is of very frequent 
occurrence in Scottish charter records of the thirteenth 
century, was more commonly used not of the original 
possessory remedy but of the comprehensive generalis 
inquisicio ••• which became the "brieve of succession" 
of Balfour ••• and the "brieve of service" of Stair ••• 
and of later practice down to 1847 - the substance of 
all these being practically identical ••• concerned 
solely vri th the investigation of the heir's title, and 
there being no intruder to eject. From all this it would 
seem to follow that by the end of the thirteenth century 
1 . . ' '. 
't 
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. '>j:; 
·: ··.r. 
.~: r: 
the original brieve of mortancestor \·ras losing its identity. ., 
Again, a broadly similar conclusion has been reached by subsequent 
"1 k 11 writers, such as Professor W1 loc : 
The brieve of mortancestor died out at an early date, being, 
in common with novel dissasine, replaced by such native 
actions as ejection and wrongous occupation, but the name 
had so impressed itself on the legal .imagination that it 
became attached to the related brieve of inquest. 
Ho\-rever the extent to v1hich Lord Cooper's general thesis was undermined 
by Sheriff McKechnie sug5ests that his particular conclusions on the 
subject of dissasine and mortancestor should be examined afresh, 
while McKechnie's own sketchy discussion of the brieve of right is 
also capable of further elaboration. In this chapter the evidence 
to be found in the sources suggested by the learned Sheriff -
8. D.M. Walker, 'The development of reparation', JR 64 (1952) 101- 134 · 
at 111. Walker otherwise reproduces the views-of Cooper on 
dissasine. For the 1368 case see APS i 505. 
9- Willock, Jur;y in Scotland, 132. 
10. He g. Brieves, 14. 
ll . "dill0ck, ~·iur·r ;~ ::; c 0 f: l :' l"'. d. ' J.OQ .• 
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ecclesiastical cartularies, collections of family papers and so on -
will be brought together with legislation and legal literature of the 
period. We are driven to these sources by the unfortunate lack of 
medieval court records, but enough can be gleaned from them and an 
occasional comparative glance south of the border to enable us to 
sketch a rather different picture from that just described. 
(b) The brieve of dissasine 
The earliest reference to a remedy for dissasine in the Scottish 
royal courts seems to be in a statute of 1230 which has generally 
been accepted as authentic.12 It is also generally agreed that the 
enactment laying down that brieves of novel dissasine and mortancestor 
are always to be determined by an assize cannot possibly be 
legislation of David I (1124 - 1153) or any other twelfth century 
king, accurate though its statement of the law is. 13 There is no 
evidence of any earlier forms of brieve dealing with such questions 
or being in any sense forerunners in style of the brieve as it 
appears in the formularies of the Ayr and Bute manuscripts. The 
statute of 1230 states that when complaint is made to the king or his 
justiciar of dissasine from any tenement in which the complainer 
claimed to have been infeft, a royal writ is to be sent to the 
justiciar or the sheriff commanding them to determine the justice 
of the complaint. This is to be done by means of a recognition, 
or jury. Professor Barrow has drawn attention to a case before the 
justiciar of Lothian begun 'by. the lord king's brieve of recognition' 
12. APS i 400, c. 7. Cf. Duncan, Making of the Kingdom, 539 - 41_, 
asp. at 541 n. 6 which I follow in my summary of the act's 
provisions; also Barrow, Kingdom, 114. 
13. APS i 325, c. 35· 
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before 1242 and suggested that, since it came before the justiciar 
and involved a recognitio, it may have been a case begun by a brieve 
f d . . 14 0 h . o 1ssas1ne. n somew at s1milar grounds it can be argued that 
a case before the sheriff of Berwick sometime between 1233 and 1235 
is possibly another early example of the brieve.15 This case is 
especially interesting in that the pursuers claim rights of estovers 
in a wood at Reston in Berwickshire, which belonged to the defenders, 
the priory of Coldingham. In England the writ of novel disseisin 
was used from its earliest beginnings in the twelfth century to 
16 protect common rights of pasture, and the author of Bracton argued 
that it could be used for common rights of all sorts, including 
estovers. 17 If the view in Bracton was ever adopted in practice, 
it was obscured in the thirteenth century and the second Statute 
of Westminster had to declare in 1285 that the assize could be used 
t b f th k . ' . t• 18 to recover es overs e ore e 1ng s JUS 1ces. Prior to 1285 
interference with estovers was dealt with by quod permittat writs 
before the sheriff, 19 which were sometimes knovrn as the 1 li ttle vrri ts 
of novel disseisin' because they were pleaded without an assize in 
14. Raine, North Durham, no. 378; Barrow, Kingdom, 115. 
15. Durham Dean & Chapter Muniments, mise. eh. no. 1263 (Appendix A). 
It is also possible that the.brieve was one of mortancestor: 
see below, 203 - 4. 
16. Glanvill XIII, 37; Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 11. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Bracton f. 231 (iii 187- 8). See also f. 235b (iii 199); 
Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 135 n. 1; Novae Narrationes 
edd. 1!: • .Shanks and S.F.C. Nilsom (Selden Soc., vol. 8o) lxxxiii. 
Statutes of the Realm i 84, c. 25. 
Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 63; Early Registers of Writs, 
32, 72·, 215 - 6; Nova~ Narrationes, lxxxiv - lxxxvi, 22, 77 - 8, 
194 - 6. 
'1,-·. 
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20 the county court. Can a parallel be drawn 'iri th England here, 
given that the Reston case was heard before the sheriff? The 
answer is, probably not. Apart from the fact that there is no 
evidence for any guod permittat form in the admittedly much later 
Scottish formularies, the act of 1230 does sugBest that the justiciar 
might issue a brieve of dissasine himself, saving the complainer the 
need to approach the l~ing' s chapel, and in it direct that the case 
be heard by the sheriff. That such a procedure was followed may 
be borne out by a letter of Hueh Barclay, justiciar of Lothian, 
written in 1262, in which he states that he has issued 'two pairs 
of the king's letters of dissasine' to John Bcott of Reston. 21 
Unfortunately it is not stated in which courts the actions will be 
heard. Another document dated 2 August 1247 narrates how Adam Spott 
impleaded Ranulf of Buncle 'by precepts of the lord king of Scots 
and of lord David de Lindsay then justiciar of Lothian' for certain 
lands in Buncle. The case was commenced in the 'county (comitatu) 
of Berwick', which suggests the sheriff's court, although a final 
settlement was reached in the 'court of the king of Scots' before 
L . d th . t• . 22 ln say e JUS lClar. Possibly then this was a case heard 
initially before the sheriff on a brieve issued by the justiciar. 
Such a pov1er did have an l:nelish parallel, although it should not be 
pressed too far: 'if the disseisin had been com~itted durin~ a 
general eyre in the county, the justices in eyre could issue the 
20. Early ReBisters of ~rits, 85, 261. 
21. Coldinc,ham Corresp. no. 1. The 'pair' probably refers to 
the brieve of dissasine and to the summons of the defender to 
answer in court. 
22. Fraser, Douglas iii no. 285; cf. Ross, Lectures ii 219 for 
a garbled version. 
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original writ themselves, saving the offended party a trip to 
23 Chancery'. Perhaps then the pursuers in the Reston case had 
1~3 
obtained a brieve of disnasine from the justiciar addressed to the 
sheriff and were exercising facilities first made available by the 
act of 1230. 
Another early case of dissasine, this time before the justiciar's 
court, may be the action in which Gilbert son of Samuel impleaded 
Maeldomhnaich earl of Lennox 'by letters of the lord king' for the 
lands of Monachkennaran in 1235. 24 The case was touched upon in 
another context in the previous chapter. The lands in question were 
attached to the church of Kilpatrick which the earl had subinfeudated 
to Paisley abbey. The rector of the church \-Jas the earl's younger 
brother Dougal, who had alienated the lands to Gilbert. Gilbert's 
title had been completed by a confirmation from the earl. In 1233 
the abbey recovered the lands by action before papal judges-delegate, 
but Gilbert remained contumaciously absent from the proceedings, 
and the secular arm had to be brought against him to enforce the 
judgment. Perhaps the earl had been compelled by higher authority 
to eject Gilbert and the latter's reaction had been to bring a brieve 
of dissasine. The case was settled with the earl agreeing to pay 
Gilbert sixty silver marks for the renunciation of his claim. 
Later, perhaps in the 1270s, the dean and archdeacon of Dunblane 
instructed Laurence dean of ~he Lennox to go 'to the pleas of the 
lord king at Dumbarton', probably meaning the justice ayre, and there 
23. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 64 - 5. 
24. Paisley Registrum, 170. For the other details of the case 
see 157 - 70 and above, 135 - 6. 
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to inhibit actions begun 'by letters of the lord king of perambulation 
or of recognition' against the abbot and convent of Paisley and their 
lands. The 'letters of recognition' may have been brieves of 
d . . 25 ~ssas~ne. 
If to begin with the sheriff's jurisdiction in dissasine was 
co-extensive with that of the justiciar, this had ceased to be the 
position by the early fourteenth century and perhaps before. In 
the fourteenth century 'registers' the brieve is always addressed to 
the justiciar. 26 Regiam Majestatem and Quoniam Attachiamenta both 
state that the action pertains to his court. 27 On this point the 
treatises are supported by the few cases of which there is any 
evidence. In 1319 the abbey of Dunfermline and the portioners of 
the barony of Fithkil were involved in a boundary dispute. The 
portioners, dissatisfied with the result of an earlier brieve of 
perambulation, brought another action by a brieve of dissasine, which 
• th • t• • I t 28 was begun ~n e JUS ~c~ar s cour • In 1342 an assize held in 
the full court of the justiciar at Inverberv~found that Sir William 
Ho\lrbray had dissaised the abbot and convent of the abbey of Arbroath 
unjustly and without a judgment of various lands in the Mearns. 29 
In 1368 Thomas Hay of Loquhariot (not to be confused with his 
contemporary, Thomas Hay of Zrroll, constable of Scotland) brought 
a brieve of dissasine against William Borthwick in the justiciar's 
25- Paisley Registrum, 176. Laurence was dean of the Lennox in 
1274: ~att, Fasti, 179. 
26. Reg. Brieves, 40 (no. 21), 62 (no. 107). 
27. Regiam Hajestatem I, 4: Quoniam .:~ttachiamenta chs. 36 and 53· 
28. Dunfermline Registrum no. 352. 
29. BL, MS. Add. 33245, ff. 156 v. - 157 r. 
~·;.•. 
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court at Edinburgh. 30 In 1430 Mariota Cunningham recovered the 
lands of Balwill and Ballaird from Susanna and Donald Christison by 
brieve of novel dissasine in the court of the justiciar south of 
Forth at Stirling.31 Finally we know of two cases of dissasine 
in 1433, both heard before the justiciar north of Forth at Perth.32 
A final confirmation of the position can be found in a minor treatise 
probably written in the 1450s, the Ordo Justiciarie, which explains 
details of procedure in the justiciar's court. This eives a form 
of summons 'super Breve de Nova Dissaisina', whereby the sheriff is 
ordered to bring the defender before the justiciar's court. 33 
It is striking how closely the form of the brieve, as it appears 
in the 'registers' and Quoniam, follows the wording of the act of 
1230 which speaks, as do the styles, of the pursuer's complaint that 
he has been dissaised by another unjustly and without a judgment and 
states that a recognition of the good and faithful men of the 
neighbourhood should be held to make inquiry. If the complaint is 
found to be true, the pursuer is to be restored to his former 
sasine; if not, he is to be put in the king's mercy. In general 
the inspiration of the English writ is clear, both in the act and 
in the styles. It is tempting therefore to assume that the brieve 
assumed this form immediately. If so, many of the thirteenth century 
30. APS i 505. 
31. Aberdeen University Library, t-1S. 1160/18/9 f. 1 r. - v. 
(Appendix F). 
32. Coupar Angus Chrs. ii no. 128. 
33. APB i 706. The Ordo runs in the name of ·.villiam Sinclair 
earl of Orkney and justiciar south of Forth. Orkney was 
chancellor 1454 - 56 (British Chronology, 175) and acted as 
ju?ticiar at that time: ER vi 386, 433, 485. 
brieves and cases which previous writers have thought to be examples 
of the brieve of dissasine can be disregarded. This is particularly 
so where the brieve in question is retourable and thus not pleadable.34 
The form appears to have been identical whether the brieve was 
called one of novel dissasine, as in the 'registers', or simply 
dissasine, as in Quoniam. The earliest direct reference, in 1262, 
is to the 'king's letters of dissasine•. 35 In the fourteenth century 
there are references both to brieves of dissasine (as in the cases of 
1319 and 1368 mentioned above) and to brieves of novel dissasine. 
Thus the 1318 legislation of Robert I speaks in two chapters of the 
brieve of novel dissasine, 36 while in 1328 the abbey of Arbroath and 
its men were given temporary exemption from all suits or complaints 
to be brought against them, excepting only actions begun by brieves 
of novel dissasine or terce.37 This document may suggest that the 
'novel' element had substantive consequences in that the action mieht 
become time-barred, as in England. But the only Scottish source to 
refer explicitly to a time-limit beyond which novel dissasine was 
not available is Regiam vrhich, in a passage borrowed from Glanvill, 
states that the time-limit was fixed periodically by the king's 
-.8 
council.-' It is perhaps important that by 1230, \·Then the Scots 
introduced their remedy, the English had begun to relax the strictness 
34. See e.g. cases cited Barrow, Kingdom, 116 nn. 156, 157· 
35. Coldingham Corresp. no. 1. 
36. APS i 470, c. 13; APS i 471, c. 19. 
37. Arbroath Liber i no. 360. Compare the Enelish letters close 
giving the beneficiary respite from actions other than novel 
disseisin, darrein· presentment and dower unde nihil habet 
discussed in Sutherland, Novel Disseisin,~- 5· 
33. Rer;iam Najestatem III, 32; Glanvill ;~III, 32. 
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of the requirement of 'novelty•. In that year a plaintiff could 
sue on a disseisin ten years old, while from 1276 to 1546 the time 
limit beyond which novel disseisin could not go was May 1242;39 
thus, as Professor Sutherland remarks, 'in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries the assize was for practical purposes free of 
t . 1. . t t. t 40 any ~me ~m1 a ~on • In the absence of any specific evidence 
on time-limits in Scotland, it may well be that in fact there were 
none, but that does not mean that the word 'novel' was wholly without 
meaning. A document of 1434 which refers to two separate actions 
in the previous year, one begun by brieve of dissasine, the other 
by brieve of novel dissasine, suggests that there was some kind of 
formal distinction based on 'novelty'. This thought is supported 
by the fact that the ejection complained of under the brieve of 
dissasine had occurred seventy years previously. Unfortunately 
the document tells us nothing about the other brieve, but it seems 
reasonable to suppose that there the ejection had been a rather more 
4oa 
recent event. 
This evidence shows that by the fifteenth century the brieve 
could stretch a long way back in time; a careful study of the 1318 
legislation on dissasine suggests that this was also the case in the 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. There are two acts 
dealing with the brieve of novel dissasine, of which the first, 
chapter thirteen, is relevant to the point under discussion. 
39. Sutherland, r·I ovel Disseisin, 55 - 7. 
40. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, ·139. 
40a. Coupar Angus Chrs. ii no. ·128. 
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It reads ~s follows (translation below): 
Item, ordinatum est et assensum quod quia ante ista 
tempera breve de nova dissaisina non solebat impetrari 
nee portari nisi super tenentem ita bene ubi tenens 
intravit per feoffamentum alterius sicut per dissaisinam 
et iniuriam suam propriam.:: Vult dominus rex et statui t 
quod de cetera ita bene nominentur in brevi de nova 
dissaisina dissaisitor sicut tenens eius et infeodator si 
sit vivus. Et si plures dissaisitores faciant unam 
dissaisinam et principalis dissaisitor moriatur antequam 
dissaisitus habuerit statum suum recuperatum propter hoc 
non perdat dissaisitus recuperacionem suam per breve de 
nova dissaisina quamdiu invenire poterit tenentem in vita 
aut dissaisitorem qui fuit ad dissaisinam factam. Et si 
tenens ita infeodatus impetraverit breve de garentya de 
carta pendente assisa penes suum infeodatorem v.el heredes 
suos si voluerit propter hoc tamen non minus capiatur 
assisa ad primum diem placiti. Et si assisa transierit 
pro queralante quilibet dissaisiencium teneatur dissaisito 
ad dampna sua secundum tempus quo tenuit tenementum post 
dissaisinam factam. Et quicunque inventus fuerit dissaisitor 
cum vi et armis post istud statutum publicatum sit adjudicatus 
ad personam et grave amerciamentum ad voluntatem regis. 
Et istud statutum de dissaisina facta teneat locum tantummodo 
post statutum editum et non ante. 
Item, it is ordained and agreed that, whereas before this 
time the brieve of novel dissasine was not wont to be 
impetrated or taken out except against the tenant, both where 
the tenant entered by the infeftment of another and where he 
entered by his O\vn dissasine and wrong·::. the lord king wills 
and enacts that from now there shall also be named in the 
brieve of novel dissasine the dissaisor as.well as his tenant 
and the feoffor if he is living. And if several dissaisors 
carried out a dissasine and the principal dissaisor has died 
before the person dissaised has recovered his estate, the 
dissaisee shall not on account of this lose his recovery by 
brieve of novel dissasine so long as he can find a living 
tenant or a dissaisor who was at the making of the dissasine. 
And if the tenant so infeft impetrates a brieve of warrandice 
of charter pending the assize against his feoffor, or his 
heirs if he wishes, on account of this, nevertheless the 
assize shall be taken at the first day of pleading. And 
if the assize holds for the complainer, the dissaised shall 
have as his damages for each dissasine according to the 
time of the holding after the dissasine. And whenever 
after the publication of this statute dissaisors are found 
to have acted with force and arms, they shall be adjudged 
to imprisonment and to a grave amercement at the will of 
the king. And this statute of dissasine shall have 
force from the time of the proclamation of the statute 
and not before.41 
This can be divided into five main sections, two of which are 
I ?51 
particularly revealing as to the question of time-limits in Scotland. 
The first of these begins by explaining current practice, that the 
brieve is only used against one who entered either by his own 
wrongful dissasine or through infeftment by another. This seems 
to mean that before 1318 the current possessor was named as the 
dissaisor in the brieve, regardless of whether or not it was he 
who had originally ejected the pursuer. But the act states that 
this practice is to be changed: the original dissaisor and the 
feoffor (if alive) are to be named as defender~ alongside the current 
possessor. 
We can best understand the significance of this provision by 
looking at thirteenth century English developments. To beein with, 
one disseised could only name his disseisor as defendant, but success 
in this action enabled him to recover from any third party put in 
after the disseisin. But about 1212 a new rule emerged, that the 
·' 
plaintiff should name both disseisor and any such third party in 
41. APS i 470, c. 13. I differ from Lord Cooper's rather free 
translation of this statute (Selected Papers, 90) in one important 
aspect. He takes the passage 'vult dominus~ et statuit guod,de 
cetero ita bene nominentur in brevi de ~ dissasyna dissasytor 
sicut tenens eius et infeodator si sit vivus' to mean, 'It is 
hereby enacted tha~it shall be competent for the future to call 
as defenders to a brieve of novel disseisin (a) the original 
intruder, (b) the person in actual possession of the lands, and 
(c) if he is still alive, the person from whom the lands were 
derived by the person in actual possession'. I suggest that as 
the verb nominentur is in the subjunctive form and in a quod 
clause following words of command it ought to be translated 'they 
shall be named'. In other words the act is not merely permitting 
the pursuer to-call the dissaisor and feoffor as defenders, it is 
compelling him to do so. This reading also balances the rather 
puzzling 'sicut tenens eius' with 'ita bene'. I read the passage as 
follows: 'The lord king wills and. eni'c ts that from now there shall 
also be named in the brieve of novel dissasine the dissaisor as well f 
as his i.e. the dissaisor's tenant and the feoffor if he is living'•l 
I think that this reading is the most consistent with the act as a ~ 
~ 
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his writ, since the old law in effect meant that the latter 
could be put out of his holding without writ and by judgment in 
a suit to which he was not a party. Professor ~utherland has 
argued that this new rule was also a consequence of the lengthening 
time limits within which the assize could be brought. The old rule 
had come to operate unfairly, 'for the third party who was holding 
the land might have come in years after the disseisin and held in 
42 good peace for a long time before the assize was broueht'. 
the end of the thirteenth century, in another reflection of the 
expansion of the time limits, the law was further developed to meet 
the contingency of feoffees intermediate between the disseisor and 
the current tenant, requiring the plaintiff to name them if they 
were alive. 43 Novel disseisin was thus available even though so 
much time had passed that feoffees of the disseisor had died and 
their heirs had come into possession. It was however always 
essential to name the disseisor: 'the form of the original writ 
was never adapted ... to make any room for a defendant who was 
named simply because he was tenant and not because he was supposed 
•lt f d. . • I 44 to be gu~ y o ~sse~s~n • 
The 1318 act can therefore be seen as a second atte~pt to solve 
a problem created by the lengthy period within which the action of 
dissasine was competent in Scotland also. The first solution had 
been sharply distinct from that developed in England and may suggest 
42. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 57-
43. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 139 - 41. 
44. Pollock and Haitland, .History of English La\'! ii 56; 
Novel Disseisin, 58. 
Sutherland, 
that the act of 1230 did not after all establish the brieve in its 
final form. The second solution is an adoption of the English rules 
as they had stood from the late thirteenth century; as we shall see, 
this characterises the whole of the act. 
The next provision deals with dissasines carried out by several 
persons. If the principal dissaisor were to die before the dissaisee 
had recovered his estate then the action could be brought against 
any living person who had taken part in the dissasine, or who was 
a tenant of the lands in the life of the principal dissaisor. 
Again passage of time between the dissasine and the raising of the 
action is implied. The act was following ~nglish precedent 
established in the reign of Edward I (1272 1306) and as Professor 
Sutherland notes the development allowed the assize to be used long 
after the original disseisin. 45 The point is reinforced when it 
is noticed that here the act makes an exception to its earlier 
provision about who should be named in the brieve. Actions may 
be directed against one who has become a tenant after dissasine 
by a group without bringing in any of the other parties involved. 
However we can derive one time limit, albeit not an especially 
severe one, from this provision. The act expressly states that 
it is to prevent the dissaisee losin~ his right of action on account 
of the death of the principal dissaisor that he is enabled also to 
sue the other participants or the tenant. The implication is that 
the brieve of dissasine was only competent during the lifetime of 
the dissaisor, a rule similar to that of English law. It looks 
as thouGh this rule was also part of pre-1318 Scots law. 
45. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 141 - 2. 
. / . ~· 
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The act Goes on in its third provision to discuss the position 
of the tenant sued as a result of the death of all those involved 
in the ori~inal dissasine. He may if he wishes take out a brieve 
of warrandice of charter against the person who infeft him, or his 
heirs; nevertheless, says the act, the assize is to proceed against 
him at the first day of pleading. It was of the essence of 
dissasine in Scotland, as in ~nGland, that no essonzies, or excuses 
from appearance, Here allo\·Jed to the defender c..tnd that the case 
should be deterQined on its first day in court. \~e can see this 
rule in operation in 1433 when it was only with the consent of tl1e 
pursuer that his case of dissasine was continued to a second day. 46 
Nothing was to delay the action and the Glanvillian rule that the 
tenant who calls a warrantor in disseisin loses the action immediately 
is found in Regiam Majestatem also. 47 Thus the warrantor could not 
take over the defence of the action in place of the tenant. In 
thirteenth century ~ngland however it became possible for the tenant 
to start a separate action against his warrantor by the writ 
warantia carte: if he lost in the assize, he would then be able to 
recover from his warrantor lands elsewhere of equal value to those 
f h d . b ~ t 48 rom e ha Just een pu~ ou • This is the position which the 
Scottish act seems to achieve. It is not known when the brieve of 
warrandice of charter was introduced; it appears in the i~Yr ~anuscript 
as a form of writ de compulnione in the name of king Alexander, 
46. Regia~ Majestatem III, 32; ~uoniam ~Lttachiamenta eh. 36; 
Coupar .Lnr,us Chrs. ii no. 12v. 
47. Regiam Eajcstatem III, 32; Glanvill J(III, 38. 
48. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 131, 218. 
li3 
implyin~ a thirteenth century date. 49 Other evidence shows that 
generally the effect of raising a brieve of warrandice was to sist 
or suspend the principal action: 50 the effect of the act is therefore 
to preserve the special position of dissasine with regard to 
warrandice, but also to permit the deflection of the burden of the 
action from the tenant infeft after dissasine by a group. 
It has been said that the 1318 act altered procedure in 
dissasine 'in favour of the dispossessed pursuer•. 51 But our 
interpretation of its provisions so far suggests a different 
conclusion, that the act favoured the sitting tenant who had come 
in after the dissasine. In general the pursuer had to search out 
the other parties involved and bring them into his action. A crucial 
consequence was the spreading of the pains of losing the action, 
either by use of the brieve of warrandice in the case of the tenant 
infeft after dissasine by a group, or, in other cases where the 
tenant had been put in after any form of dissasine, 52 by allocating 
the damages amongst the parties involved. This is provided for by 
the act which states that the dissaisee shall recover damages from 
each of the dissaisors in proportion to the time which each of them 
spent in the lands. ~ve do not kno\oJ how the quantum would have been 
50. 
Reg. Brieves, 39 (no. 16). See also ibid., 43 (no. 36), 54 
(no. 16) and Quoniam Attachiamenta chs. 38 and 56. 
Regiam Haiestatem I, 15; Quoniam Attachiamenta eh. 38; Reg. 
Brieves, 1 (no. 96); and see further below, 202 and 242. 
51. Barrow, Bruce, 417. 
52. There seems to be no evidence to show that in Scotland the tenant 
could vouch a eo-defender in dissasine as his warrantor and then 
drop out of the action. Clearly this would not be possible before 
1318 if only the tenant was named as defender; it would have been 
possible from 1318, but there is no express provision in the act 
about this. The question arises because such a rule developed 'in 
England once it became possible to sue both disseisor and tenant in 
the one action: Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 218 - 19. This was 
in addition to the action by warant1a carte. 
assessed - Regiam Majestatem states a maximum of ten marks, but 
Quoniam Attachiamenta, which is supported on this point by a case 
of 1430 in which the pursuer was awarded lOO marks by way of damages, 
allows recovery of the whole of the pursuer's loss through his 
53 
exclusion - but this reduction of his liability must have been one 
of the most important consequences of being merely a eo-defender for 
the losing tenant. The provision also underlines the point that 
actions of dissasine knew no formal time limit. 
If it is asked why the legislators of 1318·should have wished 
to give this kind of protection to tenants who had entered their 
lands after a dissasine, the political situation of the tine, in 
which Robert I was ready to restore those disinherited during the 
recent wars to their lands if they were ready to enter his allegiance, 
d , . . d 54 shoul be oorne 1n m1n • Such a policy must have led to clashes 
of interest between those put out in the wars through their English 
allegiance and those who had eained possession as a result, in which 
perhaps the former micht have raised actions of dissasine to recover 
their lands. It is surely against a background where the king's 
loyal adherents (and their tenants) were uncertain to what extent they 
would be able to retain their new lands against the returning 
disinherited tl1at chapter thirteen of the 1318 legislation was enacted. 
This would explain its preoccupation with old dissasines. li. similar 
rationale may well underlie chapter nineteen, the other act of 1318 
dealinc; ·.·ti th dissasine: the defender here, as also in brieves of 
ri~ht and nortanccstor, was to have full opportunity to consider the 
5 "7. J• Regiam Majestatem III, 32; 
Aberdeen University Library 
Attachiamenta eh. 36; 
1 9, f. 1 r - v. (Appendix F). 
54. Bar~ow, Bruce, 380 - 92; and see above, 126 8. 
case against him and to state his own position.55 
There are of course provisions in the 1318 act which clearly 
favour the pursuer, for instance where the dissasine had been 
carried out by a group. The final provision of the act also lays 
down a rule which, while not strictly in favour of the pursuer, is 
a harsh measure against the dissaisor. Those who are found to be 
dissaisors ~ vi et armis after the publication of the statute 
are to be imprisoned (adjudicatus ad personam) and are also liable 
to a major amercement or fine at the king's will. This appears 
to add to.the Glanvillian rule stated in Regiam56 and echoed in 
the brieve itself that the guilty defender must pay a fine to the 
king's use, by imposing a stricter penalty on those who dissaise 
with violence. Was this intended to deter those of the disinherited 
who mi8ht be tempted to self-help? If so, it may well stand 
alongside chapter twenty-five of the 1318 legislation which affirmed 
the rule that no man was to be put out of his freehold without the 
king's brieve.57 The provision ought also to be interpreted in the 
light of the act of which it is part and which is intended to create 
.. 
joint liability amongst the original dissaisor and those who derived 
their title to the lands from him. Such subsequent tenants are also 
dissaisors liable under the brieve, but they did not dissaise ~ vi 
~ armis; that would be most likely to happen in the act of ejecting 
the person who is now the pursuer. Thus it would be the original 
55· APS i 471, c. 19. 
56. 
57-
Regiam Majestatem III, 32; Glanvill XIII, 38. 
APS i 473, c. 25· See also above, 126 - 8. 
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dissaisor rather than the current possessor Hho would be liable to 
this penalty. Again therefore the policy of protecting the tenant 
is apparent; it is also note\·Jorthy that in framinJ this reform an 
English provision, the first Statute of Westminster of 1275, was 
being followed. 58 
Much can be learned of tl1e substantive effect of the brieve 
both before and after 1318 from this legislation; more can be 
discovered from looking at the form of the brieve itself. The 
style in the Ayr manuscript says that the pursuer must have been 
vest and saised of the lands as of fee or as of terce (dote) or by 
a rent (firma) the term of which has not yet expired. 59 This last 
suggests another interesting contrast with England where only the 
life-tenant and tenant pur autre vie, and not the mere termor, \·tere 
protected in their seisin by the assize; 60 but there is no further 
Scottish evidence on this point. In Quoniam the brieve states that 
the pursuer must have been vest and saised as of fee, 61 while in 
the Bute manuscript the formula is simply, that the pursuer was vest 
and saised of the lands. 62 It is difficult to draw any clear picture 
from this what interest in tl1e lands a pursuer had to show he held 
before the dissasine. Somethin8 can perhaps be made, ho\>Jever, of a 
58. Statutes of the Realm i 35, c. 37; Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 
134, 219 - 20. 
59. Re£;. Brieves, 40 (no. 21), readinG ·.:ith Cooper (ibid., 15) 
nondum !'or the orit;inal's dum, which makes no sense in the 
context. 
60. Sutherland, Hovel Disseisin, 12 - 13, 32, 135 - 8. 
61. Ch. 53· 
62. Reg. Brieves, 62 (no. 107) gives only a_brief summary of the 
original which I have examined in a photostat copy: Edinburgh 
Univ.ersity Library, Phot. 1141, f. 33. 
: ~! ~<:;~ 
'•l 
. ~-. -1 
. . :. ~: 
;--:>::} 
.. 
~ ·~ ~· :·' 
... l~ 
19 7 
Regiam passage which states that the brieve of dissasine 'touches 
only liberum tenementum•. 63 We have already seen that in later 
medieval Scotland 'liberum tenementum' meant in effect any life 
interest in land, whether or not that interest was heritable, a 
common example from the fourteen century onwards being the liferent 
which fathers often reserved to themselves when erantine the fee of 
h . t h . 64 I t e1r lands o t e1r sons. n Eneland the assize protected 
freeholdinzs - that is any tenancy for life - and it would be 
surprising if the Scottish brieve was not of at least comparable 
scope. Terce, the widow's liferent of part of her husband's estate, 
is specifically referred to in the Ayr manuscript. \'/hen in 1368 
Robert Stewart lord of Menteith complained before the king and 
parliament that his wife was being excluded from her terce of a 
former marriage by Archibald Douglas and it was successfully argued 
that he should have recourse not to parliament but to the common law 
in the justiciar's court, was it the case that the appropriate remedy, 
given that the lady had already been served to her terce, would have 
b b . f d' . ?65 een a r1eve o 1ssas1ne. 
In this context it is of interest to note the statute of 1434 
which introduced the brieve de agueductu into Scottish practice. 66 
The brieve was clearly modelled on that of dissasine. It began by 
narrating the pursuer's grave complaint that he had been disturbed and 
molested unjustly and without a judeMent in his possession of the 
63. Re~iam Majestatem IV, 40. 
64. See above, 147 
-
52· 
65. APS i 505. This case is discussed further b elov1, 298 
- 9· 
66. APS ii 22, c. 2. 
waterway at his mill. The court was instructed to restore him to 
his possession if the complaint was true. 67 Perhaps the reason for 
this legislation was a decision that such a possession was not a 
freehold recoverable by the brieve of dissasine. If so, the position 
may be contrasted with that in England, where the assize seems to have 
.1 bl f d. . f t 68 been ava1 a e or 1vers1ons o wa ercourses. 
What seems to emerge from this is a fuller understanding of what 
was meant by contemporary writers when they spoke of dissasine as a 
possessory remedy. It was not that the pursuer need only be someone 
who had had possession, with or without right thereto. Rather it 
v1as that the pursuer did not have to sho\.,r his heritable title, or fee. 
Medieval jurists battled to fit the realities of their land law into 
the sharp Romanist contrast of ownership and possession: ownership 
meant heritable title, therefore all else must be possession only. 
But even in Scotland with its relatively simple structure of interests 
in land that dichotomy did not fit the facts of legal life. To say 
that a man was not a proprietor did not preclude his having some 
other interest in or claim to the land; many of these he could 
recover, even against the heritable proprietor, by the brieve of 
dissasine. Indeed it may not have been uncommon for, say, a tercer 
to recover a3ainst the person who held the fee. But it is a long 
way from that to say that someone who had gained possession without 
any shadov/ of risht could br.inc the brieve successfully v1hen he Has 
68. 
For a case of 1482 see HMC xliv, 15 (8), 48 (no. 96). So 
similn.r are the brievesOr diss~;.sine and aqueductu that 
Cooper and ~alker mistake the agueductu in St. Andrews 
Formulare i 25l1- for a dissasine. 
Sutherland, Hovel Disseisin, 63, 216 - 7. 
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turned out by the true owner. Professor Sutherland has sho\m us 
that, no matter what Bracton mi~ht have said, in England the mere 
wrongful possessor was not normally protected by the assize against 
disseisin by the true owner; 69 it is probable that the position was 
the same in Scotland. In any case it is clear that dissasine in 
Scotland was far from functioning as a merely 'possessory' remedy. 
As Maitland remarked 'a possessory action is likely to lose some of 
its possessory characteristics if the plaintiff is suffered to rely 
'10 
on ancient facts'. It is clear from the 1318 legislation that 
even before that time the action enabled a challenge to another's 
title to land if its ultimate source lay in a dissasine of the pursuer 
by someone who was still alive and, from 1318, named in the brieve. 
That event need not be and often was not a recent one; again we can 
refer to the 1433 case where the action was broueht seventy years 
after the dissasine. 
Brieves of dissasine, novel or otherwise, were still known in 
mid-fifteenth century Scottish legal practice and, to judee from the 
cases of 1433 and the Ordo Justiciarie, terminology and procedure 
had changed little since its introduction in 1230. But to the best 
of my knowledge there are no subsequent references to this form of 
action and it must be assumed that sometime in the second half of the 
fifteenth century the brieve began to fall out of use. A statute of 
1504 envisages the pursuit of pleadable brieves (note the plural) in 
the justiciar'0 court.7l We know of three pleadable brieves which 
69. Sutherland, Novel Dis-seisin, 97 - 104. 
70. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law ii 52. 
71. APS ii 254, c. 41. 
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were taken before the justiciar: de proteccione regis infricta 
(which, it will be recalled, may have been abolished in 1430 and is 
not mentioned in the Ordo Justiciarie), mortancestor (of which, as 
we shall see, there are cases in the later fifteenth century) and 
dissasine. Thus the 1504 act implies the continued use of the brieve 
of dissasine. But if not already gone it was undoubtedly passing out 
of legal currency. The formulary which contains styles of various 
pleadable brieves in use by the re~ality chancery of the archbishop 
of St. Andrews about 1520 has no form for dissasine, although it does 
include others for right and mortancestor. 
·.C.c.) The brieve of mortancestor 
In many ways the story of the brieve of mortancestor seems to 
parallel that of dissasine closely. There is a reference which 
establishes its existence in Scotland in the mid-thirteenth century. 
In 1253 Emma of Smeaton sued the abbey of Dunfermline by royal letters 
of mortancestor, claimine lands in the fee of Musselburgh which had 
72 been held by her father. The case was settled, but it is clear 
that the basis of Emma's action was, as one would expect with 
mortancestor, a claim to succeed to an immediate ancestor who had 
died vest and saised in lands which were now beine unjustly withheld 
by some unentitled person. This is also the substance of the brieve 
as it a~pears in the registers nnd as it is described in Re5iam and 
' . 73 
:.tUOnl.am. .:~s such the brieve is obviously r.todelled on the i::nt;lish 
writ of mort d'ancestor. Its difference from the brieve of inquest, 
72. Dunfermline Reeistrur.t nos. 82, 83. 
73. Reg. Brieves, 40 (no. 20), 62 (no. 106); Heciam l·iu.jestatem III, 
24 ahd 25; quoniar.1 .-·lttachianentu ch.s. 35 and. 52. 
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as followine contemporary usage we shall call it, 74 is also plain. 
By the brieve of inquest an individual established his title to inherit 
a deceased person's lands. This seems always to have taken place in 
the sheriff court. It was a formal procedure, the result of Hhich 
would be retoured to the kinc's chapel. A precept of sasine would 
then be issued ordering that infeftment of the heir take place. A 
brieve of mortancestor was pleadable and not retourable; the successful 
pursuer was given sasine immediately. The action was directed not 
only at establishing the claim of the heir but also at ejecting an 
intruder who was summoned to defend the action. 
Like dissasine mortancestor proceeded without essonzie althouGh, 
as we have seen, in 1318 it was laid down that the defender should be 
given an opportunity to hear the brieve and to consider the case against 
him. According to Regiam the defender's failure to compear on the 
first day did not entail loss of the case but ~erely adjournment to a 
second day. However Quoniam states that if the defender did not 
answer the summons the case was to be decided at once and on this is 
borne out by a litigation of 1455 where the defenders apparently failed 
to compear to answer brieves of mortancestor, which were at once put 
to the recognition of an assize. 75 The action was heard by an assize 
of the eood and faithful older men of the neiGhbourhood, invariably 
74. 
75· 
See e.g. Reg. Brieves, ~1 (no. 22) ('generalis inguisicio'); 
APS ii 253, c. 40; ADA *135; ADC i 34. It is not true to 
say, as Cooper does,-rReg. Brieves, 14), that the term 
mortancestor 'is of very frequent occurrence in Scottish charter 
records of the thirteenth century' as a description of the brieve 
of inquest or, indeed, at all •. 
See note 73 above; APS i 471, c. 19; also l{e8iam Hajestatem IV, 
49; uoniam Attachiamenta eh. 35; SRO, Society of Antiquaries 
Writs, GD 103 1 7 Appendix G). 
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according to the so-called Assize of David I.76 Unlike dissasine 
the defender in mortancestor might have the action sisted while he 
called a warrantor and there is at least one example of this procedure 
in a case of 1465. 77 The scope of the action was widened in another 
act of 1318 so that an action could be brought by a pursuer tracing 
his right to succeed from grandparents as well as from parents, 
uncles, aunts and siblings. 78 As Lord Cooper noted, this brought 
Scots law into line with the position already achieved in England. 7 9 
There the writ of mort d'ancestor was similarly limited to begin 
with; the person drawing his right from the seisin of grandparents 
and other more remote relatives was first offered protection by the 
writs of aiel, besaiel, tresaiel and cosinage (which last went 
further than even post-1318 Scottish mortancestor actions) about 
1237· This suggests that the Scots' initial adoption of mort 
d'ancestor took place before that date, perhaps at about the same 
time as they borrowed the idea of novel disseisin. 
Fin~lly, this 1318 act, by contrast with that on dissasine, 
is surely in favour of the disinherited returning to Scotland 
after 1314 to reclaim lands after the dislocation of the wars of 
independence already discussed. Before the act those who sought 
76. APS i 325, c. 35· 
77. Regiam Majestatem IV; 19; SRO, Lord Advocate's Department, 
AD 1/60 (Appendix D). 
78. APS i 472, c. 23. 
79. Reg. Brieves, 14 - 15; Pollock and Maitland, History of 
English Law ii 57· . ; 
·., 
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recovery of ancestral lands of which they themselves had never 
been possessed could only have used mortancestor if a member of 
their own or an immediately preceding generation had died vest and 
saised. If the relative had no~ been infeft on death- if, for 
example, he had been put out during the wars - then only the lengthy 
procedures of the brieve of right would have been available to his 
heirs. By permitting claimants to start their mortancestor claims 
a further generation back, there was more chance of reaching the time 
of peace and settled conditions under Alexander III and an ancestor 
who had died in sasine of the lands. 
There are perhaps a couple of examples of a brieve of mortancestor 
pre-dating the case of Emma of Smeaton in 1253. One is the case 
about estovers already mentioned in the discussion of dissasine. 
A brieve of mortancestor, like one of dissasine, was one of 
recognition. 80 What suggests that the brieve of recognition in 
the estovers case might be one of mortancestor is the word used to 
describe the parties raising the action. The word is petentes, 
translated in England as 'demandants' and said to be appropriate 
for mort d'ancestor but not for novel disseisin where instead one 
speaks of the plaintiff or guerens. This follows Bracton's learning 
that novel disseisin is a possessory action whereby one complains 
of an essentially personal wrong while mort d'ancestor is petitory 
and does not necessarily reflect on the conduct of the other party. 
But, as Maitland pointed out, this sits uneasily on the reality of 
the two actions. In Scotland it is even less clear whether the 
language used to describe the p&rties has any significance of this 
80. Regiam Majestatem I, 4; III, 24. 
= 
kind. Although in one case of 1430 we do find the pursuer under 
a brieve of novel dissasine described as 'prosequens•, 81 a word 
with suggestions of wrong and of complaint, in the later medieval 
period, the normal Latin usage was that of actor and ~, without 
t . t. t th f f · 82 It . t any apparen var~a ~on amongs e orms o act~on. ~s no 
impossible however that the estovers case was one of mortancestor. 
There are some early thirteenth century cases where estovers were 
recovered by mort d'ancestor in England, 83 although later this 
function was taken over by quod permittat writs in the nature of 
mort d'ancestor and was not regained under the second Statute of 
Westminster. 84 Another possible case from the middle of the 
thirteenth century is the acti~n which Mariota daughter of Samuel 
raised by royal letters against the bishop of Glasgow concerning 
the lands of Stobo in Peeblesshire. Mariota and her sister's son 
both eventually quit - claimed the bishop of the lands; it is thus 
possible that the basis of her claim was a right of inheritance 
derived from Samuel. Accordingly, as Professor Barrow has suggested, 
this may have been a case of mortancestor. 85 If so- and we cannot 
81. Aberdeen University Library MS 1160/18/9 f. l r. - v. 
(Appendix F); but note that in 1435 the pursuers in a 
case before parliament were described as 'actores et 
prosequentes' (APS ii 23, c. 1). 
82. See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law ii 571 n. 2, 
572 on this terminology. 
83. Novae Narrationes, lxxxiii. 
84. Novae Narrationes, lxxxvi; Roll of the Shropshire Eyre of 1256 
ed. A. Harding (Selden Soc., ~ol. 96) xxx. 
Glasgow Registrum nos. 130, 131 and 172; Barrow1 Kingdom, 115 - 6. For another possibility see below, 224. 
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be sure - then it seems that in its early days mortancestor, like 
dissasine, might be taken in the sheriff court. 
However the Regiam, the Quoniam, the registers86 and surviving 
examples of the use of the brieve from the fourteenth century show 
that later it pertained only to the court of the justiciar. A 
writ in the Bute manuscript directs the sisting of procedure before 
the justiciar in a brieve of mortancestor. 87 In 1321 two justiciars 
were assigned to hear the cause of John de Mora against Sybil de 
Quarentely and John Cissor on a brieve of mortancestor. The doom 
,given stripped the defenders of their lands. 88 A document dated 
10 December 1368 and printed for the first time recently follows 
the style of the brieve of mortancestor in the Ayr manuscript 
almost exactly. It is addressed to three justiciars and commands 
them to hold a recognition of the good and faithful and older men 
of the country to see whether the late William Douglas of Liddesdale, 
uncle of the pursuer, died vest and saised as of fee of lands in 
Peeblesshire. If so, and if the. pursuer, James Douglas of Dalkeith, 
is his lawful and nearest heir, and if Roger Carruthers with his 
wife Isabella is unjustly detaining the lands then the justiciars 
are to put Douglas into the lands so that he holds as his uncle 
did on the day when he was alive and dead. 89 In an interesting 
document of 1390 Murdoch Stewart, justiciar north of Forth, narrates 
how Thomas Hay of Erroll, the constable, presented a brieve of 
86. See note 73 above; also Regiam Majestatem I, 4. 
87. Reg. Brieves, 6~ (no. 96). · 
88. APS i 4?9; RMS i app. 1 no. 74. 
89. RRS vi no. 41?. 
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mortancestor against William Keith the marischal in the full court 
of the justice ayre at Dundee. An assize of the best and worthiest 
of the country finds that Thomas is the lawful and nearest heir of 
his grandfather John Keith in the lands of Innerpeffray in Perthshire 
and that William is unjustly detaining them. Thomas is to have 
the sasine which his grandfather had on the day when he was alive 
and dead. 90 This appears to be a classic case of mortancestor 
and an application of the statutory provisions of 1318. Murdoch 
Stewart heard another such case in 1397 in his capacity as justiciar 
north of Forth, when Alexander Murray of Colbyn and William son of 
John of Badfothal sought to recover the third part of the barony of 
Badfothal by a brieve of mortancestor. They alleged that Michael 
Mercer was unjustly detaining these lands. An assize found that 
Marjorie, the pursuers' grandmother, died saised as of fee of the 
third part of the barony and that as Alexander and William were 
the lawful and nearest heirs they should have sasine and heritable 
. 91 possess~on. It seems clear that when in 1369 James Douglas of 
Dalkeith and William Cresswell agreed to have the controversy 
between them over the lands of Roberton in Lanarkshire settled by 
a brieve of mortancestor, the case would have been heard in the 
justiciar's court. 92 It is also apparent that at the end of the 
fourteenth century that brieve retained a character quite distinct 
from that of the brieve of.inquest. 
We can therefore correct what it is now apparent is an editorial 
i 
! 
90. Spalding Mise. ii 319.· 
91. Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iii 263. 
·._ .. f 
92. Morton Registrum ii no. 107. 
slip in the sixth volume of the Regesta Regum Scottorum. It is 
clearly wrong to index the brieve of 1368 referred to in the 
previous paragraph as a 'brieve of inquest'.93 The same 
observation holds good of a fragment printed in that volume which 
is also indexed as a 'brieve of inquest'. That is addressed to 
the justiciar south of Forth who is commanded to recognosce by 
good and faithful and elder men of the country whether the late 
John Helbek, brother of the bearer of the brieve, Matthew Helbek, 
died vest and saised as of fee in Calderside in Lanarkshire.94 
Nothing else survives of this brieve, but there is more than enough 
to show that it is one of mortancestor properly speaking, and that 
it went on to suggest that someone was unjustly withholding the 
lands from Matthew. 
When we move into the fifteenth century, we find it quite clear 
that the brieves of inquest and of mortancestor continued to be 
distinct entities. In 1437 William Douglas lord of Drumlanrig 
recovered from Janet Murray, widow of the late James Gledstanes, 
certain lands near Hawick in Roxburghshire in which his father had 
died vest and saised as of fee and which Janet now unjustly detained. 
The action was begun by brieve of mortancestor and decided in the 
justiciar's court. In the collection where the record of this case 
is printed there immediately follows an example from 1438 of 
proceedings by brieve of inquest where a person was served heir to 
lands in which his father had died vest and saised as of fee. 
This took place in the sheriff court and there is no mention of any 
93· RRS vi, index (a.v. 'brieves'). It is correctly noted as 
'brieve of mortancestor' later on in the index. 
94. RRS vi no. 503 and index, s.v. 'brieves'. 
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intrusion upon the lands by some unentitled person.95 Whether 
or not the juxtaposition is intentional, it shows clearly the 
survival of the distinction between brieves of mortancestor on 
the one hand and inquest on the other. 
Other fifteenth century evidence shows the brieve of 
mortancestor continuing to wear its badges of identity, namely, 
the existence of an intruder defending the action and the 
jurisdiction of the justiciar. Thus in March 1455 Margaret 
Mundell pursued two brieves of mortancestor against different 
defenders before Laurence lord Abernethy of Rothiemay, justiciar 
south of Forth. Brieves to summon the defenders had been sent to 
the sheriff of Dumfries by the justiciar and executed by the king's 
sergeant. 
favour. 96 
Finally the assize pronounced a verdict in Margaret's 
The Ordo Justiciarie provides a form for the summons 
of the defender on a brieve of mortancestor, 97 and there is an 
actual example of such a writ from 1467. In it William Edmonstone 
of Duntreath, justiciar south of Forth, commands the sheriff and 
baillies of Lanark to cause the parties to a brieve of mortancestor 
of the lord king's chapel to compear before him at the next ayre at 
Lanark for the determination of their case. 98 In January 1465 
William Douglas of Drumlanrig, grandson of the pursuer in- the case of 
95· Fraser, Douglas iii nos. 301, 302. 
96. SRO, Society of Antiquaries Writs, GD 103/1/7 (Appendix G). 
An abbreviated version of this document is printed PSAS 41 (1906) 
313 and discussed in A. Cameron Smith, 'Mundeville of Tinwald 
and Mundell in Tinwald', Dumfries-shire.Transactions 3rd series, 
22 (1938 - 40) 95 - 104. 
97. APS i 706. 
98. Morton Registrum ii no. 223. 
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1437 mentioned in the previous paragraph, sought other lands in 
Hawick by brieve of mortancestor before the justiciars south of 
Forth, this time from Alexander Gledstanes, probably the son of 
the previous defender. Douglas relied on the right of his 
grandfather and succeeded before the assize to which the brieve 
was put. 99 A year later Gilbert lord Kennedy recovered certain 
lands from Robert lord Fleming by brieve of mortancestor pursued 
in the court of the justiciar at Dumbarton. The assize found 
that Gilbert's grandfather had died vest and saised as of fee in 
the lands and that Robert was now unjustly detaining them.100 
Both these examples look identical to the cases of 1390 and 1397 
referred to earlier and show that the rule enacted in 1318 allowing 
mortancestor claims to be based on the titles of grandparents was 
still fully operational. 
It is of some interest therefore to study a case of 1471 in 
which Andrew Bissett came before the auditors of parliament to 
false a doom which had been given in the justice-ayre of Cupar 
upon a 'brief of mortancestry'. The auditors referred the question 
to the next parliament because they could 'nocht now be avisit be 
the lawys that thai find written to declare quhat order and proces 
salbe had in the preceding of the said brief•. 101 On the face of 
it this would suggest that mortancestor was becoming obsolete, but 
such a conclusion is not bo~ne out by parliament's subsequent actions. 
A statute was passed, the order and form of which were 'to be observit 
and kepit in al pointis in the preceding of the brief of mortancestrie 
99. SRO, Lord Advocate's Department, AD 1/60 (Appendix D). 
100. SRO, Ailsa Muniments, GD 25/l/102 (Appendix H). 
1 0 1. ADA , 12. 
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purchest be Andro Bissate agane the lord of Ardros and now dependand 
in the justice are of Couper', as well as in the pursuit of pleadable 
brieves generally. The doubt of the auditors seems therefore to 
have concerned a general point, rather than being the result of a 
revival of an outmoded form of action. This is confirmed by the 
tenor of the statute itself, which deals with the formalities of 
pleading and falsing the doom and which has been discussed in the 
102 previous chapter. The doubtful question related to procedure 
and pleading, not to the nature of the brieve of mortancestor. 
Bisset's action seems to have progressed slowly to its conclusion. 
In 1478 he again falsed the doom before the auditors, who declared 
that the decision of the justice-court 'upoun the breve of 
morthancestre ••• was evil gevin and wele agane sayd ••• for diverse 
d . I 103 an mony reson~s • There is no sign in the records of this case 
that the brieve of mortancestor was even beginning to lose its 
identity, although we can perhaps see reasons why potential litigants 
might wish to use other, speedier remedies. 
We are now in a position to re-examine a statute of 1430 first 
printed by Professor Dickinson, which states that 'fra hyne furth 
thar sal na bref of mortansister pass fra the kyngis chapel bot in 
maner and furm as his ordanit in Robert the Browsys statutis, that 
is to say, of lineale successioune and nocht of taylze•. 104 Professor 
Dickinson's analysis of the statute proceeded to some extent on the 
102. APS ii 101; and see above 157 8. 
103. ADA, 66. 
104. w.c. Dickinson, 'The acts of the parliament at Perth 6 March 
1429/30', SHR 29-(1950) 1- 12 at 5-9. 
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basis that by this time the brieve of mortancestor was identical in 
effect to the brieve of inquest. However it is now plain that the 
statute is referring to the pleadable brieve which enabled heirs to 
recover from intruders the lands of which their ancestors had had 
heritable sasine. It would seem that the policy behind the statute 
is to restrict the scope of the brieve rather than being, as Professor 
Dickinson thought, some sort of attempt to undermine tailzies and indeed 
this is a much more intelligible explanation of it than the one he offers. 
The statute offers interesting support to the thesis tentatively 
advanced by a number of writers that in medieval Scotland the tailzied 
fee was not distinguished from the fee in which inheritance was 
unrestricted and determined by the rules of the common law.105 Regiam 
states that mortancestor 'touches' fee and freehold and that in this it 
'exceeds' novel dissasine which touches only freehold. 106 What this 
means is that in mortancestor the pursuer's claim was necessarily to a 
fee or heritable title, based as it was on the claim to inherit from a 
deceased ancestor, whereas, as we have seen, in dissasine the title 
claimed by the pursuer did not need to be a heritable one. The 
suggestion that prior to 1430 one whose claim to succeed arose not 
through the ordinary rules of primogeniture but through the provisions 
of a tailzie could enforce his right against intruders by the brieve 
of mortancestor is borne out by the action which James Douglas of 
Dalkeith brought against Roger and Isabel Carruthers in 1368.107 
105. See e.g. Dickinson, 'The acts of the parliament', 6, 8; C.D'O. 
Farran, Principles of Scots and English Land Law (Edinburgh, 
1958) 98 - 102, 158- 163; A;W.B. Simpson, 'Entails and perpetuities', 
JR 24 (1979) 1 - 20 at 19; R. Burgess, Perpetuities in Scots Law 
<Stair Soc., vol. 31) 66 73. 
106. Regiam Majestatem IV, 40 and see above, 147 -52 and 197· 
107. RRS vi no. 417. 
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Douglas, it will be recalled, sued in right of his uncle, William 
Douglas of Liddesdale. Now when William died in 1353 he left a 
daughter Mary who inherited his lands. But in 1351 William had 
granted the lands which were to be contested in 1368 to James, with 
the proviso that James would take only if William died without male 
issue. There were several other provisions to ensure the succession 
108 
of heirs - male. Mary Douglas died in childbirth in 1367, which 
actually left James as the heir of line, entitled to all the heritage 
that had belonged to William.109 But he did not make his 1368 claim 
as Mary's heir, but directly as William's. James' action was thus 
based on the tailzie of 1351. Indeed it seems likely to have been 
the outcome of a conflict over the lands between James and Mary. 
If Mary had claimed the lands as heir-general and put in the 
Carrutherses as her vassals, then if James were her heir he would 
be bound to warrant their title. If however Mary had no right 
over the lands through the 1351 entail, then James could get rid 
of her feoffees as intruders. Regrettably we can only speculate 
as to whether facts like those suggested lie behind our records of 
this case; but it can be said that James' action appears to be based 
on his right as heir of tailzie to William rather than on the other 
right available to him as heir of line to Mary. An action of 
mortancestor, moreover, implies that James had never had sasine of 
the lands he claimed. 
108. Morton Registrum ii no. 70. 
109. Scots Peerage vi 341 - 3· See also W.D.H. Sellar, 
'Courtesy, battle and the brieve of right', Miscellany II 
(Stair Soc., vol. 35) 1- 12, Fraser, Douglas i 253- 4 
and Neilson, Trial by Combat, 216 - 7. 
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In England by this time the heir of entail was confined to 
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his remedies by the writs of formedon under the famous statute of 
1285, De Donis Conditionalibus,110 although it is worth noting that 
prior to its enactment, mort d'ancestor was competent where the 
issue in tail were heirs general and their ancestors had died 
. d 111 sel.se • In Scotland, tailzies were generally in favour of the 
male line of heirs and failure of that line was comparatively rare. 
This, coupled with the much greater control of alienation exercised 
by Scottish superiors by contrast with their English counterparts, 
probably accounts for the lack of difficulty experienced with 
tailzies in Scotland and certainly explains why mortancestor continued 
to be a most appropriate form of action for the heir of tailzie 
seeking entry against an intruder. Even after 1430 where the 
persons of the heir general and the heir of tailzie merged in one 
man, then mortancestor could be used without infringing the statute. 
Thus in 1466 Gilbert lord Kennedy brought the brieve against Robert 
lord Fleming not only as heir general but also as heir under a 
tailzie of 1385.112 
It was De Donis which was primarily responsible for the 
development of the concept of the fee tail in England and the 
consequent elaboration of the doctrine of estates in land. It is 
most unlikely that the Scottish act of 1430 had or was intended to 
110. Statutes of the Realm i 71 - 2, c. 1; Simpson, Introduction 
to the History of the Land Law, 78. 
111. S.F.C. Milsom, 'Formedon before De Donis', Law Quarterly Review 
72 (1956) 391 --7, esp.· at 394; Pollock.and Maitland, History 
of English Law ii .28 - 9. 
112. SRO, Ailsa Muniments, GD 25/l/20 and see D. Cowan, Historical 
Account of the Noble Family of Kennedy (Edinburgh, 1849) 
12· - 23 and Scots Peerage ii 44 - 54 for the Kennedy descent. 
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have a similar effect. No new remedy was offered to the heir of 
tailzie unable to gain entry against an intruder or to use mortancestor 
as heir general. This seems to leave the brieve of right as the 
only available remedy, but if so, that would not have led a lawyer 
to suppose that the tailzied fee was different in kind from a fee 
the succession to which was open to heirs general. As we shall 
see, the brieve of right also protected heirs with such a claim. 
Our lawyer would merely have seen the interposition of a longer 
procedure between the heir of tailzie and the realisation of his 
right. 
In conclusion there can be little doubt that the brieve of 
mortancestor remained in use as a distinct form of action until the 
end of the fifteenth century. The sources give no direct information 
on its operation after 1478, but as already mentioned the act of 
1504 on falsing dooms does suggest that some pleadable brieves were 
still being addressed to the justiciar's court at the beginning of 
the sixteenth century.ll3 The appearance of a style for the brieve 
of mortancestor in the st. Andrews formulary, identical with those 
in the Ayr and Bute manuscripts and in Quoniam, underlines the 
114 point that the argument from relative silence can cut both ways. 
In the latter part of the sixteenth century, however, neither Balfour 
or Skene was aware of any difference between the brieve of mortancestor 
and the brieve of inquest and plainly by their time the true nature 
and effect of the former had been forgotten. 115 
113. APS ii 254, c. 41. See above, 199 - 200. 
114. St. Andrews Formulare i 253. 
115. Balfour, Practicks ii 420 - 33; Skene, De Verborum Significatione, 
a.v. 'Breve de morte antecessoris'. 
( t1 ) The brieve of right 
The early history of the brieve of right has been discussed 
in the previous chapter in which it was argued that there were two 
forms in the thirteenth century closely comparable to the writs 
de recto and praecipe in capite in use at the same period in England 
in that one was available only to those holding of the king and the 
other only to those holding of subject superiors in whose courts 
116 the action would be begun. But by the fourteenth century, when 
for the first time styles for the Scottish breve de recto become 
available to us, a fusion of the two forms appears to have taken 
place. These styles and the treatises, Regiam and Quoniam, are 
all agreed that the brieve of right was addressed to the sheriff or 
to the provosts and bailies of the burgh court, that is, to royal 
rather than to franchise courts.117 The brieve itself was a command 
to the addressee to let someone have full right of lands which he 
claimed to hold heritably of the king but, as already noted, Regiam 
states that it was also available to one claiming to hold 'of some 
118 
other lord'. The phraseology of the styles is however an 
indication of the earlier history of two separate brieves. 
There are other similar hints elsewhere in the fourteenth century 
material. Both Regiam and Quoniam stress the minutiae of procedure 
and pleading on the brieve of right. The law appears to have been 
in no hurry to cause the defender to compear; he might be cited to 
116. See above, 128 - 38. 
117. Reg. Brieves 39- (no. 18), 40 (no. 19), 61 (no. 91) 
RegiBJD Majestatem I, 4;_ Quoniam Attachiamenta eh. 57· 
118. Regiam Majestatem I, 9. 
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appear up to four times before his absence would cost him possession 
and he could tender three successive lawful essonzies for each non-
119 
appearance. This is the procedural world of Glanvill and the 
twelfth century and one which contrasts sharply with that of the 
actions of dissasine and mortancestor. Had the brieve of right 
we know from the fourteenth century forms been the original style, 
some procedural differences from the English writs might reasonably 
have been expected. As it is, the evidence suggests that the 
fourteenth century brieve was the result of a rationalisation in 
the king's chapel of the de facto position, that actions on brieves 
of right ended up in the royal courts even when begun elsewhere, 
and that this did not affect the ancient procedural rules for 
these types of case. 
One striking contrast between Glanvill's treatment of the 
writs of right and that to be found in Regiam, however, is that 
according to the latter the issue contained in a brieve of right 
was always put to an assize. There is nothing to suggest that 
Glanvill's account of trial by combat on the writ of right was 
1 b th "1 f R . 120 regarded as re evant y e comp~ er o eg~am. The pursuer's 
statement of claim would ask for an assize if the defender denied 
his claim and, if the defender had no relevant exception to plead, 
the question would then be put to 'twelve lawful men of the 
· hb h d f th cour~. 121 It h tl b · 1 ne~g our oo or o e ~ as recen y een persuas~ve y 
119. Regiam Majestatem I, 5 - 10; Quoniam Attachiamenta, eh. 40. 
120. See Neilson, Trial by Combat, 106 ·- 8 for discussion; also 
Cooper, Regiam, 35 - 8~ 
.. 
121. Regiam Majestatem I, 9 and 11. 
-~= 
/ 
217 
argued that combat remained competent on the brieve of right in the 
122 fourteenth century but it must be accepted that at best this was 
the exception rather than the rule since all cases which are known 
to have proceeded upon such a brieve were taken before an assize. 
But if the argument is correct it reinforces the view that the 
brieve of right's history goes much further back than the earliest 
references to it in the 1290s. 123 Whether or not the 'duels of 
land' for which George Neilson offered evidence took place on brieves 
of right, 124 change and development over a long period seem to underlie 
what may be termed the mature forms of the fourteenth century. 
However this process of change and development seems to have 
been completed by then. There are only minor statutory adjustments 
to procedure, which are contained in the 1318 legislation and have 
b t h d . th . d. . f d. . 125 een ouc e upon ~n e prev~ous ~scuss~on o ~ssas~ne. In 
1456 departures from the procedural rules for brieves of right led 
to the nullification of the entire proceedings in a particular case. 
Reference was made to the books of the law, presumably texts such as 
Regiam and Quoniam, for authoritative guidance on the law, suggesting 
little change from the position at the beginning of the previous 
126 
century. In 1505 the sheriff-depute of Lanark was sued for 
wrongous and inordinate proceeding upon a brieve of right, having 
failed to allow a debate upon an exception proposed by the defenders 
122. Sellar, 'Courtesy, battle and the brieve of right', 6- 8. 
123. Stevenson, Documents i 384 - 6; Stones and Simpson, Edward I 
ii 342 - 3· 
124. Neilson, Tr{al by Combat, 86 - 90. 
125. APS i 47~, c. 19; and see above, 194 - 5· 
126. Aberdeen-Banff Ill. iii 8. 
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and put the brieve to the determination of an assize.127 This 
looks very much like a point drawn from the Regiam passage mentioned 
in the last paragraph about putting the case to the assize if the 
defender had no relevant exception to make. The burgh court of 
Haddington in 1425 referred a brieve of right to an assize of 
seventeen men, who took 'the grete ath at thai suld without fraude 
or favor of ony part determane lely qwilk of the said parties has 
ful rycht in the sayde tenements', the language of the record here 
presumably echoing the plenum rectum of the brieve.128 In this 
Haddington case, although the assize was 'lang tyme avisit', the 
decision seems to have been reached within a day; but to judge 
from other surviving records, such celerity was unusual. Thus 
for example in 1317 the defender in a case begun by brieve of 
right persistently failed to compear, exploiting to the full her 
right to give essonzies for non-appearance. At the point where 
the record breaks off the court had given her fourteen days, not 
to compear, but to arrange a settlement with the pursuers; it 
was only if this failed that the brieve would be put to an assize 
129 
of twelve. Even after the defender had finally been brought 
into court much time might elapse before a final decision was given. 
A case in the Aberdeen sheriff court which began in February 1457 
1 d d ft f t d . A . 1 130 was only cone u e , a er our separa e court ays, 1n pr1 • 
127. SRO, Acta Dominorum Concilii, CS 5/16, ff. 144 v. - 145 r. 
(Appendix C). . 
128. PSAS 2 (1"856 - 7) 386. 
129. Aberdeen Burgh Recs., 7- 8, 9,· 10, 12, 14- 15. 
130. Aberdeen - Banff Co~l. 281, 284; ~ xii 25, no. 46; 
Aberdeen - Banff Ill·. iii 318 - · 27. · · :l 
.. ·] 
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:.:: .. •) 
l 
L 
211 
The evidence of the records thus supports the conclusion to be 
drawn from Regiam and Quoniam that Scots law shared the English 
reluctance to come to a final decision on the question of right. 
Another point upon which practice remained constant in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was that of jurisdiction. The 
brieve of right appears to have been competent only in the sheriff 
and burgh courts, again showing the accuracy of the formularies and 
treatises. The earliest case on a brieve of right for which record 
survives was in Berwick burgh court about 1290, when Master Roger 
Bartholomew recovered his sasine of certain lands by an assize.131 
The 1317 case mentioned in the previous paragraph was heard in 
Aberdeen burgh court where al~o in 1405 a pursuer named John led a 
brieve of right which instructed the bailies to cause him to have 
full right of a tenement in the burgh.132 Professor W.C. Dickinson 
printed three manuscript references to brieves of right brought in 
various burgh courts between 1425 and 1449.133 The first record 
of a brieve of right in the sheriff court is found as late as 1456, 
although it can only be due to the ravages of time that there is 
nothing earlier. The case is one in which Reginald Cheyne sued 
Henry Cheyne for the lands of Esslemont and Meikle Arnage before 
the sheriff depute of Aberdeenshire.134 In 1457 the same sheriff 
court was confronted with another brieve of right,l35 while in 1471 
131. Stevenson, Documents i 384 - 6. 
132. Aberdeen Burgh Recs., 214. 
133. Aberdeen Burgh Recs., cxxv, n. 3, and cxxxv, n. 3. 
these is printed in full in PSAS 2 (1856 - 7) 386. 
134. Aberdeen Banff Ill.-iii 8. 
135- Ab er de en - Banff Coll. , 281. . . · 
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the auditors of causes and complaints heard how Robert Spens had 
led 'the process of the breif of richt ••• tuiching the landis of 
Kittidy' against James Nory and his son in the sheriff court of 
F .f 136 ~ e. 
That this remained the jurisdictional position at the beginning 
of the sixteenth century is confirmed by the 1504 statute on falsing 
the doom which mentions that 'the breve of rycht' was pursued before 
'the schireff, stewart or balze'.l37 The 'balze' was presumably 
the bailie of the burgh court, to whom the brieve of right in burgh 
was addressed; 'stewarts' were royal officers with a jurisdiction 
equivalent to that of the sheriff in certain parts of the country 
such as Kirkcudbrightshire in_ the south west. 
The jurisdiction of the burgh court to hear actions of right 
is of particular interest, as there is no evidence to show that 
brieves of dissasine or mortancestor were ever competent there. 
A comparison with the customs of some of the major boroughs elsewhere 
in those parts of the British isles under English control is 
suggestive, for in their courts the writ of right, but not the 
petty assizes of novel disseisin and mort d'ancestor, seems to have 
been available.138 Glanvill wrote that 'for reasons of convenience' 
it had been ordained that burgage tenures could not be recovered by 
mort d'ancestor.139 Bracton explained that mort d'ancestor was 
136. ADA, 16. 
137· APS ii 254, c. 41. 
138. See Borough Customs i 251 66 and ii, cxix ~ cxxiv; A. 
_ Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval England (London, 1973) 42. 
139. Glanvill XIII, 11. See also the editor's note on this passage. 
..;····.·_._,_··:··_·.-.! 
.- ... ···r. 
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excluded where local custom permitted the purchase of borough lands; 
land which had been bought could be bequeathed by will and so the 
heir by the common law rules of primogeniture might be legally kept 
out. But if lands had descended hereditarily, then a disappointed 
h . ld th . 140 e1r cou use e ass1ze. Instead of novel disseisin the 
English burgess used the assize of fresh force, while the writs of 
entry appear not to have been used at all. Thus the only one of 
the English real actions which was always competent in borough 
courts was that on the writ of right. Its use was flexible: it 
might for example be brought where in the ordinary courts of the 
common law mort d'ancestor or formedon in the descender would have 
th . t •t 141 been e appropr1a e wr1 • 
This is a much simplified picture of the position in the English 
boroughs and it should be stressed that custom varied from borough 
to borough and from time to time. The purpose of these generalisations 
is merely to give a background against which the lack of evidence for 
dissasine and mortancestor in the Scottish burgh courts may be 
considered. We know that in burgh as outwith no man could be 
ejected from his holding without the king's brieve; 142 the Leges 
Burgorum also tell us that a burgess might dispose of his 'conquest', 
that is, land he had purchased rather than inherited, as he wished 
during his life, but that he might not alienate it from his heir on 
his death-bed.143 There is no evidence that he could bequeath any 
140. Bracton f. 271 (iii 295); Borough Customs i 243 - 4. 
141. Borough Customs i 231- 42 (fresh force), 255 (right for 
mort d'ancestor); .ii, cxxiv (right for formedon in the 
descender). 
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of his lands, conquest or not. In another part of the burgh laws 
it is declared that he who had been ejected from his possession without 
proper authority or judgment should be restored before any other claim 
144 
to the lands was heard. This hints strongly at a possessory 
action in the nature of dissasine in the burgh courts without 
actually naming it as such. A fragment found in many of the later 
legal manuscripts said in gremio to be a statute of Robert I lays down 
a procedure 'super deforciatione recenti in burgo', whereby he who 
complained of ejection was to have his case heard immediately upon 
the debatable ground by an assize, to determine not just the possessory 
question of ejection and restoration but that of ownership, 'so that 
he against whom it is decided shall never be heard thereupon 
afterwards•.145 Whether or not this truly is legislation of Robert I, 
two cases of 'recens deforciamentum' were heard before assizes in 
Aberdeen burgh court in 1399.146 There is no trace in the printed 
records of that court of brieves of dissasine or mortancestor. 
Both deforcement cases proceeded upon the pursuer's complaint and 
giving of caution rather than upon royal brieve, so that this action 
seems to have been an exception to the general requirements of 
litigation to recover land. Perhaps the critical point about the 
assize was that the deforcement had to be recent, so that when that 
was not the case action by pleadable brieve under the normal rule 
became necessary. 
144. Ancient Burgh Laws, 48 (c. 99); also 168. 
145. APSi 721, c. 12 (see also APS i 722, c. 13); Ancient Burgh 
Laws, 165 - 7-
146. Aberdeen Burgh Recs., 65, 117. 
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This material does not suggest that the Bractonian explanation 
for the exclusion of·mort d'ancestor in boroughs helps us to understand 
what the position was in Scotland, although Regiam does repeat 
Glanvill's remark that it had been enacted for reasons of utility 
that burgage could not be recovered by mortancestor.147 It is not 
however inconsistent with the suggestion that burgages could only 
be recovered by brieve of right or, where appropriate, the action 
of recens deforciamentum. Perhaps the best evidence to support 
this theory is to be found in the fact that the brieve of right in 
burgh was given a place in the formularies separate from the brieve 
of right addressed to the sheriff.148 Moreover, looking at the 
words of the brieve, it could have been used to remedy situations 
where outwith burgh brieves of dissasine or mortancestor would have 
provided the answer. The brieve stated that the pursuer claimed 
to hold lands heritably of the king and to have been deforced of 
them by the defender. Such words were perfectly applicable to a 
dissasine or to a claim for recovery of the lands of an ancestor 
by heritable right, even though it is not possible to say whether 
in fact the brieve was used in this way. But it is at least a 
plausible hypothesis that the scope and function of the brieve of 
right in burgh was wider than its equivalent in the sheriff court 
because the burgess could not use either dissasine or mortancestor. 
The accumulation of information about jurisdiction also enables 
us to suggest that certain cases involving brieves may well have been 
147. Regiam Majestatem III, 25. 
148. Reg. Brieves, 40 (no. 19). Note also that some versions of 
Quoniam refer to the breve de recto in burgo rather than the 
breve de recto. 
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ones touching 'full right' rather than dissasine or mortancestor. 
The mid-thirteenth century case in the sheriff court at Traquair 
whereby Mariota claimed an apparently heritable right to the lands 
of Stobo 'per litteras regias' against the bishop of Glasgow is the 
earliest example of this, but given the possibility already discussed 
that mortancestor may also have been competent to the sheriff at 
this time, the fact that the case was heard in his court is 
. 1 . 149 J.nconc usJ.ve. A case before the sheriff of Inverness in 1454 
is more likely to have been begun by brieve of right. The pursuer 
established his rights to certain lands against a defender whom 
he had 'lachfullie followyt be brevis of law of our soveran lordis 
150 the kingis chapell'. At th_is date the only pleadable brieve by 
which land could have been recovered before the sheriff was the 
brieve of right, so it seems that this must have been such a case. 
Another interesting case is recorded in a document of 1354 which 
narrates the history of the lands of Esperston, Midlothian. Probably 
in the reign of Robert I a man named William Cook used 'litteras 
regis in forma capelle' to recover the lands, from which his mother 
had been forcibly expelled perhaps thirty years previously. The case 
was heard before the sheriff of Edinburgh with a jury and it was 
found that William was the son and nearest heir of his mother and 
that she had been vest and saised of Esperston for many years before 
her expulsion. The document describes the brieve as being super iure 
rather than de recto and makes no mention of any defender (although the 
149. Glasgow Registrum nos. 130, 131; 
and above, 204. 
150. Family.of Rose, 46. 
see·Barrow, Kingdom, 115- 6 
·.,v: 
.~:~~~·: 
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estates may have been in the possession of the knights of the 
Hospital, successors in title to the Templars who had ejected 
William's mother). 151 It is therefore possible that the brieve 
was merely one of inquest; but if the Hospitallers were in possession 
then it is certain that William's remedy would have been a brieve of 
right. He himself had not been dis-saised so a brieve of dissasine 
was of no use. The basis of his claim was heritable right. The 
ancestor from whom he derived that right was within the degrees of 
relationship which permitted action upon the brieve of mortancestor, 
but she unfortunately had not been in possession at the date of her 
death. Accordingly only the brieve of right would have enabled 
William to regain the lands. ~he case neatly illustrates the way in 
which, outside the burghs at least, the choice of remedy was dictated 
by the facts and circumstances of one's claim and how the scope of 
each brieve could be determined by the others available. 
Most of the other cases of which the details can be worked out 
also concerned parties who were closely related. Thus the lands 
claimed by brieve of right in Aberdeen burgh court in 1317 had belonged 
to a certain Brice Craigie. The defender was his daughter E~ma, 
• 1 d I ( • f • • t ) 152 described as 'anorphan and g1r un er age 1.e., o maJOr1 y ; 
the pursuers were Emma's sister Marjorie and her husband John son of 
Laurence. Almost certainly the Reginald and Henry Cheyne who were 
respectively pursuer and defender under a brieve of right in 1456 were 
151. 
152. 
See G.w.s. Barrow, 'The aftermath of war', TRHS 5th ser., 28 
(1978) at 112 - 14, discussing a document~print~d by J~ Edwards, 
SHR 5 (1908) 13 ·- 25 where the especially relevant passages 
ar~ at 24 -.5• . Edwards' own editorial comments on the case 
may be disregarded. On the succession of the Hospitallers 
to the.Templars' lands in Scotland from· 1314 see The Knights of 
St. John of Jerusalem in Scotland, xxx - xxxiv (where the 
Esperaton case is referred to). 
Aberdeen Burgh Recs., 14. 
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153 brothers. The lands in dispute, Esslem9nt and Meikle Arnage, 
both near Ellon, Aberdeenshire, had been granted to Henry by his 
father John Cheyne lord of Straloch in April 1441. In a document 
recording the grant John stated that 'giff it hapenis of case me 
or any of myn ayris to make any clame or move any question or again 
calling of this infeftment, I oblyse me and myn ayris' to pay five 
154 hundred pounds to Henry. Thus it seems that Henry was not his 
heir. In 1450 Henry entered a suitor for the lands at Aberdeen 
sheriff court despite a protest 'for the son and heir of Reginald 
Cheyne•.155 A Reginald Cheyne is designed of Straloch in July 1475, 
and it was probably his son and heir, John Cheyne of Straloch, who 
sued the still-surviving Henry before council in 1493 in another 
'6 dispute about Meikle Arnage.15 These fragments suggest that the 
Reginald who sued in 1456 was the heir of Straloch, being most 
probably Henry's elder brother. The defender to the brieve of 
right raised by James Skene in 1457 was the n1ccc of his cousin 
William Keith the first earl marischal. Finally the defenders to 
the brieve of right raised by Robert Spens in Fife sheriff court 
in 1471, James and Robert Nory, were respectively the husband and 
h . . Ch . t· S 157 son of ~s n~ece r~s ~an pens. 
The closeness of these relationships shows that under a brieve 
of right parties were not necessarily examining competing titles from 
their origins at some remote date in the past; indeed, as we shall see, 
153· See Cheyne, Chelne Famil;l, 52 - 6. 
154. Aberdeen Banff Ill. iii 6·- 7· 
155· Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iii-_ 7 _.=.:8~. 
156. Aberdeen Banff Ill. i1i l:l; ADC i ~81. 
157. W.D.H. Sellar, 'Spens family heraldry', Notes and ueries 
Societl of West Highland and Island Historical Research 22 
21 - 27 at 26. 
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the pursuers in the cases mentioned in the previous paragraph 
probably went no further back than the titles of their fathers. 
This is obvious in the case of the Craigie sisters where the 
question seems to have been which of them was entitled to inherit 
from father Brice. Was the brieve of right used because the brieve 
of mortancestor was not available in burgh? In 1456 the origin 
of the title in dispute between Reginald and Henry Cheyne was the 
grant of Henry's father in 1441. The grant could only have been 
challenged by brieve of right. Reginald could not have used 
mortancestor because his ancestor had not died vest and saised of 
the lands in'question. The case of Spens and Nory is less clear, 
but it has been suggested that the pursuer was a younger son whose 
eldest brother had predeceased and who may have claimed the lands 
in issue, Kittedie in Fife, under a settlement in favour of heirs-
male. His brother had left two daughters who as heirs-general 
also laid claim to Kittedie with the support of their husbands. 158 
Spens' action by brieve of right was part of this contest. It 
seems to follow that he had not had possession of the lands previously 
since then his action would have been one of dissasine, and that, 
if he was a younger son he could not use the brieve of mortancestor, 
since he was not the nearest lawful heir. Finally, if indeed Spens 
derived his claim from a tailzie in favour of heirs-male, then his 
use of the brieve of right rather than mortancestor would also have 
been made necessary by the act of 1430 laying down that the latter 
action protected only heirs of line and not those whose claim depended 
t . h .1 . 159 en 1rely upon sue ta1 z1es. 
158. Sellar, 'Spens family heraldry', 26- ?· 
159. Dickinson, 'The acts of the parliament', 5; above, 210 - 214. 
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Even where, as in the case of Skene and Keith, the parties 
were not so closely related, the pursuer went no further back than 
his father to establish his hereditary right. Sometime before the 
battle of Harlaw in 1411 it would seem that Adam Skene borrowed money 
from his father-in-law, William Keith the marischal, on the security 
of his lands of Easter Skene. Adam was killed at Harlaw and was 
succeeded by his son James, who was to be the pursuer of 1457· 
Easter Skene had still not been redeemed by the Skenes in 1446, 
by which time the deeds recording the impignoration had been lost. 
Accordingly it was necessary for the Skenes to obtain the depositions 
of elderly witnesses who could recall the transaction and the 
subsequent acknowledgements of its nature by the Keiths. Ten years 
later the Skene claim had still not been satisfied, for yet another 
witness's deposition had to be obtained. This was presumably a 
prelude to James Skene's action by brieve of right in the early 
months of 1457· The defender then, Janet Keith, had come to the 
lands by virtue of a grant from her u~~le William, who himself 
would have inherited them through his father and grandfather (to 
160 the latter of whom the lands had originally been granted). 
Again therefore the pursuer's claim was derived from his father, 
but because the father had not died vest and saised of the lands 
in question it was necessary to sue by brieve of right rather than 
by mortancestor. 
160. See Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iii 318 - 23. The story is told 
in W.F. Skene, Family of Skene, 15 - 22. 
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What then was the nature of the 'right' claimed by a pursuer 
under the brieve? In this chapter reference has already been made 
to the Regiam passage which states that as mortancestor touches fee 
and freehold it exceeds dissasine, which touches only freehold. 
It goes on to say that the brieve of right exceeds both these forms 
of action 'because it touches fee and freehold and just right' and 
that 'this is why one can recover lost land (terram amissam) by 
brieve of right and not by brieve of mortancestor or of novel 
d . . 161 ~ssas~ne. The direct inspiration of thirteenth century English 
theories about the relationship of the real actions lies behind 
this passage. The writ of right represented the pinnacle of the 
various remedies open to a di~possessed landholder. He who was put 
out by another had novel disseisin; he who was prevented from taking 
up the holding of certain close relatives had mort d'ancestor. But 
the intruder ejected by virtue of one of these writs was not thereby 
excluded for ever from the lands, for the actions were merely 
possessory in nature. He could re-open the question by a writ of 
right, a proprietary as opposed to a possessory action which alone 
could settle the question of ownership permanently. Thus one could 
distinguish various types of interest in land, each protected by a 
different form of action. There was the status of possessor, 
guarded by novel disseisin; the entitlement to inherit from one's 
close relatives in possessi.on, enforced by mort d 'ancestor; and 
ultimately ownership, protected by the writ which went 'highest in 
the right•. 162 It is this pyramidic structure into which Regiam 
161. Regiam Majestatem IV, 40. 
162. S~e Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law ii 74 - 5. 
·, ,, 
strives to fit the Scottish real actions. 
The relationship of this juristic structure, the division of 
actions into categories of possessory and proprietary, to real life 
h b e hall ed by m d E 1 . h 1 1 h" t . 163 Al d as e n c eng o ern ng 1s ega 1s or1ans. rea y 
in this chapter it has been argued that the brieves of dissasine and 
mortancestor cannot be characterised as possessory in any simple or 
straightforward way, certainly not in particular to contrast them 
with proprietary actions. It seems unlikely that a party losing 
an action begun by one or other of them could have reversed the 
result by raising a new action with a brieve of right. The main 
distinction between dissasine and mortancestor in practice seems 
indeed, as Regiam itself suggests, to have been the kind of interest 
in land which was the minimum that a pursuer had to show: in the 
case of dissasine, sasine of a freehold, in mortancestor, a right 
to inherit from one of a· narrowly defined group of relatives. The 
brieve of right seems to have been used in cases where for some 
reason these two actions were not available, rather than because 
the parties were anxious for a final determination of where 
ownership lay; it was not a more proprietary action than mortancestor 
and it could be used to recover what one had formerly held so long 
as that holding had been based on a heritable rather than a mere 
freehold title. 
Chapter nineteen of the 1318 legislation treats the brieves of 
dissasine, mortancestor and right together in laying down that the 
defender was to be afforded a full statement of the case against him; 164 
163. By e.g. Milsom, Historical Foundations~ 122 - 4. 
164. APS i 471, c. 19. 
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surely this is because practical men of the time looked at them in 
this way, as means of vindicating claims to land from which a 
prospective pursuer made his choice according to the facts from 
which his grievance sprang. If in 1433 the brieve of dissasine 
ld e h ba k ; to h. t t t• t · 1 l65 cou r ac c .n ~s ory o a ~me seven y years prev~ous y, 
then it explored the origins of a current title further back than 
was done in any of the cases on the brieve of right of which we 
know. Even before 1318 and the reforms that year relating to the 
brieve of dissasine it must have seemed very similar to the brieve 
of right in its operation, for prior to that time, as we have seen, 
even if the current tenant had not been the original dissaisor he 
might still be the sole defender named in the brieve. In that state 
of affairs all that can have differentiated actions of dissasine and 
right was that the former had to be brought during the lifetime of 
the original dissaisor and some procedural rules. 
In the last section of this chapter we shall examine another 
aspect of this question, the original function of the brieves and 
the continuing significance of those functions in the period of their 
maturity. The final point to be made here is to affirm Sheriff 
McKechnie's conclusion that the brieve of right remained a familiar 
form of action for the recovery of lands into the sixteenth century -
so familiar that it could be made the subject of allusion in contemporary 
poetry. Dunbar's "Fasternis Evin in Hell" contains the following 
1 . 166 ~nes: 
165. As. in Coupar Angus Chrs. ii no. 128. 
166. The Poems of William Dunbar ed. J. Kinsley (Oxford, 1979) 153, 
lines 103 - 108. The poem was probably written in 1507: see 
335 - 6. 
Na menstrallis playit to thame but dowt, 
For glemen thair wer haldin owt 
Be day and eik by nicht -
Except a menstrall that slew a man; 
Swa till his heretage he wan 
And entirt be breif of richt. 
232. 
That the reference to the brieve of right in the 1504 act on falsing 
167 the doom touched current practice is confirmed by the mention made 
in the acts of council for February 1503 of the brieve of right brought 
against the late 'William Baillie of Lamington by his namesake of Bagby 
to recover the lands of Hoprig and Panestone168 as well as by the case 
of 1505 before the sheriff depute of Lanark discussed earlier.169 
There is a style for the brieve of right in the St. Andrews formulary 
identical to those in the fourteenth century registers of brieves170 
and examples of its use within the city and regality of St. Andrews 
. 171 
may also be found in occasional references in the acts of council. 
Although there are no cases involving ~rieves of right in the earliest 
surviving sheriff court books, those for Fife from 1515 to 1522, this 
need not mean that the brieve had suddenly gone out of use. As late 
as 1541 land was being recovered by royal brieves before the sheriff 
of Renfrew. 172 Although the brieves are not identified, it is possible 
16?. 
168. 
169. 
APS ii 254, c. 41. 
SRO, Acta Domino rum 
SRO, Acta Domino rum 
(Appendix c). 
Concilii, 
Concilii, 
170. St. Andrews Formulare i 254. 
CS 5/13, ff. 35 r. - 36 r. 
CS 5/16, ff. 144 v. 
- 145 r. 
171. SRO, Acta Dominorum Concilii, CS 5/12, f. 129 v. (8 February 
1502/3) and ff. 152 r. - 153 r. (10 February 1502/3). 
172. Fraser, Lennox ii no. 149. 
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that they were de recto. But like mortancestor the brieve of right 
clearly ceases to be of practical importance during the first half of 
the sixteenth century. 
(e) Conclusions 
It has now been shown that the brieves of dissasine and mortancestor 
survived alongside the brieve of right as remedies for the recovery of 
land from intruders much longer than has hitherto been supposed. So 
far as can be told, the styles for each of the brieves remained the same 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as found in Quoniam Attachiamenta 
and in the 'registers' of the Ayr and Bute manuscripts. To some extent 
however these styles may have been the product of a course of development 
in the thirteenth century. The mature form of the brieve of right 
combined features of two English writs, the praecipe in capite and the 
breve de recto, and may have been ~n amalgamation of two equivalent but 
earlier Scottish brieves, one for tenants-in-chief of the crown taken 
in the sheriff and burgh courts and like the praecipe in capite, the 
other for those holding of subject superiors, taken in the court of that 
superior and like the breve de recto. The brieve of dissasine in the 
registers and Quoniam states that the defender dissaised the pursuer 
unjustly and without a judgment, but we know before 1318 it was competent 
to use the brieve against one infeft by the dissaisor after the dissasine. 
It would seem hard to stretch the words of the brieve in the formularies 
to cover this situation, so possibly here is evidence of a modification 
of the thirteenth century form. Both dissasine and mortancestor are 
said by the formularies to pertain tQ the justiciar's court; this is 
correct for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but once again, in 
the thirteenth century there is evidence to suggest that the sheriff had 
jurisdiction over such actions as well. 
. i 
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All this shows clearly, even given the fragmentary nature of the 
evidence, the importance to Scotland of the model provided by the 
developing English writ system of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
If we follow Professor Harding, we find the origins of the Scottish 
brieves of right in twelfth century royal orders to do right. On 
these, following George Neilson, combat may have been the method of 
proof. Towards the middle of the thirteenth century, the brieves 
of dissasine and mortancestor were introduced, providing speedier 
recovery of lands and determination of issues by recognitions of good 
and faithful men in the royal courts. This is the chronology of 
developments in England and there can be no doubt that what happened 
in Scotland was a case of lega~ transplantation. But the further 
question remains, why did this occur? In particular, why were the 
actions of dissasine and mortanceator appropriated for use in Scotland? 
It has usually been thought that the answer lies in the fact that the 
greater Scottish landholders became acquainted with the advantages of 
the English assizes for the recovery of land as owners of property 
in England and pressed successfully for their introduction in Scotland.173 
But such a view is not easy to reconcile with the conclusions of 
Professor Milsom in his important work on the early history of novel 
disseisin and mort d 1 ancestor.174 He argues that to begin with 
both actions were really attempts to curtail abuse by lords of their 
powers of control over their tenants and the lands which those tenants 
held of them. Thus a tenant was enabled to sue the lord who put him 
173. See e.g. Barrow, Kingdom, 114. 
174. See especially his Legal Framework of English Feudalism and, 
more concisely,chs. 5 and 6 of Historical Foundations. 
c 
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out without cause or due process by bringing novel disseisin in the 
king's court. The lord whose tenant died had to put in that tenant's 
heir or else be liable to an action of mort d'ancestor. While 
therefore the assizes protected freeholders, they were not necessarily 
amongst the greater magnates of the realm. There is no doubt that 
in England these actions were used by tenants against their lords and 
it looks as though this also happened in Scotland. Thus the act of 
1230 which apparently introduced the brieve of dissasine begins, 'If 
any man complains to the lord king or his justiciar that his lord 
(emphasis supplie~ or any other has dissaised him unjustly and 
without a judgment ••• When in 1253 Emma of Smeaton brought a 
brieve of mortancestor against Dunfermline abbey to recover lands 
which had belonged to her father, she was in fact suing the superior 
of whom her father had held the lands.175 Some of the other early 
cases involving brieves are also interesting in this regard, in 
particular the one in which Eda, Mary and William of Paxton sought to 
regain their right of estovers in the wood of Restonside against the 
priory of Coldingham. In English law, estovers was the right of a 
tenant to take wood from his lord's estate so far as necessary for the 
repair of houses, hedges and agricultural implements. 176 This is 
clearly what is meant by estovers in our case, where the pursuers 
were allowed reasonable estovers for the construction of houses, hedges 
and ploughs, and seem to have held their lands of Paxton as vassals 
of the priory.177 Another document allows us to see that other tenants 
175· See Dunfermline Registrum nos. 180, 185·, 194, 195 and 303. 
176. Holdsworth, History of English Law iii 143 and vii 306, 315. 
177. Durham Dean & Chapter Muniments, mise. eh. no. 1263 (Appendix A); 
Rai~e, North Durham no. 357· 
-
of the priory also enjoyed such estovers in Restonside.l78 
Professor Milsom has argued that the use of novel disseisin to 
protect such rights of common shows the action's 'feudal orientation', 
because typically the common, whether it was a pasture or a wood or 
some other, would be controlled by the lord.l79 Clearly there is 
just such an orientation in this estovers case. 
A claim by a tenant against a lord to a right of common may 
also lie behind the action, perhaps one of mortancestor, which Mariota 
daughter of Samuel brought against the bishop of Glasgow concerning 
the lands of Stobo. Stobo had been part of the bishop's demesne 
f 1 t . 180 d . t . d . d . ( . ) rom very ear y ~mes, an ~ ~s escr~be as h~s manor maner~um 
. th" d" t "th M . t 181 B t 1208 d 1 14 . h . ~n ~a ~spu e w~ ar~o a.. e ween an 2 a ne~g bour~ng 
d 1 . d f t . t 182 d lan owner c a~me common o pas ure ~n S obo an there may have 
been another such claim in the 1220s.183 There is at least a chance 
that this was also what Mariota sought. The feudal or seignorial 
dimension is clearer in the case where Mariota of Chirnside and her 
son Patrick sued the priory of Coldingham for a ploughgate at Renton. 
Patrick's father Richard (who was presumably Mariota's husband) is 
designed 'of Renton' in the record of the case. Lands in Renton would 
178. Raine, North Durham no. 418. 'Estovers' seems also to have 
been used in medieval Scotland with the wider meaning of 
'necessaries, maintenance, support'. See references in 
Du Cange, Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis and Skene, 
De Verborum Significatione, both s. v. 'estoverium'. For an 
example of the use of the word in this sense in a document of 
1238 see Arbroath Liber i no. 261. 
179. See his introduction to Pollock and Maitland, History of English 
Law i, xlii- xliii; also-Milsom, Legal Framework, 13. 
180. See·Glasgow Registrum, 5, 7, 23, 30, 43, 50 and 55· 
181. Glasgow Registrum no. 131. 
182. Glasgow Registrum nos. 104 and 105. 
183. Glasgow Registrum nos. 126 - 128. 
-
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b h ld f th . 184 have een e o e pr~ory. If this was a case of dissasine, 
what we may be seeing is a dispossessed tenant and tercer suing 
their lord to get back into their lands. A clear case of a lord 
being sued by his tenant, perhaps for dissasine, is the action of 
Gilbert against the earl of Lennox for the lands of Monachkenneran 
in 1235· 
of 1318. 
There is perhaps also a feudal dimension in the legislation 
The dissaisor who put one person out of and another into 
sasine of a tenement would most typically be a lord exercising control 
over his tenants, while the group of dissaisors could conceivably be 
the lord's court, or following, or officers, with the principal 
dissaisor being the lord himself or his steward.185 
That these brieves were used against lords is not of course 
conclusive evidence that they were created for that purpose. 
Professor Sutherland has argued against Professor Milsom that the 
main aim of Henry II and his advisers when introducing the petty 
assizes in England was to give better legal protection to all 
freeholders against dispossession from whatever source, lordly or 
otherwise.186 To some extent the argument really turns on the 
extent of lords' powers in late twelfth century England and on 
whether freeholders had any meaningful rights outwith their lords' 
courts before the introduction of the grand jury and the petty assizes. 
It is Professor Milsom's very persuasive point that these institutions 
effectively created their rights. Now in Scotland we know extremely 
184. Raine, North Durham nos. 375 - 387. 
185. See Milsom, Legal Framework~ 18 - 21. It is of course also 
possible, given t~e background to the 1318 act, that the group 
of dissaisors envisaged was an army! 
186. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, 30 - 1. 
-
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little of the powers of lords in their courts. All we can say is 
that the act of 1230 (a date long after the assizes had lost their 
feudal orientation as a primary feature in England), while it refers 
to lords as perhaps the prime examples of likely dissaisors, does 
not restrict the operation of the remedy to such cases, but states 
that it will operate whenever one is dissaised by another unjustly 
and without a judgment. · And if we can take the 1318 legislation 
as a retrospective guide to the development of the law in the 
thirteenth century then the person dissaised could and did bring 
the action directly against one infeft in the land in all good faith 
after the original dissasine. There was hardly likely to be any 
existing tenurial link in the land between such parties. Thus even 
before the act of 1318 the brieve of dissasine was much more of an 
assertion of an abstract right to land against the equally abstract 
title of some other person. This remained the position under the 
act of 1318, as we have already seen. 
When we look at the fourteenth and fifteenth century cases it 
is harder to find any feudal dimension. Most of the cases of 
dissasine seem in fact to be contests between tenants-in-chief of 
the crown rather than between tenants and lords, and to be about 
rights in land rather than the recovery of possession. Thus in 
1341 the abbey of Arbroath received royal confirmation of its title 
to the lands which it was about to recover by brieve of dissasine. 
After their recovery the abbey leased out the lands as it had been 
doing since the middle of the thirteenth century. Perhaps the 
diesaisor Mowbray was a tenant who had stayed on the lands at the 
239 
expiry of his lease.187 The dispute between the portioners of 
Fithkil (now Leslie in Fife) and Dunfermline abbey in 1319 again 
involved rights of common in the lands of Goatmilk and Caskieberran 
(now in Glenrothes, Fife, just opposite Leslie across the river 
Leven) in Fife. But there would appear to have been no tenurial 
link between the parties. Rather both had rights and the question 
concerned their mutual extent. The boundaries within which each 
could exercise his rights were initially determined by a brieve of 
perambulation, but clearly the result left the portioners with a 
smaller area than they had expected. The brieve of dissasine 
seems therefore to have been brought to claim ejection from ground 
in which they claimed common !ights and to be essentially a dispute 
between neighbours. Interestingly it was held that the matter 
could not be reopened in this way. The case of Hay of Loquhariot 
and William Borthwick in 1368 was also a dispute between neighbours 
about rights in adjoining lands. The lands under dispute were 
those of Middleton, which lie all around what are today the farm 
of Loquhariot and the village of Borthwick in Midlothian. The 
evidence shows that the two families were constantly at odds about 
each other's rights in Middleton and the brieve of dissasine raised 
by Hay in 1368 was clearly only an incident in a long story about 
the definition and extent of those rights. 188 
187. See Arbroath Liber i nos. 247 and 311 for thirteenth century 
leases of the~lands; RRS vi no. 29 (Arbroath Liber ii no. 17) 
for royal confirmation of 1341; above note 29 for case of 
dissasine; Arbroath Liber ii no. 19 for subsequent lease. 
The lands were again in dispute in the 1350s: RRS vi nos. 
124, 133, Arbroath Liber ii no. 27. See also RRS vi nos. 
13 and 182. -
188. See RMS i app. 2 nos. 31, 385, 389; Yester Writs nos. 21, 
23, 37, 39, 41A, 42 - 51, 68A, 70A and 106. 
c 
Similarly the cases of mortancestor often look as though they 
are about abstract questions of title and right to lands rather 
than being merely a remedy for disappointed heirs against wrong-
doing lords. We can see this sometimes in the language of our 
records: it is the droit of a barony which will be settled by a 
brieve of mortancestor in 1369,189 and it is complementum iuris 
which the pursuers seek under another such brieve in 1397. 19° 
Where the background to a case can be worked out in any detail, 
it is generally a title competition which is laid before us. 
Take for instance Hay the constable against Keith the marischal 
in 1390 for the lands of Innerpeffray. Hay's claim was based on 
the sasine of his grandfather John Keith. John's daughter, who 
must have been his heir, married Hay's father. But sometime after 
1324 we find Robert Keith, the then-marischal and head of the family, 
entailing Innerpeffray to his heirs-male after the death of his son 
John (the same John Keith?). Thus the lands passed to his brother 
Edward who in turn was succeeded, sometime before 1351, by his 
eldest son William, the defender of 1390. No doubt the Keith claim 
is explained by the strength of feeling in favour of agnatic succession 
in Scotland. Its illegality is easy for us to see; it would perhaps 
have been less obvious in 1390 when William was holding by a title 
over sixty years old which had been the subject of a royal 
f . t• 191 con 1rma J.on. 
189. Morton Registrum ii no. 107. 
190. Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iii _263.- · · 
191. RMS i app. 1 no. 4?; Scots Peerage vi 30 8. 
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But none of this means that the brieves had ceased to operate 
in a feudal context. There was no Quia Emptores in Scotland and 
in the fourteenth century the pivotal role of the lord or superior 
in the transfer of land, whether by succession, subinfeudation or 
substitution, was, if anything, strengthened. Heirs had still to 
seek entry and receive sasine from him, while the consent of the 
superior to a conveyance inter vivos was made even more important 
by a series of statutes defining his right to recognosce, or take 
back into his own hands, lands which had been the subject of 
unlicensed alienation by his vassal. Conveyancing was thus usually 
b . t' . f f 11 d b b f' t' 192 y res1gna 1on ~ avorem o owe y a re-grant, or y con 1rma 1on. 
That the exercise of these powers of control might give rise to a 
claim under either of our brieves is suggested by two statutes of 
1401,193 one of which deals with the difficulty experienced by heirs 
who often find that the lord has infeft someone else, and the other 
of which speaks of 'wilful and secret' recognitions by lords which 
vex the lieges in their heritage. Mortancestor and dissasine 
respectively would have provided remedies against such seignorial 
wrongs, although they are not mentioned in either of the statutes. 
Even later, in 1466, when Gilbert lord Kennedy brought a brieve of 
mortancestor against Robert lord Fleming, he was seeking to recover 
lands which his ancestors had held of the Flemings; 194 it is 
significant that to begin with the parties seem to have contemplated 
192. See Grant, 'Higher nobility in Scotland', 197- 211. 
193· Both at ~ i 57.5· 
194. SRO, Ailsa Muniments; GD 25/1/9, 14, 20, 24, 31, 59, 97 - 105; 
Wigtown Charter Chest nos. 25 - 42, 413, 414; RMS ii no. 874. 
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action in Robert's court. 195 Here then the question seems to have 
been, was Robert entitled to the lands in demesne, or only to a 
superiority over them? Moreover, even when there was no tenurial 
link claimed between the original parties in a case of mortancestor, 
a feudal dimension could come in if the defender called a warrantor. 
It would seem from a writ in the Bute manuscript that this would 
sist the principal action until the warrantor appeared to take over 
its defence; 196 there is here a significant contrast with the position 
in dissasine. Often the warrantor must have been the superior and 
the pursuer's case would then become a claim to hold the lands of 
him. At least this is what we can see happening in a case of 1372 
where James Douglas of Dalkeith, who had been impleaded in the 
justiciar's court for his lands of Morton in Dumfriesshire, brought 
a brieve of warrandice against the earl of March in the sheriff 
court. 197 The earl, who had granted the lands to be held of him 
198 by Douglas only a few years before, accepted his liability to 
appear before the justiciar. It seems almost certain that the 
case in that court was one of mortancestor and that it would now 
become a question of the pursuer's right to hold of the earl.l99 
195· SRO, Ailsa Muniments, GD 25/l/97· 
196. Reg. Brieves, 61 (no. 96). 
197· Morton Registrum ii no. 130. 
198. Morton Registrum 11 nos. 100 and 101 (see also nos. 136, 
141, 142); RRS vi no. 105. 
199. For a case of 1465 where th~ defender in an action begun 
by brieve of mortancestor·had it sisted to enable him to 
call his warrandice (unsuccessfuliy) see SRO, Lord Advocate's 
Department, AD 1/60 (Appendix D). 
.. 
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Professor Sutherland has used the English material for the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to show how in that period the 
assize of novel disseisin became the principal vehicle by which 
title might be tried, before ultimately it was superseded by 
trespassory actions. By contrast the assize of mort d'ancestor 
fell into obsolescence, along with the writs of right and of 
200 
entry. The picture is very different in Scotland, where the 
brieve of dissasine co-existed not only with the brieve of 
mortancestor but also with the brieve of right. Thus a Scot who 
had a right to enter land without ever having had sasine did not 
need to bring dissasine against the intruder as did his English 
counterpart. The Scot could use mortancestor if his right of entry 
was derived from a deceased relative within the relevant degrees, 
or the brieve of right if his claim was from a more remote ancestor. 
If the ancestor had been ejected before his death, or had surrendered 
the lands unjustly, so that it was not possible to say that he had 
died vest and saised, then again he would have resort to the brieve 
of right. It is probably safe to say that dissasine remained a 
remedy for one who had had sasine properly speaking, that is, had 
been infeft, and had been put out by someone still alive. If the 
dissasine had been committed by one who had since died, then 
presumably the ejected person would usually turn to the brieve of 
right. 
The scope of the brieve of right can therefore be seen as 
largely determined by that of the brieves of dissasine and mortancestor. 
It was the general as opposed to the specific action for the recovery 
200. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, chs. 4 and 5· 
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of lands, used where other forms of action would for some reason 
be inappropriate. There is no sign of any equivalent of writs of 
entry in Scottish practice, but we can see the brieve of right being 
used in situations where in England such a writ would have provided 
the remedy. The most striking example is James Skene's action 
against Janet Keith to recover lands which his father had granted 
away to her great-grandfather in security of a debt. This would 
have been a case for the breve si heres petat quod antecessor dimisit 
ad terminum in England, a variant on the very first writ of entry, 
ad terminum qui praeteriit, according to Bracton; the case would 
however most likely have been decided by a recognition as to whether 
201 the tenant Janet held the lands in fee or gage. Similarly 
Reginald Cheyne raised a brieve of right to complain of his ancestor's 
grant to another; as Maitland pointed out, most of the developed 
writs of entry were about 'alienations made by someone who, though 
he was occupying and rightfully occupying had no power to alienate•. 202 
Here he was echoing Bracton's remark that the writs lay 'against all 
who have their entry through those who transfer without having a 
free tenement or the right to transfer•. 203 In Scotland, it is 
submitted, the brieve of right covered the whole field of the writs 
of entry to permit attacks on flaws in the titles of current tenants. 
It would certainly have been the remedy to meet a case of entry ~ 
disseisin where the dissaisor or dissaisee had died before recovery 
could take place by the brieve of dissasine. 
201. Bracton f. 321 (iv 30). For the recognition as to whether 
lands were fee or gage, see Glanvill XIII, 26 - 7. 
202. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law ii 68. 
203. Bracton f. 318 (iv 21). 
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This view of the brieve of right as comprehending the writs 
of entry seems to gain some support from the provisions of the 
Statute of Wales enacted in 1284. 204 This imported the current 
English writ system in conquered Wales but, as already noted in an 
earlier chapter, with only a single writ, the breve commune, in place 
of the writ of right and, moreover, no writs of entry. It seems that 
it was the intention of the legislators that the breve commune should 
stand alone in their place. 205 The reason for the development of 
the writs of entry in England is currently the subject of a controversy 
the elements of which may throw some light on their non-appearance in 
the Statute of Wales and in Scotland. Professor Milsom has argued 
that writs of entry grew out of writs of right, to enable lords to 
challenge the entries of those whom they would otherwise be compelled 
to warrant as their tenants. This was made necessary by the fact 
that the tenant could only be put out by writ. Using the writ of 
right the lord had to set up his own title as 'better' than that of 
the tenant. But that title was really irrelevant in the true dispute, 
which only concerned the tenant's title to hold of the lord. 
Accordingly lords sought and gained special clauses in their writs 
of right for such cases, stating the defect in the tenant's title 
upon which they proposed to eject him. Such writs became de cursu 
and proliferated especially after 1215 and clause thirty-four of 
Magna Carta. The entry clause in the praecipe indicated that the 
writ would not deprive some other lord of his jurisdiction but would 
204. Statutes of the Realm i 60. · 
205. Smith, 'The Statute of Wales 1284•, 141- 4. 
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rather enable a lord to get rid of a tenant with no valid title 
to hold Of hl.·m. 206 Th t th a e pre-1215 writs of entry were solely 
used in cases where there were difficulties in using an ordinary 
praecipe has been effectively disproved by Professor Palmer, who 
has also shown that they appeared with an 'upward' - that is, tenant 
suing lord - as well as a 'downward' orientation. But he does not 
challenge the theory of the importance of Magna Carta in the increasing 
use of writs of entry in the thirteenth century and he accepts t~at 
some of those then formulated do indeed derive from writs of right. 207 
Bracton's discussion of the writs of entry shows how closely thirteenth 
century English lawyers linked them with writs of right. He explains 
how the party suing by a writ of entry might be forced to shift to 
the procedure of a writ of right 'because of a very distant ~ntry 
which cannot be proved by a witness's own sight and hearing but that 
of another, as the sight and hearing of a father who instructed his 
son, in which case, because of necessity and the lack of other proof, 
the tenant must put himself on the grand assize or defend by the 
d l t 208 ue • Equally a writ of right might become a writ of entry: 209 
206. 
207. 
208. 
209. 
If, though, the writ of right begins to be a writ of 
entry by the narratio and the demandant puts forward 
his intentio, supports it and is prepared to prove it 
by the country, it is still in the election of the 
tenant whether he wishes to put himself on a jury with 
respect to such entry or not, since he has three remedies, 
namely, defending himself by the duel, or putting himself 
on the grand assize on the right, or on a jury as to the 
entry. Since it is in the tenant's discretion to elect 
whichever of these he wishes the writ of right will not 
become a writ of entry until the tenant elects to defend 
himself by a jury against the entry. 
Milsom, Legal Framework, 9-2 - 102, and Historical Foundations, 
143 - 9· 
Palme·r, 'Feudal framework of English law', 1153 - 61. 
Br.acton f. 318 (iv 23). 
Bracton f. 318 (iv 22 - 3). 
... 
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The interchangeability of writs of right and entry in England 
is apparent from these passages of Bracton. Clearly many 
technicalities of the law and procedure of the forms of action 
underlie the bifurcation of the remedies, technicalities which so 
far as can be told did not arise in Scotland. Nor is it possible 
to detect whether claims in the early brieve of right cases third 
chapter were either upward- or downward-looking in nature. All 
but one of those cases heard before franchise courts in the 
thirteenth century were upward claims by tenants to hold of lords; 
the nature of the remaining example is an inscrutable mystery. 210 
Only one other case of a brieve of right is known before 1300 and 
this was heard in the burgh court where feudal elements are unlikely 
211 to have been present. Further we have seen that the rule 
requiring brieves to make freeholders answer for their lands did 
not inhibit a lord's right to make his tenant 'show his holding', 
and it would seem from at least one case that he could use this 
action to reduce the title shown. 212 Thus one of Professor Milsom's 
conditions for the development of writs of entry was not present in 
Scotland. Nor did Magna Carta apply in Scotland to make necessary 
the addition to brieves of right of explanatory clauses about 
jurisdiction. So superiors who wished to challenge the titles 
of their vassals and to proceed by way of brieve of right would 
not have been confronted with all the technical difficulties which 
may have led to some of the writs of entry in England. 
210. The mysterious case is Fraser, Keir, 197 - 8; the other 
cases are Raine, North Durham nos. 91 and 296, and Paisley 
Registrum, 180, 192 and 198. See discussion above, 134 - 6. 
211. Stevenson, Documents i 384. 
212. See above 143 - 6. 
Aberdeen and John Crab: 
The case is that of the Bishop of 
Aberdeen Registrum i 143 - 55. 
.. 
~: .. 
Whatever the truth about the origins of the writs of entry, it 
seems clear that in Scotland their work could have been and probably 
always was done by the brieve of right. It was in other words the 
remedy where the complaint was of a wrongful or exhausted alienation 
to the defender or his predecessor in title. We have also seen its 
importance in the recovery of burgage or tailzied holdings in 
circumstances where prima facie mortancestor or perhaps dissasine 
might have seemed more appropriate. Unfortunately it is not possible 
to say much of its significance in the feudal structure within which 
the operation of dissasine and mortancestor has been examined, save 
that probably an early form was addressed to the lords of franchise 
courts. Over the period of the later middle ages, however, there can 
be no doubt of its importance alongside the brieves of dissasine and 
mortancestor as a remedy to gain lands from intruders. 
Two general points conclude this chapter. The material 
discussed in it surely shows that the traditional picture of these 
remedies, that of 'an agitated and arid world ••• in which malefactors 
hurry about attacking people, ejecting them from their lands, hoping 
to get away with obvious wrongs•, 213 must be set firmly on one side 
and forgotten. Rather they were used to deal with essentially 
civil questions which pre-suppose a stable background of law and 
society, questions about the rights of lords, about entitlement to 
inherit and alienate and the scope of holdings and about the 
boundaries of lands. We may never know the contribution which the 
existence and use of these remedies made to the shaping of that law 
and that society, but we are safe in assuming their significance and 
ubiquity-throughout the period to the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
An awareness of this mus·t affect our thinking in considering the 
jurisdiction of the conciliar courts in questions of fee and heritage. 
213. Milsom, Le~al Fram~~or~, 5· 
-
Chapter Five 
Parliament, Council and the Common Law 
(a) Parliament, Council General and Common Justice 
Perhaps enough has now been said to suggest that the pessimistic 
view of the institutional arrangements for the administration of law 
and royal justice before 1500 is unjustified. Quite clearly there 
existed a structure of royal justice, a system of courts which were 
not centralised and not dependent for their authority upon the personal 
presence of the king. It is striking how little change is apparent 
in these arrangements when it is considered how often·the administration 
of justice appears to have been criticised by contemporaries. The 
forces of conservatism or of continuity with the past were obviously 
very strong and deep-rooted. 
To leave our picture of royal justice at this would however be to 
give a false impression, for we have not yet dealt with the king's 
council acting as a judicial body. This has been the subject of a 
considerable amount of research because from these activities the 
Court of Session, the principal court of Scots law from the sixteenth 
century, took its origins. The story is a complex one and not yet 
fully understood. The starting point seems to be the exercise of 
judicial functions in parliament in the fourteenth century. It should 
be noted that there is little justification for regarding a parliament 
as merely a feudal court'of and for all the king's tenants-in-chief. 
In Scotland as in England, parliament was basically 'a session of the 
king's council', afforced by individuals who as tenants-in-chief had a 
right to attend. 1 It has been suggested-that 'the primary purpose of 
1. A.A.M. Duncan, 'The early parliaments of Scotland', SHR 45 (1966) 
36 -58, at 47, 51 - 6; A. Grant, 'The development or-the Scottish 
pccrace', SHR 57 (1978) 1 - 27 at 18 - 24. 
... 
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these early parliaments of Scotland was the dispensing of justice' , 2 
and this interpretation draws support from late fourteenth century 
documents which speak of parliament as a time 'at which and in which 
justice ought to be done to anyone complaining 13 and say that the 
king should hold one annually 'swa that his subjectis be servit of 
4 the law•. This function of parliament, whether or not that was its 
primary purpose, was clearly not confined to the provision of remedies 
for aggrieved tenants-in-chief; any of the king's subjects could 
bring his complaint there. Whatever the original position, by the 
reign of Robert I parliament was also summoned 'to do the king's 
business' and assist him in all manner of political as well as 
judicial affairs.5 Consequently there had developed a practice, 
of which the first evidence is found in 1341, 6 of devolving the 
business of complaints to 'sub-committees', presumably to permit 
the completion of all work in hand. Parliament was held at most 
twice a year and had limited time at its disposal; it is in this 
perspective, one of pressure of business in the time available, not 
that of a flood of litigants seeking 'central' as opposed to 'local' 
justice, that the creation of these sub-committees should be seen. 
2. H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, 'The Scottish parliaments of 
Edward', SHR 25 (1928) 300- 317 at 303; cf. Duncan, 'Early 
parliaments•, 37- 4?, 50-51. 
3· APS i 557· 
4. APS i 573· 
5· Duncan, 'Early parliaments', 57- 8. 
6. APS i 513 (Scone Liber no. 168). See A.A.M. Duncan, 'The 
central courts before 1532', in Introduction to Scottish Legal 
History, 321 - 340 at 324 - 7 on further developments of this 
practice in the fourteenth century. 
c 
I> 
It is of course true that Scottish parliaments were courts, 
opened by the procedures of fencing and calling of suits and having 
a supreme appellate jurisdiction over all other courts as well as 
competence to try those charged of treason; 7 but it is also 
important to observe that parliament was an occasion to deal 'with 
that which concerns common justice' (my emphasis). This included 
the falsing of dooms, as well as 'questions and other complaints 
which ought to be ended, discussed and determined by parliament•. 8 
The phrase 'common justice' takes on significance when we see 
parties who have complained to parliament being told to sue elsewhere 
at common law. For example in 1368 Robert Stewart lord of Menteith 
was told that the action he had brought in parliament should be 
pursued and defended in another court according to the order and 
form of the common law, the defender having contended that the case 
should be heard in the justiciar's court by the custom of the realm. 9 
Similarly in 1401 Marjorie Lindsay was sent to the common law 
regarding certain matters not central to a complaint for which 
10 parliament had given her a remedy. There is an obvious parallel 
here with English parliamentary practice of the fourteenth century 
when, according to a document of 1309, the most important class of 
petitions to parliament concerned grievances which it was claimed 
7. See P.J. Hamilton-Grierson, 'The appellate jurisdiction of the 
Scottish parliament',- SHR 15.(1918) 205- 222; R.K. Hannay, 
'On "Parliament" and "General Council"', SHR 18 (1921) 157- 170 
at 158- 160; Duncan, 'Central courts', 328, 340. 
8. APS i 507. 
9. APS i 505. 
10. APS i 582; Morton Registrum i app. no. 12. 
could not be redressed by the common law nor in any other manner 
save by special warrant. Where however parliament determined that 
a petitioner had an action at common law he would be sent to that 
remedy rather than given one under his petition.11 So when Scottish 
parliamentary records refer to 'common justice' as a major concern of 
parliament, we should understand by that something distinct from its 
'common law' jurisdiction. In dealing with the complaints of the 
king's subjects parliament was a court for justice out of the ordinary 
course of law, justice not obtainable by the processes of the common 
law. 
Alongside parliament in the later fourteenth century we find 
the institution of the 'council general'. Professor Hannay 
carefully distinguished the two bodies in a series of articles in 
the Scottish Historical Review. 12 Council general was also a 
meeting of the estates, afforcing the king's council, but of lesser 
numbers and called together on a summons shorter than that of forty 
days by which a parliament was convened. Perhaps for reasons 
connected with the shorter summons council general does not appear 
to have acted regularly as a judicial body, although it can be seen 
handling some complaints in 1385.13 It is important therefore to 
11. H.G. Richardson and G.O •. Sayles, Parliaments and Great Councils 
in Medieval England, (London, 1961), 37; A. Harding, 'Plaints 
and bills in the history of English law, mainly in the period 
1250- 1350', Legal History Studies 1972 ed. D. Jenkins (Cardiff, 
1975), 65- 86 at 8o. 
12. 'On "Parliament" and "General Council", cited above note 7; 
'General Council and Convention of Estates', SHR 20 (1923) 
98 ~ 115; 'General Council· of Estates', SHR 20 (1923) 263-
284. See also two articles of A.A.M. Duncan: 'Councils 
general 1404 1423', SHR 35 (1956) 132- 143; 'Central courts', 
325 - 8. 
13. APS i 552 - 4. 
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distinguish these councils general from the sub-committees of 
parliament dealing with its judicial business when, as is sometimes 
the case, they are described as councils general. As Professor 
Duncan has explained, they were so called because representatives 
of each of the three estates were members, yet the numbers were not 
h f 1 . t 14 t ose o a par 1amen • 
The judicial functions of councils general as an alternative to 
parliament seem to have expanded during the Albany governorship, 
perhaps because a parliament could not be held unless the king was 
present and this was a physical impossibility during the English 
captivity of James I.15 The new role of council general was not 
apparently abandoned on the king's return in 1424; certainly in 
the reign of his successor, James II, we find that council general, 
. d. f d 1 . 16 h.l like parliament, has 1ts au 1tors o causes an comp a1nts, w 1 e 
in 1428 parties were cited to appear before the king or his council 
'at the first day of our next parliament or council general' for a 
determination as to which one should be given possession of lands 
recognosced by the king. 17 
(b) The king's council 
The last reference underlines the critical point that both 
parliament and council general had as their core the king's council. 
14. Duncan, 'Central courts' , 325 
- 7-
15. Duncan, 'Central courts 1 , 327; 'Councils general' , 141 
- 3· 
16. APS xii 22, no. 41 (Scone Li·ber no. 213); APS ii 46, c. 8. 
17. Hi~hland Pa;,eers ii' 160. 
,i 
i 
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There is evidence_ to suggest that council also exercised judicial 
functions outwith its afforced sessions as parliament or council 
18 
general. It is however possible that these functions were rather 
more limited than the 'common justice' of a parliament or council 
general. As late as 1487 it was possible to say that only cases 
1 pertenyng in speciale to our soverane lord' fell within the proper 
jurisdiction of his council, these being 'accions and complaintis 
made be kirkmen, wedowis, orphanis and pupillis, accions of strangearis 
of uther realmis and complaintis made apone officiaris forfalt of 
execucioun of thair office•.19 This list of the king's special 
responsibilities in certain types of complaint was already very old 
in 1487. Thus Ailred of Rievaulx wrote in the twelfth century of 
David I diligently hearing the causes of the old women and the poor 
in each district that he came to. 20 Legislation attributed, more 
or less reliably, to David's successors constantly refers to their 
duty to protect the church, the poor and the weak, 21 while Professor 
Duncan has drawn attention to the brieve 'de pauperibus guod dicitur 
audita guerela', which may have accelerated procedure in cases of 
impoverished pursuers, as another possible manifestation of this aspect 
18. Duncan, 'Central courts', 325- 6, 332. 
19. APS ii 177, c. 10. 
20. R. Twysden, Historiae Anglicanae Scriptores X (London, 1652) 
col. 348. 
21. See e.g. APS i 383, c. 42 (perhaps unlikely to be legislation 
of William I); 399, c. 5 (Alexander II); 467, c. 2 (Robert I); 
576 (Robert III). 
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of the king's role. 22 In 1401 the king's lieutenant and his 
ministers were ordered to give reparation for the just complaints 
of churchmen, widows, orphans and pupils 'simpliciter et de plano 
sine plegio', that is, without at least some of the usual formalities 
required of those raising legal actions. 23 Almost sixty years later 
James II wrote to the aldermen and bailies of Aberdeen and Perth under 
his 'signet of the Unicorn', explaining that 'it effeirs to the king 
24 of law to defend orphans and pupils being under age'. There are 
also numerous examples from the fourteenth century of ecclesiastics 
such as the abbots of Cambuskenneth, Dunfermline and Arbroath, the 
bishops of Aberdeen and Horay and the friars preacher of Perth 
complaining before the king and his council of various wrongs 
committed against them. We know of these from royal letters issued 
under the privy seal giving commands to repair the wrongs, which are 
often said to have been issued 'ex deliberatione consilii 1 • 25 
The king's responsibilities for his officers were also important 
at this period; indeed this may have been the most important class 
of case in increasing the judicial work of council in and out of 
parliament and council general. Commonly the king's executive 
brieves to his officers concluded with an exhortation to carry out 
22. For the brieve see Formulary E, no. 52; Reg. Brieves, 43 (no. 43); 
Duncan, 'Central courts', 330. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
APS i 576. 
w.c. Dickinson, 1110ur Signet of the Unicorn"!, SHR 26 (1947) 
147 - 148. 
See Cambuskenneth Registrum no. 54 (RRS vi no. 356), 
Dunfermline Registrum no. 394, RRS vi nos. 83 and 152, 
Aberdeen Registrum.i 136- 141, 155 7 and 170, and 
Moray Registrum nos. 172 and 173. 
' i 
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the commands contained therein as he had no wish to hear complaints 
of his officers' failures to carry out their duties. That complaints 
were made and brought judicial work upon king and council, both in 
and out of parliament, is very apparent in our sources for the 
period. Thus for example the auditorial committee of parliament 
in 1341 dealt with a complaint by Scone abbey of wrongful diligence 
against its lands by the sheriff and bailies of Perth. 26 Throughout 
the latter half of the century, the volume of complaints was clearly 
such that it could not be handled centrally. When David II returned 
from captivity in England in 1357 one of the first tasks laid upon 
him by his parliament was the holding of a great justice ayre 'throughout 
the whole kingdom in his own person ... on account of the full justice 
of the king's authority which makes and strikes fear into wrongdoers~ 
Particularly prominent amongst the wrongdoers who would be thus 
stricken were those royal officers who had 'conducted themselves 
unfaithfully or fraudulently in their offices•. 27 No doubt this 
act owed as much to the need to regularise royal finances as to the 
complaints of the lieges, 28 but twelve years later parliament spoke 
of 'continual complaints' about the royal officers and of 'grave 
complaints' which had reached the hearing of the king. On this 
occasion it was ordained that the justiciars and the chamberlain 
were to convene all officers in each sheriffdom and put the conduct 
of their duties to an assize of the community of the land. If the 
assize declared these officers to have been at fault, they were to be 
26. APS i-513 (Scone Liber no. 168). 
27. APS i 491. 
28. See Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 149; 165. 
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put out of office. 29 In 1397 it was ordained that 'the justice 
in each justice· ayre shall take knowledge ••• upon sheriffs if they 
do duly perform their duty in their office', and this was re-enacted 
in 1398.30 In 1404 further provisions were made for the supervision 
of sheriffs, and justiciars and sheriffs were encouraged to hold 
their courts at the due times so as to avoid delay of justice 
'through ••••• negligence or injustice or fraud•. 31 None of this 
of course is in any way direct evidence that the procedure of complaint 
before council was invoked against the misbehaviour of royal officers; 
but it does show regular attempts by council, in and out of parliament, 
to provide a judicial remedy for those who did complain of royal 
officers. We know that council did not wish to take on a heavy 
load of judicial work, work which would of course be brought before 
it by the complaint procedure. It would seem reasonable to suggest, 
taking the evidence of the fourteenth century as a whole, that 
complaints of royal officers were sufficiently regularly brought 
before council to compel the establishment of alternative methods 
of dealing with the problem. But the council continued to have work 
to do in this field. The controls over sheriffs introduced in 1397 
were extended to the officers of the regalities in the following year, 
and it was further provided that lords of regality who failed to comply 
with this provision would be impleaded before the king. 32 The 
29. APS i' 508. 
30. APS i 570. 
31. SHR 35 (1956) at 142. 
32. APS i 571. ' 
greatest of all temporal lords, the king himself, was brought 
under the jurisdiction of council in 1384, to answer •to any party 
complaining of him' and to make prompt reparation for his wrongs.33 
In 1399, the misgovernance of the realm and the default of the 
keeping of the common law were attributed to the king and his 
officers, and the king was invited to complain of his officers 
before the council who would judge of their defaults.34 
It would however be unwise to suppose that the jurisdiction of 
the king and council was absolutely restricted to the complaints of 
the weak and the church and to the control of royal officers. The 
council was the king's and, within the limits of the common law, he 
could use it as he willed. Thus we find in the early fifteenth 
century an instance of a defender being called before the council 
to answer for purprestures on crown lands and rights. 35 Early in 
the reign of David II there is the remarkable case before council 
in which Robert Stewart gained sasine and possession of Liddesdale 
from William Douglas. Whether or not this judgment was within the 
law, or merely cloaked the collusive and illegal activities of 
Stewart and Douglas, the case itself does not fit into any of the 
categories just discussed. 36 Nor does the decreet of council in 
1388 by which Alan Lauder, constable of the castle of Tantallon in 
East Lothian, was ordered to yield it to the new governor of the 
33. APS i 550. 
34. APS i 572. 
35. HMC xiv (3), 15, summarised Fraser, Douglas iii no. 369. 
36. Morton Registrum-ii no. 61; APS xii no. 8; · RRS vi no. 44. 
See Scots Peerage vi 340 - 1. 
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realm, the king's second son, the earl of Fife and Menteith.37 
Council's primary function was to advise the king on the king's 
business; its activities could be confined by no theory, legal or 
otherwise, and if the king decided to hear a case with his council, 
then there was little to be done to prevent him. What can be said 
however is that there appear to have been categories of complainers 
with a right to be heard before the king and council and that others 
only gained audience there through his favour, or grace. The place 
where all had a right to complain before the king was in his 
parliament. 
Fifteenth century evidence appears to confirm this view of the 
place of the council, in parliament or without, within the framework 
of jurisdictions. Thus we find James I 'committing a cause to his 
council' in December 1424; 38 perhaps an example of the king making 
council available as a matter of grace rather than as of right. 
An act of 1450 speaks of the penalties imposed upon officers proved 
guilty of trespass before king and council. 39 The jurisdiction 
over the king's officers was defined by statute in 1469. Only if 
the sheriff or other judge ordinary failed to administer justice to 
a complaining party, or administered 'parcial' justice, should action 
be taken before king and council. The complainer might 'summond his 
partii before the king' or have another officer 'in that part' 
appointed. But, the statute concluded, 'it salbe leful to the 
37. HMC v 611. For some of the complex background, which relates 
~the Douglas succession after Otterburn, see Nicholson, 
Later Middle Ages, iOl - 2. · 
38. Paisley Registrum, ·70. 
39. APS ii 35, c. 5. 
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kingis hienes to tak the desisioun of any actione that cummis before 
him at his emplesance (§y emphasi~ like as it was wont tobe of 
4o 
before'. Thus the king's pleasure might permit actions before 
council and had done so before the act. This statute put the 
action of wrongous and inordinate proceeding on a statutory basis 
and was preserved by the act of 1487 restricting council's jurisdiction 
to the traditional area of complaints against officers and also those 
made by churchmen, widows, orphans and pupils. 41 In 1474, parliament 
ordered that 'all personis that has complayntis persew to thair juge 
ordinar and vex nocht our soverane lorde nor his consale with na 
complayntis bot gif it be on officiaris that will nocht do justice 
nor minister in thir office efter the forme of law•. 42 Taken 
together these three acts clearly show the willingness, even the 
duty, of king and council to deal with their customary remit of 
complaints, in particular those against officers of the king, but 
also reluctance to deal with other matters. 
It is of importance to note the distinction in these acts and 
others between the king and his council on the one hand, and the 
judge ordinary on the other. 'Judge ordinary' or 'judex ordinarius' 
was a phrase of canon law origin, used in the canonical texts as a 
contrast with the judge delegate. The judge delegate was one 
assigned to a particular cause or causes by some higher authority, 
a practice very familiar in medieval ecclesiastical law. The phrase 
'judge ordinary' appears never to have been defined independently 
40. APS ii 94, c .. 2. 
41. APS ii 177, c. 10. 
42. APS ii 107, c. 11. 
--
i 
f 
~ 
l 
2~1 
in the canonical texts, but its implication seems to have been that 
of one who had jurisdiction by virtue of permanent office rather 
than through delegation from above. Within the church therefore 
the bishop was the ordinary judge of his diocese, while Tancred 
could state that the pope was the judge ordinary of all Christendom. 
Within his diocese however the bishop might delegate his jurisdiction 
to archdeacons, commissaries and officials; similarly papal judges 
delegate were familiar figures throughout medieval Europe. 43 The 
contrast between ordinary and delegated jurisdiction was appropriated 
for use in the secular context in Bracton, where the king is said to 
be the ordinary of his realm, 'for he has in his hand all the rights 
belonging to the crown and the secular power and the material sword 
. 44 
pertaining to the governance of the realm', while those whom he 
appoints as his justices, sheriffs and other officials are his 
delegates, having no authority but that committed to them by the 
king. 45 
The distinction between ordinary and delegated jurisdiction was 
of course familiar in Scotland from ecclesiastical practice and seems 
d . 1 · d 46 Of "t t to have remained so throughout the me ~eva per~o • 1 s use o 
43. For this discussion of the distinction between the judge ordinary 
and the judge delegate in medieval canon law see O.J. Reichel, 
44. 
45. 
46. 
A Complete Manual of Canon Law (London, 1896) ii 210 - 21; 
F.W. Maitland, Roman Canon Law in the Church of En land (London, 
1898) 104; R. Naz, Dictionnaire de Droit Canonigue 7 vols., 
Paris, 1935) s.v. 'Ordinaire'; Ollivant, Court of the Official, 
19 - 22. 
Bracton, f. 55 b (ii 166). 
Bracton, f. 108 (ii 306). 
See Dr~burgh Lib er, 77 - 8; Ollivant, Court of the Official, 
22 - ·7· 
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describe secular jurisdictions nothing seems to have survived from 
before the fifteenth century, and then the earliest example is an 
act of 1458. Significantly it lays down that certain causes 'salbe 
decydit and determyt before the ordinar jugis of the realme, the 
lordis of the sessione haifande na power to know apone thame•. 47 
The act of 1487 seeking to limit the business coming before the 
council speaks of the judge ordinary as one 'to quham the acciounis 
pertenis and efferis to be determyt and decidit•, 48 recalling the 
words of another act in 1425 stating that bills of complaint which 
could not be dealt with by parliament should go to the judges 'to 
quham thai perten of law•. 49 It seems clear from this that the 
king and his council were not regarded as judges ordinary. It is in 
fact possible to derive a list of the 'ordinaries' from the fifteenth 
century statutes referring· to the subject, and all were officers whom 
Bracton would have regarded as royal 'delegates' rather than 
'ordinaries•. The act of 1487 says that the 'ordinaries' are the 
'justice, chaumerlane, schireffis, barones, provostis and baillies 
of borowis and uther officiaris, jugis and ministeris of law•. 50 
In 1500 a sheriff in hac parte was described as 'judex delegatus' 
while the sheriff principal was 'judex ordinarius' in the sheriffdom 
h h . d . . d. t• 51 Wh t b . h . w ere e exerc1se JUr1s 1c 1on. a we may e see1ng ere 1s a 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
APS 
APS 
APS 
APS 
ii 
ii 
ii 
ii 
47, c. 2. 
177, c. 10. 
8, c. 24. 
177, c. 10; cf. APS ii 8, c. 24, and 94, c. 2. 
51. Cawdor Bk., 104. ·On the distinction reference is made to 
Regiam, but I have not been able to trace the passage in any 
of the printed editions. 
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development somewhat analogous to one which took place in the 
church; the delegates of the ordinary exercise the ordinary's 
jurisdiction and in course of time by the establishment of their 
offices are increasingly seen as exercising jurisdiction by virtue 
of their office rather than through the delegation constituted by 
appointment to the office.52 So archdeacons and officials came 
to be ordinaries, having been delegates of the bishop; similarly, 
it is suggested, justiciars and sheriffs in Scotland came to be 
seen as judges ordinary as the jurisdiction of their courts became 
a matter of custom and thereby law. Something of this process 
may have already been seen in this thesis, with the apparent exclusion 
of the sheriff from cases of dissasine and mortancestor, leaving the 
justiciar with sole jurisdiction. The authority of the officers 
had ceased to be a matter of delegation by the king and was rather 
something which the law defined in relation to the office, no matter 
by whom or on whose appointment it was held. 
If then the king had once been regarded as the 'ordinary' of 
his realm in Scotland, that was no longer true in the fifteenth 
century. But it seems clear that we ought not to think of the 
jurisdiction exercised by king and council as 'extra-ordinary', 
the term suggested by A.R.G. Macmillan.in his Evolution of the 
Scottish Judiciary. 53 The contrast in the fifteenth century was 
still that between ordinary and delegated jurisdiction, and the 
jurisdiction of king and council was neither. Perhaps our best 
way of understanding the nature of the jurisdiction is through the 
52. Ollivant, Court of·the Official, 20- 24. 
53· (Edinburgh, 1941), PP• x- xi. 
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language of 'The Scottish King's Household', which lays down that 
the justiciars are to act 'so that no complaint be presented to the 
king except only such complaint as cannot be redressed without the 
presence of the king himself by the default of the justiciars or 
sheriffs•.54 It was a supervisory, yet residual jurisdiction; 
jurisdiction which stepped in where the common law courts failed 
or went wrong in some way. In this respect it appears little 
a 
different from the jurisdiction of parliament to deal with 'common 
justice' as distinct from 'common law'. The crucial distinction 
between the two seems to have been that the right of complaint to 
parliament was less restricted than that to council. In parliament 
anyone could seek a remedy for matters beyond the scope of the common 
law; only certain persons had such rights before the council, 
namely, churchmen, widows, orphans, the poor, those complaining of 
royal officers and those permitted to come before council by the 
king's grace. 
(c) Council and Sessions 
The development of council's judicial functions and jurisdiction 
outwith parliament and ooun·cil general in the fifteenth century is, 
as Professor Duncan has clearly shown, the true background to the 
emergence of the Court of Session in the sixteenth century. 55 But 
the wisdom of hindsight has, it may be suggested, misled scholars 
seeking to explain the nature of and reasons for this development. 
Some have spoken of the council actually becoming 'the supreme court', 
54. SHS Mise. ii 36 - 7• 
55· Duncan, 'Central courts', 329 - 336. 
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during the pe·riod although the precise meaning of this phrase, the 
use of which cannot be justified from contemporary sources, is 
obscure. 56 Others go less far and argue that rather the development 
manifests 'recurrent concern to establish a supreme court', which was 
only ultimately successful.57 This is to be set against the background 
of Lord Cooper's 'chaotic welter of ill-defined and overlapping 
jurisdictions' and of courts 'inferior in capacity and efficiency' 
which led to 'an insistent and persistent public demand from a 
growing population for better and stronger organised justice•.58 
The evidence for this public demand is usually justified by reference. 
to contemporary satires on the law59 (which overlooks the fact that 
lawyers and the law have at all times and in all places been a standard 
6 . 
target for such attacks 0 ) and also by reference to the fifteenth 
century statutes concerning the administration of justice. Yet as 
we have already seen some of these statutes, at least, must be used 
with the greatest caution in drawing anything other than the most 
limited conclusions from them. 
56. J. Wormald, Court Kirk and Community (London, 1981) 14; see 
also her 'Bloodfeud, kindred and government in early modern 
Scotland', Past and Present no. 87 (1980) 54- 97 at 77• 
57· 
58. 
59. 
60. 
J.J. Robertson, 'The development of the law', in Scottish 
Society in the Fifteenth Century ed. J.M. Brown (London, 1977) 
136 - 152 at 146. 
Cooper, Selected Paper9, 230, 234. 
See e.g. G. Neilson in ADC ii, introduction, xxii - xxv; 
Cooper, Selected Papers, 230; Dickinson, 'Administration of 
justice', 347. 
R.J. Lyall, 'Politics and .Poetry in fifteen~h and sixteenth 
century Scotland', Scottish Literary Journal 3 (1976) 5- 29 
at 7 - 10. Literary complaints about lawyers were also familiar 
in England: E.W. Ives, The Common Lawyers of Pre-Reformation 
England (Cambridge, 1983) 285. · 
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The starting point for discussion of the emergence from council 
of a fully-fledged central court is usually taken to be an act of 
1425 passed by parliament on the return of James I from his twenty 
years of captivity in England. This provided that 1billis of 
complayntis the quhilkis may nocht be determyt be the parliament 
for diverse cause belangand the common profyt of the realme' should 
instead be taken before the judges 'to quham thai perten of law', 
that is, to the judge ordinary having jurisdiction. The bills were 
only to come before the king if the ordinary failed to do justice.61 
Professor Duncan says of this act that it was an 'attempt to stem the 
flow of bills to the council•, 62 but it may be suggested that this is 
to misunderstand its import and overall context. The context is 
one of the subject's right to present a bill of complaint for remedy 
in parliament; the import of the act is not to prevent such complaints 
being made but rather one of too much business for parliament to cope 
with in the time at its disposal, even by the means of its auditors 
of causes and complaints. Accordingly, bills not dealt with should 
go to whichever judge had ordinary jurisdiction and only in the event 
of that failing should the cause reappear before parliament. 
If it is accepted that parliament's jurisdiction in complaints 
was confined to cases where there was no ordinary remedy, then this 
act must have been doomed to fail in its attempt to deflect the 
pressure of business away to other courts. We may be able to see an 
indication of its failure in another act passed in the following year, 
61. APS ii 8, c. 24. 
62. Duncan, 'Central courts•, 330. 
r 
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1426, which provided that the chancellor, together with members 
of the three estates named by the ki~g, should sit at three stated 
terms in the year to deal with 'all and sindry complayntis causes 
and querellis that may be determynit befor the kingis consal'. 63 
The jurisdiction of this grou~ was to be that of the council rather 
than parliament, but from the fact that its membership was to be 
drawn from the three estates it seems likely that it was intended to 
reduce the pressure of complaints work coming to parliament. The 
jurisdiction of parliament could however only be exercised in 
parliament; elsewhere only the more restricted jurisdiction of 
council could be made available. No doubt the act also reflects 
a need to organise the judicial business of council, to make it 
clear to potential litigants when such business would be done and to 
shift the burden of the work from the king's closest councillors to 
men chosen from the wider grouping of the three estates. 
However it is examineq, though, this act of 1426 cannot be seen 
as an attempt to establish a central supreme court. It must be seen 
as an effort to organise the handling of petitions and complaints to 
the king in council and in parliament in order to enable the work of 
government to be done efficiently. The choice of the chancellor to 
play a leading role in this is of some significance, the inference 
of an English model being difficult to resist. The earliest 
beginnings of the Court of Chancery 
64. 
grew not from the departmental work of the Chancery but 
from the jurisdiction of the king's council to deal with 
bills of complaint. In the fourteenth century bills 
addressed to the king in council came to be passed to 
the chancellor, and before 1400 most petitioners had 
begun to address their complaints directly to him.64 
APS ii 11, c. 19. Note that O'Brien, 'Scottish parliaments', 
~ and appendix C, has suggested that originally the chamberlain 
rather than the chancellor was to chair the sessions. 
Baker, Introduction to EnG~ish Le~al Historv, 8?. 
In this work the chancellor was merely an 'informal delegate' of a 
council which could no longer cope with the work thrust upon it by a 
mass of petitions and bills of complaint. The work was passed to him 
because he was at the head of the chancery, the royal writing office 
which was the hub of the common law system and so the place where a 
petitioner might best be advised whether or not he had a remedy at law. 
If not, the chancellor might either himself provide a remedy or refer 
the matter back to council and parliament for legislative treatment. 65 
Was the appointment of the Scottish chancellor made for similar 
reasons? He headed the Scottish chapel or chancery, controlling 
the issue of royal brieves by virtue of his custody of the great seal. 
The new judicial body was to h~ndle the business of complaints which, 
it was claimed, could not be resolved by common law, and which was now 
proving too great a burden for parliaments and councils preoccupied 
with other matters. 
The establishment of the 'sessions', as the judicial sittings of 
the chancellor and his colleagues seem to have been known, did not 
bring an end to the judicial tasks of parliament and council. In 
1450 parliament passed a number of statutes concerning litigations 
before council. One permitted a person complaining of spuilzie to 
raise his action before the council in the first instance, reversing 
an earlier act of 1438 whereby the initial complaint was to be made 
to the sheriff. 66 Another ~ade provisions for dealing with the 
contumacious defender who refused to answer a summons before council. 67 
- 65. P~ucknett, Concise History of the Common Law, 180. 
66. APS ii 36, c. 7• For the 1438 act see APS ii 32, c. 2. 
67. APS ii 37, c. 18. 
• I 
There are a number of examples of cases before parliament, council 
general and council from this period, only one from a 'session'. 68 
This tends to reinforce the view that the sessions were intended to 
relieve, rather than supersede, the other central institutions. In 
1456 a council general set up a new scheme for sessions thrice in the 
year, indicating that 'all caus that can nocht be rede at this tyme 
be the auditouris of complayntis' were to be continued to the first 
of these sessions. 69 The members of the session were named by the 
council general, not by the king as in 1426. The scheme was approved 
and continued by parliament in 1458. 70 Again the members of session 
were nominated by parliament, while the jurisdiction of the sessions 
was more fully defined than ever before.7l Professor Duncan argues 
that the jurisdiction conferretl was merely that of the council72 but 
it is much wider than the traditional subject matter of that jurisdiction 
already discussed in this chapter. It includes spuilzies under the 
act of 1450 mentioned above and spuilzies committed between the earlier 
act of 1438 and 1450 (which would otherwise have pertained to the 
sheriff) as well as 'all obligacionis, contractis and all maner of 
dettis and uther civile accionis the quhilkis concernys nocht fee nor 
heretage'. The act goes on to say that pursuers are 'to haif full 
fredome to folow thir accionis-befor the saidis lordis [Er session) 
or thir ordinar jugis'. 
68. For the case 'in cessione nublica' see Scone Liber no. 222 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72-
(APS ii 77, c.~8). Note also the reference to the 'next 
s~ion' in Fraser, Douglas iii no. 87. For references to 
cases before parliament, council general and council see Duncan, 
'Central courts', 332. 
APS ii 46, c. 8. 
· APS ii 47, c. 1. 
APS ii 47, c. 2. 
Duncan, 'Central courts' , 333· 
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The relative length and detail of the provisions anent 
jurisdiction in this act of 1458 make it difficult to accept that 
it was merely intended as a summary of existing rules. It looks 
rather more like a liberalisation of the jurisdiction of the central 
bodies, a shift away from the old position whereby they stood outside 
the ordinary p~ocesses of the common law. No doubt this was the 
outcome of a long period in which an increasing number of wholly 
private suits had been heard before them by the king's grace. 
After 1458, as the act itself indicated, the session was an 
alternative to the judge ordinary rather than a substitute in the 
event of his default, except in the field of 'fee and heritage'. 
The sessions were however gradually abandoned, the last one 
apparently being held in 1468.73 It is significant that in 
1469 and again in 1474 parliament ordered that actions before to 
council should be confined to complaints against royal officers 
and that otherwise parties should bring their cases to the ordinaries. 74 
These statutes should be seen as attempts to reassert the traditional 
jurisdiction of council at a time when litigants were looking to it 
to act as a substitute for the sessions with their wider statutory 
jurisdiction, for the records after 1478 show council exercising 
that jurisdiction. Parliament too seems increasingly to have 
regarded council as the body to handle its surplus business in 
the absence of the sessions. In 1467 it was provided that cases 
which the parliamentary auditors had been unable to determine could 
be continued to the council without litigants being required 
to take out new summonses. 75 In 1471 the auditors concluded 
73- Duncan, 'Central courts', 331. 
74. APS ii 94, c. 2; APS ii 107, c. 11. 
75· APS ii 88. 
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their sitting with a provision continuing unfinished cases to the 
next parliament but allowing parties to 'tak new summondis til a 
schortar day befor the lordis of consail~•.76 It seems clear 
therefore that at this period strain was being placed upon the 
traditional jurisdiction of the council, although its basic concepts 
still survived. 
This is also the period when the actual records of parliament 
and council are becoming available for the scrutiny of the researcher. 
While he may bewail the lack of record for the period when sessions 
were b~ing held, there is still much of interest to be learned from 
the record of the subsequent arrangements, which have recently been 
illuminated by the work of Dr. Trevor Chalmers. 77 In a sense the 
conclusions which he has drawn have already been available to scholars 
throughout the 150 years since the publication of the Acta Dominorum 
Auditorum by Thomas Thomson. To that work Thomson prefixed a 
chronological table of the sittings of parliament and its auditors 
and of council when carrying out its judicial work; as he put it, 
'to exhibit the connection of the sittings•. 78 The Acta Dominorum 
Auditorum began in 1466, the Acta Dominorum Concilii in 1478, so it 
is only from the latter date that any connection can be seen. The 
merest glance at Thomsen's tables will show that the connection was 
very close until 1492 and that thereafter new arrangements began to 
come into effect. 
The basic pattern which Thomsen's table shows very clearly seems 
to have been the meeting of parliament, at which auditors would be 
76. 
77· 
78. 
ADA, 14. 
Chalmers, 'King's council', chs. 3 and 4. 
ADA, introduction, i. 
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appointed and sit, followed immediately by prolonged sessions of 
council. Dr. Chalmers speaks of 'the lords of council who generally 
commenced their diet as the lords auditors finished theirs'.79 As 
we have seen there is evidence that this was becoming established as 
practice at least as early as 1467 and 1471. 80 Professor Hannay 
noted of this period that 'continuation from Parliament to Council 
••• was not yet regarded as a matter of course' but that 'gradually 
the practice of continuing actions from the auditors in Parliament 
to the Council became familiar, and the clerk entered the date for 
81 the next hearing without specifying the court'. He linked this 
with the lapse of the sessions. Although he saw that in March 1478 
auditors and council sat concurrently, he went on to argue that in 
gener.al there was a lack of regularity in council's sittings which 
frustrated litigants and led to yet further accumulation of business. 82 
This view, also put forward by Professor A.L. Brown, 83 has now been 
84 
authoritatively refuted by Dr. Chalmers: 
79· 
8o. 
81. 
84. 
US]ome measure of regularity resulted from the habit 
of arranging council diets for the period immediately 
following the holding of parliament or, perhaps, of a 
general council; this meant that litigants might 
expect diets organised, at best twice yearly, for some 
time between January and March, and for the late 
autumn or early winter. Study of the practice of 
holding council diets around the time of a parliament 
Chalmers, 'King's council', 162. 
See above, 270 - lo 
R.K. Hannay, 'On the antecedents of the College of Justice', 
Book of the Old Edinburgh Club 11 (1922) 87 - 123 at 96. 
Hannay, 'Antecedents•, 97 ~ 8. 
A.L. Brown, 'The Scottish "establishment" in the fifteenth 
century', JR-23 (1978) 89- 105 at 91 2; see also Wormald, 
Court .Kirk-and Community, 24. 
Chalmers, 'King's council', 231. 
t-,. 
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shows the underlying principle: parliament would 
meet, and elect auditors of causes and complaints 
who would sit until parliament was dissolved or ' 
continued, or until some date designated by the 
parent b~dy. While they were sitting, the lords 
of counc1l, with personnel quite distinct from 
that of the auditors would hold brief hearings 
dealing with the king's business. After the 
auditors' jurisdiction expired, the council began 
its diet, and heard a general run of civil causes 
until it had dealt with all the summonses before 
it, or until circumstances necessitated terminating 
the sittings. 
2/3 
What this suggests, looking backwards to the earlier 'sessions', 
is that the pattern of the fifteenth century is one where surplus 
parliamentary work, doing justice to anyone with a complaint, was 
being passed on to council outwith parliament. Thus council's 
ordinary diet, the business of the king, comp~aints against royal 
officers and the grievances of kirkmen, widows, pupils and orphans, 
was perhaps extended to embrace most types of case, not because there 
was a desire to establish a supreme or central court, but because it 
was necessary to find some way of handling the flow of judicial 
business into parliament which would leave time for the other work 
of that institution. By 1480, after further attempts at diversion 
to the courts of the ordinaries and then to special sessions appointed, 
first by the king, then by the estates, a simple system whereby 
council completed the unfinished work of parliament had been 
established. The end result of course was to make access to the 
king's council for all types of litigants less a matter of royal 
grace and more a matter of right comparable to the right of complaint 
in parliament. 
Dr. Chalmers has also traced the continuing changes in the 
system under James IV: the lapsing of the auditorial system as 
parliament was held less often and the establishment of fixed sessions 
~ 
r 
t 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
! 
i 
l 
! 
I 
l 
l 
! 
;· 
L 
274 
of council for judicial work not linked to the holding of parliaments 
as the problem became one of handling, not the flow of business to 
parliament, but rather the burden upon the council. With Professors 
Hannay and Duncan Dr. Chalmers is led by this to the conclusion that 
it is only from the later 1490s that one can speak of the emergence 
within the council of 'a regular and quasi-professional central 
judicature•. 85 
(d) The comparative context 
The simple explanation of the evolution of the various 
institutions of council and parliament is, then, that they were 
attempts to handle the business of council, in and out of parliament, 
with the aim always being to ~elieve the increasing burden on council. 
What is more difficult to explain is why this burden was increasing. 
Most writers have focussed on the inadequacies, the corruption and 
the ignorance of the ordinaries. But it may be suggested that this 
is too pessimistic and narrow a view. Few have examined the 
1 t '1' · · d' · · 'd t t 85a Th deve opmen of cone~ ~ar JUr~s ~ct~on ~n a w~ er con ex • e 
development of the Court of Chancery to cope with petitions to the 
English royal council has already been mentioned. Reference could 
also have been made to numerous other conciliar courts which began 
to emerge in fifteenth century England and in particular to the 
court of Star Chamber. As Chancery jurisdiction became more 
specialised and defined, so the royal council had to find other ways 
in which to deal with the continuing business of petitions. By the 
85. Chalmers, 'King's.council', 316; Hannay, 'Antecedents', 99- 101; 
Duncan, 'Central courts',-334- 5· 
85a. Mention ought to be made here of Neilson's introduction to ADC 
if and of Harding, 'Medieval brieves of protection', both passim. 
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reign of Henry VII, sittings of council in camera stellata were well 
established as 'a secondary forum for litigation during the law 
86 
terms'. Dr. J.H. Baker and Mr. Bruce Webster have suggested 
that the sessions of council in Scotland were 'in many ways like 
those of the English Star Chamber•. 87 It is therefore of some 
interest to note on what grounds English legal historians explain 
the rise of conciliar jurisdiction. Dr. Baker points to the 
influence of more powerful litigants to overawe and intimidate corrupt 
sheriffs and juries; 88 but stress can also be laid on the procedural 
advantages of suing before council rather than in the common law 
courts and on the freedom of conciliar courts from the constraints 
of the forms of action. It is important to realise that this was 
not quite the same thing as the later distinction between the two 
systems of Common Law and Equity, which was the result of a long 
process of development and change based on these original procedural 
differences. The party complaining before council did so because 
common law process would not permit justice to be done. But this 
was a 'mechanical' rather than a substantive failure of the common 
law to provide justice; it was not so much that the common law would 
not but that often it could not. 89 
It was not only in England that such developments were taking 
place. It is many years since F.W. Maitland drew attention to the 
86. J.A. Guy, The Cardinal's Court: The Im act of Thomas wolse in 
Star Chamber Hassocks, 1977 , 13. 
87. Baker, Introduction to English Legal Histor~, 31; Webster, 
Scotland, 157· 
88. Baker, Introduction to English Le~al His tor~, 101; also Guy, 
Cardinal's Court, 8. 
89. Mi~som, Historical Foundations, 82 - 5. 
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rise of conciliar courts in France and Germany in his famous lecture 
on English Law and the Renaissance. In this context he also referred 
briefly to the fact that 'this was the time when King Henry [the 
eighth's] nephew James V was establishing a new court in Scotland, 
a College of Justice'.90 Apart from w.s. Holdsworth, no-one in 
either England or Scotland has sought to elaborate this comparative 
point in explaining the development of concilar jurisdictions, and 
Holdsworth did not take matters much further than Maitland.9l 
the task of detailed comparison is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
the background to the rise of the conciliar courts of the continent 
has suggestive similarities to that found in the British kingdoms. 
The establishment of the German Reichskammergericht in 1495 was the 
outcome of a period in which 'courts came to be supplemented or 
replaced by the ruler's chancellary, the privy councillor, or by 
ordinary councillors' as a consequence of the practice of litigants 
bringing cases before them by petition. The Imperial Chamber Court 
was not a new institution; what happened in 1495 was a reconstitution 
or re-formation of something that was already there. 92 In 1497 the 
Grand Conseil was formally separated from the French king's council 
to carry out judicial work, but it ha~ already acquired a distinct 
identity as a court, taking cases 'in which the Parlement Cde ParisJ 
90. F.W. Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance (Cambridge, 1901) 
19 - 20, 69 - 70. 
91. Holdsworth, History of English Law iv 56. 
92. See G. Dahm, 'On the reception of Roman and Italian law in 
Germany', in Pre-Reformatio~ Germany ed. G. Strauss (London 
and Basingstoke, 1972) 282 -- 315 at 285; also in the same 
work F. Hartung, 'Imperial reform 1485 - 1495: its course 
and character', 73- 135, and K.S. Bader, 'Approaches to 
imperial reform at the end of the fifteenth century', 136 - 161. 
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had either shown signs of partiality or become involved in a 
jurisdictional dispute with another sovereign court•.93 In the 
Burgundian Netherlands, appeals to the council of the duke led to the 
establishment of the Parliament of Malines in 1473. Although it was 
subsequently abandoned, the court was revived under the name of the 
Grand Council in 1504. This development owed something to 'the 
promise of more impartial justice by courts that were not involved 
in local tensions or influenced by local potentates•.94 Similarly 
in Spain the supplemental judicial functions of the Consejo Real of 
Castile became increasingly important in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. From 1480 only Letrados, men with academic legal 
qualifications, were entitled to vote on matters coming before the 
counci1. 95 
Clearly much work remains to be done on these developments in 
Europe and in England. In the present state of knowledge, however, 
the most striking common feature is that in all the countries considered, 
conciliar jurisdiction rose within and was supplemental to the established 
structure of ordinary courts. Its purpose was to do work which these 
courts could not or would not do. It would seem therefore that to 
present the development of conciliar justice in Scotland as the 
consequence of the inadequacies of the ordinary courts is to over-
simplify and distort a very complex story. It cannot be denied that 
the established 'Dark Age' view contains a kernel of truth inasmuch 
93-
94. 
95· 
J.H. Shennan, The Parlement of Paris (London, 1968) 80. 
R.C. van Caenegem, 'Law in the medieval world', Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 49 (1981) 13 - 46 a~ 36 - 7• 
R.L. Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile 1500 - 1700 
(Chapel Hill, 1981) 122 - 3· 
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as obviously council, in and out of parliament, did deal with 
complaints about the ordinary judges. But what did these complaints 
concern? When record becomes available in the latter part of the 
fifteenth century, such complaints hardly bulk large in the court's 
business and mostly they are of a technical, procedural nature: 
holding court in feriate time, failing to proclaim brieves of 
inquest in lawful manner, issuing summonses on less than forty days' 
notice and so on. 96 In short the crude view of the relationship 
between conciliar and ordinary courts cannot stand against the 
evidence. We must look for rather more subtle explanations of the 
increase of council's judicial work and, given the small amount of 
evidence available, we must seek guidance from comparison with other 
European systems undergoing a· similar development at the same time. 
This thesis is not an attempt to account for any quantitative 
increase in the business coming before council. The purpose of the 
argument presented in this chapter has been to affirm the essentially 
residual and supervisory nature of council's jurisdiction in relation 
to that of the ordinary courts and to show that, while that jurisdiction 
was expanded in the course of the fifteenth century, by virtue of 
transfers of business from parliament and from the sessions, the 
original limited jurisdiction was still kept in view as defining the 
proper role of council. The institutional developments of the 
fifteenth century are to be explained as devices for the efficient 
administration, not of justice in general, but of parliamentary and 
96. See indices to ADA and ADC i, s.v. 'Assize', 'Error', 
'Execution', 'Malver-sation'~ 'Sheriff'. Note also-the 
remarks in Macdougall, James III, 203-- 4. 
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conciliar justice, so that that business might be dealt with I 
~; 
with the greatest despatch and not prevent the other functions 
j 
of those bodies being properly carried out. The changing structure 
of conciliar justice in the fifteenth century is thus not to be 
explained by a theory of a 'dark age' in the law and its administration 
by the ordinary courts. It will be argued in the next chapter that 
only with this appreciation of the relationship between parliament 
and council, on the one hand, and the ordinary courts on the other, 
can the exclusion of the former from cases of fee and heritage be 
properly understood. 
> 2§o 
Chapter Six 
Jurisdiction in Fee and Heritage 
• (a) Introduction 
When the records of council and the parliamentary auditors of 
causes and complaints become available in the second half of the 
fifteenth century, it is immediately apparent that when a case before 
them concerned 'fee and heritage' jurisdiction would be declined by 
. I 
these bodies and the case remitted to the judge ordinary. The 
purpose of this chapter is to place the development of this limitation 
of their jurisdiction in the context of the argument of the preceding 
chapters. The argu~ent has been that the administrati.on of the 
common law in later medieval Scotland was primarily the responsibility 
of courts held by the king's ·officers such as the sheriff and the 
justiciar and that the role of parliament and council was essentially 
supplementary to and corrective of these courts. Within this system 
the rule that no man needed to answer for his freeholding without 
the king's pleadable brieve had a particular jurisdictional effect, 
in that the relevant brieves, those of dissasine, mortancestor and 
right, were competent only in the courts of the burgh, the sheriff 
and the justiciar. Thus most disputes over landholding, at any rate 
at the level of libere tenentes, would have been resolved in these 
courts. The last reference to the brieves rule which can be dated 
with confidence is c. 1400, but the continued use of the brieves of 
dissasine, mortancestor and right in the fifteenth century seems to 
imply that it remained of effect in that period. 
As noted in the first chapter, historians have usually explained 
the fee and heritage rule as the· consequence of a 'feudal victory', 
·the survival of the idea that pleas concerning landholding should be 
heard in the court of the lord of whom the land was held.1 It is 
clear however that this explanation is unacceptable since, even if 
this 'feudal theory' ever did apply in Scotland, it would appear to 
have been superseded by the brieves rule. 2 A more subtle explanation 
of the exclusion of council from fee and heritage cases has been 
advanced by Professor Duncan.3 Because council could not call upon 
the men of the neighbourhood to give a verdict, it was debarred from 
dealing with landownership. This he seems to link with the fact that 
council, unlike parliament, was not fenced and had no dempster; thus 
council, unlike parli.ament, was not a court. Although Professor 
Duncan does not make the point explicit, it might be thought to follow 
from.this that parliament, as a court, did have jurisdiction in fee 
and heritage. 
The difficulty with such a view is the fact that parliament's 
auditors of causes and com~laints could not hear cases of fee and 
heritage, and there is, it is submitted, no good reason for supposing 
that the auditors here exercised-a lesser jurisdiction than that of 
the full parliament. It is true that parliament could appoint an 
assize and pronounce a doom based on the verdict of that assize; it 
/ did so constantly in cases of treason.· We may also note that the 
auditors of falsed dooms reported back to parliament so that the 
1. See above, 14. 
2. See above, 137 46. Nevertheless on the two occasions when 
the judge ordinary to whom c~ses are remitted is named, he turns 
out to be a lord of regality (~ i 188 (the archbishop of St. 
Andrews) and ADA, 13, 15, 17 (the earl of Angus)). As the· 
brieves rule applied within regalities, however (see above, 138- 9), 
it would seem that neither of these cas~s is inconsistent with 
the view expressed in the text. 
3. Duncan, 'Central courts', 328; Duncan, 'James I', 3. 
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verdict could be pronounced by its dempster within the fenced full 
court. 4 If such a procedure was conceivable for falsed dooms, it is 
difficult to see why it could not also have been used by the auditors 
of causes and complaints in cases of fee and heritage. The better 
view is that the auditors had no jurisdiction in such cases because 
parliament had no jurisdiction. 
This point of view is reinforced by the observation that the 
application of the brieves rule would have had the effect of restric~ing 
the jurisdiction of both parliament and council, since none of the 
brieves described in Regiam or Quoniam as pleadable was addressed to 
these institutions. The little evidence that exists on how actions 
were brought before parliament and council suggests that a summons 
was issued in response to a bill of complaint and that in the early 
fifteenth century the summons took the form of a brieve 'under the 
'testimony of the great seal'. This means that the document was 
written in Latin on parchment and was authenticated by the quarter 
seal - that is, one half of the king's great sea1.5 Since we only 
know definitely of the quarter seal from the reign of James r 6 the 
position in the fourteenth century is uncertain, but it seems most 
likely that the brieve of summons, either under the great seal proper 
'or the quarter seal, was the standard writ by which defenders were 
brought before parliament or council to answer complaints. It has 
been said that the privy seal was 'commonly used by the council from 
the later fourteenth century', but all the examples cited in support 
4. Duncan, 'Central courts', 337, 340. 
5. See especially Highland Papers 11 158 - 60. 
see Thomson, Public Records, 75 - 6. 
6. Thomson, Public Records, 75; cf. RRS vi 28. 
On the quarter seal 
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of that statement show this to have been in the execution of decrees 
rather than to summon defenders.? Sometime in the first half of the 
fifteenth century summonses before council and the parliamentary 
auditors began to be issued under the.king's signet seal. Signet 
letters were in the vernacular and written on paper, by contrast with 
the Latin and the parchment of the quarter seal brieve; ultimately 
they were to oust the brieve as the principal writ of summons. 8 
While then brieves were used to commence actions in parliament and 
council, they did not meet the requirements of the 1318 act, since 
they were not amongst the pleadable brieves; in any event they were 
being used less and less frequently during the fifteenth century. 
However, it is clear that the connection between the brieves 
rule and the fee and heritage rule was not quite as simple as it 
may appear from the previous paragraph. There is a difficulty with 
the view that the brieves rule operated directly to deprive parliament 
and council of jurisdiction, and that is the differ~nce, more than 
just one of words or of formulation, between saying that a court has 
no jurisdiction in fee and heritage,and that a man cannot be put out 
of his freehold except by pleadable brieve. The difference between 
a freehold, an interest enduring for one man's lifetime, and the 
potentially perpetual interest of heritage, has been explained 
elsewhere in this thesis. 9 It means that, at any rate by the time 
7. Duncan, 'Central courts', 334 and sources there given. 
8. R.K. Hannay, 'The early history of the Scottish 
Histor of the Societ of Writers to His Ma"est 
Edinburgh, 193 3 - 51 at 20 - 2 • 
9. See above, 147 - 52·, l97 and 211. 
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records begin, the jurisdiction of parliament and council was wider 
than a strict application of the brieves rule would have permitted. 
An example will illustrate the point. A liferenter dispossesses a 
tercer. The tercer is forced to action by pleadable brieve because· 
the liferenter can claim to be vest and saised of a freehold. The 
tercer's only remedy is the brieve of dissasine, because under that 
brieve she need only show a freehold interest herself. But by 
1466 it would seem that such a case could be dealt with by parliament 
and council because no question of fee and heritage arose in it. 
Differences between the two rules also emerges from consideration 
of the cases in which the fee and heritage exception was pleaded 
after 1466. ·It was usually raised by way'of dilatory exception by 
. . 10 . . . 
the defender and ~n most cases ~t is apparent that he was ~n 
possession of the lands in issue. Thus the defender could also have 
pleaded the brieves rule. But there were also cases where the lords 
remitted the action because in the course of the litigation it emerged 
that at the heart of the dispute there were claims on both sides to 
a heritable title; inrsuch circ~stances the fee and.heritage rule 
might protect a defender not in possession from action before the 
lords. 
The cases in which it is most apparent that the defender is in 
possession are those where the complaint is of wrongful occupation. 
Thus in 1483 William Ayton claimed that Duncan Toshack had wrongfully, 
occupied his heritage of Petteny for eight years. Toshack replied 
that he held the lands heritab1y in feu-ferme by a grant of Ayton's 
10. See e.g. ~' 3, •123; ADC i 161, 216; ADC ii 350; ADC 
(Stair) iii 44, 63, 139, 179. 
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father and excepted to the jurisdiction of the lords. To shack 
having proved his lawful possession of the lands, the case was 
remitted to the judge ordinary as concerning fee and heritage.11 
Similarly in another action for wrongful occupation in 1490, this 
time concerning the barony of Fordell in Fife, the defender produced 
a royal charter under the great seal and a sasine and claimed the 
lands as her heritage. When the pursuer produced his sasine, the 
defender argued that the case should be remitted to the judge 
ordinary. The lords duly declined jurisdiction 'because the 
disputaccioun thirof micht exclude·ane of the said partiis perpetualy 
fra the heretage of the said landis and als because the.disputaccioun 
of the saidis sesing concernis the fee and heretage of the saidis 
landis•.12 A complaint in 1492 of wrongful occupation of the barony 
· of-Luss was referred to the judge ordinary after the defender had 
alleged the lands to be his fee and heritage 'and wochit the samyn 
with the parell of law•. 13 In 1495 the defender answered a complaint 
of eighteen years' wrongful occupation of Lammelethin, Fife by 
claiming it as his heritage and producing an instrument of sasine. 
The lords referred the action to the judge ordinary as it concerned 
d h •t 14 fee an er1 age. 
In these cases of wrongful occupation held to concern fee and 
heritage (of which there are other examples.~15 ) it is obvious that 
11. ADA, *123, 128•. 
12. ADC i 161. 
13. ADC i 216. 
14. ADC i 419· 
15. E.g. .i\DA, 10, 48; ADC ii 212, 258. 
the defender is in possession since otherwise the action would be 
unnecessary, but it is also apparent that he had to prove some title 
to support his possession and his claim of heritage. If he failed 
in this, the action proceeded before the lords. So in 1502 when the 
abbot and convent of Jedburgh sued Andrew Ker of Ferniehurst for 
twenty years' wrongful occupation of Thornyhaugh in the forest of 
Jed, Ker produced his charter and sasine of Ferniehurst and claimed 
that Thornyhaugh was a pertinent of ·those lands. No proof of this 
was offered and his argument that the dispute was one of fee and 
heritage and should be remitted to the judge ordinary was rejected.16 
The defender thus had to show lawful possession, possession of the 
kind which under the 1318 act would have compelled the pursuer .to 
use a pleadable brieve to eject him. So in these cases at least we 
can see the fee and heritage rule operating in the same way as the 
1318 act, protecting lawful possession, the only real difference being 
in the legal nature of the possession protected, heritage as distinct 
from freehold. 
However the exception to the jurisdiction was not pleaded only 
in cases of wrongful occupation. Probably the commonest types of 
case where it was pleaded were actions of error against inquests in 
Jthe service of heirs and actions of spuilzie. In the former of 
these the exception would be raised normally by the person served 
heir at the inquest, since it was his title, not that of the members 
of the inquest, which the action put in issue. Generally speaking 
he would have been summoned as a defender to the action for his 
interest and might have sasine as a consequence of the service. 
16. ADC (Stair) iii 145. 
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So again such a defender would have had protection under the 1318 
act. 17 But none of the cases recorded in print show clearly the 
nature of the defender's possession, if any, and so it is also 
possible that here the fee and heritage rule operated in a different 
way from the brieves rule, looking not for the defender's possession 
but simply for two competing claims to land. But this need not 
mean that there was no relationship between the two rules; it would 
show rather that by the latter part of the fifteenth century the 
fee and heritage rule had by virtue of its separate formulation 
acquired an independent content and application. The question 
would then be to explain how this development came to take place. 
Actions of spuilzie also raise difficult problems. It is worth 
beginning with the subject matter of the actions of spuilzie in which 
'the fee and heritage exception was pleaded. They may be divided 
.1 into two main types: either the spuilzie of rents of lands or the 
spuilzie of animals from lands. The basis for the defender's 
actions was of course ownership, or lordship, of the lands and 
entitlement to take the rents and profits thereof. In one of the 
earliest cases of spuilzie of rents, it was alleged that the 
defenders had been uplifting the maills of Kimmerghame for the past 
18 three years. The fee and heritage exception was upheld and the 
case remitted to the judge ordinary. The facts are not completely 
clear, but the case appears to have arisen out of a dispute between 
the heir-male and the daughters of John Sinclair"of Herdmanston. 
17. E.g. ADC i 5, 6 - 7, 25, 36,. 57, 67 
ADC (Stair) iii 139· 
18. ADA, ~3, 15. 
8, 223; ADC ii 175; 
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The daughters were the defenders in the spuilzie case and subsequently . 
acquired ownership of Kimmerghame, presumably as heirs general.19 
It seems very likely therefore that they were in possession for the 
three years during which they were taking the rents and that they 
were not mere interlopers. Accordingly here again the rule about 
fee and heritage operated as the 1318 act would have done; perhaps 
a similar situation lies behind two other near-contemporaneous cases 
of spuilzie of rents in which also the fee and heritage exception was 
20 
upheld. 
The spuilzie of animals cases are less straightforward. In the 
action brought by Ad~m Blackadder against Thomas ~dingtqn in 1480, 
Edington claimed that he had taken the beast as a herezeld - that is, 
in exercise of the right of a·superior to the beat animal of his 
. 21 
,deceased tenant.· Acting as a superior is not of course quite the 
same thing as being vest and saised of the superiority on a formal 
title; it might rather be a way of laying claim to the title of 
superior as against another. Nevertheless the record states somewhat 
ambiguously that 'the lard of Dalwolsy, advocate for Thomas Edington, 
allegit that a part of the landis of Blakader pertenis to the said 
Thomas in heretage and that the resoun of the landia he tuke a 
herezelde and is in possessioun thirof'· It is not clear whether 
this means that Edington claimed to be in possession of the lands 
themselves, or whether he was merely explaining his possession of 
19. See ~ ii 394, 396. 
20. ~' 9, 13. 
21. ADC i ?8. 
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the herezeld by reference to his claim of a heritable title; but 
at all events the lords held that the case depended upon fee and 
heritage and remitted to the judge ordinary. Legal possession does 
however appear to be important in the complex case of William lord 
Ruthven against Archibald Preston in 1495.22 William alleged 
spuilzie of oxen from him and his tenants of Coustland by Archibald, 
who replied by claiming that the lands were his heritage, that he 
was in possession, and that he had taken the beasts for the maills. 
William called Henry lord Sinclair for warrandice and the argument 
became one between Henry and Archibald as to who had right to uplift 
the maills of Coustland. Archibald argued that Henry only had right 
by virtue of an agreement with his sister, whose rights ended on her 
marriage. The lords fixed a proof of the manner of the parties' 
possession, presumably as a preliminary to determining whether to 
'uphold Archibald's exception that as the case touched fee and 
heritage it should be referred to the judge ordinary. By contrast 
nothing about the nature of. the parties' possession emerges from the 
two other cases of spuilzie of cattle which were sent to be decided 
by the judge ordinary because, as all parties claimed heritable 
title to the lands in question, they concerned fee and heritage. 23 
Another interesting group of cases are those where the pursuer 
alleged that an annualr.~n~ due to him was being wrongfully withheld 
' from him by the defender. In essence these would have been actions 
for payment, but on a number of occasions in the printed records we 
22. ADC i.405. 
23. ADA, 94; ADC i 33~ 
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find them being sent to the judge ordinary 'becaus it is fe and 
heretage and kan nocht be decidit but one of the partiis be hurt in 
the richt of thir heretage•. 24 An annualrent was a method of 
securing repayment of the loan of a capital sum without infringing 
the prohibition of usury. The sum lent was treated as purchasing 
the lender a r~ght to receive a rent from the borrower's lands. The 
lender was formally infeft in his annualrent as a right in land and 
so acquired a heritable title. But, by contrast with the position 
under a wadset,the borrower was not divested of his own heritable 
title and poasession. 25 It is significant that according to Quoniam 
the creditor's remedy·in the case of the debtor's default was the 
brieve of right rather than the brieve of distress. 26 In the actions 
remitted to the judge ordinary by council, the problem appears to 
have arisen because the original holder of the annualrent right had 
assigned it to another and the validity of the transfer was denied by 
the borrower. So in 1480 John Porterfield claimed that ~ annualrent 
in the lands of Schethum had been assigned to him by his father, but 
was met by an allegation that this had been without the consent of 
27 
the owner of the lands, the defender, Thomas Schethum. Thomas 
would be in possession and his argument would have been that John's 
invalid claim would put him out of the _free enjoyment of his heritage. 
So the lords' decision to remit the case to the judge ordinary as one 
of fee and heritage can be seen as a recognition that the claim 
24. 
25-
26. 
27. 
H.H. Monteath, 'Heritable rights', in Introduction to Scottish 
Legal History (Stair Soc., vol. 20) 156- 198 at 187. 
Quoniam Attachiamenta, eh. 40. 
ADC. i 58. 
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challenged the free title of a man in possession. Similarly in 
1478 Andrew Mowbray sued John Barton for an annual and called 
Alexander Knightson, presumably the o~iginal ~reditor of the rent, 
as his warrant; ·it seems probable that Barton, like Schethum, was 
denying the validity of an assignation to the pursuer, so making the 
case one of competing claims to heritable rights appropriate only to 
the judge ordinary. 28 Following Quoniam, it would appear that in 
both cases the creditor~ remedy was the brieve of right. 29 
Finally we may note two of the many cases which arose out of the 
complex question of the succession to the lands of Sir Thomas Wemyss 
of Rires and Leuchars.in Fife. 30 Sir Thomas died in the winter of 
1478 - 79· By virtue of a royal grant of 147731 Rires should then 
have passed to Arthur Forbes, husband of Elizabeth Wemyss ,. (the 
grand-daughter and heir of Sir Thomas). But when in March 1479 
·Forbes raised an action of spuilzie of thirty oxen and large quantities 
of crops 'out of the maynis of Reras' against John and Thomas Wemyss, 
'sons to umquhile Schir Thomas of Wemis of Reras', the case was 
'referrit and remittit be the lordis of counsale to be determit 
before the juge ordinare, because the landis that the said gudis 
28. 
29. 
30. 
ADC i 18. 
For another more complex case concerning annualrents which was 
remitted to the judge ordinary as concerning fee and heritage 
see ~ i 118. The pr~cise .nature of the dispute is unclear. 
See generally my 'Jurisdiction in heritage and the lords of council 
and session after 1532', in Miscellany II (Stair Soc., vol. 35) 
61 - 85. 
31. RMS ii no. 1305. 
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was takin of is clamyt fee and heretage be baith the said parties 
and the questioun of the richt dependis apoun heretage•.32 In the 
context of the present discussion the main point of interest lies in 
the fact that the Wemyss brothers were protected by the fee and 
heritage rule although in 1479 they could show no ~ facie valid 
title to justify any possession of Rires they may have had. 
Accordingly theY could not have claimed the protection of the 1318 
act. But, as I have attempted to show in detail elsewhere, John 
Wemyss did have some claim to a better right than that of Arthur 
Forbes in Rires. 33 The remission of Forbes• action of spuilzie to 
the judge ordinary was therefore based on the existence of competing 
claims of heritable right only and not on the lawful possession of 
Wemyss, showing that by this time the fee and heritage exception was 
wider in scope. than the brieves rule. 
The case may be contrasted with another action of spuilzie, 
this time of the lands of Wester Cruivie in Fife, brought in 1480 
against James Bonar by Baldred Blackadder. 34 Blackadder's title 
to Wester Cruivie was derived from the conjunct fee of his wife, 
Margaret Melville, who was the widow of Sir Thomas Wemyss. 35 
Nevertheless the case was remitted to the judge ordinary as a matter 
of heritage. Bonar had produced 'a letter of testimoniale schewand 
that he was enterit as are to his fader ••• be Arthur of Forbace as 
32. ADC i 22. 
33· 'Jurisdiction in heritage', 68- 75· 
34. 
35· 
ADC i 65 - 6. 
For Margaret's right to Wester Cruivie see RMS ii no. 1303. 
For all the issues arising see 'Jurisdiction in heritage', 
72 - 4. 
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his oure lord'; in other words he was in apparently lawful possession 
and so protected not only by the fee and heritage rule but also by the 
1318 act. 
This examination of the cases in which the fee and heritage 
exception was pleaded has shown that, while there was a substantial 
overlap with the brie~es rule, there were situations where the lords 
declined jurisdiction even though the defender would have been unable 
to show that he held possession so that he could only be put out by 
pleadable brieve. It would seem therefore that there is no direct 
link between the two rules. Some other explanation for the fee and 
heritage rule must be· found. In the remainder of this chapter it 
will be argued that the true origin of the fee and heritage rule lies 
in the exclusion of the jurisdiction of parliament and council where 
there was an ordinary common law remedy. T~e gradual abandonment 
of this position in the fifteenth century did not affect issues of 
landholding however, because in that area there was.the additional 
hurdle of the brieves rule to be overcome. In this way the brieves 
rule helped to define what became one of the few limitations on the 
jurisdiction of parliament and, in particular, council. It will 
also be shown that council always enjoyed a particular jurisdiction 
to determine certain questions about the possession of land, and from 
this the tentative suggestion will be made that the canonist 
distinction of proprietary and possessory actions may have led to 
some idea that council was excluded only from proprietary actions, 
that is, those about ownership of lands or, in the terminology of 
medieval Scots law, the fee and heritage. 
----------------------------------------~-· 
(b) The early restrictions 
Professor Duncan states that, in the fourteenth and early 
fifteenth centuries, 'where an action concerned fee and heritage, 
. 1 h d . . d. t . ' 36 the counc~ a no Jur~s ~c ~on • He bases this conclusion upon 
the evidence of a small number of cases, but in fact none of these 
give direct support to the statement since, while all involved 
disputes over land, in none did the council decline jurisdiction. 
Thus Professor Duncan refers to the decree of council general in 
March 1416 holding that the governor of the realm ought to recognosce 
the superiority of the barony of Cessford_and to maintain William 
Cockburn and his wife as tenants there. Cockburn and his wife had 
alleged molestation by William Douglas of ·old Roxburgh,who claimed 
to be the superior of the lands.j. against the argument of the 
Cockburns that the lands were held of the ki~g.37 There-is no 
hint of a declinature of jurisdiction here. Rather council general 
acts to maintain the possession of the Cockburn~ which was apparently 
justified by charters. A case of 1373 decided by the presides of 
parliament appears to be of a similar nature; the decreet is that 
David Graham ought to remain in possession of the lands of Old 
Montrose and that the king ought to stand with him as ·Warrantor, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary by John Lindsay of Thurston.
38 
Professor Duncan speaks of the 'delivery of possession' and the 
'giving of sasine' by council in connection with these cases, but 
with respect that is not quite what happens; it looks more as though 
existing possession is protected by the decreets. 
36. Duncan, 'Central courts', 328. 
37. ~ xiv (3) 15 (no. 24). 
38. APS xii 18 (no. 32). 
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Professor Duncan also mentions two cases of 1416 and 1423 
recorded in two documents first printed by him.39 Both involved 
the procedure of recognition, here meaning the process by which 
lands in dispute were taken into the hands of the superior of whom 
they were held in order to determine which of the competing parties 
had been the last lawful possessor thereof. The effect of the award 
was not to settle the whole question at issue between the parties 
but simply to define who should be pursuer and defender in the 
eventual litigation which would determine where the better title 
40 lay. The person in possession as a result of the recognition 
could only be ejected by action against him begun by ple.adable brieve. 
Thus in the first of Professor Duncan's cases Sir John Rosa of 
Hawkhead received lands which he claimed to hold of the king in fee 
and heritage, but only upon giving a pledge and subject to reservation 
of the rights of others. In the second case the lands had been 
recognosced and the pursuer, having given documentary evidence of 
his title (and so established the lawfulness of his possession), 
received the lands in pledge. 
These cases are not therefore evidence about council's lack of 
jurisdiction in fee and heritage. Instead they are examples of what 
was a common form of process, not just before council, but also before 
parliament and indeed subject-superiors. Thus in 1422 Herbert 
Maxwell lord of Carlaverock received the lands of Nether Dryppis, 
which had been recognosced by the governor, in pledge, having given 
39. In 'Councils general 1404 -·1423', SHR 35 (1956) 132- 143 at 
"141-- 2. 
40. On recognition see Skene, De Verborum Significatione, s.v. 
'Recognition', no. 5. 
evidence of his title to the superiority.41 In 1427 the king 
recognosced lands disputed between 'the lorde Kambal' and Sir John 
Scrymgeour as the first step in what were to be·lengthy proceedings 
to determine their ownership. 42 In 1459 recognosced lands were given 
in borgh (i.e. pledge) to Thomas Allardice by king and council; 43 
similarly in 1467 the king in presence of his council commanded the 
chancellor to relax a recognition over certain lands in favour of 
- 4L.f. 
David Hay of Yester. That this procedure might be followed in 
parliament is shown by the dispute over the ownership of the barony 
of Rires between Arthur Forbes and John Wemyss of Pittencrieff. 
Forbes and Wemyss were unable to agree on who the judge should be 
and upon which of them should be pursuer or defender. In 1481 
parliament decide~ that the lands of Rires should be recognosced 
by the king, 'for staynchin of debate betuix the saide partiis, 
but nocht lattin thaim to borgh to nowther of thame•. 45 In 1485 
-Forbes sued Wemyss before council 'anent the asking of the lands of 
Reris to borgh quhilkis ar recognist in our soverane lordis handis 
for the debatis betuix the said partiis'. It would seem that 
Wemyss had gained possession for it was 'complenit be the said 
Arthur that the hous of Reras is takin fra him be uncoursable lettrez 
41. Fraser, Carlaverock ii no. 31. 
42. Highland Papers ii 152 ~ 175· 
43. HMC v, appendix, 629 - 30. 
44. Yester Writs no. 137. 
45. APS ii 134 •. 
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purchest be the said Johne of Wemia•. 46 Subsequently the question 
of who had been the last lawful possessor was settled in favour of 
Forbes: in 1491 the recorda of the parliamentary auditors note 
'that our soverane lordis faider quham god assolze let the said 
landia of Reres to borgh to the said Arthure Forbea efter congnitioun 
of the cause him self sittand in jugement•. 47 
This last example shows very well how contentious and difficult 
to resolve the issue of possession might be and that it was not merely 
a matter of preserving the status quo. What was critical was the 
lawfulness of the possession; that is to say, possession based upon 
some ~ facie valid and regular title such as a charter and sasine .• 
It is clear that in most cases the determination of this question was 
only a preliminary to further action; the successful party had to find 
a pledge, or borgh, as an acknowledgement that his possession was 
interim only and not that of an owner. But it does not necessarily 
follow from this that council had no jurisdiction to hear questions 
of fee and heritage; all that can be said is that council (and 
parliament) had jurisdiction to maintain and, if required, to 
determine issues as to the most recent lawful possession of lands. 
A more fruitful approach is to examine the small amount of 
evidence showing parliament and council_declining jurisdiction in 
cases apparently concerned with the ownership of land. What is 
striking about them is that jurisdiction was declined, not on the 
grounds that the cases concerned fee and heritage, but on the grounds 
that the parties ought to use the common law. Two examples have 
46. ADC i •107. 
47. ADA, 159. See 'Jurisdiction in heritage', 74. 
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been mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the cases of Robert stewart 
lord of Menteith in 1368 and Marjorie Lindsay in 1401. 48 Both 
raised complaints in parliament and were told that their remedy lay 
at common law. In another chapter it was suggested that Robert 
Stewart's remedy for the recovery of terce lands belonging to his 
wife by reason of a former marriage would have been a brieve of 
d . · 49 Th . 1 h ~ssas~ne. e case ~s comp ex. T e link between Stewart and 
the defender, Archibald Douglas, was most probably the earlier 
marriage of Stewart's wife, Margaret countess of Menteith, to Sir 
John Hurray of Bothwell. Murray had died in 1351, to be succeeded by 
Sir Thomas Murray who -in turn died in 1361. His widow, ·herself a 
Murray of Drumsargard, married Archibald Douglas in 1362, bringing 
with her a liferent of Bothwell as the conjunctfiar thereof with Sir 
Thomas.50 It seems highly probable that in 1368 Stewart was seeking 
to regain the terce of Bothwell pertaining to his wife Margaret, 
while Douglas was asserting a freehold in the whole of the lands by 
virtue of the conjunct fee of his wife. Here then we have an actual 
example of the hypothetical situation discussed earlier, a dispute 
over lands, not involving any question of fee and heritage, which 
under the 1318 act should have been litigated by pleadable brieve. 
But in declining jurisdiction parliamen~ did not mention the brieves 
rule; instead it was simply stated that Stewart must have resort 
to the common law in the court of the justiciar. Yet a century 
later the case could have been heard by parliament or council because 
it did not involve any dispute about fee and heritage. 
48. APS i 505, 582.· See above, 197 and. 251. 
49. See above, 197• 
50. Scots Peerage iii 161 - 3, vi 138 - 40. 
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This case is extremely important. It shows a dispute over 
land being remitted by parliament to another court and the common 
law. In other words at common law parliament was not a forum for 
such litigation even though it involved lands held in chief of the 
king• The declinature of jurisdiction was not couched in terms of 
either the brieves rule or the fee and heritage rule; indeed, if the 
latter had been the rule at the time, the case would not have been 
sent away to another court. It seems clear that the case was 
remitted on the basis that parliament was incompetent to deal with 
complaints for which there existed remedies at common law: in 
this instance, the brieve of dissasine in the justiciar ,·s court. 
Similarly Marjorie Lindsay's case does not seem to have involved 
~ny question of fee and heritage. Her complaint concerned 
dispossession from her terce of the estates of her deceased husband, 
Henry Douglas of Lochleven and Lugton,51 as well as from the tutory 
of her son William. The defender was Henry Douglas' brother, James 
Douglas the elder (patre) of Dalkeith. As Marjorie had a conjunct 
fee of· her husband's principal lands of Lochleven, Lugton and 
Langnewton,52 her claim to terce must have been to the lands of 
Cros~raguel, Lanarkshire, which Henry held of his brother. We know 
that after Henry's death James recognosced Crossraguel and that there 
was a dispute over the tutory of Henry's heir William.53 In his 
testament Henry had apparently provided that Marjorie should be the 
tutor54 but at common law william's nearest agnate, his uncle James, 
51. 
52. 
53· 
54. 
~or Henry Douglas see Scots Peerage vi 364 - 5· 
Morton Registrum ii nos. 190 - 2. 
See Marton Registrum ii nos. 194 and 217. For Crossraguel, 
Lanarkshire (Glassford parish) see RMS · i no·. 490 and Morton 
Registrum ii no. 106; also W.J. Watson, The History of the Celtic 
Place Names of Bcotland (Edinburgh and London, 1926) 190, 576. 
Morton Registrum ii no. 194. 
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would be entitled to the office. Thus at bottom this dispute was 
really about the right to possess and administer lands where the 
undoubted heir was not yet of full age. No question of fee and 
heritage arose, yet parliament declined jurisdiction. If the 
recognition by James had put Marjorie out of her terce, nevertheless 
his consequent possession was~ facie lawful and regular; it could 
therefore be shown to be wrongful only by an action at common law. 
It may be suggested that Margaret's remedy was the brieve of. 
dissasine. 
This case demonstrates again the concern of parliament and 
council to protect the most recent lawful state of possession and 
its inability to go further into land disputes. A similar rationale 
appears to underlie a c·ase of.l430 in which parliament over-ruled 
a plea in a dispute over lands that 'the cause ought not to be 
determined by parliament 1 .55 The reasons for advancing the plea 
are not known but what is said of the facts of the case suggests that 
they were connected with the jurisdiction of parliament to determine 
questions of land-holding where there was a common law remedy. The 
pursuer complained that the defenders had despoiled her of the lands 
of Luchald in the barony of Dalmeny and now unjustly held them. 
Accordingly this looks like a situation in which once again a 
brieve of dissasine would have provided an appropriate remedy and 
it was probably this which underlay the defender's contention that 
parliament had no jurisdiction. Nevertheless parliament restored 
the pursuer to the lands. The reason for this seems to have been 
the inability of the defenders to justify their possession of the 
lands once the pursuer had stated that she held, not of them, but 
55. RHS ii no. 146; APS ii 28, no. 6. 
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of the king. Thus hers was the last lawful possession and that 
could only be challenged, in accordance with principle, by action 
at common law. 
Finally this protection of possession emerges clearly from 
another case in 1385 where the pursuer was sent to his common law 
remedy, this time by council general rather than parliament.56 The 
case also shows that complaints might be remitted to the common law 
even though they did not concern landholding directly. William 
Fenton complained of expulsion from his tenement and did obtain a 
decree of restoration. The facts were very special. Fenton had 
been ejected from his lands in the barony of Dirleton, East Lothian, 
by judgment of the baron court. He had falsed the doom in the 
sheriff court of Edinburgh and, pending the outcome of this _appeal, 
had been restored to his former possession. The baron however had 
again put him out and Fenton had sought a remedy for this abuse of 
process before king and council; a decree for his restoration had 
been pronounced and executed but once more the baron moved to expel 
him from possession. It was this last action of which Fenton 
complained before council general and for which he received another 
decree of restoration until the discussion of the doom of the baron 
court. The complaint was thus of contempt of a decree of council, 
which doubtless explains why, exception.ally in this period, council 
general dealt with the matter. But Fenton was sent to the common 
law ~concerning other artic~es contained in his complaint which do 
not depend from the falsing of the doom'. Fenton was in lawful 
possession and that would be protected by council; all else would 
require procedure at common law. · 
56. APS. i 552. 
Q 
In conclusion therefore, it is submitted that the jurisdiction 
of parliament in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries was 
indeed limited, but that limitation was not expressed as an exclusion 
from cases touching fee and heritage. Rather it was excluded from 
cases where a remedy might be had through ordinary common law procedure. 
Council general appears to have been subject to a similar limitation 
and, we. must assume, so was council. But parliament and council did 
protect, and determine questions concerning, the most recent state of 
lawful possession of lands. This can be seen as part of the 
jurisdiction to· supplement the common law. At common law the rule 
was that no one vest ~nd saised of lands could be ejected from them 
except by action begun by pleadable brieve. The last lawful possessor 
was entitled to the protectio~ of the rule, but if his or her identity 
was disputed how was the matter to be resolved? The capacity of 
council and parliament to deal with such questions should not however 
be misunderstood; this was undoubtedly a jurisdiction to establish 
and maintain the most recent state of possession of lands and thus to 
identify who should have the benefit of defending the subsequent action 
on the question of the right. It was not a covert substitute for a 
jurisdiction which belonged to other courts. vli th this understanding 
of council's jurisdiction we can make sense of an act passed in 1450, 
which Professor Duncan suggests concerns spuilzie.57 It dealt with 
defenders contumaciously not compearing in answer to summonses before 
council. In general the d&fender was to be given three separate 
days to answer; if he continued contumacious throughout, then on the 
third day the action should proceed in his absence. There were 
57. APS ii 37, c. 18; Duncan, 'Central co~rts', 333· 
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however special provisions 'gif the.cause be of fee and heritage'. 
The case should not be proceeded with; instead the pursuer was. to 
be put in possession of the lands where he was to remain until the 
defender paid the expenses and unlaws incurred through his contumacy. 
That done, 'he salbe herde in the principale cause movit agaynis hym 
nochtagaynstandand the decrete of possessioune befor gevin'. Only 
if 'prescripcioune lauchful' ran against him by reason of the length 
. ~o.d r-evv""~&.~•,··e..J U~"\·V~:.,.,.~u;sked 
of time for which his liabilities~would he be prevented from answering 
the cause of fee and heritage. 
It seems clear that this statute is modifying the procedure, 
not of spuilzie, but ·or recognition before council. The pursuer 
is to be given possession without having either to establish that 
he was the last lawful possessor or to give a borgh. If the defender 
subsequently purges his contumacy, then the issue of last lawful 
possessor may be re-opened, unless prescription operates to prevent 
this. It is the reference to prescription which makes this 
interpretation particularly likely. Scots law has never known the 
possibility of acquiring ownership of land by prescription based on 
possession alone; 58 on the other hand medieval canon law allowed the 
pursuer in an action where the defender was contumacious to be awarded 
interim possession of its subject mat~er which would become definitive 
after one year without challenge.59 What the act of 1450 is saying 
here is that the possession awarded where the defender has persisted 
in contumacy cannot be challenged on the basis that the pursuer was 
not in fact the last lawful possessor: the pursuer's possession is 
58. Craig, Jus Feudale II, i, 8; C. D'O. Farran, Principles of Scots 
and English Land Law (Edinburgh, 1958) 187. 
59. R~ichel, Complete Manual of Canon Law ii 274, note 84. 
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now established and it is for the defender to raise the action 
concerning the right to which the recognition was a preliminary. 
The references to 'causes of fee and heritage' obscure the meaning 
of the act from modern eyes; but the phrase was u~ed because 
recognitions and determinations of possession by council were the 
opening stages of ,just such causes, not because council had then 
acquired a jurisdiction to decide them finally itself. 
(c) The emergence of the fee and heritage rule 
In the previous chapter I argued that in the course of the 
fifteenth century the idea that parliament and council could not 
act where there was a common law remedy was gradually superseded. 
Perhaps the most likely explanation of this is that increasingly 
parties were ·allowed to raise actions before council by the king's 
'emplesance' (this being perhaps linked with the development of the 
signet summons, a direct expression of the king's will). 
the lords of session were given jurisdiction over most forms of 
civil action, it being indicated that in all these causes parties 
had 'ful fredome' to sue either before the session or the judge 
ordinary. 
i('\ c..{v-dec:{ ~{( 
_ The jurisdiction of the session 
J•accionis the quhilkis concernys nocht fee nor heretage', while 
there were also special provisions about spuilzie. In 'spoliacione 
of movabill gudis nocht tuiching fee nor heretage' the lords might 
proceed 'indifferentle'; qut in 'spoliacione ••• done becaus of 
landis or possessionis debatable or grondyt apone fee and heretage' 
then they were to call upon the sheriff to restore the ground 
'without preiudice of any ~arty tuichande thir fee and heretage'. 
This was to be done by ·the familiar processes of recognition: the 
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lands were to be recognosced into the king's hands, the sheriff 
was to hold an inquest on who had been the last lawful possessor of 
the lands and to him the king would give the lands on receipt of a 
borgh. Although the act does not say so expressly this was 
presumably intended to be only the first step towards an action 
before the judge ordinary to determine where the ground right truly 
6o lay. So here again the act is evidence of the limited competence 
of the sessions in cases of fee and heritage. 
This act of 1458 is the first recorded use of the phrase 'fee 
and heri ta·ge' to define the limits of conciliar jurisdiction and it 
is necessary to explain how that formulation of the rule emerged. 
The starting point is the idea that parliament and council had no 
jurisdiction where there was a common law remedy. This idea 
survived 1458; as was shown in the last chapter, in 1469 and again 
in 1474 there were attempts to bring the jurisdiction of council 
back to its old limited scope. 61 More particularly, where an 
action related to some issue about land-holding other than ownership, 
it remained the practice to remit the parties to some other remedy. 
_, 
Thus, as a number of cases demonstrate, where part~es were 'grevit 
in exceding of marches and divise of land' a brieve of perambulation 
should be used, for 'the mater standis upon perambulacioun and 
redding of marchis•. 62 · Similarly brieves of division were appropriate 
for disputes between heirs-portioner or their representatives: for 
example in 1498 council ordained that 'because thir partiis allegis 
thare portionaris of thir landis and for the contencione had ymangis 
60. APS ii 47, c. 2. For a different interpretation see Duncan, 
'Central courts', 332. 
61. ~ ii 94, c. 2; APS ii 107, c. 11; and see above, 270. 
62. ADA, 76, 78; ADC i 29, 62, 71, 72, 394. 
thame thareof, that the chancellary be opin and that brevis of 
divisione be gevin thame efter the forme of the chancellary•. 63 
In two other cases the parliamentary auditors stated that the action 
should be begun by a brieve de agueductu. Thus in 1483 David 
Lauder of Pople and James Ogill agreed that their respective claims 
to the 'mylne dam' of Pople should be determined by such a brieve, 64 
while in 1491 James Muschet's action against John lord Drummond 'for 
the wrangwis doun· castin of his myllande of Tolgart and stoppin of 
the watter of the sammyn' was remitted to the sheriff 'because thare 
is a breif of our soverane lordis chapel1 de aque ductu•. 65 
Another case of. a different type came before the parliamentary 
auditors in 1479. 66 This concerned a land and tenement in Edinburgh 
to the ground right of which ·there were various claims. The matter 
having been often before both auditors and council previously, a 
final decision to set the matter before a 'great assize' was reached. 
Letters were to be addressed to the provost and bailies of Edinburgh 
to set a lawful day for the hearing, on forty days' notice to the 
parties. The assize was to be made up of the best and unsuspect 
persons of the burgh and, if required, of the other burghs round 
about. The purpose of the assize was to find out who had right and 
was nearest and lawful heir to the lands, 'that thir may be a finale 
ende and the trew grund fundyn in the said mater, ande quhat beis 
63. ADC ii 119; cf. ADA, 67. 
64. ADA, *119. 
66. ADA, 83. Other r.elevant references are ADA, 61; ADC i 17, 
~ APS ii 133· 
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fundin be the said gret assise to haf place and be kepit in tyme 
tocum'. At first sight it looks as though the letters to the 
provost and bailies would take the form of a brieve of right (in 
which, it will be recalled, the burgh court had jurisdiction), but 
from the language used it seems more likely that the procedure to be 
d t d t b th t kn 'th t . f . ht' 67 a op e was o e a own as e grea ass1ze o r1g • 
This action was one appropriate where, as in the 1479 case, there 
were several competing claims to a piece of land and it appears to 
have been common in, although not confined to, burghs. 
In all these cases concerning land the view of the court seems 
to have been that the parties should make use of an existing remedy 
available elsewhere to resolve their dispute. In none, it should be 
noted, had the fee and heritage exception been pleaded and only in 
' 68 
the doubtful example of the brieve de agueductu was the remedy 
suggested one involving a pleadable brieve. In actions relating 
to land there was available a comprehensive range of remedies and 
parties were expected to use them. 
It is also this idea which lies behind the fee and heritage 
exception, where parties were told that their action should be taken 
before the 'judge ordinary', that is, the judge having jurisdiction at 
common law over the land in issue. 69 The availability of remedies 
in his court means that parliament or council ought not to act. So 
67. For other examples see Melrose Liber ii no. 526; Fraser, 
Maxwell Inventories no. 18 (misunderstood as a brieve of right 
in McKechnie, 'Brieves', 19); Fraser, Carlaverock ii no. 35; 
Dunfermline Burgh Recs. no. 46 and ADC i 21. 
68. Although agueductu is not listed amongst· the ·pleadable brieves, 
it was an offshoot .of the brieve of dissasine: see above, 197 - 8. 
69. See above, 260 - 64. 
~ .. ------------------------------------------------& 
it is clear that the remit to the judge ordinary in the later 
fifteenth century is another way of expressine the idea current 
in the fourteenth century, that the parties must resort to the 
common law. There is perhaps a change or development of vocabulary, 
but not in the basic idea. What is important however is that by the 
later fifteenth century this idea was operative only in cases relating 
to land and in particular.in relation to disputes about ownership. 
What distinguished issues of landownership from other civil actions 
that they remained competent only in the courts of the ordinaries? 
The answer must be the continuing force of the common law rule 
that, when a pursuer sought to recover lands from the possession of 
another, he had to proceed by way of a pleadable brieve. This rule 
distinguished disputes over title to land from all others. No 
similar rule compelled the use of the brieves de conventione to 
enforce contracts or recover debts, or of the brieve de proteccione 
regis infricta to gain reparation for other personal wrongs. For 
this reason, it is submitted, issues of landownership remained 
distinct even in an era when the existence of other remedies was 
ceasing to exclude the jurisdiction of parliament and, more especially, 
council: the necessary forms of initial writ pertained to the sheriff, 
burgh or justiciary courts. 
It remains to explain, however, why, if the fee and heritage 
restriction was thus connected with the brieves rule, it was expressed 
·not in terms of freeholdings, but of fee and heritaee. This was not 
a direct result of the act of 1458. None of the subsequent fee and 
heritage cases refer to that act as might be expected if it were the 
immediate source of the rule. Moreover the act referred only to the 
'sessions' and not to parliament or the full council (although it is 
---.-.. ----------------------------------------~-
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reasonable to suspect that by the 1470s council had inherited the 
jurisdiction of the sessions outlined in 145870). In the light of 
the earlier act of 1450, which refers to 'causes of fee and heritage•, 71 
it seems likely that the terminology had become established before 
1458 as part of the development of which that act was itself the 
outcome. 
The explanation to be advanced here is almost entirely speculative 
but not, it is hoped, altogether without substance. It is based on 
the fact that, as shown earlier in this chapter, parliament and 
council enjoyed a jurisdiction over certain issues about the 
possession of land_, ih that the determination and maintenance of 
recent lawful possession was competent to them.72 If, as seems 
possible, this led to talk of a possessory jurisdiction then the 
familiar dichotomy of possessory and proprietary may have had some 
effect. In another chapter it has been seen that medieval jurists 
saw the heritable title as the proprietary one with all others being 
possessory. 73 Such an analysis was simplistic and misleading but 
if and when made it was capable of taking on a life of its own .and 
effecting changes in the jurisdictional position. If issues about 
freeholdings were possessory, then a court with possessory jurisdiction 
could deal with them. So the original limited nature of that 
possessory jurisdiction might be forgotten; the court would only be 
excluded from proprietary matters, that is, in the lawyers' vernacular, 
70. See above, 270. 
71. APS ii 37, c. 18. 
72. See above, 294 - 7~ 
73. See above, 197, 231 
-
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those touching the fee and heritage. 
This in turn must have affected the brieves rule and the use of 
brieves. By contrast with the brieves of right and mortancestor 
where the pursuer had to show a heritable title, there is only one 
piece of indirect evidence for the 'possessory' brieve of dissasine 
after the 1450s. Was this because those dispossessed now had 
actions before parliament and council? Thus for example in 1459 
Janet Borthwick successfully sued in parliament to recover the 
barony of Morton, Dumfriesshire, from which she claimed to have 
been 'dejecta et expulsa' although she had a life interest as 
conjunct fiar with and widow of James Douglas, first~ lord of 
Dalkeith. 74 This certainly looks like a case where a brieve of 
dissasine would have been an appropriate remedy. The petition of 
the Grahams of Hutton expressed the brieves rule in terms of fee 
and heritage rather than freeholding; 75 was this because at the 
time the petition was made the law had changed by virtue of the 
developing jurisdiction of parliament and council? 
(d) Conclusions 
The petition of the Grahams of Hutton mentions two rules which 
exclude the jurisdiction of the king's council, one concerning 
pleadable brieves, the other a statement about council and fee and 
heritage. There is no suggestion there that one rule follows from 
or is a consequence of the other. They appear independent and self-
supporting. The picture thus given seems to be a true one, for the 
74. APS ii 79, no. 42; ffitlS ii no. 224. 
75· HMC Various Collections v 77. 
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two rules did have a separate content and effect. Nevertheless there 
was a link between them, the brieves rule being critical, it is 
suggested, in confining the jurisdiction of the central courts of 
parliament and council at a time when these bodies, and in particular 
the latter, were admitting an increasing number of actions before 
them as a matter of course. The procedure which the law required 
to be followed could not be used in courts other than those to 
which the appropriate pleadable brieves were addressed. The lack 
of record and of any contemporary accounts of the jurisdiction of 
parliament and council defeats any attempt to produce a definitive 
explanation of the shifts and changes which took place during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The story is a complex one, 
involving many factors in Scottish legal history which are now 
beyond recovery. But that there was connection between the two 
rules discussed in this thesis surely admits of little doubt. It 
is submitted that the emergence of the fee and heritage rule, 
whenever that took place, was linked with the brieves rule by virtue 
of the fact that the latter distinguished and marked off a category 
of disputes for uniquely restricted treatment under the procedures 
of the ordinary courts of the common law. 
= 
~---------------------------------& 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
312. 
The general question with which this thesis began was that of 
the relationship between the medieval common law and the rise of the 
lords of council and session as the principal court in Scotland in the 
sixteenth century. The issue was to be approached by considering two 
jurisdictional rules, one from the medieval law, the other a restriction 
acknowledged by the lords, both of which related to litigations 
concerning land and which thus might appear to be connected in the 
sense that one was the source of the other. 
The first conclusion is that in the later middle ages the 
judicial functions of parliament and council were seen, not as those 
of central supreme courts, but rather as essentially supervisory of 
and supplementary to, the ordinary processe.s of the decentralised 
court structure of the common law. There is no reason for supposing 
that this decentralised system had ceased to function or that it 
functioned only sporadically, and there is little evidence to show 
that its officers were either inadequate for or incapable of 
exercising their judicial functions. In relation to disputes over 
land in particular the common law courts enjoyed a near-exclusive 
jurisdiction by virtue of a rule .found in the thirteenth century 
and given statutory form by an act of 1318, that np man could be put 
out of his freehold without the king's pleadable brieve. This 
entailed the use, according to the nature of the dispute, of either 
the brieves of dissasine or mortancestor in the justiciar's court, 
or the brieve of right in the sheriff or burgh court. The evidence 
shows that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a well-developed 
and sophisticated body of law, substantive and procedural, .had been 
~------------------------------------~-313 
built up around these forms of action by the courts in which they 
were used and it seems certain that when in the later fifteenth 
c~ntury council and the parliamentary auditors remitted cases of 
fee and heritage to the common law courts or the judge ordinary, it 
was to this structure of remedies that the litigants were expected 
to have resort. 
But it does not follow from this that the two rules which have 
been the focus of this study were connected in the straightforward 
sense that whenever an appropriate case came before parliament or 
council the defender would plead the 1318 act and jurisdiction 
would be declined. ·There is no reference to the brieves rule in 
the printed records of the auditors or of council. The declinature 
is always in the terms of lacking jurisdiction in fee and heritage, 
not that the pursuer must use a pleadable brieve, so that there are 
clearly two independent rules. Moreover the two rules were not 
merely different ways of saying the same thing; their content and 
effect seem also to have been different. 
The best way of explaining this, it is submitted, is to go 
back to the fourteenth and early fifteenth century cases concerning 
landholding in which parliament and council declined jurisdiction, 
not by applying one or other of the two rules, but on the general 
grounds that the parties should have resort to the common law. 
This can also be seen in the fee and heritage rule with the concept 
of sending the parties to the judge ordinary which is almost always 
referred to in the cases. But by the later fifteenth century, 
the general idea that parliament and council gave remedy only where 
. . . 
there was no remedy at common law was being superseded and council 
in particular was being seen increasingly as an alternative to the 
~------------------------------------------~-31Lt 
judge ordinary in most forms of case. The one exception to this 
was cases of fee and heritage; and there the survival of the old 
concept of a limited jurisdiction was due, it is suggested, to the 
existence of a structure of remedies which the common law required 
to be used and which could not be used in council or parliament. 
That this was expressed in terms of fee and heritage rather 
than freehold, as in the brieves rule, is perhaps to be explained 
by the 'possessory' jurisdiction enjoyed by the council and parliament, 
which seems to have arisen out of the king's role as feudal superior 
in connection with the disputes over land of his vassals. One of 
the contending parties would be awarded interim possession of the 
debatable ground on the basis that his was the most recent lawful 
possession, based on some ~·facie valid title. At this point the 
common law would come into operation; the holder could only be put 
out of his possession by the king's pleadable brieve. In determining 
preliminary issues of possession, therefore, the king and his council 
were only ensuring the observance of due process and enabling the 
common law to work, so that this particular function was consistent 
with the general supplementary nature of parliamentary and conciliar 
jurisdiction. While the evidence to support the hypothesis is 
lacking, it does seem plausible to suggest that the existence and 
elaboration of this possessory jurisdiction, alongside the development 
of jurisdiction in most other forms of civil action, may have led 
to the view that parliament and council were excluded only from 
proprietary disputes. In terms of medieval juristic analysis, 
'proprietary' or 'ownership' disputes were those over heritable 
title •. In. practice there were of course many other forms of 
interest in land apart from the heritable title and by the 1318 act 
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disputes over a good number of these would have to be begun by 
pleadable brieve. But such non-heritable interests tended to be 
classed as possessory and thus competent to a court with possessory 
jurisdiction. Accordingly it was only from issues of property, or 
of fee and heritage, that the court was excluded. 
The theory that the exclusion of parliament and council from 
fee and heritage was linked with the rule requiring pleadable brieves 
is further supported by the fact that it was only after the brieves 
of dissasine, mortancestor and right had apparently fallen into 
desuetude in the first half of the sixteenth century that the lords 
of council and session cast off the restriction on their jurisdiction. 
Thus it is stated in Balfour' s Practicks::·~ 
Item, the lordis of sessioun alanerlie, and na uther 
judge, ar jugeis competent to actio.unis of reductioun 
of infeftmentis, evidentis, or sasines, and of all 
actiounis of heritage betwix all the liegis of this 
realme, spiritual or temporal, and to all obligatiounis 
and contractis followand as accessory thairupon, 20 Mart. 
1545, Sir James Caldwell contra Sir James Maison. 
Skene also cites a case of the 1540s ('ult. Februar 1542, Patrick 
Weems contrair Forbes of Reres') for the proposition that the lords 
of council and session were 'judges competent in all causes of 
heretage 1 • He points out that earlier questions of 'the ground 
richt and propertie of lands' had been determined before the justice 
general by the brieve of right, but that in Weems the lords had 
determined this process 'nocht to have bene nor yit to be thir mony 
yeires in use', so justifying their taking jurisdiction in such 
2 
matters. It is clear that Skene derived this decision from the 
1. Balfour, Practicks i 269. 
2. Skene, De Verborum Significatione s.v. 'breve de recto'. 
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practicks of John Sinclair, a collection of the decisions of the 
lords from 1540 to 1549 made by one of its judges, where under the 
heading 'That reductioun of auld infeftmentis pertenis to the lordis 
of sessioun', appears the following passage:3 
The last of Februar anno eodem in causa Patricii 
Wemymes contra dominum de Rires, the said lairdis 
procuratour allegit that the lordis of counsall wer 
na judges competent to the reductioun of his infeftment 
vi yeiris auld, becaus thairthrow vald cum in disputatioun 
of the rycht of his landis, quhilk ground rycht of landis 
aucht be act of parliament to be decydit be ane breif of 
rycht befoir the justice and nocht befoir the lordis of 
sessioun. The lordis of counsall nochtwithstanding 
decernit thame competent judges in this mater, sic as 
thai wer thir divers yeiris in use of calling sic materia 
befoir thame, and divers sic interlocutoris gevin, ut 5n 
causa domini de Sanquhair et in causa cuiusdam Pringill 
de Torsounis et aliis diversia, and ala becaus the breif 
of rycht is nor hes nocht yit bene mony yeiris usit in 
this realme. 
Although examination of the official record of this case in the Acts 
and Decreets reveals no reference to the desuetude of the brieve of 
right, it does show that the prolocutor·· for Forbes of Rires 'allegi t 
the said mater was auld and that the lordis war na competent jugis 
thareto' and that the plea was repelled by a bench which did probably 
include John Sinclair. 4 It seems quite likely therefore that his 
report can be taken as evidence that in developing jurisdiction in 
3. The text from Sinclair's practicks is based on Edinburgh University 
Library Laing MS. III 388a with amendments suggested by a collation 
of that MS. with Edinburgh University Library Laing MS. III 429 and 
·with NLS Advocates MSS.·22. 3· 4 and 24. 1. 11. The amendments 
4 .. 
are indicated in the text by italics: for 'vi' read 'viXX'; for 
'landis', 'auld'; for 'brief', 'schiref'; for 'sic interlocutoris', 
'sicitouris'. The consulted.MSS. differ only on whether the 
infeftment was six or six score years old: I have taken six, as 
the infeftment of Arthur Forb~s was in fact only of six years' 
standing: see MacQueen, •·Jurisdiction in heritage' , 65, 78. For 
the MSS. of Sinclai~'s practicks see Murray, 'Sinclair's practicks', 
91 - 2. 
SRO, Acts and Decreets, CS 7/1/1, ff. 248 v. -
HacQueen, 'Jurisdiction in heritage', 64- 6. 
presence see also ibid., 66. 
250 r., printed in 
For Sinclair's 
heritage the lords of council and session were consciously departing 
from the old law requiring brieves; indeed it is possible that, when 
Forbes' prolocutor argued that the 'ground rycht of landis aucht be 
act of parliament to be decydit be ane breif of rycht', he was 
referring to the 1318 statute of Robert I. 
The desuetude of the pleadable brieves and so of the 1318 act 
must have been because parties seeking to recover lands were turning 
to other, more satisfactory remedies. By 1532, the year of the act 
for the erection of the College of Justice, it was being argued that 
the lords were the most appropriate judges to try causes of heritage,5 
in one case because sheriffs were 'small persounis of little knowledge 
and undirstanding to decid apoun auld hiritage', 6 in another because 
'the sheriff and his deputes are oure simple of knowledge to decyde 
apoun auld heretage 1 • 7 In many cases it appears that the parties to 
a dispute over heritage would agree to resort to the lords rather 
than the judge ordinary. 8 It has also been suggested that use of 
possessory remedies such as wrongful occupation, spuilzie and 
molestation enabled the court to deal with questions truly affecting 
. d t . t . 9 ownersh~p an no JUS possess~on. However that may be, another 
form of action which was of great importance was the reduction of 
infeftments. In 1532 and 1533 it was. still arguable that the lords 
had no jurisdiction in such cases, presumably because, since a 
5. See Acta Sessionis (Stair), cases nos. 30, 33, 70. 
6. Acta Sessionis (Stair), 46. 
7• Acta· Sessionis (Stair), 104. 
8. E.g. Acta Sessionii (Stair) cases nos. 30, 33, 70. 
9. By J.A. Clyde in ADC (Stair) iii, introduction, xli, and by 
Dickinson, 'Administration of justice', 350. 
3/~ 
successful action would destroy a title to land, they touched 
h •t 10 er1 age. But in Duddingston v. Duddingston in 1533 the lords 
declared themselves to be competent to reduce infeftments while 
recognising that this meant acquiring jurisdiction in proceedings 
. t h •t ll I 1539 aga1ns er1 age. n it was decided that 'all summondis 
rasit for reductioun of infeftmentis be privilegiat, tablit and 
callit be the Monundayis table wolkly becaus the samin concernis 
tinsale of heritage•.12 Wemyss v. Forbes and Caldwell v. Mason 
both fit into this development. Wemyss appears to reverse a 
decision of 1535 that the lords could not reduce 'old' infeftments: 13 
Sinclair's report of the case is headed 'That reductioun of auld 
infeftmentis pertenis to the lordis of sessioun', and the exception 
pleaded on behalf of Forbes was that the lords were not competent 
judges on old infeftments. Caldwell asserts the exclusive nature 
of the jurisdiction; the record of the case, like the report in 
Balfour's Practicks, states that the lords 'are in use to tak the 
decisioun of all actiounis of retretting of infeftmentis, evidentis 
or seisingis to thame selfis•.14 Here was a further important step: 
not only did the court have jurisdiction in heritage, but it would act 
to prevent other courts exercising such a jurisdiction. The old 
10. Acta Sessionis (Stair) cases nos. 15 (printed in Wigtownshire 
~., 143) and 8g. 
11. Acta Sessionis (Stair) case no. 8g. 
12. Acts of Council (Public Affairs), 478. 
13. Acts of Council (Public Affairs), 440. 
14. SRO, Acta Dominorum Concilii et Sessionis, CS ~/20. ff. 
18 r.- 18 v., printed in MacQueen, 'Jurisdiction in heritage', 
Bo - 1. 
[· 
f 
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position was being reversed. 15 
By the end of the 1530s the lords of council and session were 
prepared to deal with questions of heritage even where reduction 
of an infeftment was not involved.16 Their appropriation of a 
general jurisdiction is confirmed by the Discours Particulier of 
1560, which states that the sheriff has no jurisdiction in matters 
of fee and heritage.17 The pleadable brieves had disappeared and 
soon Scots lawyers had forgotten the nature and effect of these 
medieval forms of actio~. 
It may be concluded that the existence and use of the brieves 
of dissasine, mortancestor and right made necessary by the medieval 
common and statute law of Scotland was instrumental in preventing 
the development of council's jurisdiction in fee and heritage during 
the fifteenth century. There was no fourteenth century break in the 
development of Scots law in this area and no revival of 'feudal' 
practices or theories. Law and procedure first promulgated in 
the thirteenth century (possibly having some earlier roots) not only 
survived but flourished in the later medieval per{od. It seems that 
_I 
a rule which, in J.J. Robertson's terminology, was of an 'archaic' 
. . 
character was not superseded by the growing 'maturity' of the 
18 fifteenth century. Rather the argument presented here supports 
the view of medieval Scottish legal development put forward by 
15. Note that neither Wemyss nor Caldwell appears to have been 
the first decision on either old infeftments or the exclusive 
jurisdiction to reduce infeftments: MacQueen, 'Jurisdiction 
in heritage', 82- 3· 
16. Acts of Council (Public Affairs), 484, 486. 
17. Discours Particulier d'Escosse ed. T. Thomson (Bannatyne Club, 
1824) 11; P.G.B. McNeill, 'Discours Particulier d'Escosse 
1559/60 1 , in l-1iscellany II (Stair Soc., vol. 35) 86 - 131 at 109. 
18. See above, 12-13. 
----~~ .. ------------------------------------------------~ 
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George Neilson: 'running on lines parallel to, and often identical 
with, those of English jurisprudence, it pursued a course of its own, 
little changed by either English or French influence, until the 
sixteenth century•.19 There were no dramatic breaks, even in the 
sixteenth century; instead what we see is a gradually changing 
picture, an understanding of which is fundamental in approaching 
the emergence of the Court of Session as the supreme court of 
Scots law. 
19. G. Neilson, 'The study of early law', JR 3 (1891) 12- 20 
a~ 19. 
---------------------------------------------~ ~ I 
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APPENDICES 
Note 
In editing the documents contained in these appendices, I have 
expanded all contractions and followed modern conventions of 
capitalisation and punctuation. Translations of Latin·documents 
have been given. Editorial notes have been kept to a minimum. 
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APPENDIX A 
DURHAM CATHEDRAL, Dean and Chapter Muniments, Miscellaneous Charters, 
no. 1263. 
Hec est finalis concordia facta inter dominum Anketinum priorem de 
Coldingham et conventum, tenentes, et Edam et Mariam de Paxton, 
sorores, et earum heredes, et Willelmum de Paxton, filium dicta Ede, 
petentea per breve domini regia de recognicione directum domino 
Willelmo de Lindeaey tunc vicecomiti de Berwic et eiua ballivia super 
quodam bosco vocato Ristoneside, scilicet, quod solium eiuadem bosoi 
et custodia dictis priori et conventui et eorum successoribus remane~unt 
in perpetuum tali siquidem condicione, quod dicti Eda, Maria et earum 
heredes et Willelmus de Paxton racionabilia estoveria sua propria tam 
in domibus et sepibus construendis quam estoveriis carucarum per visum 
forestarii dictorum prioris et conventus libere percipient ad usus 
suos proprios de Aldenecrawe et dictus prior et conventus et eorum 
successores dictum boscum adeo bene sine wasto et destruccione custodiri 
facient quod dicti Eda, Maria et earum heredes et Willelmus de Paxton 
de omnibus in dicto bosco crescentibus racionabilia estoveria sua per 
visum forestarii sicut predictum est possint percipere. Et ut hec 
finalis concordia perpetuam optineat stabilitatem scriptum istud in 
modum cirographi est confectum cuius parti penes priorem et conventum 
residenti sigilla Ede, Marie et Willelmi filii Ede apponuntur pars 
vero penes partes prenominatas deposita siggillis ~sicJ capituli 
Dunelmensis et domini ·Anketini prioria roboratur. Teste curia domini 
regis apud Berwic in pleno comitatu. 
'I lt 
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Translation 
This is the final concord made between the lord Anketin, prior 
of Coldingham, and the convent, defenders, and Eda and Maria of Paxton, 
sisters, and their heirs, and William of Paxton, son of the said Eda, 
pursuers by the lord king's brieve of recognition addressed to the lord 
William Lindsay, then sheriff of Berwick, and his bailies, concerning 
a certain wood called Restonside, namely, that the ground and 
ownership of the same wood should remain with the said prior and 
convent and their successors in perpetuity, but under a certain 
condition, that the said Eda, Maria and their heirs and William of 
Paxton shall freely occupy to their own use their own reasonable 
estovers of Auchencrow, both in the building of houses and hedges 
and in estovers of ploughs, under the view of the foresters of the 
said prior and convent, and the said prior and convent and their 
successors shall act to protect the said wood so well without waste 
or destruction that the said Eda, Maria and their heirs and William 
of Paxton shall be able to occupy their reasonable estovers of 
everything growing in the said wood under the view of the foresters 
as is aforesaid. And so that this final concord shall possess 
perpetual validity this deed is made in the form of a chirograph, 
to the part of which remaining in the possession of the prior and 
convent the seals of Eda, Maria and William, son of Eda, are affixed; 
however the part deposited in the possession of the forenamed parties 
is confirmed by the seals of the chapter of Durham and of the lord 
Anketin, prior. Witness the court of the lord king at Berwick in 
full county. 
32~ 
Notes (see text, pp. 42, 181 - 3, 203 - 4, 235 - 6). 
(i) The document is misleadingly discussed in M.L. Anderaon, 
(ii) 
A History of Scottish Forestry (1967) i lOO and is referred 
to in the Handliat of Acta of Alexander II 1214 - 1249 compiled 
by J.M. Secular for the Regesta Regum Scottorum series (Lost 
Acta, no. 388). There are two seal tags on the document, 
suggesting that it is the half which was given to the family 
of Paxton; it may be that its presence at Durham can be 
explained by extinction of heirs leading to all the documents 
anent the property being called in by the superiors. It is 
to be noted that in 1235 it was settled that the heirs of 
Paxton and Auchencrow owed homage, relief and marriage to 
Durham and not to Coldingham, a question previously in doubt 
(Coldingham Correap., no. 239). 
Anketin prior of Coldingham: The document gives only the initial 
'A', but there can be no doubt of his identity (cf. Raine, North 
Durham nos. 253, 339, 362, 365, 426 and 427). Dated documents 
show him to have been prior in 1239 (Raine, North Durham no. 
272) and probably in January 1240/1 (Raine, North Durham nos. 
479 and 480). His latest known predecessor .was Thomas de 
Melaanby, who was elected prior of Durham in 1233, and his 
successor, Richard, was in office by October 1245 (see A.A.M. 
Duncan, The Bibliotheck 2 (1959) at 8 - 9). 
(iii) Eda, Maria and William of Paxton: In 1236 lady Eda of Paxton, 
her first-born son Robert, her sons Robert (presumably a different 
Robert) and William, both c~erka, and her daughters Cecilia and 
Matilda granted a.nine year lease of the fisheries at Paxton 
upon Tweed which was confirmed by the .prior and convent of 
'I lt r ~ 
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I 
32s-
Durham, presumably as accepted superiors of the lands 
following the dispute of 1235 (Raine, North Durham no. 358). 
(iv) William Lindsay sheriff of Berwick: In an unpublished 
handlist of The Sheriffs of Scotland before c. 1306, 
Professor Barrow assigns William Lindsay's sheriffship to 
the period c. 1233 to c. 1240 (Raine, North Durham nos. 394 
and 426). In the latter document, William's name appears 
alongside that of prior Anketin. 
(v) 'Aldenecrawe': This is clearly modern Auchencrow, a hamlet 
(vi) 
in Berwickshire (OS, NT 853 607) two miles south-west of the 
village of Reston (os, NT 884 620). It should be noted that 
at the present time Auchencrow is pronounced 'Edincraw' locally 
(and see W.F.H. Nicolaisen, Scottish Place Names (1976), 126). 
Date: Anderson dates the document to 1249: this is clearly 
wrong. Scoular suggested sometime between 1226 and 1247. It 
is submitted that this can be narrowed down • The nature of the 
right of estovers (see text above, 235) suggests that at the 
time of the case Coldingham priory was regarded as the superior 
J 
of the lands of Paxton and of Auchencro.w. As shown above, 
from 1235 this was no longer so. Anketin may well have been 
prior of Coldingham from 1233· Accordingly the document can 
be placed sometime in the years from 1233 to 1235· Perhaps 
the dispute about the superiority between Coldingham and 
Durham was the reason why the seals of both were affixed to 
confirm or strengthen the document given to the family of 
Paxton, even though Durham was not party to the concord. 
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APPENDIX B 
Scottish Justiciars c. 1306 - 1513. 
For discussion of the list see chapter 2 above, pp. 93 - 118. 
It is divided into four parts: (i) justiciars south of Forth (or of 
Lothian) to June 1488; (ii) justiciars north of Forth (or of Scotia) 
to June 1488; (iii) justiciars of James IV; (iv) justiciars appointed 
under the authority of the English crown between 1305 and 1340. 
Dates given relate to spread of documents, not actual periods of 
office. 15th century justiciars 'of Scotia' are treated as justiciars 
of the whole kingdom, as explained above at pp. 60 - 61 • Since such 
justiciars are otherwise found only south of Forth, these references 
are included in the first list. 
(i) Justiciars south of Forth or of Lothian 
(a) JAMES DOUGLAS 1316 x 1319 
Melrose Liber ii no. 415. 
(b) ROBERT LAUDER ('the elder') c. 1319- c. 1337 
Dunfermline Reg. no. 352; HMC Various Collections v 8; 
Laing Chrs. no. 2?; Melrose .Liber ii nos. 422 - 6; 
Yester Writs no. 19; Perth Blackfriars, 18; Newbattle Reg. 
no. 149; Yester Writs no. 22; Raine, North Durham no. 584; 
Yester Writs no. 24 (misdated); Morton Reg. ii no. 34; 
Raine, North Durham no. 218; Kelso Liber ii no. 484; 
Paisley Reg., 28; Morton Reg. ii nos. 16 and 38; Raine, 
North- Durham no. 432; Fraser, Douglas iii no. 16; RRS 
v1 nos. 6 and 10; Raine, North Durham no. 586; Dryburgh 
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Liber, 274; ~ i 452; Kelso Liber ii nos. 477 and 479; 
Morton Reg. ii no. 50; Melrose Liber ii no~ 393; Glasgow 
Reg. i no. 280. 
(c) WILLIAM DOUGLAS, 1st EARL OF DOUGLAS ante 1360 - 1374. 
ER ii 82, 394, 462; Raine, North Durham no. 147. 
(d) ROBERT ERSKINE 1366 (see also ii (j) below) 
Raine, North Durham no. 326. 
(e)? ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS, LORD OF GALLOWAY 1383 
Me1rose Liber ii no. 485 (see p. 104 n. 300 above). 
(f)? DAVID STEWART·, EARL OF CARRICK 1392 
ER iii 311 (see p. 104 n. 302 above). 
(g) ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS, 4th EARL OF DOUGLAS 1410 
ER iv 133· 
(h) ROBERT STEW.ART, DUKE OF ALBANY, EARL OF FIFE AND MENTEITH 1414 
ER iv 412 (see also ii (s) below). 
(i) ROBERT LAUDER OF THE BASS AND EDRINGTON 1425 - 1428 
~ ii, reign of James I, witness nos. 27, 36 and 45; 
Laing Chrs. no. 81; RMS ii no. 29; Haddington Burgh Chrs., 13. 
(j) THOMAS SOMERVILLE OF CARNWATH 1428 - 1435 
Melrose Liber ii no. 525; Haddington Burgh Chrs., 15; 
Aberdeen University Library MS. 1160/18/9, f. 1 r. (Appendix F); 
Laing Chrs. no. 113; SRO, Peebles Burgh Recs. B 58/17/1. 
(k) JAMES DOUGLAS OF BALVANY AND ABERCORN, EARL OF AVANDALE, 
7th EARL OF DOUGLAS 1437· - 1441 
Fraser, Douglas iii no. 301; Wigtown Charter Chest no. 24. 
I 
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(1) ALEXANDER LIVINGSTONE OF CALLENDAR 1444 - 1449 
~ v 249; Foedera xi 238 (Bain, ~ iv no. 1216). 
(m) GEORGE CRICHTON ~ 1454 
g vi 178. 
(n) WILLIAM LORD SOMERVILLE ante 1456 
ER v 670. 
(o) WILLIAM SINCLAIR, EARL OF ORKNEY 1454 x 1456 
~ i 705 (Ordo Justiciarie), ER vi 386, 433, 485. 
{p) LAURENCE LORD ABERNETHY OF ROTHIEMAY 1455 
SRO, SocietY of Antiquaries Writs, GD 103/1/7 (Appendix G); 
~ vi 168. 
(q) ANDREW STEWART, LORD AVANDALE c. 1457 - c. 1464 
ER vi 201, ER vii 281, Irvine Muniments i no. 13 
- . -
(See also (cc) below). 
(r) COLIN CAMPBELL, 1st EARL OF ARGYLL, and ROBERT LORD BOYD 1461 
Wigtown Charter Chest no. 31. 
(s) GILBERT LORD KENNEDY 1464 
~ iv 507; RMS ii no. 812. 
( t) WILLIAM LORD ABERNETHY OF ROTHIEMAY and WILLIAM LORD BORTHWICK 
1465 
SRO, Lord Advocate's Dept. Writs, AD 1/60 (Appendix D). 
·-
(u) JOHN LORD HOUSTON and SIR WILLIAM SEMPLE 1465 
Wigtown Charter Chest no. 36 (See also SRO, Ailsa l-1uniments, 
GD 25/1/102. (Appendix H)) •. 
(v) WILLIAM EDMONSTONE OF DUNTREATH and GILBERT KENNEDY OF BARGANY 
1466 
Irvine Muniments i no. 13 (See also (w) and (y) below). 
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(w) WILLIAM EDMONSTONE OF DUNTREATH 1467 
Morton Reg. ii no. 223 (See also (v) above and 
(y) below). 
(x) ROBERT 1st LORD LYLE 1468 
~ ii 94. 
(y) WILLIAM EDMONSTONE OF DUNTREATH and MASTER DAVID 
GUTHRIE OF KINCALDRUM 1471 
HMC xiv (iii) 27 (See also (v) and (w) above, 
and (z) below). 
(z) MASTER DAVID GUTHRIE OF KINCALDRUM 1472 - 1473 
Irvine Muniments i no. 131 SRO, Rollo of Duncub 
Muniments, GD 56/11; TA i 66, 68; Nat. MSS. Scot. 
ii no. 71 (misdated) (See also (y) above). 
(aa) :?THOMAS 2nd LORD ERSKINE 1474 
TA i 53· (See above, PP• 80 - 81 and 113). 
(bb) ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS 5th EARL OF ANGUS ?1482 - 1483 
APS xii 33· 
(cc) ANDREW STEWART, LORD AVANDALE and ROBERT 2nd LORD LYLE 
1485 
Peeb1es Chrs. no. 16 (See also (q) above and ii (y) 
and (dd), iii, (a) and (c), below). 
(dd) ROBERT 2nd LORD LYLE and JOHN RAMSAY, LORD BOTHWELL 
1488 
APS ii 182 (also John lord G1amis and John lord 
·Dr~mmond); B1air Castle, Atholl Chrs., Box 7, 
parcel ii (4) (See also (cc) above and iii {a) and 
(c) below). 
j ~ 
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(ii) Justiciars north of Forth or of Scotia 
(a) ROBERT KEITH ~310- 1312· 
Abbotsford Mi·sc. i 53; .!!!:!f. v 626 (See also iv (a) below). 
(b) THOJ.-IAS RANDOLPH, EARL OF MORAY, LORD OF ANNANDALE AND MAN 
1320 - 1331 
Scone Liber no. 130; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing) ii, lines' 
3188 - 9 and 3210. 
(c) WILLIAM MUSCHET OF CARGILL 1319 x 1333 
Moray Reg., cartae originales, no. 18. 
(d)? REGINALD CHEYNE 1330 
Familia of Innes, 58. (See above, p. 98 and n. 74). 
(e) WILLIAM MELDRUM 1335 
~ i 436 (See also below, i). 
(f) ROBERT LAUDER ('the younger') 1336 - 1337 
Arbroath Liber i no. 290; Spalding Mise. v 243 - 4. 
(Fraser, Douglas iii no. 315). (See also iv (c) below). 
(g) ADAM BUTTERGASK 1337 
ER i 436. 
(h) WILLIAM 5th EARL OF ROSS 1339 - 1358 
Dunfermline Reg. no. 376; Fraser, Southesk ii no. 36; 
Panmure Reg., 169; ER i 543; Aberdeen Reg. i 79 - 81; 
ER i 546. 
(i)? WILLIAM MELDRUM 1358 
ER i 562. (See above, P• 102). 
(j) ROBERT ERSKINE 1359 - c. 1368 
~ ii no. 3717; RRS vi no. 230; APS i 504; 
with HUGH EGLINTON 1360 
HHS vi no. 228; Fraser, Menteith ii no. 29 
(~..,...,. !'t1cn i (1"1) ~hnvP-). 
'11 1 
(k) WILLIAM DISHINGTON 1370 . 
RRS vi no. 462. 
(1) JAMES LINDSAY OF CRAWFORD ante 1373 
§g ii 435, 437, 457· 
(m) ALEXANDER LINDSAY OF GLENESK 1373 - 1380 
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ER ii 435, 458 - 9, 620; ER iii 30 - 1, 652; Laing 
Chra •. no. 65; Spalding Mise. ii 319. 
(n) ALEXANDER STEWART, EARL OF BUCHAN 1387 - 1388 
Moray Reg. no. 168; APS i 556. 
(o) DAVID LINDSAY OF GLENESK 1389 
~ i 556. 
(p) MURDOCH STEWART 1389 - 1390 
~ i 557; Spalding Mise. ii 319; HMC vii (ii) 718. 
(q) WALTER STEWART, LORD OF BRECHIN 1391 
~ iii 417 (See also (u) below). 
(r) MURDOCH STEWART 1392 - 1401 
* Fraser,·Menteith ii no. 43; Fraser, Grandtully no. 84 
ER iii 316, 347, 376; Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iii 263; 
Moray Reg. no. 180; RMS i no. 886; HMC iv 495· 
(a) ROBERT STEWART, DUKE OF ALBANY, EARL OF FIFE AND MENTEITH 
ante 1406 
ER iii 644 (See also i (h) above). 
(t) PATRICK OGILVY 1427 - 1428 
~ ii, reign of Jam~s I, witness no. 53· 
( u) WALTER STEWART, EARL· OF ATHOLL, STRATHEARN AND CAITHNESS 
1433 - 1435 
Coupar Angus Chrs. ii no. 128; Pitfirrane Writs no. 24 
(See also (q) above). 
'I ll' 
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(v) ALEXANDER STEWART, EARL OF MAR ?1435 
ER iv 634; ~ vi 264. 
(w) ALEXANDER, LORD OF THE ISLES, EARL OF ROSS 1439 - 1443 
Familia of Innes, 14; Munro of Foulis Writs no. 18; 
Cawdor Bk., 14; Aberdeen Reg. i 241; RMS ii no. 1252. 
(x) JOHN LORD LINDSAY OF THE BYRES 1457 - 1466 
Dunfermline Reg. no. 452; Aberdeen - Banff Ill. iv 205; 
Spalding Mise. v 264; Dunfermline Reg. no. 458. 
(y) ROBERT 2nd LORD LYLE 1471 
~, 12 (Sae also i (cc), (dd) above and iii (a) and 
(c) below). 
(z) JOHN HALDANE OF GLENEAGLES 1478 
~' 66. 
(aa) GEORGE GORDON, 2nd EARL OF HUNTLY 1479- 1482 
Aboyne Records, 401; Cawdor Bk., 63 (See also (cc) and 
iii (f) below). 
(bb) DAVID LINDSAY, 5th EARL OF CRAWFORD 1487 - 1488 
SRO, ~, CS 5/16, f. 6; SRO, Society of Antiquaries Writs, 
GD 103/2/42 (See also (cc) below). 
(cc) DAVID LINDSAY, 5th EARL OF CRAWFORD, and GEORGE GORDON, 
2nd EARL OF HUNTLY 1488 
APS ii 182. 
(iii) Justiciars of James IV 1488 - 1513 
Dates are based on entries in the Register of .the Great Seal, 
the Exchequer Rolls and the Justiciary Records, unless otherwise stated. 
See pp. 115 - 117 above. 
tj.l .,, 
' 
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(a) ROBERT 2nd LORD LYLE, JOHN LORD DRUMMOND and JOHN LORD GLAMIS 
1488 - 1489. 
(b) JOHN LORD DRUMMOND and JOHN LORD GLAMIS 1489 - 1491. 
(c) ROBERT 2nd LORD LYLE and JOHN LORD GLAMIS 1491 - 1495 
Possibly from 1494 Ly1e and Glamis were only acting 
south of Forth. In 1493 Lyle appears to have acted 
as justiciar south of Forth with Laurence lord 01iphant. 
(d) JOHN LORD DRUMMOND 1494 - 1497 
Possibly in 1494 - 5 Drummond acted only north of Forth. 
(e) JOHN LORD DRUMMOND and ANDREW 2nd LORD GRAY 1497 - 1498. 
(f) AN DREW 2nd LORD GRAY and GEORGE GORDON 2 2nd EARL OF HUNTLY 
1499 _. 1501. For Huntly as a justiciar south of Forth 
in March 1499 see SRO, Glencairn Muniments, GD 39/24. 
(g) ANDREW 2nd J.,ORD GRAY 1501 - 1513. 
(iv) Justiciars appointed under English crown 1305 - 1340 
(a) The 1305 Ordinance of Edward I 
See Stones, Documents no. 33; APS i 120. 
Lothian: John de Insula, Adam Gordon 
Galloway: Roger Kirkpatrick, Walter de Burghdon 
Forth to the Mounth: Robert Keith, William Inge or 
Henry Kighle 
Beyond the Mounth: Reginald Cheyne, John de Vaux of 
Northumberland or John de Val1ibus. 
(b) DAVID MUSCHET, justiciar of Fife May 1306 
See text above p. 69 n. 118. 
Dunfermline Registrum no. 590. 
'I l{ I ·I I 
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(c) ROBERT LAUDER ('the younger') justiciar of the king of 
England in Lothian 1334. 
Rot. Scat. i 271. 
(d) RICHARD TALBOT justiciar of the king of England in Lothian 
1338. 
Bain, ~ iii no. 1288. 
335 
APPENDIX C 
SCOTTISH RECORD OFFICE, Acta Dominorum Concilii, (1 March 1504/5) 
CS 5/16 ff. 144 v. - 145 r. 
In the actioun and cause persewit be Catrin Folkart, Beatris Folkart, 
Elizabeth Folkart and Johne of Menzeis, hir spouse, again Robert 
Hamiltoun of Mylneburne, pretendit schiref deput of Lanark maid and 
constitut, as was allegit, be James erle of Arran, schiref principale 
of the schire, and Johne Were in Raclauch and Quentyne Folkart for 
his interess, that is to say, the said schiref deput for his partiale, 
wrangwis and unordurly preceding again the saidis persounis in the 
pretenditt serving and executing of ane breif of rycht of our soverane 
lordis chapell impetrat be the said John Were apone the landis of 
Folkartoun and in speciale becaus the said pretendit schiref deput 
put the said breif to the knawlage of ane assise, the borcht and 
recounter proponit of before nocht being discussit be warde and dume, 
as at mair lentht is contenit in the summoundis thirupoun. The said 
Johne Menzeis, Quentin Folkart, John Weir comperand personally, and the 
said Robert Hamiltoun comperand be William Hamiltoun, his procurator, 
ande the said Johne Menzeis comperand as procurator for the said 
Elizabeth, Catrune and Beatrise: thare rychtis, ressounis and 
allegatiounis herde, sene and understand and thirwith being riplie 
avisit, in presens of the kingis hienes, the lordis of consale decretis 
and deliveris that the said pretendit process lede apoun the said breif 
of rycht, togidder with the sesing apoun the said landis and all that 
followit thirapoun, is of nain avail, force nor effect, in jugement 
nor without, in al tyme cuming, because the said schiref put the said 
breif to the knawlage of ane assise, the borcht and recounter before 
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proponit being undiscussit be warde and dume, as said is, efter 
the forme of oure soverane lordis lawis, and ordanis our soverane 
lordis lettrez to be directit hereupoun in dew forme as efferis. 
Notes (see text, pp. 160, 217 - 8, 233). 
This extract from the Acta Dominorum Concilii relates to a 
long-standing dispute over the lands of Folkerton, Lanarkshire 
(OS, NT 858359). Catherine and Beatrice Folkert were heirs-
portioner of Folkerton who as early as 1476 were raising actions 
concerning the wrongful occupation and withholding of the maills of 
the lands by one Alexander Folkerton. The sisters' dispute with 
Alexander seems to have continued at least until 1501 (ADA, 46, 49; 
!QQ i *91, 91, 93, 112; ADC ii 332, 378, 382; ADC (Stair) iii 24) 
and seems likely to have been linked with the issue raised by John 
Weir's brieve of right. The details are however obscure. 
i 
!I-
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I~ ~.' 
337 
APPENDIX D 
SCOTTISH RECORD OFFICE, Lord Advocate's Department Writs, AD 1/60 (22 
January 1464/5) 
Wi11iame lorde Abirnethi in Rothimay and Williame lorde Borthwic, 
justices til oure soverane lorde on southalffe Forthe constitute, 
til al and sindri quhais knawlege thir present lettres saltocum, 
grating: Wit yhe that thare comperit before us, in the justice ayre 
of oure soverane lord the kingis be us haldin at Jedwort the xxii 
day of the moneth of Januare the yhere of oure lorde a thousand 
fourhundir sexti and foure yeris, Williame of Douglas of Drumlangrig 
and his forespekare, Maistir David Guthrie of Kincaldrum, and present 
til us in jugement a rolment of courte of the justice ayre ganging 
before, undir the sele of office of justiciarie, tuiching the process 
of a breffe of mortantecesstry purchesit be the said William apon 
the landis callit the Kirktonemanys with the mylne of that ilk and 
thair pertinentia and the landis of the Flekkis with the pertinentia, 
liand in the barony of Hawic within thes~birrefdome of Roxburgh, 
agane Alexander of Gledstanys and askit it to be red in court; the 
quhilk beand red be the clerc of the said court, the said Maistir 
David, forespekare to the said William, askit at us that the said 
brefe mycht procede to the recognicioune of ane assise and be this 
reson: because that at ·the last justice ayre of before the said 
Alexander allegit a warant and the justices assignit him this day to 
produce his warant and nane comperit, quharefore he had renuncit his 
rycht and p~t it til ane othir, and for that reson, sen it was the 
last excepcipune, thair acht na plede borowis na recountir to be herd, 
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bot the justices suld ger the breffe procede to the recognicioune 
of ane assise. Than comperit Alexander of Gledstanys and his 
forespekare,~lir Thomas of Cranston of that ilk, knycht, and allegit 
that the breffe acht nocht to procede to the recognicioune of ane 
assise and be this reson, because the said Alexander had allegit 
oure soverane lorde to be warant til him and he was within age 
quharefore he mycht nocht convene his hienes to mak him warandize 
unto the tyme he war of lachfull age and for that reson the said 
breffe acht nocht til pass as yit til ane assise and thairto profferit 
til have fundin borgh in the schirreffis hand. To the quhilk the 
said Maistir David, forespekare to the said Williame, ansuerit, sayand 
as of before that it was impertinent to the cause, al thingis 
considerit gangand before, to find any borowis, and besocht us as 
justices to be avysit with the barones and frehaldaris of the court [,11 
.,, 
~I quhethir at sic borowis acht to be ressavit as the mater was procedit 
or nocht. Than we gert devoyde baith the said partis oute of court 
and was avysit with the baronis and frehaldaris in the said cause, 
the quhilkis beand diligently~and riply avysit, the partis agane 
incallit, decretit and deliverit that sic borowis profferit be the 
said Alexander of Gledstanys and his forespekare forsaid was impertinent 
and acht nocht to be admittit as the cause was procedit and at the 
breffe acht til pass to the recognicioune of ane assise. And 
incontinent we gert chese ane assise of thir personis folowand, that is 
to say,~hir Walter Scot of Kirkurd, knycht, Androu Ker of Altonburne, 
James of Ruthirfurde of that ilk,Sd~r Robert Colvil of Oxnarne, knycht, 
Androu Ker youngare, James of Twedy of Drummelier, Dungal Makdowel of 
Malkerston; Walter of Twedy, Androu Ormistoune of that ilk, Quintine 
Riddale of that ilk, Robert Ruthirfurde of Chatto, George of Douglas 
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of Bunjedwort, Thom Ker, George Tayt of the Pren, Archibald of 
Douglas, Waltere Scot, Hector of Lauedyr, Wil of Pringil, Robert 
Scot of the Haynig, Johne of Ruthirfurde of Hundwellee, Adam Scot, 
Arichbald Neuton of that ilke, Johne Turnbule of Ernhuych, George of 
Abirnethi and Thomas of Grymslaw. The quhilk assise, beand sworne 
be thare grate athis, the said breffe beand red, the richtis and 
meritis of the cause diligently and riply considerit, be thare 
forespekare Androu Ker del~verit in writ that sum tyme~~r William 
of Douglas of Drumlangrig, knycht, the grantsire of William of 
Douglas of Drumlangrig, deit vestit and sesit as of fee of the landis 
quhilk ar callit Kirktonmanys with the myln of the sam with the 
pertinentia and of the landis ~f the Flekkis with the pertinentia 
liand in the barony of Hawic within the schirefdome of Roxburgh, 
and at the said William is lachful and nerast aire of the said 
sumtiroe~lur William his grantsyre of the said landis and myln with the 
pertinentia, and at Alexander of Gledstanys had wrangwisly haldin the 
said landis and mylne with the pertinentia quharefore the said William 
of Douglas acht til have sic sesine of the said landis and mylne with 
the pertinentia sic as sumtyme the said~ar William his grantsire had 
of the sam landis and mylne with the pertinentia the day he was quik 
and dede. Eftir the quhilk deliverance it was gifin for dome be the 
mouth of Johne Stodart, soytour of Halden, that the said William of 
Douglas acht til have sic sesine of the landis of Kirktonmanys and 
the myln of that ilk with the pertinentia and the landis of the 
Flekkis with the pertinentia sic as sumtyme~Jdr William of Douglas 
his grantsire had of the sam landip and mylne with the pertinentia 
the day he was quyk and dede and at the said Alexander of Gledstanys 
nor his ayris acht nevyr tobe herd in jugement apon the said landis 
apon a breffe of mortantecesstry in tyme tocum. And thareeftir 
we gafe sasine be state ryal to the said William of Douglas of the 
said landis and mylne with the pertinentia in plaine court and comandit 
the schirref or his mare of fe to pass to the chemys of the said landis 
and mylne and thare to gif corporale sesine, state and possessioune 
of the said landis and mylne eftir the tenor of the said dome as 
eferis apon law. And this til al men quhilkis it eferis we mak 
kend be thir present lettres. In witnes of the quhilk thing the sele 
of oure office of justiciarie is to put the day, moneth, yhere and place 
beforwritin. 
(Notarial docquet records that this was done at Jedburgh 
in the presence of various persons, including William 
Hacate of Belsyis clerk of the justiciary. The notary 
is Alexander Foulis, clerk of the diocese of St. Andrews 
and notary public. The seal of the office of the 
justiciary south of Forth is attached). 
Notes (see text, pp. 120, 176, 202, 209, 242). 
In November 1458 Alexander Gledstanes received from James II a 
confirmation of the dominical or demesne lands of Kirkton with its 
mill and of 'Flekkis', both in the barony of Hawick, Roxburghshire 
(RMS ii no. 646). The barony itself was the property of the family 
of Douglas of Drumlanrig (see Fraser, Buccleuch ii nos. 22 and 23). 
Kirkton is today two miles from the town of Hawick (OS, NT 539139); 
'Flekkis' has not been identifie~. It is clear that Alexander's 
claim to warrandice from the·minor James III depended upon the royal 
grant of 1458. The particular interest of the document lies in its 
discussion of procedure when a defender claimed warrandice. Two 
points would appear to have been important: the minority of the 
warrantor and his status ·as king. 
3~( 
James III was undoubtedly still a minor in 1465 (see w. Angus, 
~ 30 (1951) 199 - 201, A.I. Dunlop, SHR 30 (1951) 201 - 204; 
Macdougall, James III, 7 and 125) and the forespeaker for Gledstanes 
contended that accordingly 'he mycht nocht convene his hienes to mak 
him warandize into the tym he war of lachful age'. Insofar as the 
general law of the middle ages relating to warrandice by minors is 
known, this appears to have been correct. A fragment which in 
most manuscripts is part of the Leges Forestarum, but which Skene 
and, following him, Lord Cooper printed as eh. 90 of Quoniam 
Attachiamenta, explains that where a minor is called as a warrantor 
the principal action will be sisted until he reaches majority (APS 
i 745, cc. 20- 3 and also the 'Table of Authorities', APS i_262- 3; 
Cooper, Regiam, 373 - 4)~ These passages are cited as from the 
Leges Forestarum in Balfour, Practicks ii 331 (in eh. Llll, read 
'c. 63' for 'c. 83 1 ). The fragment also states that the charters 
importing the minor's obligation of warrandice must be shown before 
he can be called. The position thus revealed tallies with that of 
English law as described in Bracton, where the req~irement that 
charters be shown is explained by the fear that the voucher might 
otherwise be made deceitfully or frivolouslt (ff. ~57 b, 260 b, 392). 
But even though it seems that the contention advanced on behalf 
of Gledstanes was good law it failed to turn the case in his favour. 
The reason for this is not stated in the instrument recording the 
decision but probably was connected with further specialities of the 
law of warrandice where the king was called as warrantor. It is said 
in Balfour's Practicks (ii 327) that 'it is not the use, law, nor 
consuetude of this realme, that the King's Grace sould warrand onJ 
alienatioun, infeftment, gift, or dispositioun maid be his Hienes to 
ony of. his lieges, albeit the samin be maid titulo oneroso, and he 
have ressavit gude deid thairfour, Pen. Novemb. 1527, 1 t. c. 335'· 
The authority cited by Balfour does not come from the so-called 
'Auld Lawes' of the earlier medieval period but is rather a relatively 
recent decision of the lords of council and session. The absolute 
position here laid down may be contrasted with that stated by the 
medieval English texts such as Bracton, which held that the king 
might warrant the title of his tenant. However as king he could 
not be vouched to warranty like a private lord, since he could not 
be summoned by writ (Bracton, f. 382 b). In cases of mort d'ancestor 
the proper procedure was for the tenant to say he could not answer 
without the king: the assize would still be taken at once, but the 
enforcement of any judgment in the demandant•s favour would depend 
on the king's pleasure (Bracton, f. 261; cf. Britton ed. F.M. Nicholls 
(Oxford, 1865) ii 110). Similarly the defeated tenant's claim to 
escambium against the warrantor could not be enforced against the 
king by his own courts (Bracton, f. 389 b). It is also apparent 
that in medieval English law vouching the king as warranty was 
regarded as a largely mischievous device for the delaying of pleas 
and so to be discouraged (see S.J. Bailey, Cambridge Law Journal 
8 (1942) 274 - 299 at 292). 
The plea for Gledstanes seems most likely to have been defeated 
as the result of rules similar to those expressed in Bracton. In 
the instrument there is no sign of any objection to the competency 
of calling the king as warrantor; rather the question was whether or 
not the principal action should be sisted further, and the decision 
of the court that it should not is consistent with the rules applied 
in England. The problem for the .court was the conflict with the 
law on minor warrantors,. which it resolved by holding that the rules 
concerning warrandice by the king prevailed •. The king could not be 
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compelled to warrant a subject but might do so of his grace once 
the outcome of the principal action was known. In the long run, 
given that the king would not normally rescind from the warrandice 
given by him or his ancestors, neither party to the principal action 
would be prejudiced if its merits were determined immediately. 
It may also be noted that the forespeaker for Douglas of 
Drumlanrig who argued this point so successfully was Master David 
Guthrie, later himself one of the king's justiciars (see above, P• 115 
and below, Appendix H). 
i 
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APPENDIX E 
De Exceptionibus eh. 1 
Quatt~or modis de exceptio, videlicet, exceptio dilatoria, exceptio 
peremptoria, exceptio de jure et exceptio de facto. Exceptio 
dilatoria est petere visum terre vel aliquod dicere per quod placitum 
capiat dilationem. Exceptio peremptoria est quando aliquis monstrat 
contra aliquem aliquid factum antecessorum suorum sicut cartam vel 
quietaclamationem vel aliquid aliud dicit contra ipsum in agendo per 
quod poterit ab actione excludi. Exceptio de jure est ratio vel 
argumentum in disputando prepositum per quam vel quod sentit sibi 
esse sufficientem vel sufficiens, justum tamen est eis ad responsionem 
aliam resortum. Exceptio de facto est ratio preposita per quam 
utraque pars descendit in primam propositionem et post illam 
responsionem prepositam non valet ad aliam responsionem resortum. 
Translation 
There are four types of exception, as follows, the dilatory 
exception, the peremptory exception, the exception of law and the 
exception of fact. The dilatory exception is to ask a view of the 
lands or to say anything by which the plea undergoes delay. The 
peremptory exception is when one shows against another any deed of 
his ancestors such as a charter or a quitclaim or says anything else 
against the pursuer by which he can be excluded from the action. 
The exception of law is a reason or argument put forward in debate 
- . 
which is perceived by _him to be sufficient, yet resort to another 
answer is ju_st. The exception of fact is a reason proposed by 
' 
' ... 
:: 
,. 
which either party descends into the first proposition and after 
the proposal of that answer it is invalid to resort to another 
answer. 
Notes (see text, pp. 167, 175). 
The text is based on a collation of the so-called Cromertie 
and Auchinleck MSS (NLS, Adv. MSS. 25.5.10, 25.4.15), where the 
passage will be found at ff. 13 r. and 189 v. - 190 r. respectively. 
Both appear to be of fifteenth-century date (APS i 183 - 4, 188 - 9)• 
The chapter corresponds partially with a passage in Balfour's Practicks 
(ii 343) where it is stated that there are two kinds of exceptions, 
viz, dilatory exceptions, whiqh 'prolongis and delayis the actioun 
or clame to ane certane time•, and peremptory exceptions, which 'ar 
perpetual because they stay alluterlie and for ever cuttis away the 
actioun or claime, and resistis and stoppis the samin at all times•. 
The authority cited for this is chapter 1 of a treatise De Exceptionibus. 
Elsewhere Balfour cites other chapters from this treatise as follows: 
2(ii 412, 414, 415); 3(ii 290, 294); 4(ii 298, 299, 300, 301); 
12(ii 290, 294); and 13(ii 294). This capitulation does not however 
correspond with that of either Cromertie or Auchinleck, while the two 
MSS. also differ between themselves. In Cromertie, the treatise has 
22 chapters, in Auchinleck 12. Some material appears common to 
Cromertie, Auchinleck and B~lfour, but each also has sections unique 
to it. The one wholly consistent point would appear to be that the 
distinction of dilatory and peremptory exceptions was made in the first 
chapter. Consequently, while the contents, devel~pment and status of 
De Exceptionibus must remain a matter of doubt until further research 
is carried out, there is reason to believe that the text above can b~ 
treated as evidence for the distinction of various types of 
exception used in pleading by fifteenth century Scots lawyers. 
APPENDIX F 
ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MSS. 1160/18/9 f. 1 r. - v. 
Penes dominum de Somervi1e.Universis ad quorum noticiam 
praesentes 1itterae pervenerint, Thomas Somervi1e dominus de 
Carnwath ac justiciarius_ domini nostri regis ex parte austra1i 
aquae de Forth specia1iter constitutus, sa1utem: Noveritis quod 
comparens coram nobis in itinere justiciarie domini nostri regis 
per nos tenta apud Streve1ine quarto die mensis Novembris anno 
domini mi11esimo quadringentisimo tricesimo, Mariota de Coningham, 
prosequens ~usannam, sponsam D~na1di Cristason, ac ipsum Donaldum 
ratione ejus~em Susanna per breve domini nostri regis de nova 
dissasina, graviter conquerendo quod praedicta Susanna et Donaldus 
ipsam injuste et sine judicio dissaisiverint de terris de Ballul 
et Ballard cum pertinentiis jacens infra vicecomitatum de Streveline 
praedictum et post nonnullas et varias altercationes ab iisdem 
parti bus in medium productas tandem ad dic.tam causam decidendem 
assisam nobilium virorum ex mutuo consensu partium in itinere 
praecedente e1ectorum onerari. fecimus. Quae quidem assisa diligenter 
consulta et examinata decrevit et declaravit quod praedicta Susanna 
et Donaldus, ratione qua supra, praedictam Mariotam de Coningham de 
supradictis terris de Bal1u~ et Ballard cum pertinentiis injuste et 
sine judicio dissaisiverint; quare precipimus vicecomiti de Streveline 
quatenus praedictam Mariotam in praedictis terris reinvestiret et 
resaisiret. Et nos sibi,_ut moris est, possessionem rea1em per 
D· traditionem bacu1i de1iberavimus et praedictam Susannam et Donaldum 
secundum decretum curiae in centum marcis de· dampnis praedictae 
Mariotae taxatis condemnavimus. Et hoc omnibus quorum interest 
et interesse poterit notificamus per praesentes. In cujus rei 
testimonium sigillum officii nostri justiciarie praesentibus est 
appensum anno, .die, mense et loco suprascriptis. 
Translation 
To all to whom notice of the present letters shall come, Thomas 
Somerville, lord of Carnwath and justiciar of our lord king specially 
constituted on the south side of the water of Forth, greetings: 
Know that there compeared before us in the justice ayre of our lord 
king held by us at Stirling on 4 November in the year of our lord 
1430, Mariota Cunningham, pursuing Susan, spouse of Donald Christison, 
.and the same Donald by reason of the same Susan by brieve of our lord 
king of novel dissasine,gravely complaining that the foresaid Susan 
and Donald had dissaised her unjustly and without judgment of the 
lands of Balwill and Ballaird with the pertinents lying within the 
foresaid sheriffdom of Stirling, and after some and various debates 
produced by the same parties in dispute, at last with mutual consent 
of parties we caused an assize of noble men chosen in the preceding 
ayre to be burdened with the decision of the cause. Which assize, 
having diligently consulted and examined, decreed and declared that 
the foresaid Susan and Donald, as above, unjustly and without judgment 
dissaised the foresaid Mariota Cunningham of the foresaid lands of 
Balwill and Ballaird with their pertinents. Hherefore we commanded 
the sheriff of Stirling to reinfeft and resaise.the foresaid Mariota 
in the foresaid lands. And we, ~s is usual, delivered real possession 
to her by tradition of sticks and we have condemned the·foresaid Susan 
and Donald ·according to the decree of the court in 100 marks of damages 
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taxed to the foresaid Mariota. And we notify this to all whom it 
concerns or who may be concerned by the presents. In witness whereof 
the seal of our office of justiciary is appended to the presents, 
year, day, month and place abovewritten. 
Notes (see text, pp. 185, 194, 204). 
This is taken from the notes of John Gordon of Buthlaw (?1715 -
1775) an advocate who was joint professor of Civil Law at Edinburgh 
University from December 1753 to December 1754 (The Faculty of 
Advocates in Scotland 1532 - 1943, ed. F.J. Grant (Scottish Record 
Society, 1944), 84). As an historian he has been perhaps unfairly 
neglected (see Webster, Scotland, 26). He is known to have owned 
two 'auld lawes' manuscripts (~. inf. Mr. W.J. Windram). His 
papers are preserved in Aberdeen University Library. The transcript 
is of a document said to be in the possession of the lord of 
Somerville, but it has not been traced amongst the Carnwath papers 
in the Scottish Record Office. The lands in issue are now the farms 
of Upper Balwill (OS, NS 548926),Lower Ballaird (OS, NS 551924) and 
Upper Ballaird (OS, NS 555919) in west Stirlingshire. It may be 
noted that Thomas Somerville is here said to be 'specially' rather 
than 'generally' constituted as justiciar south of Forth, although 
other evidence shows him to have held the office from 1428 to at 
least 1435· As he was holding an ayre it may be suggested that 
he was not acting here 'in hac parte'; rather the 'special 
constitu~on' related to the limitation of his jurisdiction to the 
south of Forth. See Appendix B(i)(j). 
APPENDIX G 
SCOTTISH RECORD OFFICE, Society of Antiquaries Writs, 
GD 103/l/7 (4 March 1454/5) 
In the justice ayre of oure soverane lorde the kingis haldin at 
Drumfrese on Tyseday the ferde day of the moneth of Marche the 
yere of oure Lord a thousand fourehundir fifti and foure yeris 
before Laurence lord Abrenethi in Rothimay and justice til oure 
soverane lord the king on southalff the watter of Fforth generily 
constitute thare comperit Mergarete Munduyle, the dochtir of sum 
tyme Henry Munduyle, lorde of Tynwald and lord of the Tempilland 
of Dalgernow with the pertinentia, with hir forespekare, Thomas the 
Graham of the Thornuke. The quhilk Thomas the Graham in the name I~ ~I: 
. I 
~I and on the behalve of the said Mergarete askit at the said justice 
quhat he had done or gert do apon the executione of twa brevis that 
scho had present til him of before tyme of the twa quartaris of the 
landis of the barony .. of Tynwald and of twa quartaris of the 
Tempillandis of Dalgarnow with the pertinentia liand within the 
schirefdome of Dumfrese; of the quhilk twa brevis, the tane was 
de morte antecessoris and agane Willia~e of Hepburne be resoun of 
sum tyme Janet, his spouse, apon a quartare of the landis of the 
barony of Tynwald and a quartare of the Tempillandis of Dalgarnow 
with the pertinentia beforesaid, and the tothir was richt sa a breve 
of morteantecessoris and againe Hawys Munduyle apon ane othir quartare 
of the landis of the barony of Tynwald and a quartare of the 
- . 
Tempillandis of Dalgernow. The quhilk justice ansuerit and said at 
he had direct two preceptis to the schiref of Drumfrese to summond or 
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ger summond the said William and Hawis and askit at the schiref 
quhat he had done thareto. And than the said schiref ansuerit and 
said that he had chargit the kingis seriand, David Haliday, to 
execute the said preceptis eftir the tenor of thaim. The quhilk 
executione the said David previt in court lachfully made be him. 
And the said Thomas the Grahame askit the said justice to ger the 
said twa brevis be red in court and to procede to the recognicioune 
of ane assise. The quhilkis brevis beand red, the said justice 
chesi t ane assise of thir personis undirwri tin., that is to say, John 
the Menzeis of the Enach, William Grereson, George of Kirkpatric, 
Aymere of Gledstanys, Tassy of Maxwell of Collynhach, Florides of 
Murray, Robert Makbraare, Robert of Johnstoune, Robert Munduyle, 
Simon Litil, James of Kirkhalch, Gilbert Makmath, Wil~iam Portare, 
Gilcriste Grereson, Thomas Fergussoun, William Boyle, Cuthbert 
Molmerson, George Nelesoun, Johne the Menzeis of Achinsel, Malcolme 
Magilhauche, Johne Steuart, Davy Steuart, George Were, Donald Huntare 
and William Maxwell. The quhilk assise, the grete aith sworne and 
the avaymentis and the resounis of the party herd, passit oute of 
court and, thai riply and sadly (~) avisit thare, incuming in 
courte agane concorduntly pronuncit thare veredict be the mouth of 
Johne the Menzeis of the Enach, sayand that sum tyme Henry Munduyle, 
the fadir of Mergarete Munduyle thare present, deit vestite and sesit 
as of fee of the twa quartaris of the landis of the barony of Tynwald 
and of the twa quartaris of the Tempill landis of Dalgernow with the 
pertinentia, and at the said Mergarete was nerast and lachful ayre 
to sumtyme the said Henry, hir fady~, of the said foure quartaris of 
the said landis with the P.ertinentis, · and at the for said foure quartaris · 
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of the said landis with thare pertinentia war wrangwialy haldin 
fra hir be the forsaid William and Hawis, and at thare was no 
lachful cause to let the said Mergarete til obtene sesine and 
possessioun of the said foure quartaris of the said landis with 
the pertinentia, and at sic sesine suld be gevyn til hir of the 
said foure quartaris of the said landis with the pertinentia sic 
as sumtyme the said Henry, hir fadir, had of the said foure quartaris 
of the said landis with the pertinentia that day that he was quyk 
and dede. And than the said Thomas Grahame askit sesine of the 
forsaid foure quartaris of the said landis with the pertinentia 
tobe jugit to the said Mergarete be dome of court. And than the 
court, riply avysit, gafe for dome be the mouth of Thom of Hill, 
sutoure of Diercol, that the said Mergarete suld have sic sesing 
gevin til hir of the said foure quartaris of the said landis with 
the pertinentia sic as sum tyme the forsaid Henry, hir fadir, had 
of the said foure quartaris of the forsaid landis with the pertinentia 
the day that he was quyk and dede, outakand the landis annual rentis 
and the doweris of wemen outane in the said brevis. And than the 
said justice, at the instance of the said Mergarete, in jugement 
sittand gave heretable possession and state to,the said Mergarete 
of the forsaid foure quartaris of the ~aid landis with the pertinentia 
eftir the tenor and veredict of the said assise and dome of court, 
and chargit the schiref to ger gif hir sic like possession and sesine. 
apon the grond of the said landis with the pertinentia. And this 
til al and sindri quhom it aferis we, the said Laurence, makis kend 
be thir present lettres, to the quhilkis we have gert set to the 
s~le of·o~re office the day,,moneth, yere~and plae~ forsaid. 
# 
(Notarial docquet records that this was done in the 
tolbooth of the burgh of Dumfries in the presence 
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of various persons. The notary is Alexander Foulis, 
clerk, notary public of the diocese of St. Andrews. 
There is a slit for the seal tag, but the seal is 
now missing). 
Notes (see text, pp. 201, 208). 
This instrument was first printed in abbreviated form by 
Matthew Livingstone (PSAS 41 (1906 - ?) 313). That version was 
more or less reprinted as part of an article by A. Cameron Smith, 
'Mundeville of Tinwald and Mundell in Tinwald', Dumfries-shire 
Transactions, 3rd series, 22 (1938 - 40) 95 at 9? - 9. The above 
is a full version. Cameron Smith's article explains some of the 
factual background to the case. The lands in issue were in 
Dumfries-shire. The modern village of Tinwald is some three miles 
north-east of Dumfries (OS, NY 004815) while Dalgarnock was a village 
and parish north of Closeburn, near Thornhill in Nithsdale (F.H. Groome, 
Ordnance Gazetteer of Scotland (1886) ii 334). A farm, Templand 
Mains, may still be found near Closeburn (os, NX 882942). A sixteenth 
century rental of the Hospitallers, successors in title to the lands 
of the Templars in Scotland, records that 'the landis of Dagarno in 
Nyddsdaill were set in few of the auld to the lord of Tynwall payand 
therfor yeirlie of few maile xl s.• (Knights of St. John of Jerusalem 
in Scotland, 14). 
# 
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APPENDIX H 
SCOTTISH RECORD OFFICE, Ailsa Muniments, GD 25/1/102, 15 April 1466 
In dei nomine amen. In curia itineris justiciarie domini nostri regis 
tenta et inchoata apud Dumbertane in pretorio eiusdem die martis 
decimoquinto die mensis Aprilis anno domini millesimo quadringentesimo 
sexagesimo sexto coram honorabilus viris Willelmo Simple et Johanne 
domino Howistone de eodem, militibus, justiciariis domini nostri 
regis ex parte australi aqua de Forth infra vicecomitatum de Dumbertane 
specialiter constitutis, in judicio comparuit nobilis et prepotens 
dominus, Gilbertus dominus Kennedy, et suus prelocutor, honorabilis 
vir Magister David Guthre de Kincaldr~m, exposuit qualiter certo 
tempore devoluto appunctuatum et concordatus extitit inter prefatum 
dominum Kennedy et nobilem dominum, Robertum dominum Flemyng, super 
breve de morte antecessoris impetratum per dictum dominum Kennedy 
contra et adversus prefatum Robertum dominum Flemyng super terris que 
vocantur Estirmanys, Westirmanys, Schirvay, Bar, Badcol et Westirgartachou 
cum pertinentiis iacentibus in baroniam de Lenze infra vicecomitatum 
de Dumbertan, quod dictum breve de morte antecessoris in proximo 
itinere justiciarie tenendo apud Dumbertan absque impedimenta seu 
obstaculo procederet ad assisam prout in indentura in pergameno 
scriptum sub sigillo dicti Roberti domini Flemyng in cera rubea infra 
albam impressa sigillatis in plena curia ostensis et perlectis plenius 
continebatur ut etc, iuxta tenorem eiusdem instrumenti super consensu 
et assensu ac iuramenti corporali~ per dictum Robertum dominum Flemyng 
desuper prestiti. Quo .facto comparuerunt in judicio honorabilis vir 
Malcolmus Flemyng, filius et heres apparens .predicti domini Flemyng, 
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et David Rede, procuratores legitti predicti domini Flemyng prout 
per suas litteras de procuratoris officio sub sigillo dicti domini 
sigillatis ostensis et perlectis plenius continetur, allegantes 
quod dictum breve de morte antecessoris ad aasisam nunc [sic - read 
'non•]procederet ex et pro eo quod processus dicti brevis legittimus 
iuxta ordinem eiusdem in forma debita nullatenus procedebat. Ad quod 
respondit dictus Magister David, prelocutor, quod attentis et 
consideratis compromissione et iuramentis inter prefatos dominos de 
eorum consensu et assensu factis et prestitis dictum breve absque 
aliquo processu ad assisam procederet indilate prout declaratur in 
libro Regie Maiestatis: nee preiudicat absentia alicuius partis 
quin procedat assisa cum iam de consensu suo posuerunt se in assisam 
ac etiam on (sic) alio capitula iuxta fin.em si duo homines ponant se 
in inquisicione super aliquod factum inter ipsos nullum essonium 
valet quin procedat inquisicio. Similiter in Attachiamentis: si 
duo homines ponant se ad assisam pro veritate clarificanda de aliqua 
re dubia super aliquod factum inter ipsos ortum nulla essonia potest 
valere quin assisa procedet indilate. Et super hoc idem Magister 
David, prelocutor, cum instancia petiit decretum curie. Qui bus 
itaque peractis post multas et varias altercaciones ab utraque parte 
prolatas predictis partibus extra curiam remotis, curia diligenter 
avisata per dominos barones et libere tenentes ibidem existentes, 
partibus reintratis, publice decrevit quod considerata compromissione 
de consensu·partium facta et iuramentis desuper prestitis, dictum 
breve de morte antecessoris ad assisam procederat indilate absque 
excepcione et obstaculo quibuscumq~e. Et incontinente dicti domini 
justiciarii virtute sui ~fficii et ~uxta mandatum supremi domini 
nostri regis-sub suo signeto ac subscripcione. manuali directus elegere 
(.I~ I 
~I 
fecerunt condignam assisam proborum et fidedignorum hominum quorum 
nomina subsequuntur, viz, dominus Johannes Maxwell, miles, Robertus 
de Conyngham de Conynghamhed, Johannes Berclay de Kilbyrny, Robertus 
de Crauforde, Robertus Mure de Polkelyhe, Magister Adam de Cokburne 
de Skirling, Thomas Lowis de Mennare, Thomas de Menteth, Jacobus de 
Douglas, Malcolmus Milery, Malcolmua Macferlam, Duncanus Napere de 
Kilmahow, Patricius de Galbrath, Patricius de Culquhone, Johanne 
Blare, Willelmus Arthurson, Angusius Campbel, Alquinius de Arngapil, 
Johannes Lile, Andreae de Galbrath, Gilbertus de Galbrath, Walterus 
Noble, Nirdane Buntyne, Johannes Hyndisaayd de Bulule et Johannes 
Champnay. Que vero assisa hincinde diligenter consulta et plenius 
avisata, auditis dicti domini Kennedy cartia, li.tteris, evidentiis, 
juribus et muhimentis et ad plenius intellectis consideratis qui in 
hac parte consideratis, decrevit et per sua corporalia iuramenta 
preiudicavit et deliberavit quod quondam dominus Gilbertus Kennedy, 
miles, avus Gilberti domini Kennedy, latoris presentium, obiit 
vestitus et sasitus ut de feodo de terris que vocantur Estirmanys, 
Westirmanys, Schervay, Bar, Badcol et Westirgartschore cum pertinentiis 
iacentibus in baronia de Lenze infra vicecomitatum de Dumbertane, et 
quod dictus Gilbertus dominus Kennedy est legittimus et propinquior 
heres eiusdem quondam domini Gilberti, avi sui, de dictis terris cum 
pertinentiis, et quod Robertus dominus Flemyng prefatas terras cum 
pertinentiis iniuste detinet, et quod Gilbertus dominus Kennedy habet 
plenius ius ad dictas terrae cum pertinentiis et de jure recuperare 
debet talem sasinam dictarum terrarum cum pertinentiis qualem quondam 
antedictus dominus Gilbertus, avus suus, habuit de eisdem cum 
pertin~ntiis die qua fuit vivus et mortuus. Post quam·quidem 
,deliberacionem incontinente datum fuit per j~dicium curie per os 
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Johannis Gordoun, sectatoris terrarum de Dalnotty~ quod dictus 
Gilbertus dominus Kennedy haberet talem aasinam terrarum que 
vocantur Estirmanys et Westirmanys, Schervay, Bar, Badcol et 
Westirgartschore cum pertinentiis iacentibus in baronia de Lenyhe 
infra vicecomitatum de Dumbertan qualem quondam dominus Gilbertus 
Kennedy, avus suus, habuit de eisdem terris cum pertinentiis die 
qua fuit vivus et mortuus, et quod dictus Robertus dominus Flemyng 
nee heredes sui in.judicio nunquam audiantur penes breve de morte 
antecessoris temporibus profuturis. Quibus omnibus ut premittitur 
pronotis supradicti domini justiciarii matura deliberacione dederunt 
supradicto domi~o Kennedy statum realem omnium et singularum dictarum 
terrarum cum pertinentiis, precipientes et stricte mandantes 
honorabili viro, Johanne de Culquhoune de eodem, militi, vicecomiti 
de Dumbertan, quatenus procederet personaliter usque capitale 
messuagium dictarum terrarum cum pertinentiis et ibidem sasinam 
legittimam, investituram et corporalem possessionem dictarum terrarum 
cum pertinentiis prefato Gilberto tenderet iuxta tenorem decreti 
dicta assise et iudicii curie desuper datum prefato Gilberto domino 
Kennedy et heredibus suis pertinens temporibus profuturis. Super 
quibus omnibus et singUlis dictus dominus Kennedy a me notario publico 
infrascripto aibi fieri petiit publicum instrumentum. Acta fuerunt 
hec in pretorio burgi de Dumbertan anno, die, mensi supradictis, 
indictione xiiii pontificis sanctissimi in Christo patris ac domini 
nostri, domini Pauli, divina providentia, pape secundi, anno secundo. 
Presentibus reverendo in Christo patre ac domino Andrea, permissione 
divina episcopo Glasguenais, nobilibus et prepotentibus dominis Andrea 
domino Avendale, cancellario_Scotie, Johanne domino Dernle, ·Jacobo 
domino Hamm~ltone, Roberto domino Boyde, Roberto domino Lile, Magistro 
Jacobo Lyndissay, preposito de Linclouden, et Magiatro Alexandro 
Murray, canone Moraviensis, cum multis aliis testibus ad premiasa 
vocatia specialiter et rogatis. 
Et ego Alexander de Foulis clericus Sanctiandree 
dioceseos publicus auctoritate imperiali notarius 
predictis omnibus et singulis dominis sic ut 
premittitur fierent et agerentur unacum prenominatis 
testibus presentibus personaliter interfui eaque sic 
fieri. 
Translation 
In the name of God amen. In the court of the ayre of the justiciary 
of our lord king held at Dumbarton in its tolbooth on Tuesday 15 April 
in the year of our lord 1466 before the honourable men William Semple 
and John lord Houston of that ilk knights, justiciars of our lord the 
king on the south side of the water of Forth specially constituted 
within the sheriffdom of Dumbarton, there compeared in judgment a noble 
and powerful lord, Gilbert lord Kennedy, and his forespeaker, the 
honourable man, Master David Guthrie of Kincaldrum, explained how 
at a certain time in the past an appointment and agreement existed 
between the foresaid lord Kennedy and a noble lord, Robert lord Fleming, 
concerning a brieve of mortancestor impetrated by the said lord Kennedy 
against the foresaid Robert lord Fleming concerning the lands which 
are called Easter Mains, Wester Mains, Shirva, Bar, Bedcow and Wester 
Gartshore with the pertinenta lying in the barony of Lenzie in the 
sheriffdom of Dumbarton; which said brieve of mortancestor should 
proceed to the assize at the next ayre of the justiciary to be held 
at Dumbarton without impediment or obstacle, just as it was written 
in the· indenture in parchment under the seal of the said Robert lord 
Fleming impressed in red wax within white, the sealed documents having 
3~ 
been shown and read in open court as is more fully contained, etc 
according to the tenor of the same instrument concerning the consent 
and agreement and the bodily oath given by the said Robert lord 
Fleming on this. Then there compeared in judgment the honourable 
man Malcolm Fleming, the son and heir of the foresaid lord Fleming, 
and David Reid, lawful procurators of the foresaid lord Fleming, just 
as is more fully contained in their letters of the office of procurator 
under the seal of the said lord, which sealed documents were shown and 
read, alleging that the said brieve of mortancestor should not proceed 
to the assize because the lawful process of the said brieve according 
to the order of the same was by no means proceeding in due form. 
To which the said Master David, prelocutor, replied that, having 
regard to the submission and oaths made between the foresaid lords 
concerning their consent and agreement that the said brieve should 
proceed without any process and without delay to the assize, just 
as is declared in the book Regiam Majestatem: Nor does the absence 
of any party prevent the procedure of the assize when they have 
already put ~hemselves on the assize of their own consent and also 
in another chapter, near the end, if two men put themselves upon an 
inquest concerning any matter, no essonzie avails betwe&n them and 
the inquest proceeds nonetheless. Similarly in Quoniam Attachiamenta, 
if two men put themselves on an assize to settle the truth about some 
doubtful matter concerning any question that has arisen between them, 
no essonzie can avail and the assize proceeds without delay nonetheless. 
And upon this Master David, prelocutor, earnestly sought a decreet of 
court. When these things had been performed, after many and various 
altercations drawn out by each party, the foresaid parties having been 
removed from the court, the court was dilige~tly advised by the lord 
unjustly withholds the foresaid lands with their pertinents, and that 
the said Gilbert lord Kennedy has full right to the said lands with 
their pertinents and of right ought to recover such sasine of the said 
lands with the pertinents such as the late foresaid Sir Gilbert, his 
grandfather, had of the same with the pertinents on the day on which he 
was alive and dead. After which deliverance, it was immediately given 
for the judgment of the court by the mouth of John Gordon, suitor of the 
lands of Dalnottar, that the said Gilbert lord Kennedy should have such 
sasine of the lands which are called Easter Mains and Wester Mains, 
Shirva, Bar, Bedcow and Wester Gartshore with the pertinents lying in 
the barony of Lenzie within the sheriffdom of Dumbarton such as the late 
Sir Gilbert Kennedy, his grandfather, had of the same lands with the 
pertinenta on the day upon which he was alive and dead, and that the said 
Robert lord Flaming and his heirs should never be heard in judgment 
concerning the brieve of mortancestor at any time in the future. 
Which all noted as above the foresaid lords justiciara with mature 
deliberation gave the foresaid lord Kennedy real state in all and whole 
the said lands with the pertinents, ordering and strictly commanding the 
honourable man, Sir John Colquhoun of that ilk, knight, sheriff of 
Dumbarton, to proceed personally to the chief messuage of the said lands 
with the pertinents and there tender to the foresaid Gilbert lawful sasine, 
infeftment and corporal possession of the said lands with the pertinents 
in accordance with the tenor of the decreet of the said assize and the 
judgment of the court given upon this, to pertain for the future to the 
foresaid Gilbert lord Kennedy and his heirs. The said lord Kennedy 
asked me, the notary public underwritten, to make a public instrument for 
him concerning all thes~ matters. This was done in the tolbooth.of the 
burgh of Dumbarton, year, day and month for~said, and the fourteenth 
I 
., 
lo ,, 
·I 
barons and freeholders there present; the parties having reentered, 
,. 
the court publicly decreed that, having considered the submission 
made of consent of the parties and the oaths made thereupon, the said 
brieve of mortancestor should proceed without delay, without any 
exception or obstacle whatsoever, to the assize. And at once the 
said lord justiciars, by virtue of their office and according to the 
mandate of our supreme lord the king addressed under his signet and 
subscription manual, caused choose a worthy assize of the good and 
faithful men whose names follow, viz, Sir John Maxwell, knight, 
Robert Cunningham of Cunninghamhead, John Barclay of Kilbirnie, 
Robert Crawford, Robert Muir of Polkelly, Master Adam Cockburn of 
Skirling, Thomas Lowis of Menn~re, Thomas Menteith, James Douglas, 
Malcolm Milery, Malcolm McFarlane, Duncan Napier of Kilmahew, Patrick 
Galbraith, Patrick Colquhoun, John Blair, William Arthurson, Angus 
Campbell, Alcuin of Arngapil, John Lyle, Andrew Galbraith, Gilbert 
Galbraith, Walter Noble, Nirdane Buntyne, John Handasyde of Bulule 
and John Champnay. Which assize, diligently consulted and fully 
advised by both sides, having heard and fully understood the charters, 
letters, evidents, rights and muniments of the said lord Kennedy, and 
having considered what ought to be considered in this matter, decreed 
and by its bodily oaths passed judgment ·and delivered that the late 
Sir Gilbert Kennedy knight, grandfather of Gilbert lord Kennedy bearer 
of the presents, died vest a~d saised as of fee of the lands which are 
called Easter Mains, Wester Mains, Shirva, Bar, Bedcow and Wester 
Gartshore with the pertinents lying in the barony of Lenzie within the 
sheriffdom of Dumbarton, and that the said Gilbert lord Kennedy is_the 
lawful and nearest heir of the same late Sir Gilbert, his grandfather, 
of the said lands with their pertinents, and that Robert lord Flaming 
indiction of the second year of the pontificate of the most holy 
father in Christ, Paul, by divine providence second pope of that 
name. Present the reverend father and lord in Christ, Andrew, by 
divine permission bishop of Glasgow, Andrew lord Avandale, chancellor 
of Scotland, John lord Darnley, James lord Hamilton, Robert lord Boyd, 
Robert lord Lyle, Master James Lindsay provost of Lincluden, and 
Master Alexander Murray, canon of Moray, with many other witnesses 
specially called to the foregoing. 
(The notarial docquet is by Alexander Foulis, clerk 
of the diocese of St. Andrews and notary public by 
imperial authority). 
Notes (see text, pp. 209, 213, 241). 
A number of other documents relating to the litigation recorded 
in this notarial instrument still survive. The lands in issue all 
lay to the east of the modern town of Kirkintilloch, Dunbartonshire 
and were collectively known as the forty-shilling lands of Kirkintilloch. 
Of particular interest are the references by Master David Guthrie as 
Kennedy's forespeaker to Regiam Majestatem and Quoniam Attachiamenta. 
The first reference to Regiam is to Book I, eh. 11 (Record ed.): 
'Nee prejudicabit absentia alicuius partis quin procedat assisa cum 
se jam de consensu suo posuerunt in assisam'. The second reference 
is to Book IV, eh. 51: 'Si duo homines ponunt se in inquisicione 
super aliquod factum inter ipsos, nullum essonium valet quin procedat 
inquisicio'. This chapter is also found as eh. 4? of Quoniam 
Attachiamenta. 
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(i) Introduction 
The beginnings of m
ilitary feudalism
 in Scotland m
ay be found in th~ ~~lgn 
of D
avid I (I 124-53). Its ev
olution into a sophisticated system
 of Iand,law
 
and co
n
v
eyancing in the follow
ing centuries has n
ev
er been fully e
xplored. 
A
bundant charter a
nd 
other evidence 
show
s 
clearly e
n
o
ugh that 
·iater 
m
edieval Scottish land-ow
ners w
ere thoroughly c
o
n
v
e
rsa
nt w
ith c
o
n
c
epts 
su
ch 
as 
sasine, dependent tenure 
a
nd its incidents 
a
nd prim
ogenitary 
inheritance a
s m
ajor features 
of tha_t system
. But it w
o
uld be u
n
w
ise to
 
suppose that w
hen D
avid I infeft (anglice, 
enfeoffed) his knights in the 
m
iddle of the tw
elfth c
e
ntury he w
as m
inded to introduce a 'feudal system~ of 
landholding a
s law
 for all Scotland. That w
as rather the o
utcom
e of v
a
rious· 
factors in 
.the developm
ent of Scottish so
ciety a
nd royal governmen~ the1i 
a
nd at later periods. N
ot the least im
portant of these, it m
ay re
a
so
n
ably be 
suggested, w
as the provision of royal c
o
u
rts a
nd procedures by wh~ch the 
.
 
rights of landow
ners m
ight be defined a
nd e
nforced. This essay e
x
a
m
ines 
tw
o su
ch procedures m
ade av
ailable in the king's c
o
u
rts in the thirteenth 
century, the a
ctions o
n
 the 'brieves of dissasine a
nd m
o
rtancestor. ; 
There has been relatively little study of procedure by brieve in m
edieval 
Scottish 
c
o
u
rts by 
c
o
m
parison 
w
ith 
the 
w
ealth 
of literature 
o
n
 the 
equivalent English procedure by 
o
riginal 
w
rit. Forty years ago, L
ord 
.
 
C
ooper pointed o
ut that a form
ulary system
 of procedure had c
o
m
e
 into 
·
 
operation in Scotland w
hereby c
o
u
rt a
ctions w
ere begun by w
rits in the 
n
a
m
e
 of the king, c
o
m
m
a
nding the judge to determ
ine a
n
 issue set o
ut in the 
docum
ent. Such docum
ents w
ere know
n in the v
e
rn
a
c
ular as 
'brieves', a 
w
o
rd derived from
 their Latin n
a
m
e
 of'brevia~ It w
as Lord C
ooper's belief 
that, 
after this 
system
 had 
'attained its 
c
ulm
inating point in the· e
a
rly. 
fourteenth 
c
e
ntury', it 
'_fell into decay' a
nd had, w
ith so
m
e
 e
x
c
eptions, 
disappeared by the 
.m
iddle of the fifteenth c
e
ntury .I The e
x
c
eptions w
ere, of 
co
u
rse, the 
'classical' br~eves discussed in Stair's Institutions at the e
nd of. 
the se
v
e
nteenth c
e
n
tu
ry-peram
bulation, su
ccession, terce, division~ lining. 
in burghs. tutory a
nd idiotry. 2 A
fter the death of Lord C
ooper, Sheriff. 
M
cK
echnie dem
onstrated that the theory of a declining system
 in the late : 
m
edieval period 
w
a
s
 
m
istaken. 
In 
a 
c
a
reful 
study 
of a 
w
ide 
ra
nge o
f 
m
a
te
rial. h
e s
o
u
g
h
t th
e first ap
p
earan
ce o
f e
a
ch
 fo
rm
 o
fb
riev
ean
d
_
w
asab
le. 
l r' 
V' 
.
.:r-
~
 
(') 
.
 
-
-
=
.::..7:. 
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 this to show
 that the system
 w
as apparently still e
xpanding in the 
fourteenth c
e
ntury a
nd re
a
ched w
hat he called its 
'heyday' in the fifteenth. 
H
e 
also drew
 attention to the c
o
ntinuous history of the brieve of right 
throughout this period.3 Since M
cK
echnie's paper w
as published, there 
have been further detailed studies of particular form
s of brieve. n
otably 
Professor H
arding's 
essay 
c
o
m
paring 
the brieve de protcccipne 
regis 
infricra w
ith the English w
rit of trespass:' A
ttention m
u
st also be paid to the 
illum
inating w
o
rk of Professor B
arrow
 o
n
 tw
elfth c
e
ntury developm
entss 
a
nd to Professor W
illock 's c
a
reful researches o
n
 the 
'classical se
v
e
n
' in the 
m
edieval period. 6 H
ow
ever. there re
m
ain m
a
ny gaps in o
u
r know
ledge, 
so
m
e
 of w
hich it is hoped to fill in this paper. 
There w
o
uld appear to have been n
o
 se
rious dissent from
 Lord C
ooper's 
c
o
n
clusions o
n
 the subject of the brieves of dissasine a
nd m
o
rtancestor. H
e 
recognised their e
xistence in the thirteenth c
e
ntury but. in line w
ith his 
general thesis, seem
s to have thought that dissasinc fell into desuetude in 
the fourteenth a
nd fifteenth c
e
nturies. C
ertainly he n
e
v
e
r c
a
rried its history 
beyond the legislation touching the m
atter in 1318 in a
ny of his published 
w
o
rks. 7 Professor W
alker has since n
oted a c
a
se
 of dissasine in 1368 a
nd 
stated that 'it w
o
uld appear a
c
c
o
rdingly that n
o
v
el dissasine fell largely into 
desuetude 
ro
u
nd 
about 1400', 8 
w
hile Professor \V
illock states that this 
o
c
c
u
rred 
'probably in the m
id-fourteenth c
e
ntury'. 9 If L
ord C
ooper's vie'w 
of dissasine is so
m
e
w
hat u
n
clear. his thoughts o
n
 m
o
rtancestor a
re
 m
o
re
 
easily seen
, w
hen he w
rites: to 
·
 
(T]he e
m
phasis appears to have shifted from
 ejecting the intruder to 
declaring 
the 
title 
of 
the 
heir 
to 
su
cceed. 
Indeed 
the 
term
 
"
m
o
rtancestor", 
w
hich is 
of v
ery frequent 
o
c
cl!rrence in Scottish 
charter re
c
o
rds of the thirteenth c
e
ntury. w
as m
o
re
 c
o
m
m
o
nly u
sed 
n
ot 
of the 
o
riginal possessory 
re
m
edy but 
of the c
o
m
prehensive 
generalis inquisicio 
.
.
.
 w
hich becam
e the 
"brieve of su
c
c
e
ssion" of 
B
alfour 
.
.
.
 
a
nd 
the 
"brieve 
of se
rvice" 
of Stair 
.
.
.
 
a
nd 
of later 
practice dow
n to 1847 
-th
e substance of all these being practically 
identical 
.
.
.
 c
o
n
c
e
rn
ed solely w
ith the investigation of the heir's title, 
a
nd there being n
o
 intruder to eject. From
 all this it w
o
uld se
e
m
 to 
f~llow that by the e
nd of the thirteenth c~ntury the o
riginal brieve of 
m
o
rtancestor w
as losing its identity. 
·
 
A
gain, 
a broadly sim
ilar c
o
n
clusion has been re
a
ched by subsequent 
w
riters, su
ch a
s Professor W
illock: 11 
The brieve 
of 
m
o
rtancestor died 
o
ut 
at 
a
n
 
e
a
rly date, being, in 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 w
ith 
n
o
v
el dissasine, 
replaced by su
ch n
ative a
ctions as 
ejection a
nd w
ro
ngous o
c
c
upation, but the n
a
m
e
 had so
 im
pressed 
1.\.s«?\.f o
n
 ~~e \eg.a\ im
agination that it becam
e attached to the related 
-
:
.
:
 
s;:::o 
.. ,
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H
ow
ever the e
xtent to w
hich Lord C
ooper's general thesis w
as u
nderm
ined 
by Sheriff M
cK
echnie 
suggests that his particular 
c
o
n
clusions o
n
 the 
subject of dissasine a
nd m
o
rtancestor should be e
x
a
m
ined afresh. In this 
paper the evidence to be found in the so
u
rc
e
s suggested by the learned 
Sheriff-
ecclesiastical c
a
rtularies, c
ollections of fam
ily papers a
nd so
 o
n
-
w
ill be brought" together w
ith legislation a
nd legal literature of the period. 
W
e a
re
 driven to these so
u
rc
e
s by the u
nfortunate lack of m
edieval c
o
u
rt 
re
c
o
rds, 
but 
e
n
o
ugh 
c
a
n
 
be 
gleaned 
from
 
them
 
a
nd 
a
n
 
o
c
c
a
sional 
c
o
m
parative glance so
uth of the border to e
n
able u
s to sketch a 
rather 
different picture from
 that just described. 
(ii) The brieve of dissasine 
The e
a
rliest reference to a re
m
edy for dissasine in the Scottish royal c
o
u
rts 
se
e
m
s to be in 
a 
statute 
of 1230 
w
hich has generally been a
c
c
epted as· 
a
uthentic. 12 There is n
o
 evidence of a
ny e
a
rlier form
s of brieve dealing w
ith 
su
ch questions o
r being in a
ny sen
se forerunners in style of the brieve as it 
appears in the form
ularies of the A
yr a
nd B
ute m
a
n
u
sc
ripts. The statute 
states that w
hen c
o
m
plaint is m
ade to the king o
r his justiciar of dissasine 
from
 a
ny tenem
ent in w
hich the c
o
m
plainer claim
ed to have ~en infeft, a 
royal w
rit is to be se
nt to the justiciar o
r the sheriff c
o
m
m
a
nding them
 to 
determ
ine the justice of the c
o
m
plaint. This is to be done by s:neans of a 
re
c
ognition, o
r jury. Professor B
arrow
 has draw
n attention to a c
a
se
 before 
the justiciar of L
othian begun 
'by the lord king's brieve of re
c
ognition' 
before 1242 
a
nd 
suggested that, 
since it 
c
a
m
e
 before the justiciar a
nd 
involved 
a 
re
c
ognitio, it 
m
ay have been 
a 
c
a
se
 begun by 
a brieve 
of 
dissasine. 13 O
n so
m
e
w
hat 
sim
ilar grounds it c
a
n
 be a
rgued that a 
c
a
se
 
before the sheriff of B
erw
ick so
m
e
 tim
e betw
een 1233 a
nd 1235 is possibly 
a
n
other e
a
rly e
x
a
m
ple of the brieve. 14 This c
a
se
 is e
specially interesting in 
that 
the 
pursuers 
claim
 
rights 
of 
e
stovers 
in 
a 
w
o
od 
at R
eston in 
B
erw
ickshire, w
hich belonged to the defenders, the priory of C
oldingham
. 
In E
ngland the w
rit of n
o
v
el disseisin w
as u
sed from
 its e
a
rliest beginnings 
in the tw
elfth c
e
ntury to protect c
o
m
m
o
n
 rights of pasture, IS a
nd the a
uthor 
of 'B
racton' a
rgued that it c
o
uld be u
sed for c
o
m
m
o
n
 rights of all so
rts, 
.
 
including e
stovers.'6 If the view
 in B
racton w
as e
v
e
r adopted in practice, it 
w
as 
obscured 
in 
the 
thirteenth 
c
e
ntury 
a
nd 
the 
se
c
o
nd Statute 
of 
W
estm
inster had to declare in 1285 that the assize c
o
uld be u
sed to re
c
o
v
e
r 
e
stovers be{ o
re
 the king's justices.l 7 Prior to 1285 interference w
ith e
stovers 
w
as dealt w
ith by quod perm
ittat w
rits before the sheriff, 11 w
hich w
e
re
 
so
m
etim
es know
n a
s the 
'little w
rits of n
o
v
el disseisin' because'they w
ere 
pleaded w
ithout a
n
 assize in the c
o
u
nty c
o
u
rt.' 9 C
an a parallel be draw
n 
w
ith England here, given that the R
eston c
a
se
 w
as heard before the sheriff! 
The a
n
sw
e
r is, probably n
ot. A
part from
 
.
.
 the fact that there is n
o
 e
vidence 
a
n
y
 
q
u
o
d
 p
e
rm
iu
a
r 
form
 
in 
th
e 
adm
ittedly 
m
u
ch
 
·later S
cottish 
\.n 
'-.D 
rJ 
-
-
=
.:....::-3iii:i:"'" 
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form
ularies, the a
ct of 1230 does suggest that the justiciar m
ight issue a 
brieve of dissasine him
self, sa
ving the c
o
m
plainer the n
eed to approach the 
king's 
chapel (chancery). 
a
nd in it direct that the case be heard by the 
sheriff. T
hat su
ch a procedure w
as follow
ed m
ay be borne o
ut by a letter of 
B
ugh B
arclay, justiciar of Lothian. w
ritten in 1262. in w
hich he states that 
he has issued 
'tw
o pairs of the king's letters of dissasine' to John Scott of 
Reston.2o U
nfortunately it is n
ot stated in w
hich c
o
u
rts the a
ctions w
ill be 
heard. A
nother docum
ent dated 2nd A
ugust 1247 
n
a
rrates how
 A
dam
 
Spott im
pleaded R
anulf of B
uncle 'by precepts of the lord king of Scots a
nd 
of lord D
avid de Lindsay then justiciar of L
othian' for c
e
rtain lands in 
B
uncle. The c
a
se
 w
as c
o
m
m
e
n
c
ed in the 
'c
o
u
nty (comiraru) 
of B
erw
ick', 
w
hich suggests the sheriffs c
o
u
rt, although a final settlem
ent w
as re
a
ched 
in the 
'c
o
u
rt of the king of Scots' before Lindsay the justiciar.21 Possibly 
then this w
as a c
a
se
 heard initially before the sheriff o
n
 a brieve issued by 
the justiciar. Such a pow
er did have a
n
 English parallel. although it should 
n
ot be pressed too far: 
'if the disseisin had been c
o
m
m
itted during a general 
eyre in 
the 
c
o
u
nty, 
the justices in 
eyre 
c
o
uld issue the 
o
riginal 
w
rit 
them
selves, sa
ving the offended party a trip to Chancery'.22 Perhaps then 
the pursuers in the R
eston c
a
se
 had obtained a brieve of dissasine from
 the 
justiciar addressed to the sheriff a
nd w
e
re
 e
x
e
rcising facilities first 
m
ade 
a
v
ailable by the a
ct of 1230. 
A
nother e
a
rly c
a
se
 of dissasine, this tim
e before thejusticiar's c
o
u
rt, m
ay 
be the a
ction in w
hich G
ilbert so
n
 of Sam
uel im
pleaded M
aldoven e
a
rl of 
L
ennox 
'by letters of the lord king' for the lands of M
 o
n
a
chkennaJan in 
1235.23 The c
a
se
 is o
n
e
 for w
hich there is a c
o
m
parative w
e
alth of su
rviving 
docum
entation. T
he lands w
ere attached to the church of K
ilpatrick w
hich 
the e
a
rl had subinfeudated to Paisley abbey. The re
ctor of the church w
as 
the e
a
rl's younger brother D
ougal. w
ho had alienated the lands to G
ilbert. 
G
ilbert's title had been c
o
m
pleted by a c
o
nfirm
ation from
 the e
a
rl. In 1233 
the abbey re
c
o
v
e
red the lands by a
ction before papal judges-delegate, but 
G
ilbert had 
re
m
ained c
o
ntum
aciously absent from
 the proceedings, a
nd 
the se
c
ular a
rm
 had to be brought against him
 to e
nforce the judgm~nt. 
Perhaps the e
a
rl had been c
o
m
pelled by higher a
uthority to eject G
ilbert 
a
nd the latter's re
a
ction had been to bring a brieve of dissasine. The c
a
se
 
w
as settled w
ith the e
a
rl agreeing to pay G
ilbert 
-sixty silver m
a
rks for the 
re
n
u
n
ciation of his claim
. 
If to begin w
ith the sheriffs jurisdiction in dissasine w
a
s co
-extc;nsive 
w
ith that of the justiciar, this had c
e
a
sed to be the position by the e
a
rly 
fourteenth c
e
ntury a
nd perhaps before. In the fourteenth c
e
ntury 'registers' 
the brieve is alw
ays addressed to thejusticiar.H R
egiam
 Majestatem2~ a
nd 
Q
uoniam
 A
ttachiam
enta26 both state that the a
ction pertains to
 his c
o
u
rt. 
O
n
 th
is p
o
in
t th
e tre
a
tises a
r
e
 s
u
p
p
o
rted
 b
y
 th
e few
 c
a
s
e
s
· o
f w
h
ich
 th
ere is 
·
'
 
a
n
y
 e
v
'i.d
e
n
c
e
.ln
 1
3
1
9
 t.h
e a
b
b
e
y
 
o
f D
u
n
fe
rm
lin
e
 a
n
d
 t.h
e p
o
rtio
n
e
rs
 o
ft.h
e
 
·,, .
 
.,.~.~ 
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barony of Fithkil w
ere involved in a boundary dispute. The portioners. 
dissatisfied 
w
ith 
the 
result 
of 
a
n
 
e
a
rlier 
brieve 
of peram
bulation. 
brought a
n
other a
ction by a brieve of dissasinc. w
hich w
a
s begun in the 
justiciar's c
o
u
rt. 27 In 1342 a
n
 assize held in the full c
o
u
rt ofthejusticiar at 
lnverbervy found that Sir W
illiam
 M
ow
bray had dissaised the abbot a
nd 
c
o
n
v
e
nt 
of the abbey 
of A
rbroath u
njustly a
nd 
w
ithout a judgment of 
v
a
rious lands in the M
earns.2B
ln 1368 Thom
as H
ay of L
oquhariot (not to 
be c
o
nfused w
ith his c
o
ntem
porary, Thom
as H
ay of Erroll, c
o
n
stable of 
Scotland) brought a brieve of dissasine against W
illiam
 B
orthw
ick in the 
justiciar's c
o
u
rt at Edinburgh.2
9 Finally w
e knQw oft w
o cases of dissasine 
in 1433. both heard before the justiciar n
o
rth of Forth at Perth.JO
 A
 final 
c
o
nfirm
ation of the position c
a
n
 be found in a m
inor treatise 
·probably 
w
ritten in 
the 
1450s. 
the O
rdo Justiciari~. 
w
hich 
e
xplains details 
.of 
procedure in the justiciar's c
o
u
rt. This gives a form
 
of su
m
m
o
n
s 'sup~r 
Br~ve de N
ova D
issaisina'.JJ 
It is 
striking how
 closely the form
 of the brieve. a
s it appears in the 
'registers' a
nd Quoniam, follow
s the 
w
o
rding of the a
ct of 1230 w
hich 
speaks, 
a
s do the 
styles, 
of the pursuer's 
c
o
m
plaint that he has been 
dissaised by a
n
other u
njustly a
nd w
ithout a judgment and· states that a 
re
c
ognition of the good a
nd faithful m
e
n
 of the n
eighbourhood should be 
held to m
ake inquiry. If the c
o
m
plaint is found to be true, the pursuer is to 
be re
stored to his form
er sasine: if n
ot, he is tQ be put in the king's m
e
rcy.ln 
general the inspiration of the English w
rit is clear. both in the a
ct a
nd in the 
styles. It is tem
pting therefore to a
ssu
m
e
 that the brieve took this form
 
im
m
ediately. If so
, m
a
ny of the thirteenth c
e
ntury brieves a
nd cases w
hich 
previous w
riters have thought to be e
x
a
m
ples of the brieve of dissasine c
a
n
 
be disregarded. This is particularly so
 
w
here the brieve in question is 
retourable (returnable to the king's chapel); the brieve of dissasine w
as a 
pleadable brieve a
nd thus n
ot retourable. 
The form
 appears to have been identical w
hether the brieve w
a
s called 
o
n
e
 
of 
n
o
v
el dissasine, 
a
s in the 
'registers'. 
o
r sim
ply dissasine, 
a
s in 
Quoniam. The e
a
rliest direct reference, in 1262. is to the 
'king's letters of 
dissasine ',32 In the fourteenth c
e
ntury there a re references both to brieves of 
·
 
dissasine (as in the cases of 1319 a
nd 1368 m
e
ntioned above) a
nd to brieves 
of n
o
v
el dissasine. Thus the 1318 legislation of R
obert I speaks in tw
o 
chapters 
of the brieve 
of n
o
v
el dissasine, 33 
w
hile in 1328 the abbey of 
A
rbroath a
nd its m
e
n
 w
ere given tem
porary e
x
e
m
ption from
 all suits o
r 
c
o
m
plaints to be. brought against them
, e
x
c
epting o
nly a
ctions begun by 
brieves of n
o
v
el dissasine o
r terce.l 4 This docum
ent m
ay suggest that the 
'n
o
v
el' elem
ent had substantive c
o
n
sequences in that the a
ction 
m
i:Bht 
becom
e tim
e-barred, a
s
 in E
ngland. B
ut t,Pe o
nly Scottish s
o
u
rc
e
 to
 refer 
e
xplicitly to
 a tim
e-lim
it beyond w
hich n
o
v
el dissa"Sinc; w
a
s
 n
o
t a
v
ailable is 
Region~ 
w
h
ic
h
. in
 a 
p
a
ssa
g
e
 b
o
rro
w
e
d
 fro
m
 G
Jan
v
ill. s
ta
te
s
 th
a
t th
e
 tim
e-
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f"-
dissasine in Scotland, a
s in England, that n
o
 esso
n
zies, o
r ex
cu
ses from
 
'--.9 
appearance, 
w
ere allow
ed to the defender a
nd that the case should be 
C'J 
determ
ined o
n
 its first day in c
o
u
rt. W
e c
a
n
 see this rule in operation in 1433 
w
hen it w
as o
nly w
ith the c
o
n
se
nt of the pursuer that his c
a
se
 of dissasine 
w
as c
o
ntinued to a se
c
o
nd day:CJ N
othing w
as to delay the a
ction a
nd the 
G
lanvilJian rule that the tenant w
ho calls a w
a
rra
ntor in disseisin loses the 
a
ction im
m
ediately is found 
in 
Regiam
 
M
ajestatem 
also.« Thus the 
w
a
rra
ntor c
o
uld 
n
ot take o
v
e
r the defence of the a
ction in place of the 
tenant. In thirteenth c
e
ntury England how
ever it becam
e possible for the 
tenant to start a separate a
ction against his w
a
rra
ntor by the w
rit w
a
ra
ntia 
ca
rte: if he lost in the assize, he w
o
uld then be able to re
c
o
v
e
r from
 his 
w
a
rra
ntor lands elsew
here of equal v
alue to those from
 w
hich he had just 
been put o
ut." 5 This is the position w
hich the Scottish a
ct se
e
m
s to a
chieve. 
It is n
ot know
n w
hen the brieve of w
a
rra
ndice of charter w
as introduced; it 
appears in the A
y( m
a
n
u
sc
ript a
s a form
 of w
rit decom
pulsio in the n
a
m
e
 of 
king A
lexander, im
plying a thirteenth c
e
ntury date."
6 O
ther e
vidence show
s 
that generally the effect of raising a brieve of w
a
rra
ndice w
as to ~ist o
r 
su
spend the principal a
ction: 47 the effect of the a
ct is therefore to preserve 
the special position 
of dissasine 
w
ith 
regard to w
a
rra
ndice, but also to 
perm
it the deflection of the burden of the a
ction from
 the tenant infeft after 
dissasine by a group. 
It has been said that the 13 I 8 a
ct altered procedure in dissasine 'in favour 
of the dispossessed pursuer'. "
•
 B
ut o
u
r interpretation of its provisions so
 far 
suggests a different c
o
n
clusion, that the a
ct favoured the sitting tenant w
ho 
had c
o
m
e
 in after the dissasine. In general the pursuer had to se
a
rch o
ut the 
other 
parties 
involved 
a
nd 
bring 
them
 
into 
his 
a
ction. 
A
 
c
ru
cial 
c
o
n
sequence w
as the spreading of the pains of losing the a
ction, either by 
u
se of the brieve of w
a
rra
ndice in the c
a
se
 of the tenant infeft after dissasine 
by a group, o
r, in other c
a
se
s w
here the tenant had been put in after a
ny 
form
 
of dissasine, 49 
by 
allocating 
the dam
ages 
a
m
o
ngst 
the 
parties 
involved. This is provided for by the a
ct w
hich states that the dissaisee shall 
re
c
o
v
e
r dam
ages from
 
e
a
ch 
of the dissaisors in proportion to the tim~ 
w
hich e
a
ch of them
 spent in the lands. W
e do n
ot know
 how
 the quantum
 
w
o
uld have been a
sse
ssed 
-
Regiam
 M
ajestatem states a m
a
xim
um
 of ten 
m
a
rks, but Quoniam Attachiam
enta allow
s re
c
o
v
e
ry of the w
hole of the 
pursuer's loss through his ex
clusion.so 
-
but this reduction of his liability 
m
u
st have been o
n
e
 of the m
o
st im
portant c
o
n
sequences of being m
e
rely a 
co
-<iefender for the losing tenant. T
he provision also u
nderlines the point 
that a
ctions of dissasine knew
 n
o
 form
al tim
e lim
it. 
If it is a
sked w
hy the legislators of 1318 should have w
ished to give this 
kind of protection to tenants w
ho had e
ntered their lands after a dissasine, 
the political situation of the tim
e should be borne in inind. F
ollow
ing his 
triu
m
p
h
 a
t B
an
n
o
ck
b
u
rn
 in
 1314, R
o
b
ert I h
ad
 his p
arliam
en
t declare th
at 
fti 
-
-
.
.
 -~-·-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
·
·
-
-
-
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all those w
ho w
o
uld n
ot c
o
m
e
 into his peace should be forfeited. Those w
ho 
held lands in both Scotland a
nd England had to choose for the first tim
e to 
w
hich c
ro
w
n
 they w
o
uld in future give their aiJegiance; those w
ho chose to 
be subject to the English king w
o
uld 
'lose their Scottish lands. This had 
happened to ~any w
ho had been put o
ut in the w
a
rs from
 1296 o
n
w
a
rd, 
a
nd the lands had been granted o
ut instead to R
obert's supporters. This, 
c
o
upled w
ith a 
return of the form
er o
w
n
e
rs to Scottish allegiance after 
1314, led 
to 
a 
c
o
m
plex 
situation 
w
hich has been fully discussed by 
Professor B
arrow
. H
e c
o
n
cludes that •K
ing R
obert held fast to the principle 
that there 
should be 
n
o
 disinheritance 
of 
m
e
n
 
a
nd 
w
o
m
e
n
 
claim
ing 
property by hereditary right. provided that they w
ere prepared to sw
e
a
r 
allegiance to him
'. 51 Such a policy 
m
u
st have led to clashes of interest 
betw
een those disinherited during the 
w
a
rs 
a
nd those w
ho had gained 
possession a
s 
a 
re
sult, in 
w
hich perhaps the form
er 
m
ight have raised 
a
ctions of dissasine to re
c
o
v
e
r their lands. It is su
rely against a background 
w
here the king's loyal adherents (and their tenants) w
e
re
 u
n
c
e
rtain to w
hat 
e
xtent they w
o
uld be able to retain their n
ew
 lands against the returning 
disinherited that chapter thirteen of the 1318 legislation w
a
s e
n
a
cted. This 
w
o
uld e
xplain its preoccupation w
ith old dissasines. A
 sim
ilar rationale 
m
ay w
ell 
u
nderlie chapter 
nineteen, the other a
ct of 1318 dealing w
ith 
dissasine: the defender here, a
s in brieves of right a
nd m
o
rtancestor, w
a
s to 
have full opportunity to c
o
n
sider the c
a
se
.against him
 a
nd to state his o
w
n
 
position .
 .s2 
There a
re
 of c
o
u
rse
 provisions in the 1318 a
ct w
hich clearly.favour the 
pursuer, for instance w
here the dissasine had been c
a
rried o
ut by a group. 
The final provision of the a
ct also lays dow
n a rule w
hich, w
hile n
ot strictly 
in favour of the pursuer, is a harsh m
e
a
su
re
 against the dissaisor. T
hose 
.
 w
ho a
re
 found to be dissaisors c
u
m
 vi et a
rm
is after the publication of the 
statute a
re
 to be im
prisoned (adjudicatus ad personam) a
nd a
re
 also liable 
to a m
ajor a
m
e
rc
e
m
e
nt o
r fine at the king's w
ill. This appears to add to the 
G
lanvillian rule stated in Regiam
53 a
nd e
choed in the brieve itself that the 
guilty defender m
u
st pay a fine to the king's u
se, by im
posing a stricter 
penalty o
n
 those w
ho dissaise w
ith violence. W
as this intended to dete"r 
those of the disinherited w
ho m
ight be tem
pted to self-help? If so
, it m
ay 
w
ell 
stand 
alongside 
chapter tw
enty-five 
of the 1318 legislation w
hich 
affirm
ed the rule that n
o
 m
a
n
 w
as to be put o
ut of his freehold w
ithout the 
king's brieve .
 .s.~ T
he provision o
ught also to be interpreted in the light of the 
a
ct of w
hich it.is part a
nd w
hich is intended to c
re
ate joint liability a
m
o
ngst 
the o
riginal dissaisor a
nd those w
ho derived their title to the lands from
 
him
. Such subsequent tenants a
re
 also dissaisors liable u
nder the brieve, 
but they did 
n
o
t dissaise c
u
m
 
vi et a
rm
is; that w
o
uld be m
o
st likely to 
happen in the a
c
t o
f ejecting the perso.n 
w
ho is n
o
w
 the pursuer. T
hus it 
uld be the o
riginal dissaisor r
a
ther than the c
u
r
r
e
n
t possessor. w
ho w
.o
uJd 
·
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be liable to this penalty. A
gain therefore the policy of protecting the tenant 
'.9 
is apparent; it is also n
otew
orthy that in fram
ing this reform
 a
n
 English 
(Y) 
provision, the first Statute of \\'estm
inster of 1275. w
as being follow
ed 
.
 .s.s 
M
uch c
a
n
 be learned of the substantive effect of the brieve both before 
a
nd after 1318 from
 this legislation~ m
o
re
 c
a
n
 be discovered from
 looking at 
the form
 of the brieve itself. The style in the A
yr m
a
n
u
sc
ript says that the 
purs"uer m
u
st have been v
est a
nd saised of the lands as of fee o
r a
s of terce 
(dote) o
r by a re
nt (flrma) the term
 of w
hich has n
ot yet ex
 pired.S
6 This last 
suggests 
a
n
other interesting c
o
ntrast 
w
ith England 
w
here o
nly the life-
tenant a
nd tenant pur a
utre \'ie, a
nd n
ot the m
e
re
 term
or. w
ere protected in 
their seisin by the assize:.S
7 but there is n
o
 further Scottish e
vidence o
n
 this 
point. In Quoniam the brieve states that the pursuer m
u
st have been v
est 
a
nd saised a
s of fee. sa w
hile in the B
ute m
a
n
u
sc
ript the form
ula is sim
ply, 
that the pursuer w
as v
est a
nd saised of the lands .
 .s9 It is difficult to draw
 a
ny 
clear picture from
,this w
hat interest in the lands a pursuer had to show
 he 
held before the dissasine. Som
ething c
a
n
 perhaps be m
ade, how
ever. of a 
Regiam
 passage 
w
hich Lord C
ooper treated w
ith so
m
e
 sc
epticism
. This 
states that the brieve of dissasine 'touches o
nly liberum
 tenem
entum
'.6o It is 
apparent that in later m
edieval Scotland 
'liberum
 ten
em
en
tu
m
' m
e
a
nt in 
effect a
ny life interest in land. w
hether o
r n
ot that interest w
as heritable. A
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 e
x
a
m
ple from
 the fourteenth 
c
e
ntury 
o
n
w
a
rds is the life-rent 
w
hich fathers often re
se
rv
ed to them
selves w
hen granting the fee of their 
lands 
to 
their 
so
n
s. 61 
In 
England 
the 
assi1.e 
protected freeholdings 
-
including a
ny tenancy for life-
a
nd it w
o
uld be su
rprising if the. Scottish 
brieve w
as n
ot of c
o
m
parable sc
ope. Terce. the w
idow
's liferent of part of 
her husband's e
state, is specifically referred to in the A
yr m
a
n
u
sc
ript. In 
1368 the lord of M
enteith c
o
m
plained before the king a
nd parliam
ent that 
his 
w
ife 
w
as being 
e
x
cluded from
 her 
terce 
of a form
er 
m
a
rriage by 
A
rchibald 
D
ouglas.62 It 
w
a
s 
su
c
c
e
ssfully 
a
rgued 
that he 
should have 
re
c
o
u
rse
 n
ot to parliam
ent but to the c
o
m
m
o
n
 law
 in the justiciar·s c
o
u
rt: 
does this m
e
a
n
 that the appropriate re
m
edy. given that the lady had already 
been se
rv
ed to her terce. w
o
uld have been a brieve of dissasine? 
In this c
o
ntext it is of interest to n
ote a statute of 1434 w
hich introduced 
the brieve de aqueductu into Scottish practice. 6J T
he brieve w
as clearly 
m
odelled o
n
 that of dissasine. It began by n
a
rrating the pursuer's grave 
c
o
m
plaint that he had been disturbed a
nd m
olested u
njustly a
nd w
ithout a 
judgment in his possession 
of the w
aterw
ay at his 
m
ill. T
he c
o
u
rt w
a
s 
instructed to 
re
store him
 to his possession if the c
o
m
plaint w
a
s true.M
 
Perhaps the re
a
so
n
 for this legislation w
a
s a decision that su
ch a possession 
w
a
s n
ot a freehold re
c
o
v
e
rable by the brieve of d issasine. 1 f so
, the position 
m
ay be c
o
ntrasted w
ith that in E
ngland, w
here the assize se
e
m
s to have 
been a
v
ai\ab\e for diversions of watercourses.
6~ 
·
 
W
hat se
e
m
s to e
m
e
rge from
 this is a fuller u
nderstanding of w
hat w
a
s 
~-
-
-
-
-
·
-
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31 
m
e
a
nt 
by 
c
o
ntem
porary 
w
riters 
w
hen 
they 
spoke 
of dissasine 
a
s 
a 
possessory re
m
edy. lt w
a
s n
ot that the pursuer n
eed o
nly be so
m
e
o
n
e
 w
ho 
had had possession, w
ith o
r w
ithout right thereto. R
ather it w
a
s that the 
pursuer did 
n
ot have to show
 his heritable title. o
r fee. M
edieval jurists 
battled to fit the realities of their land law
 in to the sharp R
om
anist c
o
ntrast 
of o
w
n
e
rship a
nd possession: o
w
n
e
rship m
e
a
nt heritable title, therefore all 
else m
u
st be possession o
nly. B
ut e
v
e
n
 in Scotland w
ith its relatively sim
ple 
structure of interests in land that dichotom
y did n
ot fit the facts of lega11ife. 
T
o say that a m
a
n
 w
as n
ot a proprietor did n
ot preclude his having so
m
e
 
other interest in o
r claim
 to the land; m
a
ny of these he c
o
uld re
c
o
v
e
r, e
v
e
n
 
against the heritable proprietor, by the brieve of dissasine. Indeed it m
ay 
n
ot have been u
n
c
o
m
m
o
n
 for, say, a tercer to re
c
o
v
e
r against the person 
w
ho held the fee. B
ut it is a long w
ay from
 that to say that so
m
e
o
n
e
 w
ho had 
gained possession 
w
ithout 
a
ny shadow
 of right 
c
o
uld bring the brieve 
su
c
c
e
ssfully 
w
hen he 
w
as 
turned 
o
u
t by 
the 
true 
o
w
n
e
r. 
Professor 
Sutherland has show
n u
s that, n
o
 m
atter w
hat B
racton m
ight have said, in 
E
ngland the m
e
re
 w
ro
ngful possessor w
as n
ot n
o
rm
ally protected by the 
a
ssize against disseisin by the true o
w
n
er;66 it is probable that the position 
w
a
s the sa
m
e
 in Scotland. 
In 
a
ny 
c
a
se
 
it 
is 
clear 
that 
dissasinc 
in 
Scotland 
w
a
s 
far from
 
functioning 
a
s a 
m
e
rely 
•possessory' re
m
edy. A
s M
aitland 
re
m
a
rked 
'a
 
possessory a
ction is likely to lose so
m
e
 of its possessory characteristics if 
the plaintiff is ~uffered to rely o
n
 a
n
cient facts'. 67 It is clear from
 the 1318 
legislation that e
v
e
n
 before that tim
e the a
ction e
n
abled a 
challenge to 
a
n
other's title to land if its ultim
ate so
u
rc
e
 Jay in a dissasine of. the pursuer 
by so
m
e
o
n
e
 w
ho w
a
s still alive a
nd. from
 1318, n
a
m
ed in the brieve. T
hat 
e
v
e
nt n
e
ed n
ot be a
nd often w
as n
ot a re
c
e
nt o
n
e; again w
e c
a
n
 refer to the 
1433 c
a
se
 w
here the a
ction w
as brought se
v
e
nty years after the dissasine. 
C
hapter nineteen of the 1318 legislation show
s u
s the brieve of dissasine 
being treated a
s e
sse
ntially sim
ilar to the brieves of right a
nd m
o
rtancestor: 
su
rely this is because they w
ere se
e
n
 by practical m
e
n
 of the tim
e in this w
ay, 
a
s m
e
a
n
s of vindicating claim
s to land, to be v
a
riously u
sed a
c
c
o
rding to
 the 
n
ature of those claim
s. 
B
rieves of dissasine, n
o
v
el9r otherw
ise. w
e
re
 still know
n in m
id-fifteenth. 
c
e
ntury Scottish legal practice a
nd, to judge from
 the c
a
se
s of 1433 a
nd the 
O
rdo Justiciarie, term
inology a
nd procedure had changed little since its 
introduction in 1230. B
ut to the best 
of m
y know
ledge there 
a
re
 
n
o
 
subsequent 
·references to this form
 of a
ction a
nd it m
u
st be a
ssu
m
ed that 
so
m
etim
e in the se
c
o
nd half of the fifteenth c
e
ntury the brieve bepn tof~U:fi~­
o
u
t of u
se. A
 statute of J 504 e
n
visages the pursuit of pleadable 
·
 
·
 
·
 
the plural) in the justiciar's co
u
rt.6• W
e-.know
 of three, possi):)ly 
.
 
pleadable brieves 
w
hich 
w
ere taken before the justiciar: peram
buJ4qojf) 
h c
o
ntinued in u
se throughout the sixteenth c
e
ntury). 
~ 
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o
-
regis infricta (which m
ay have been abolished in 1430 a
nd is n
ot m
e
ntioned 
'-..9 
in the O
rdo Justiciarie), m
o
rtancestor (of w
hich, a
s w
e shall see. there a
re
 
(YJ 
cases in the later fifteenth c
e
ntury) a
nd dissasine. Possibly therefore the 
1504 a
ct im
plies the c
o
ntinued 
u
se 
of the brieve of dissasine. B
ut if n
ot 
already gone it 
w
as 
u
ndoubtedly passing 
o
ut 
of legal 
c
u
rre
n
cy. The 
form
ulary w
hich c
o
ntains styles of v
a
rious plcadable brievcs in u
se by the 
regality chancery of the a
rchbishop of St. A
ndrew
s about 1520 has n
o
 form
 
of dissasine, although it does include others for right a
nd m
o
rtancestor. 
(iii) 
The brieve of m
o
rt a
n
cestor 
In m
a
ny w
ays the story of the brieve of m
o
rtancestor se
e
m
s to parallel that 
of dissasine closely. There is a reference w
hich e
stablishes its e
xistence in 
Scotland in the m
id-thirteenth c
e
ntury. In J 253 E
m
m
a ofSm
eaton su
ed the 
abbey of D
unferm
line by royal letters of m
o
rtancestor. claim
ing lands in 
the fee of M
usselburgh w
hich had been held by her father.6
9 The c
a
se
 w
as 
settled, but it is clear that the basis of Em
m
a's a
ction w
as, a
s o
n
e
 w
o
uld 
e
xpect w
ith m
o
rtancestor, a claim
 to su
cceed to a
n
 im
m
ediate a
n
c
e
stor w
ho 
n
ad died v
est a
nd saised in lands w
hich w
ere n
o
w
 being u
njustly w
ithheld 
by so
m
e
 u
n
e
ntitled person. This is also the substance of the brieve a
s it 
appears in the registers
70 a
nd a
s it is described in Regiam
 a
nd Quoniam.11 
A
s 
su
ch the brieve is 
obviously 
m
odelled 
o
n
 the English 
w
rit 
of m
o
rt 
d'ancestor. Its difference from
 the brieve of su
c
c
e
ssion, a
s w
e shall call it,12 
is also plain. By the brieve of su
c
c
e
ssion a
n
 individual e
stablished his title to 
inherit a deceased person's lands. This se
e
m
s alw
ays to have taken place in 
the sheriff c
o
u
rt. It w
as a form
al procedure, the re
sult of w
hich w
o
uld be 
retoured to the king's chapel. A
 precept of sa
sine w
o
uld then be issued 
o
rdering that infeftm
ent of the heir take place. A
 brieve of m
o
rtancestor 
w
as pleadable a
nd n
ot retourable; the su
c
c
e
ssful pursuer w
as given sa
sine 
im
m
ediately. The a
ction w
as directed n
ot o
nly at e
stablishing the claim
 of 
the heir but also at ejecting a
n
 intruder w
ho w
as su
m
m
o
n
ed to defend the 
a
ction. 
Like dissasine m
o
rtancestor proceeded w
ithout e
sso
n
zie, although, a
s w
e 
have se
e
n
, in 1318 it w
a
s laid dow
n that the defender should be given a
n
 
opportunity to hear the brieve a
nd to c
o
n
sider the c
a
se
 against him
.n T
he 
a
ction w
a
s heard by a
n
 assize of the good a
nd faithful older m
e
n
 of the 
n
eighbourhood. Its sc
ope w
as w
idened in a
n
other a
ct of 1318 so
 that a
n
 
a
ction c
o
uld· be brought by a pursuer tracing his 
right to su
cceed from
 
grandparents a
s w
ell as from
 parents, u
n
cles, a
u
nts a
nd siblings. 74 A
s L
ord 
C
ooper n
oted, this brought Scots law
 into line w
ith the position already 
a
chieved in E
ngland. There the 
w
rit 
of m
o
rt d'ancestor 
w
as 
sim
ilarly 
lim
ited to begin with~ the person draw
ing his 
right from
 the seisin 
o
f 
grandparents a
n
d
 o
ther m
o
r
e
 re
m
o
te
 relatives w
a
s
 first offered protectio~ 
·b
y
 
th
e
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suggests that the Scots' initial 
adoption 
of m
o
rt d'ancestor took place 
before that date, perhaps at about the sa
m
e
 tim
e a
s they borrow
ed the 
brieve of dissasine. Finally, this 1318 a
ct, by c
o
ntrast w
ith that o
n
 dissasine, 
is su
rely in favour of the disinherited returning to Scotland after 1314 to 
reclaim
 lands 
.after the dislocation of the w
a
rs of independence already 
discussed. 
There a
re
 perhaps a c
o
uple of e
x
a
m
ples of a brieve of m
o
rtancestor pre-
dating the c
a
se
 of E
m
m
a ofSm
eaton in 1253. O
ne is the c
a
se
 about e
stovers 
already m
e
ntioned in the discussion of dissasine. A
 brieve ofm
ortancestor, 
like 
o
n
e
 of dissasine, 
w
as 
o
n
e
 of re
c
ognition. 76 W
hat suggests that the 
brieve of re
c
ognition in the e
stovers c
a
se
 m
ight be o
n
e
 of m
o
rtancestor is 
the 
w
o
rd 
u
sed 
to describe the parties 
raising the 
a
ction. T
he w
o
rd is 
petentes, translated in England a
s 'dem
andants' a
nd said to be appropriate 
for m
o
rt d'ancestor but n
ot for n
o
v
el disseisin w
here instead o
n
e
 speaks of 
the plaintiff o
r querens. This follow
s B
racton ·s learning that n
o
v
el disseisin 
is a possessory a
ction w
hereby o
n
e
 c
o
m
plains of a
n
 e
sse
ntially personal 
w
ro
ng w
hile m
o
rt d'ancestor is petitory a
nd does n
ot n
e
c
e
ssa
rily reflect o
n
 
the 
c
o
nduct 
of the 
other party. B
ut. a
s M
aitland pointed o
ut, this sits 
u
n
e
a
sily o
n
 the reality of the tw
o a
ctions. In Scotland it is e
v
e
n
 less clear 
w
hether the language 
u
sed 
to describe the parties has a
ny significance 
of this kind. In the later m
edieval period, the n
o
rm
al L
atin u
sage w
a
s that 
of a
ctor a
nd reu
s, 
w
ithout a
ny apparent ·v
a
riation a
m
o
ngst the form
s of 
a
ction.n lt is 
n
ot im
possible how
ever that the e
stovers c
a
se
 w
as o
n
e
 of 
m
o
rtancestor. There a
re
 so
m
e
 e
a
rly thirteenth c
e
ntury c
a
se
s w
htre e
stovers 
w
ere 
re
c
o
v
e
red 
by 
m
o
rt d'ancestor in 
E
ngland, 71 
although later 
this 
function 
w
a
s taken 
o
v
e
r by quod perm
iuar w
rits in the n
ature of m
o
rt 
d'ancestor, a
nd w
as n
ot regained u
nder the se
c
o
nd Statute ofW
estm
inster. 79 
A
nother possible 
c
a
se
 from
 
the 
m
iddle of the thirteenth c
e
ntury is the 
a
ction w
hich M
ariota daughter of Sam
uel raised by royal letters against the 
bishop of G
lasgow
 c
o
n
c
e
rning the lands of Stobo in Peeblesshire. M
ariota 
a
nd her sister's so
n
 both e
v
e
ntually quit-
claim
ed the bishop ofthe.tands; it 
is thus possible that the. basis of her claim
 w
a
s a right ofinheritancederived 
from
 Sam
uel. A
ccordingly, a
s Professor B
arrow
 has suggested, this m
ay 
have been a c
a
se
 of m
o
rtancestor. 80 If s
o
-
a
nd w
e c
a
n
n
ot be s
u
re
-
then it 
se
e
m
s that in its e
a
rly days m
o
rtancestor, like dissasine, m
ight be taken in 
the sheriff c
o
u
rt. 
H
ow
ever 
the 
Regiam
, 
the Quoniam, 
the 
registers•• 
a
nd 
su
rviving 
ex
am
ple.s of the u
se of the brieve from
 the fourteenth c
e
ntury show
 that 
later it pertained 
o
nly to the c
o
u
rt 
of the justiciar. A
 
w
rit in t~c B
ute 
m
a
n
u
sc
ript directs the sisting of procedure before thejustici&rin a f)ri~, 
m
o
rtancestor.a2 In. 1321 t~o justiciars w
e
re
 a
ssigned l? hear the Cft~~ 
_,._;;;"..; 
Jo
h
n
 de M
o
ra agaanst Sybal de Q
uarentelyand Jo
h
n
 C1ssoro~a~~~g{' 
,
 
·"
'' 
•
.rta
n
c
e
sto
r. T
h
e
 d
o
o
m
 g
iv
en
 s
trip
p
ed
 th
e d
efen
d
ers o
f th
ear Jands~o 
·
.A
.· 
·U ''.li . ' ;. ; 
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docum
ent dated I Oth D
ecem
ber 1368 a
nd printed for the first tim
e re
c
e
ntly 
f'-
follow
s the style of the brieve of m
o
rtancestor in the A
yr m
a
n
u
sc
ript alm
ost 
(Y) 
e
x
a
ctly. It is addressed to three justiciars a
nd c
o
m
m
a
nds them
 to hold a 
re
c
ognition 
of the good a
nd faithful a
nd 
old 
m
e
n
 
of the c
o
u
ntry to se
e
 
w
hether the late W
illiam
 D
ouglas of Liddesdale. u
n
cle of the pursuer. died 
v
est a
nd saised a
s of fee of lands in Pecblesshire. If so
. a
nd if the pursuer, 
Jam
es D
ouglas of D
alkcith. is his law
ful a
nd 
n
e
a
re
st heir, a
nd if R
oger 
C
arruthers w
ith his w
ife lsabella is 
u
njustly detaining the lands then the 
justiciars a
re
 to put D
ouglas into the lands so
 that he holds a
s his u
n
cle did 
o
n
 the day w
hen he w
a
s alive a
nd dead."
4 In a
n
 interesting docum
ent of 
1390 M
urdoch Stew
art, justiciar n
o
rth 
of Forth. 
n
a
rrates how
 T
hom
as 
H
ay of E
rroll, the c
o
n
stable. presented a brieve of m
o
rtancestor against 
W
illiam
 K
eith the m
a
rischal in the full c
o
u
rt of the justice-ayre at D
undee. 
lt is 
e
xplained that the brieve had been led before the justiciar o
n
 tw
o 
previous 
o
c
c
a
sions, 
a
nd 
the doom
s given (presum
ably 
o
n
 prelim
inary 
pleas) had both been falsed in parliam
ent. N
ow
 r he brieve is put to a
n
 a
ssize 
of the best a
nd w
o
rthiest of the c
o
u
ntry. w
ho find that T
hom
as is the law
ful. 
a
nd n
e
a
re
st heir of his grandfather John K
eith in the lands of Jnnerpeffray 
in Perthshire a
nd that W
illiam
 is 
u
njustly detaining them
. T
hom
as is to 
have the sa
sine w
hich his grandfather had o
n
 ~he day w
hen he w
a
s alive a
nd 
dead.ss This appears to be a classic c
a
se
 of m
o
rtancestor a
nd a
n
 application 
of the statutory provisions of 1318. M
urdoch Stew
art heard a
n
o
ther su
ch 
c
a
se
 in 1397 in his c
apacity-
a
s justiciar n
o
rth of Forth, w
hen A
lexander 
M
urray of C
olbyn a
nd W
illiam
 so
n
 of John of B
adfothal so
ught to re
c
o
v
e
r 
the third part of the barony of B
adfothal by a brieve of m
o
rtancestor. T
hey 
alleged that M
ichael M
ercer w
a
s u
njustly detaining these. lands. A
n a
ssize 
found that M
arjorie, the pursuer's grandm
other, died saised a
s of fee of the 
third part of the barony a
nd that a
s A
lexander a
nd W
illiam
 w
e
re
 the law
ful 
a
nd 
n
e
a
re
st heirs they should have sa
sine a
nd heritable possession.ll6 It 
se
e
m
s clea.r that w
hen in 1369 Jam
es D
ouglas of D
alkeith a
nd W
illiam
 
C
ressvyle agreed to have the c
o
ntroversy betw
een them
 o
v
e
r the lands of 
R
oberton in L
anarkshire 
settled by 
a brieve 
of m
o
rtancestor, the c
a
se
 
w
o
uld have been heard in the justiciar's c
o
u
rt. 117 It is also apparent that at 
the e
nd of the fourteenth c
e
ntury that brieve 
retained a character quite 
distinct from
 that of the brieve of su
c
c
e
ssion. 
W
e c
a
n
 therefore c
o
rre
ct w
hat it is n
o
w
 apparent is a
n
 editorial slip in the 
sixth v
olum
e· of the Regesta R
egum
 Scutturum
. It is clearly w
ro
ng to index 
the brieve of 1368 
referred to in the previous paragraph a
s a 
'brieve of 
inquest'. T
he sa
m
e
 observation holds good of a fragm
ent printed in th~t 
v
olum
e w
hich is also indexed a
s a 
'brieve of inquest' (presum
ably m
e
a
ning 
brieve of su
c
c
e
ssion). as T
his is addressed to thejusticiar s
o
u
th of F
orth w
ho 
is c
o
m
m
a
nded to re
c
ognosce by good a
nd faithful' a
nd elder m
e
n
 of the 
·c
o
u
n
try
 w
h
eth
er th
e \ate Jo
h
n
 H
e\b
ek
. b
ro
th
er o
f th
e b
earer o
f th
e brieve, 
~ r. 
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M
atthew
 
H
elbek. 
died 
v
e
st 
a
nd 
saised 
a
s 
of fee 
in 
C
alderside in 
L
anarkshire. 119 N
othing else su
rvives of this brieve. but there is m
o
re
 than 
e
n
o
ugh to show
 that it is o
n
e
 of m
o
rtancestor properly speaking, a
nd that it 
w
e
nt o
n
 to suggest that so
m
e
o
n
e
 w
as u
njustly w
ithholding the lands from
 
M
atthew
. 
.
 
·
 
W
hen w
e
 m
o
v
e
 into the fifteenth c
e
ntury. w
e find it quite clear that the 
brieves of su
c
c
e
ssion a
nd of m
o
rtancestor c
o
ntinued to be distinct e
ntities. 
In 
the late 1430s W
illiam
 D
ouglas lord 
of D
rum
lanrig re
c
o
v
e
red from
 
Janet M
urray c
e
rtain lands n
e
a
r H
aw
ick in R
oxburghshire in w
hich his 
father had died 
v
est 
a
nd saised a
s of fee 
a
nd w
hich Janet n
o
w
 u
njustly 
detained. The a
ction w
a
s begun by brieve of m
o
rtancestor a
nd decided in 
the justiciar's c
o
u
rt. In the c
ollection w
here the re
c
o
rd of this c
a
se
 is printed 
there im
m
ediately follow
s a
n
 e
x
a
m
ple from
 1438 of proceedings by brieve 
of su
c
c
e
ssion w
here a person w
a
s se
rv
ed heir to lands in w
hich his father 
had died v
e
st a
nd saised a
s of fee. This took place in the sheriff c
o
u
rt a
nd 
there is 
n
o
 m
e
ntion of a
ny intrusion upon the lands by so
m
e
 u
n
e
ntitled 
person. 90 W
hether o
r n
ot the juxtaposition is intentional. it show
s clearly 
the su
rvival of the distinction betw
een brieves of m
o
rtancestor o
n
 the o
n
e
 
hand a
nd su
c
c
e
ssion o
n
 the other. 
O
ther fifteenth 
c
e
ntury 
e
vidence 
show
s 
the brieve 
of 
m
o
rtancestor 
c
o
ntinuing to 
w
e
a
r its badges 
of identity. 
n
a
m
ely. the 
e
xistence of a
n
 
intruder defending the a
ction a
nd thejuris~iction ofthejusticiar. T
he O
rdo 
Justiciarie provides a form
 for the su
m
m
o
n
s of the defender o
n
 a brieve of 
m
o
rtancestor, 91 a
nd w
e have a
n
 a
ctual e
x
a
m
ple of su
ch a w
rit fro~ 1467.ln 
it W
illiam
 E
dm
onstone of D
untreath,justiciar so
uth of Forth, c
o
m
m
a
nds 
the 
sheriff a
nd baillies 
of L
anark 
to 
c
a
u
se
 the parties to 
a brieve 
of 
m
o
rtancestor of the lord king's chapel to c
o
m
pear before him
 at the n
e
xt 
ayre at L
anark for the determ
ination of their c
a
se
. 92 A
 year e
a
rlier G
ilbert 
lord K
ennedy had 
re
c
o
v
e
red c
e
rtain lands from
 R
obert lord Flem
ing by 
brieve of m
o
rtancestor pursued in the c
o
u
rt of the justiciar at D
um
barton. 
1t w
a
s found that G
ilbert's grandfather had died v
e
st a
nd saised a
s of fee in 
the lands a
nd that R
obert w
a
s n
o
w
 u
njustly detaining them
.9J This looks 
identical to the c
a
se
s of 1390 a
nd 1397 
referred to e
a
rlier. 
It is of so
m
e
 interest therefore to study a c
a
se
 of 1471 in w
hich A
ndrew
 
B
issett c
a
m
e
 before the a
uditors of parliam
ent to false a doom
 w
hich had 
been given in the justice-ayre of C
upar upon a 
'brief of m
o
rtancestry·. T
he 
a
uditors referred the question to the n
e
xt parliam
ent because they c
o
uld 
•n
o
cht n
o
w
 be a
visit be the law
ys that thai find w
ritten to
 declare quhat 
o
rder a
nd proces sal be had in the proceding of the said brier. 94 O
n the face 
of it this w
o
uld suggest that m
o
rtancestor w
a
s becom
ing obsolete. but su
ch: 
a c
o
n
clusion is n
ot borne o
ut by parliam
ent's subsequent a
ctions. Asta~ut~/' 
w
a
s passed. the o
rder a
nd form
 of w
hich w
e
re
 'to
 be observit a
nd kepiti~~~t~ 
tis in
 th
e p
ro
ced
in
g
 o
f th
e b
rief o
f m
o
rta
n
c
e
strie p
u(chest be A
nC
fro:·: 
·
 
i '~ .f,. i J' l 
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Bissate agane the lord of A
rdros a
nd n
o
w
 dependand in the justice a
re
 of 
C
ouper', a
s w
ell a
s in the pursuit of pleadable brieves generally. T
he doubt 
of the a
uditors seem
s the.refore to have c
o
n
c
e
rn
ed a general point. rather 
than being the result of a revival of a
n
 o
utm
oded form
 of a
ction. This is 
c
o
nfirm
ed by the tenor of the statute itself. w
hich deals w
ith the form
alities 
of pleading 
a
nd falsing the doom
. If a
n
 
e
x
c
eption 
w
as 
m
ade by the 
defender, judgment w
o
uld have to be given thereupon a
nd that judgment 
m
ight ultim
ately be falsed. B
ut parliam
ent ruled that if the doom
 w
ere 
finally falsed in the pursuer's favour. that w
as n
ot to c
o
n
clude the w
hole 
a
ction for him
: the parties w
e
re
 to return to the justice-ayre a
nd c
o
ntinue 
the a
ction. 
'T
hai sal pas o
rdourly furthw
art fra e
x
c
epcioun to e
x
c
epcioun 
how
 oft that e
v
e
r the dom
e be falsit o
n
 to the tim
e that the brief be brocht to 
the 
re
c
ognicioun 
of a
n
 
assize'. 95 Thus the doubtful question 
related to 
procedure a
nd pleading, n
ot to the n
ature of m
o
rtancestor. B
isset's a
ction 
seem
s to have progressed slow
ly to its c
o
n
clusion. In 1478 he again falsed 
the doom
 before the a
uditors, w
ho declared that the decision oft he justice-
c
o
u
rt 
'upoun the breve of m
o
rthancestre 
.
.
.
 w
as evil gevin a
nd w
ele agane 
sayd 
·: 
.
.
 for diverse a
nd m
o
ny re
so
nis'. 96 There is n
o
 sign in the re
c
o
rds of 
this c
a
se
 that the brieve of m
o
rtanccstor w
as 
e
v
e
n
 beginning to lose its 
identity, although w
e
 c
a
n
 perhaps see re
a
so
n
s w
hy potential litigants m
ight 
w
ish to u
se other, speedier re
m
edies. 
.
 
.
 
f'-
I I I I I I ' (1} 
W
e a
re
 n
o
w
 in a position to re
-e
x
a
m
ine a statute of 1430 first printed by 
Professor D
ickinson, w
hich states that 
'fra hyne furth thar sal n
a bref of 
m
o
rtansister pass fra the kyngis 
chapel bot in 
m
a
n
e
r a
nd furm
 
a
s his 
o
rdanit in R
obert the B
row
sys statutis. that is to say. of linea le su
c
c
e
ssioune 
a
nd 
n
o
cht 
of taylze'. 97 
Professor D
ickinson's 
a
n
alysis 
of ihe 
statute 
proceeded to so
m
e
 e
xtent 
o
n
 the basis that by this tim
e the brieve of 
m
o
rtancestor w
a
s identical in effect to the brieve of su
c
c
e
ssion. H
ow
ever it 
is 
n
o
w
 plain that the statute is 
referring to the pleadable brieve w
hich 
e
n
abled heirs to re
c
o
v
e
r from
 intruders the lands of w
hich their a
n
c
e
stors 
had had heritable sa
sine. It w
o
uld se
e
m
 that the policy behind the statute is 
to re
strict the sc
ope of the brieve rather than being. a
s Professor D
ickinson 
thought, so
m
e
 so
rt of attem
pt to u
nderm
ine e
ntails, a
nd indeed this is a 
m
u
ch m
o
re
 intelligible e
xplanation of it than the o
n
e
 he offers. 
T
he statute offers interesting support to the thtsis tentatively advanced 
by a n~mber of w
riters that in m
edieval Scotland the e
ntailed fee w
a
s n
ot 
distinguished from
 
the fee in 
w
hich inheritance 
w
a
s 
u
n
re
stricted 
a
nd 
determ
ined by the rules 
of the c
o
m
m
o
n
 law
. 98 T
he Regiam
 states that 
m
o
rtancestor 
'touches• fee a
nd freehold a
nd that in this it 
'e
x
c
e
eds' n
o
v
el 
dissasine 
w
hich touches 
o
nly freehold. 99 W
hat 
this 
m
e
a
n
s is 
that in 
m
o
rtan
cesto
r the pursuer's claim
 w
a
s
 n
e
c
e
ssa
rily to
 a fee o
r heritable title. 
based a
s
 it w
a
s
 o
n
 the c\aim
 to
 inherit from
 a deceased a
n
c
e
sto
r. w
hereas. a
s
 
'W
e h
a
v
e
 s
e
e
n
, \n
 d
\ssas\n
e th
e
 t.'it.le claim
ed
 b
y
 th
e
 p
u
rsu
e
r d
id
 n
o
t n
e
ed
 to
 b
e 
.
.
 
-
-
-
-
-
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a heritable 
o
n
e. The suggestion that prior to 1430 o
n
e
 w
hose claim
 to 
su
c
c
e
ed a
ro
se
 n
ot through the o
rdinary rules of prim
ogeniture but through 
the provisions of a
n
 e
ntail c
o
uld e
nforce his right against intruders by the 
brieve of m
o
rtancestor is borne o
ut by the a
ction w
hich Jam
es D
ouglas of 
D
alkeith brought against R
oger a
nd I sa
 bel C
arruthers in 1368.100 D
ouglas, 
it w
ill be re
c
alled, su
ed in right of his u
n
cle, W
illiam
 D
ouglas of Liddesdale. 
N
ow
 w
hen W
illiam
 died in 1353 he left a daughter M
ary w
ho inherited his 
lands. 
B
ut in 
1351 
W
illiam
 had granted the lands 
w
hich 
w
ere to be 
c
o
ntested in 1368 to Jam
es, w
ith the proviso that Jam
es w
o
uld take o
nly if 
W
illiam
 died w
ithout m
ale issue. There w
ere se
v
e
ral other prov~sions to 
e
n
su
re
 the su
c
c
e
ssion of heirs-
m
ale. 101 M
ary D
ouglas died in childbirth in 
1367, w
hich a
ctually left Jam
es a
s the heir of line, e
ntitled to all the heritage 
that had belonged to W
illiam
.l 02 B
ut he did n
ot m
ake his I 368 claim
 a
s 
.
 
M
ary's heir, but directly a
s W
illiam
's. Jam
es' a
ction w
a
s thus based o
n
 the 
e
ntail of I 351. Indeed it se
e
m
s likely to have been the o
utcom
e of a c
o
nflict 
o
v
e
r the lands betw
een Jam
es a
nd M
ary. If M
ary had claim
ed the lands a
s 
heir-general a
nd put in the C
arrutherses a
s her v
a
ssals, then if Jam
es w
e
re
 
her heir he w
o
uld be bound to w
a
rra
nt their title. If how
ever M
ary had n
o
 
right o
v
e
r the lands through the 1351 e
ntail, thenJam
es c
o
uld get rid.of her 
feoffees a
s intruders. R
egrettably w
e c
a
n
 o
nly speculate a
s to w
hether facts 
like those suggested lie behind o
u
r re
c
o
rds of this c
a
se; but it c
a
n
 be said 
that Jam
cs' a
ction appears to be based 
o
n
 his right a
s heir of e
ntail to 
W
illiam
 rather than o
n
 the other right a
v
ailable to him
 a
s heir of line to 
M
ary. A
n a
ction of m
o
rtancestor, m
o
re
o
v
e
r, im
plies that Jam
es had n
e
v
e
r 
had sa
sine of the lands he claim
ed. 
In E
ngland by this tim
e the heir of e
ntail w
as c
o
nfined to his re
m
edies by 
the 
w
rits 
of form
edon 
u
nder 
the fam
ous 
statute 
of 1285, D
e D
onis 
Conditionalibus, 1°3 although it is w
o
rth n
oting that prior to its e
n
a
ctm
ent, 
m
o
rt d'ancestor w
a
s c
o
m
petent w
here the issue in tail w
e
re
 heirs general 
a
nd their a
n
c
e
stors had died seised. 104 In Scotland, e
ntails w
e
re
 generally in 
favour of the m
ale line of heirs a
nd failure of that line w
a
s c
o
m
paratively 
ra
re
. This, c
o
upled w
ith the m
u
ch greater c
o
ntrol of alienation e
x
e
rcised by 
Scottish superiors by c
o
ntrast w
ith their English c
o
u
nterparts, probably 
a
c
c
o
u
nts for the lack of difficulty e
xperienced w
ith e
ntails in Scotland a
nd 
c
e
rtainly e
xplains w
hy m
o
rtancestor c
o
ntinued to be a m
o
st appropriate 
form
 of a
ction for the heir of e
ntail se
eking e
ntry against a
n
 intruder. E
ven 
after 1430 
w
here the persons 
of the heir general 
a
nd the heir of e
ntail 
m
e
rged in o
n
e
 m
a
n
, then m
o
rtaocestor c
o
uld be u
sed w
ithout infringing the 
statute. T
hus in 1466 G
ilbert lord K
ennedy brought the brieve against 
R
obert lord Flem
ing n
ot o
nly a
s heir general but also a
s heir u
nder a
n
 e
ntail 
.
.
 
o
f 1385.10' 
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 D
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doctrine of e
states in land. It is m
o
st u
nlikely that the Scottish a
ct of 1430 
f'--
had o
r w
a
s intended to have a sim
ilar effect. N
o n
e
w
 re
m
edy w
a
s offered to 
("'") 
the heir 
of e
ntail 
u
n
able to gain 
e
ntry 
against 
a
n
 intruder 
o
r to
 
u
se
 
m
o
rtancestor a
s heir general. T
his se
e
m
s to leave the brieve of right a
s the 
o
nly a
v
ailable 
re
m
edy. but. if so
. that 
w
o
uld 
n
ot have led a law
yer to 
suppose that the e
ntailed fee w
a
s different in kind from
 a fee the su
c
c
e
ssion 
to w
hich w
a
s open to heirs general. T
he brieve of right also protected heirs 
w
ith su
ch a claim
. O
ur law
yer w
o
uld m
e
rely have se
e
n
 the interposition of a 
longer procedure betw
een the heir of e
ntail a
nd the re
alisation of his right. 
In c
o
n
clusion there c
a
n
 be little doubt that the brieve of m
o
rtancestor 
re
m
ained in u
se
 a
s a distinct form
 of a
ction u
ntil the e
nd of the fifteenth 
c
e
ntury. T
he so
u
rc
e
s give n
o
 direct inform
ation o
n
 its operation after 1478, 
but a
s already m
e
ntioned the a
ct of 1504 o
n
 falsing doom
s does suggest that 
so
m
e
 pleadable brieves w
e
re
 still being addressed to the justiciar's c
o
u
rt at 
the beginning of the sixteenth c
e
ntury. 1011 T
he appearance of a style for the 
brieve of m
o
rtan
cesto
r in the St. A
ndrew
s form
ulary. identical w
ith those 
in the A
yr a
nd B
ute m
a
n
u
sc
ripts a
nd in Quoniam. u
nderlines the point that 
the a
rgum
ent from
 relative silence c
a
n
 c
ut both w
ays.J0
7Jn the latter part of 
the sixteenth c
e
ntury, how
ever. n
either B
alfour n
o
r Skene w
a
s a
w
a
re
 of a
ny 
difference betw
een the brieve of m
o
rtan
cesto
r a
nd the brieve of su
c
c
e
ssion 
a
nd plainly by their tim
e the true n
atu
re a
nd effect of the form
er had been 
forgotten.
108 
(iv) C
onclusions 
W
e have se
e
n
 that the brieves of dissasine a
nd 
m
o
rtan
cesto
r su
rvived a
s 
distinct re
m
edies in Scots law
 m
u
ch longer than has hitherto been re
alised, 
w
ith little e
xternal sign of change. So far a
s c
a
n
 be told. the styles of the 
brieves re
m
ained the s
a
m
e
 throughout. Perhaps to
 begin w
ith, in the m
id-
thirteenth c
e
ntury, they w
e
re
 taken in the c
o
u
rts of either the sheriff o
r the 
justiciar, but they alw
ays pertained to
 the latter's from
 the beginning of the 
fourteenth 
c
e
ntury. T
he brieves provided m
e
a
n
s w
hereby land m
ight be 
re
c
o
v
e
red from
 
a person w
ho c
o
uld be described 
a
s a
n
 intruder, either 
because u
njustly a
nd w
ithout a judgm
ent he had ejected the pursuer w
ho 
had had sa
sine of a freehold, o
r because he ijad e
ntered upon lands w
hich 
the pursuer w
a
s e
ntitled to inherit from
 a deceased a
n
c
e
stor. 
T
he appearance of u
n
changing form
 
m
ay how
ever disguise significant 
developm
ents in the 
u
se
 to 
w
hich the brieves w
e
re
 put. T
he question is 
raised by the im
portant w
o
rk of Professor M
 ilsom
 o
n
 the e
a
rly history of 
the equivalent E
nglish w
rits.'09 H
e a
rgues that to
 begin w
ith both a
ctions 
w
e
re
 re
ally attem
pts to
 c
u
rtail abuse by lords of their pow
ers of c
o
ntrol o
v
e
r 
th
eir te
n
a
n
ts a
n
d
 th
e lands w
hich those te
n
a
n
ts held o
f them
. T
h
u
s a te
n
a
n
t 
.
'W
as e
n
a
.b
\ed
 \.o 
s
u
e
 \.he \o
rd
 
"W
ho p
u
t h
im
 o
u
\. w
ith
o
u
t c
a
u
s
e
 o
r
 d
u
e
 p
ro
c
e
ss 
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by bringing n
o
v
el disseisin in the king's c
o
u
rt. T
he lord w
hose tenant died 
had to put in that tenant's heir 
o
r else be liable to 
a
n
 
a
ction of m
o
rt 
d'ancesror. T
here is 
n
o
 doubt that in E
ngland these a
ctions w
e
re
 u
sed by 
tenants against their lords 
a
nd it looks a
s though this also happened in 
Scotland. T
hus. the a
ct of 1230 w
hich apparently introduced the brieve of 
dissasine begins. 'If a
ny m
a
n
 c
o
m
plains to the lord king o
r hisjusticiar that 
his lord [em
phasis supplied) o
r a
ny other has dissaised him
 u
njustly a
nd 
w
ithout a judgment 
.
.
 
.
'
 W
hen in 1253 E
m
m
a of Sm
eaton brought a brieve 
of m
o
rtancestor against D
unferm
line abbey to re
c
o
v
e
r lands w
hich had 
belonged to
 her father. she w
a
s in fact suing the superior of w
hom
 her father 
had held the lands. 110 Som
e of the o
ther e
a
rly c
a
se
s involving brieves a
re
 
also interesting in this regard. in particular the o
n
e
 in w
hich E
da, M
ary a
nd 
W
illiam
 of Pax to
n
 so
ught to regain their right of e
stovers in the w
o
od of 
R
estonside against the priory of C
oldingham
. In E
nglish law
, e
stovers w
a
s 
the right of a tenant to take w
o
od from
 his lord's e
state so
 far a
s n
e
c
e
ssa
ry 
for the 
repair of houses. hedges a
nd agricultural im
plem
ents.IIJ T
his is 
clearly w
hat is 
m
e
a
nt by e
stovers in 
o
u
r c
a
se
. 
w
here the pursuers w
e
re
 
allow
ed 
re
a
so
n
able e
stovers for the c
o
n
struction of houses, hedges a
nd 
ploughs. a
nd 
se
e
m
 to have held their lands of P
axton a~ 
v
a
ssals of the 
priory.IJl A
nother docum
ent 
allow
s 
u
s to
 se
e
 that o
ther tenants of the 
priory also e
njoyed su
ch e
stovers in R
estonside.J13 Professor M
.ilsom
 has 
a
rgued that the u
se
 
of n
o
v
el disseisin to protect su
ch rights of c
o
m
m
o
n
 
show
s 
the 
a
ction's 
'feudal 
o
rientation', because typically the 
c
o
m
m
o
n
, 
w
hether it w
a
s a pasture o
r a w
o
od o
r so
m
e
 o
ther, w
o
uld be· c
o
ntrolled by 
the lord.l•
4 C
learly there is just su
ch a
n
 o
rientation in this e
stovers c
a
se
. 
A
 
claim
 by a ten
an
t against a lord to
 a 
right of c
o
m
m
o
n
 m
ay also lie 
behind the a
ction, perhaps o
n
e
 of m
o
rtancestor, w
hich M
ariota daughter 
of Sam
uei brought against the bishop of G
lasgow
 c
o
n
c
e
rning the lands of 
Stobo. Stobo had been part 
of the bishop's dem
esne from
 
v
e
ry e
a
rly 
times,ll~ a
nd it is described a
s his m
a
n
o
r (manerium) in this dispute w
ith 
M
ariota.116 B
etw
een 1208 
a
nd 1214 a 
n
eighbouring landow
ner claim
ed 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 of pasture in Stobo
1
"
 
a
nd there m
ay have been a
n
o
ther su
ch 
claim
 in the 1220s.ll 8 T
here is 
at least 
a 
chance that this W
aS also w
hat· 
M
ariota so
ught. T
he feudal o
r seignorial dim
ension is clearer in the c
a
se
 
w
here 
M
ariota 
of C
hirnside 
a
nd 
her 
so
n
 
Patrick 
su
ed 
the priory 
of 
C
oldingham
 for a ploughgate at R
enton. Patrick's father R
ichard (who 
w
a
s presum
ably M
ariota 's husband) is designed 'of R
enton'in the re
c
o
rd of 
the c
a
se
. L
ands in R
enton w
o
uld have been held of the priory.l' 9 If this w
a
s 
a 
c
a
se
 of dissasine, w
hat w
e
 
m
ay be se
eing is a dispossessed ten
an
t a
nd 
tercer suing their lord to
 get back tnto their lands. A
 clear c
a
se
 of a lord 
being su
ed by his tenant. perhaps for dissasine. is the a
ction of G
ilbert 
ag
ain
st th
e e
a
rl o
f L
en
n
o
x
 for the lands o
f M
o
n
ach
k
en
n
eran
 in 1235. T
h
ere 
is p
e
rh
a
p
s a
lso
 a 
fe
u
d
a
l d
im
e
n
sio
n
 in
 th
e
 le
g
isla
tio
n
 o
f J3
J8
. T
h
e
 d
issa
iso
r 
,} -4 
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w
ho put o
n
e
 person o
ut of a
nd a
n
other into sasine of a tenem
ent w
o
uld 
r-
m
o
st typically be a lord e
x
e
rcising c
o
ntrol o
v
e
r his tenants. w
hile the group 
(Y) 
of dissaisors c
o
uld c
o
n
c
eivably be the lord's c
o
u
rt. o
r follow
ing, o
r officers, 
w
ith the principal dissaisor being the lord him
self o
r his stew
ard.J2o 
T
hat these brieves 
w
ere u
sed against lords is 
n
ot of c
o
u
rse
 co
n
clusive 
evidence that they w
ere c
re
ated for that purpose. Professor Sutherland has 
a
rgued against Professor M
ilsom
 that the 
m
ain aim
 of 
·H
enry 11 a
nd his 
advisers w
hen introducing the petty assizes in England w
as to give better 
legal protection to all freeholders 
against dispossession from
 
w
hatever 
so
u
rc
e
, lordly o
r otherw
ise.l21 T
o so
m
e
 e
xtent the a
rgum
ent really turns o
n
 
the e
xtent of lords' pow
ers in late tw
elfth c
e
ntury England a
nd o
n
 w
hether 
freeholders had a
ny m
e
a
ningful rights o
utw
ith their lords'courts before the 
introduction 
of the grand jury 
a
nd 
the petty 
assizes. It is 
Professor 
M
ilsom
's v
ery persuasive point that these institutions effectively c
re
ated 
their rights. N
ow
, in Scotland w
e know
 e
xtrem
ely little of the pow
ers of 
lords in their c
o
u
rts. A
ll w
e c
a
n
 say is that the a
ct of 1230 (a date long after 
the 
assizes had lost 
their feudal 
o
rientation 
a
s 
a 
prim
ary feature in 
England). w
hile it refers to lords a
s perhaps the prim
e e
x
a
m
ples of likely 
dissaisors, does n
ot re
strict the operation of the re
m
edy to su
ch cases, but 
states that it w
ill operate w
henever o
n
e
 is dissaised by a
n
other u
njustly a
nd 
w
ithout 
a judgment. 
A
nd 
if 
w
e 
c
a
n
 
take 
the 
1318 legislation 
a
s 
a 
retrospective guide to the developm
ent of the law
 in the thirteenth c
e
ntury 
then the person dissaised c
o
uld a
nd did bring the a
ction directly against o
n
e
 
infeft in the land in all good faith after the o
riginal dissasine. There w
as 
hardly likely to be 
a
ny e
xisting tenurial link in the land betw
een su
ch 
parties. T
hus e
v
e
n
 before the a
ct of 1318 the brieve of dissasine w
as m
u
ch 
m
o
re
 of a
n
 a
sse
rtion of a
n
 abstract righ~ to land against the equally abstract 
title of so
m
e
 other person. This re
m
ained the position u
nder the a
ct of I 318. 
a
s w
e have already se
e
n
. 
W
hen w
e look at the fourteenth a
nd fifteenth c
e
ntury c
a
se
s it is harder to 
find a
ny feudal dim
ension. M
ost of the c
a
se
s of dissasine se
e
m
 in fact to be 
c
o
ntests betw
een tenants-in-chief of the c
ro
w
n
 rather than betw
een tenants 
a
nd lords. 
a
nd to be about 
rights in land 
rather than the 
re
c
o
v
e
ry 
of 
possession. T
hus in 
1341 
the 
abbey 
of A
rbroath 
received 
royal 
c
o
n
-
firm
ation of its title to the lands w
hich it w
as 3bout to re
c
o
v
e
r by brieve of 
dissasine. A
fter their re
c
o
v
e
ry the abbey leased o
u
t the lands a
s it had been 
doing since the 
m
iddle 
of the thirteenth c
e
ntury. Perhaps the dissaisor 
M
ow
bray w
a
s a tenant w
ho had stayed o
n
 the lands at the e
xpiry of his 
lease.tll T
he dispute betw
een the portioners of Fithkil (now Leslie in Fife) 
a
nd D
unferm
line abbey in 1319 again involved rights of c
o
m
m
o
n
 in the 
lands 
of G
oatm
ilk 
a
nd 
C
askieberran (now
 in G
lenrothes, Fife, just 
o
p
p
o
site L
eslie a
c
r
o
s
s
 th
e river L
ev
en) in F
ife. B
u
t there w
o
uld ap
p
ear to
 
l:\av
e b
e
e
n
 n
o
 te
n
u
ria
l \in
k
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 th
e
 p
a
rtie
s. R
a
th
e
r b
o
th
 h
a
d
 
rig
h
ts a
n
d
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the question c
o
n
c
e
rn
ed their m
utual e
xtent. The boundaries w
ithin w
hich 
e
a
ch c
o
uld ex
ercise his 
rights 
w
ere initially determ
ined by a brieve of 
peram
bulation. but clearly the result left the portioners w
ith a sm
aller a
re
a
 
than they had e
xpected. The brieve of dissasine seem
s therefore to have 
been brought to claim
 ejection from
 ground in w
hich they claim
ed c
o
m
m
o
n
 
rights a
nd to be essentially a dispute betw
een n
eighbours. Interestingly it 
w
as held that the m
atter c
o
uld n
ot be re
opened in this w
ay. The c
a
se
 of H
ay 
of L
oquhariot a
nd W
illiam
 B
orthw
ick in 1368 w
as also a dispute betw
een 
n
eighbours about rights in adjoining lands: T
he lands u
nder dispute w
ere 
those 
of M
iddleton, 
w
hich lie 
all a
ro
u
nd 
w
hat a
re
 today the farm
 
of 
L
oquhariot 
a
nd the 
village 
of B
orthw
ick in. M
idlothian. The e
vidence 
show
s that the tw
o fam
ilies 
w
ere c
o
n
stantly at odds about e
a
ch other's 
rights in M
iddleton a
nd the brieve of dissasine raised by H
ay in 1368 w
as 
clearly o
nly a
n
 incident in a long story about the definition a
nd e
xtent of 
those righ ts.l 2J 
Sim
ilarly the cases of m
o
rtanceS\or often look as though they a
re
 about 
abstract questions of title a
nd 
right to lands rather than being a m
e
rely 
possessory re
m
edy for disappointed heirs against w
ro
ng-doing lords. W
e 
c
a
n
 see this so
m
etim
es in the language of o
u
r records~ it· is the droit of a 
barony w
hich w
ill be settled by a brieve ofm
ortancestor in t369,t24 a
nd it is 
c
o
m
plem
ent u
rn
 iuris w
hich the pursuers seek u
nder a
n
other su
ch brieve in 
1397.l2S W
here the background to a c
a
se
 Qln be w
o
rked o
ut in a
ny detail. it 
is generally a title c
o
m
petition w
hich is laid before u
s. T
ake for instance 
H
ay the c
o
n
stable against K
eith the m
a
rischal in 1390 for tbe lands of 
lnnerpeffray. H
ay's claim
 w
as based o
n
 the sa
sine of his grandfather John 
K
eith. John's daughter, w
ho m
u
st have been his heir, m
a
rried H
ay's father. 
B
ut so
m
etim
e after 1324 w
e find R
obert K
eith, the then-m
arischal a
nd 
head of the fam
ily. e
ntailing lnnerpeffray to his heirs-m
ale after the death 
of his so
n
 John (the sa
m
e
 John K
eith?). T
hus the lands passed to his brother 
Edw
ard w
ho in turn w
a
s su
c
c
e
eded, so
m
etim
e before 1351. by his eldest so
n
 
W
illiam
, the defender of 1390. N
o doubt the K
eith claim
 is e
xplained by the 
strength of feeling in favour of agnatic su
c
c
e
ssion in Scotland. Its illegality 
is e
a
sy for u
s to see; it w
o
uld perhaps have been less obvious in 1390 w
hen 
W
illiam
 w
a
s holding by a title o
v
e
r sixty years old w
hich had been the 
subject of a 
royal c
o
nfirm
ation.' 2 6 
C
learly then in 
the later 
m
edieval period 
the Scottish brieves had 
virtually lost a
ny 'possessory' character w
hich they m
ight have had. B
ut this 
does n
ot m
e
a
n
 that they had also c
e
a
sed to operate in a feudal c
o
ntext. 
There w
as n
o
 Quia Em
ptores in Scotland a
nd in the fourteenth c
e
ntury the 
pivotal 
role 
of the lord 
o
r superior in the transfer of land. 
w
hether by 
s
u
c
c
e
s
sion, s
ubinfeudation o
r s
ubstitution. w
a
s. if a
nything. strengthened. 
H
eirs h
ad still to
 s
e
ek e
n
try
 a
n
d
 re
c
eive s
a
sine from
 him
. w
hile the c
o
n
s
e
n
t 
o
f th
e
 s
u
p
e
rio
r to
 a 
c
o
n
v
e
y
a
n
c
e
 in
tl!"r v
iv
o
s
 w
a
s
 
m
a
d
e
 ~ven 
m
o
r
e
 im
p
o
rta
n
t 
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by a
 series of statutes defining his rights to recognosce. o
r take back into his 
f"-
o
w
n
 hands, lands w
hich had been the subject of u
nlicensed alienation by his 
c<J 
v
assal. C
onveyancing 
w
as 
thus 
c
o
m
m
o
nly by 
re
signation in favorem 
follow
ed by a 
re-grant. o
r by c
o
nfirm
ation.
127 That the ex
ercise of these 
pow
ers of c
o
ntrol m
ight give rise to a claim
 u
nder either of o
u
r brieves is 
suggested by tw
o statutes of 1401, 12 11 o
n
e of w
hich deals w
ith the difficulty 
e
xperienced by heirs w
ho often find that the lord has infeft so
m
e
o
n
e
 else. 
a
nd the other of w
hich speaks of 'w
ilful a
nd se
c
ret' re
c
ognitions by lords 
w
hich 
v
ex
 
the 
lieges 
in 
their 
heritage. 
M
ortancestor 
a
nd dissasine 
respectively w
o
uld have provided rem
edies against su
ch seignorial w
ro
ngs. 
although they a
re
 
n
ot 
m
e
ntioned in either of the statutes. Even later, in 
1466, w
hen G
ilbert lord K
ennedy brought a brieve of m
o
rtancestor against 
R
obert lord Flem
ing, he w
a
s se
eking to re
c
o
v
e
r lands w
hich his a
n
c
e
stors 
had held of the Flem
ings;
12 9 it is significant that to begin w
ith the parties 
seem
 
to have c
o
ntem
plated 
a
ction in R
obert ·s 
c
o
u
rl.
1111 H
ere then the 
question seem
s to have been. w
as R
obert e
ntitled to the lands in dem
esne, 
o
r o
nly to a 
superiority o
v
e
r them
'? M
oreover. ev
en
 
w
hen there w
a
s n
o
 
tenurial link claim
ed betw
een the o
riginal parties in a c
a
se
 of m
o
rtancestor, 
a feudal dim
ension cou"Id 
c
o
m
e
 in if the defender called a w
a
rra
ntor. It 
w
o
uld se
e
m
 from
 a 
w
rit in the B
ute m
a
n
u
sc
ript that this w
o
uld sist the 
principal a
ction u
ntilj the w
a
rra
ntor! appeared to take o
v
e
r its defence; Ill 
there is here a significant c
o
ntrast w
ith the position in dissasine. O
ften the 
w
a
rra
ntor m
u
st have been the superior a
nd the pursuer's c
a
se
 w
o
uld then 
becom
e a claim
 to hold the lands of him
. A
t least this is w
hat w
e c
a
n
 see 
happening in a c
a
se
 of 1372 w
here Jam
es D
ouglas of D
alkeith. w
ho had 
been 
im
pleaded in 
the justiciar's 
c
o
u
rt 
for 
his 
lands 
of M
orton in 
D
um
friesshire, brought a brieve of w
a
rra
ndice against the e
a
rl of M
arch in 
the sheriff c
o
u
rt.Jl2 The e
a
rl, w
ho had granted the lands to be held of him
 by 
D
ouglas o
nly a few
 years beforc.l.l·' a
c
c
epted his liability to appear before 
the justiciar. It se
e
m
s alm
ost ce11ain that the c
a
se
 in that c
o
u
rt w
as o
n
e
 of 
m
o
rtancestor a
nd that it 
w
o
uld 
n
o
w
 becom
e a question of the pursuer's 
right to hold of the e
a
rl. 
The e
vidence is in general too sc
attered. both in quantity a
nd in tim
e, to 
allow
 a
nything 
other than 
educated guesses 
at changes in the 
u
se
 a
nd 
substantive 
significance of the brieves of dissasine a
nd 
m
o
rtancestor in 
Scotland. W
e m
ay e
n
vy the abundance of m
aterial w
hich by co
ntr-ast is at 
the disposal of.historians of English law
. O
ne final point c
a
n
 be m
ade. 
Professor Sutherland has u
sed the English m
aterial for the fourteenth a
nd 
fifteenth c
e
nturies to show
 how
 in that period the assize of n
o
v
el disseisin 
becam
e the principal v
ehicle by w
hich title m
ight be tried, before ultim
ately 
it w
a
s
 s
uperseded by trespassory a
ctions. B
y c
o
n
trast the a
ssize of m
o
rt 
d'ancestor feU
 in
to
 
obsolescence. 
alo
n
g
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
w
rits 
o
f 
right 
a
n
d
 
o
f 
ent.cy.'~ 
T
h
e
 
p
ie1
;u
re is 
v
e
ry
 
d
iffe
re
n
t 
in
 S
c
o
tla
n
d
. 
w
h
e
re
 
th
e
 
b
rie
v
e
 
o
f 
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dissasine c
o
-e
xisted n
ot o
nly w
ith the brieve of m
o
rtancestor but also w
ith 
the brieve of right. Thus a Scot w
ho had a right to e
nter land w
ithout ev
er 
having had sasine did n
ot n
eed to bringdissasine against the intruder as did 
his English c
o
u
nterpart. The Scot c
o
uld u
se 
m
o
rtancestor if his right of 
e
ntry w
a
s deriycd from
 a deceased relative w
ithin the relevant degrees, o
r 
the brieve of right if his claim
 w
as from
 a m
o
re
 re
m
ote a
n
c
e
stor. If the 
a
n
c
e
stor had been ejected before his death. o
r had su
rre
ndered the lands 
u
njustly. so
 that it w
as n
ot possible to say that he had died v
est a
nd saised, 
then again re
so
rt w
o
uld be had to the brieve of right. lt is probably safe to 
say that dissasinc re
m
ained a rem
edy for o
n
e
 w
ho had had sa
sine properly 
speaking a
nd had been put o
ut by so
m
e
o
n
e
 still alive. If the dissasine had 
been c
o
m
m
itted by 
o
n
e
 w
ho had since died, than presum
ably the ejected 
person w
o
uld 
u
su
ally turn to the brieve of right. 
The evidence o
n
 dissasine a
nd m
o
rtancestor discussed in this essay su
rely 
show
s that for Scotland a
s for England w
e m
u
st set a
side the traditional 
picture w
hich is 
suggested by the supposed 
'possessory' n
ature of these 
rem
edies, that is of 'a
n
 agitated a
nd a
rid w
o
rld 
.
.
.
 in w
hich m
alefactors 
hurry about attacking people. ejecting them
 from
 their lands, hoping to get 
a
w
ay w
ith obvious w
ro
ngs·.us R
ather w
e see e
sse
ntially civil questions-
about the rights of lords. about e
ntitlem
ent to inherit, about boundaries-
being 
raised 
a
nd 
settled in 
c
o
u
rts w
hich a
re
 operating w
ithin a clearly 
defined system
 of law
. W
e m
ay n
ev
er knqw
 the c
o
ntribution w
hich these 
rem
edies m
ade to the a
ctual shaping of that law~ w
e c
a
n
 how
ever do rather 
m
o
re
 than hitherto w
ith the m
aterial that re
m
ains. 
N
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he developm
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. D
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37. Ibid .•
 139. 
38. APS i 470. 
c
.ll I differ from
 Lord C
ooper's 
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(St'lt>cltd Papt•rs 90) in o
n
e
 im
portant a
spect. H
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o
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o
v
el disseisin (a) the o
riginal 
intruder. (b) the pcr~on in a
ctual po~ession of the land~. a
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 I re
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/ D
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46. 
Reg. 
B
ritvts 
·39 (no. 
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c
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. 19. 
53. 
R
egiam
 M
ajestatem Ill. 32: G
lam
·i/1 X
lll. 38. 
54. A
PS i 473. c
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. D
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.
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c
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79. 
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.
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O
. G
D
 25/1/97. 
131. Rt>g. Bri~\'l'S 61 (no. 96). 
132. M
orton R~gistrum ii n
o
. 130. 
.
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N
EW
 PERSPECTIVES IN
 SCO
TTISH L
H
iA
l. H
ISTO
R
Y 
A
PPE
N
D
IX
 
This docum
ent is printed by kind perm
ission of the D
ean a
nd C
hapter of D
urham
 
C
athedral. (See text at pp. 23-4. 33 a
nd 39.) 
D
U
R
H
A,\-1 D. &
 C. M
U
N
IM
E
N
7S, 
,\-fisc. Ch. 
n
o
. llf>J. 
H
ec e
st finalis c
o
n
c
o
rdia facta inter dom
inum
 A
nketinum
 priorcm
 de C
oldingham
 
et c
o
n
v
e
nt u
rn
. tenentes. et Edam
 et M
ariam
 de Paxtou. so
ro
re
s. et e
a
 ru
m
 heredes. 
et W
illelm
um
 de Paxton. filium
 dicte Ede. petcntes per breY
e dom
ini 
regis de 
re
c
ognicione directum
 dom
ino W
illelm
o de Lindesey tunc vicccom
iti de B
erw
ic et 
eius ballivis super quodam
 bosco v
o
c
ato R
istoncside. scilicet. quod solium
 eiusdcm
 
bosci et c
u
stodia dictis priori et c
o
n
v
e
ntui et e
o
ru
m
 su
c
c
e
sso
ribus rc
m
a
n
ebunt in 
perpetuum
 tali siquidem
 c
o
ndicione. quod dicti Eda. M
aria et c
a
ru
m
 heredes et 
W
illelm
us de Pax ton ra
cionabilia e
stoveria su
a
 propria tarn in dom
ibus et scpibus 
c
o
n
struendis quam
 e
stoveriis c
a
ru
c
a
ru
m
 per visum
 forestarii dictorum
 prioris et 
c
o
n
v
e
nt u
s libere percipient ad u
su
s su
o
s proprius de A
ldenccraw
e et dictus prior et 
c
o
n
v
e
ntus 
et 
e
o
ru
m
 
su
c
c
e
sso
re
s 
dictum
 
b'-lscum
 
adeo 
bene 
sine 
w
a
sto 
et 
destruccione c
u
stodiri facicnt quod dicti Eda. M
 a
ria et ea ru
m
 heredes et W
illelm
us 
de Paxton de o
m
nibus in dicta bosco c
re
sc
e
ntibus ra
cionabilia e
stovcria su
a
 per 
visum
 forestarii sicut predictum
 est possint percipere. Et 
ut hec finalis c
o
n
c
o
rdia 
pcrpetuam
 optineat stabilitatem
 sc
ript u
rn
 istud in m
odum
 cirographi e
st c
o
nfectum
 
c
uius parti penes priorem
 et c
o
n
v
e
ntum
 re
sidenti sigilla Ede. M
arie et W
illelm
i filii 
Ede apponuntur pars v
e
ra
 penes partes prenom
inatas deposita siggillis [sic] c
apituli 
D
unelm
ensis et dom
ini A
nkctini prioris roboratur. T
este c
u
ria dom
ini regis apud 
B
erw
ic in plena c
o
m
itatu. 
Translation 
This is the final c
o
n
c
o
rd m
ade betw
een the lord A
nketin. prior of C
oldingham
. a
nd 
the c
o
n
v
e
nt. defenders. a
nd Eda a
nd M
 a
ria of Pax ton. sisters. a
nd their heirs. a
nd 
W
illiam
 
of Paxton. 
so
n
 
of the 
said Eda. pursuers by the lord king's brieve of 
re
c
ognition addressed to the lord W
illiam
 Lindsay. then sheriff of B
erw
ick. a
nd his 
bailies, c
o
n
c
e
rning a c
e
rtain w
o
od c
alled R
estonside. n
a
m
ely. that the ground a
nd 
o
w
n
e
rship of the sa
m
e
 w
o
od should 
re
m
ain Yiith the said prior a
nd c
o
n
v
e
nt a
nd 
their su
c
c
e
sso
rs in perpetuity. but 
u
nder a 
c
e
rtain c
o
ndition. that the said Eda, 
M
aria a
nd their heirs a
nd W
illiam
 of Paxton shall fn:ely o
c
c
upy to their o
w
n
 u
se
 
their o
w
n
 re
a
so
n
able e
stovers of A
uchencrow
. both in the building of houses a
nd 
hedges a
nd in e
stovers of ploughs, u
nder the view
 of the foresters of the said prior 
a
nd c
o
n
v
e
nt, a
nd the said prior a
nd c
o
n
v
e
nt a
nd their su
c
c
e
sso
rs shall a
ct to protect 
the said w
o
od so
 \\'ell 
w
ithout w
a
ste o
r destruction that the· said Eda. M
aria a
nd 
their heirs a
nd W
illiam
 of Pax ton shall be able to o
c
c
upy their re
a
so
n
able e
stovers 
of e
v
e
rything grow
ing in 
the 
said 
w
o
od 
u
nder the 
view
 
of the foresters 
a
s is 
aforesaid. A
nd so
 that this final c
o
n
c
o
rd shall possess ~crpctual v
alidity this deed is 
m
ade in the form
 of a chirograph. to the part of w
hich re
m
aining in the possession 
of the prior 
·a
nd c
o
n
v
e
nt the se
als of Eda. M
 a
ria a
nd W
illiam
. so
n
 of Eda. a
re
 
affixed: how
ever the part deposited in the possession of the forenam
ed parties is 
c
o
nfirm
ed by the se
als of the chapter of D
urham
 a
nd of the lord A
nketin. prior. 
W
itness the c
o
u
rt of the lord king at B
erw
ick in full c
o
u
nty. 
DISSASI~E A
N
D
 M
O
R
.IAN
C
ESIO
R
 I~ SCO
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W
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N
O
TES 
(i) The docum
ent is 
m
isleaJingly di~cus!>Cd in M
.l.. A
ndcrson. A J/istury of Scouish 
Forc>.\"lfy ( 1967) i 100 
and is 
referred 
tn in the /londlist 
cif Acl.f 
uf Alexander 11 
/214 /249 co
m
piled by J.M
. Scoular for the Rt·~:esto l?t•gum Scotw
rum
 series (Lost 
Act~. no. 3KX). There arc tw
n !.Cal tags n
n
 the docum
ent. suggesting that it is the half 
w
hich w
as gi\'cn to the fam
ily or Pax ton: it m
ay he that its presence at D
urham
 can
 be 
explained by extinction of heirs leading to all the docum
ents a
n
e
ntthe property being 
called in by the ~upcriors. lt is to he n
oted that in 12J5 it w
as 5c:ttled that the heirs of 
Pi!:<tnn and A
uchcncrow
 ow
ed hnm
age. 
relief and 
m
arriage to D
urham
 and n
ot to 
Coldingham
. a question prc\ iously in doubt (Coldinxlwm C
orrtsp .
.
 
no. 239). 
(ii) Anketin prior of Culclingham
: The docum
ent gives o
nly the initial' A
', but there can
 be 
no doubt of his identity (cf. Raine. N
orth D
urham
 n
o
s. 253,339. 362. 365,426 and 427). 
D
ated docum
ent!> show
 him
 to have been prior in 1239 (Raine, N
urth D
urham
 no. 272) 
and probably in January 1240/1 CRaine. N
orth D
urham
 n
o
s. 479 and 480). His latest 
know
n predecessor w
as Thom
as de M
elsanby. w
ho w
as elected prior of D
urham
 in 
1233. and his su
ccesso
r. Richard. w
as in office by O
ctober 1245 (sec A
.A
.M
. D
uncan. 
The Bihliotlu:c-k 2 ( 1959) at 8-9). 
(iii) 
Eda. M
oria 
a
nd W
illiom
 t~{ Po:m
m
: In 1236 lady Eda of Paxton. her first-born so
n
 
R
obert. her so
n
s R
obert (presumably a different R
obcrt) and W
illiam
, both clerks. and 
her daughters Cecilia and M
atilda granted a nine year lease of the fisheries at Paxton 
upon Tw
eed w
hich w
as co
nfirm
ed by the prior and co
n
v
ent of D
urham
, presum
ably as 
accepted superiors of the lands follow
ing the dispute of 1235(Raine. N
orth D
urham
 no. 
358). 
(iv) 
W
illiam
 U
nJ.\ay 
sheriff tif /Jerwick: In 
an
 
u
npublished handlist 
of the Sheriffs of 
Srvtlund htfort c. 1306. Professor Barrow
 a.'isigns W
illiam
 Lindsay's shcriffship to the 
period 
c. 1233 to 
c. 1240 (Raine. N
orth D
urham
 
n
o
s. 394 and 426). In the latter 
docum
ent. W
illiarn's n
am
e appears alongside that of prior A
nketin. 
(v) 'Aiclt'ntcra~n··: 
This 
is 
clearly 
m
odern 
A
uchencrow
. 
a 
ham
let 
in 
Berw
ickshire 
(Ordnance Survey NT 853 607) tw
o m
iles so
uth-w
c:st oft he village of R
eston (Ordnance 
Survey N
T 884 620). lt 
should be 
n
oted that 
at the present tim
e A
uchencrow
 is 
pH
m
ounced 
'Edincraw
' locally (and see W
.F.H
. N
icolaisen. Scouish P
lau Nam
es 
( 1976). 126). 
(vi) Vatr: A
nderson dates the docum
ent to 1249: this is clearly w
ro
ng. Scoular suggested 
so
m
etim
e betw
een 1226 and 1247. lt is subm
itted that this can
 be n
arro
w
ed dow
n. The 
n
ature of the right of estovers (sec text above. 39) suggests that at the tim
e of the case 
Cnldingham
 
priury 
w
as 
regarded 
as 
the 
superior 
of the 
lands 
o
r 
Paxton 
and 
A
uchcncrow
. As show
n above, from
 1235 this w
as n
o
 lnnger so. A
nketin m
ay w
ell have 
been prior 
of Coldingham
 from
 
1233. A
ccordingly the docum
ent 
can
 be placed 
so
m
etim
e in the years from
 1233 to 1235. Perhaps the dispute about the superiority 
betw
een Coldingham
 and D
urham
 w
as the reaso
n
 why the seals of both w
ere affixed to 
co
nfirm
 
o
r strengthen the docum
ent given to the fam
ily 
of Paxton. ev
en
 though 
D
urham
 w
as 
n
ot party to the co
n
co
rd. 
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